


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COLLECTED WORKS

OF

THE RIGHT HON. F. MAX MÜLLER

VII

CHIPS FROM A GERMAN WORKSHOP

III. ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE
AND LITERATURE



FROM A DRAWING OF GOETHE ON HIS DEATH-BED. BY F. PRELLER

(Published by Paul Bette, Berlin)

CHIPS

FROM A

GERMAN WORKSHOP

BY

F. MAX MÜLLER, K.M.

FORMERLY FOREIGN MEMBER OF THE FRENCH INSTITUTE

VOL. III

ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

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PREFACE.



IT is given to few scholars only to be allowed to devote the whole of their time and labour to the one subject in which they feel the deepest interest. We have all to fight the battle of life before we can hope to secure a quiet cell in which to work in the cause of learning and truth. There is no room in the thronged market of our age for the mere scholar. He is looked upon as a useless drone, though he may work harder than any of the working bees, and though the honey which he gathers may supply the necessary food not only for the present but for future generations also. Knowledge, we are told, counts for nothing unless to *savoir* is added that *savoir faire* which leads to Deaneries, Bishoprics, Judgeships, or secures at least some valuable patents. The dream of my life has been different; all I longed for was to be able to devote the whole of it to the study of Sanskrit as the best foundation for

a study of language, mythology, and religion. This was not to be, and perhaps it was well, nor have I any right to complain, when I look at the struggles and disappointments of so many among my fellow labourers. I came to England as a young unknown scholar. When I told my friends that my object was to publish the first edition of the Rig Veda, probably the most ancient book of the whole world, they stared and smiled; still I did not despair. Without any help from anybody I had worked in the Libraries of Berlin and Paris, copying and collating the MSS. of the Veda. The most important MSS., however, were at the India Office, and there in a small room in Leadenhall Street I settled down to my work without any prospect of being able to finish, and when finished to publish it. All I felt was that the work *must* be done, and with the help of kind friends, such as Baron Bunsen and Professor Wilson, it was done at last. The funds, however, though generously granted by the Directors of the old East India Company, left but a very small margin for myself. When therefore I was invited by the University of Oxford to act as Deputy of the Professor of Modern Languages and Literature, and was, after the death of my friend Dr. Trithen, chosen as his successor, I could not hesitate to accept so

honourable an offer, because thus alone was I enabled to continue my stay in England and to finish the work of my life, the *editio princeps* of the text and the native commentary of the Rig Veda, published now in six large quarto volumes, and in a second edition of four volumes.

My new position, however, necessarily entailed new studies, and interrupted for many years my work among the Sanskrit MSS. of the Bodleian Library. The outcome of these new studies may be seen in my *Lectures on the Science of Language*, in my *German Classics from the Fourth to the Nineteenth Century*, 2 vols., second edition, 1886, and in some of the articles collected in the present volume of my *Chips from a German Workshop*. I have to confess that during all that time I was never off my first love, though I did my best to prove faithful to my second, and to rouse an interest in the Science of Language and in the study of the modern languages and literature of Europe in the ancient University of Oxford. It was, no doubt, hard sometimes to see the work to which I felt pledged delayed from year to year, and I am all the more grateful that, after twenty-five years of professorial service, I have been allowed to return to *mes premiers amours*. Still I shall always

recollect with pleasure the bright years which I spent as Professor of Modern Languages and Literature at the Taylor Institution, and I shall always feel most deeply grateful to my many friends at Oxford—alas! most of them gone before me—for the warm welcome they gave to a young unknown scholar, and for the hearty sympathy which they have never ceased to show me during the long time of my professorial activity among them.

OXFORD, *March 22, 1895.*

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ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE.

LIFE OF SCHILLER¹.

THE hundredth anniversary of the birthday of Schiller, which, according to the accounts published in the German newspapers, seems to have been celebrated in most parts of the civilised, nay even the uncivilised world, is an event in some respects unprecedented in the literary annals of the human race. A nation honours herself by honouring her sons, and it is but natural that in Germany every town and village should have vied in doing honour to the memory of one of their greatest poets. The letters which have reached us from every German capital relate no more than what we expected. There were meetings and feastings, balls and theatrical representations. The veteran philologist Jacob Grimm addressed the Berlin Academy on the occasion in a soul-stirring oration; the directors of the Imperial Press at Vienna seized the opportunity to publish a splendid album, or 'Schiller-Buch,' in honour of

¹ 'Rede auf Schiller,' von Jacob Grimm. Berlin, 1859. (Address on Schiller, by Jacob Grimm.)

'Schiller-Buch,' von Tannenberg; Wien. From the Imperial Printing Press, 1859.

'Schiller's Life and Works.' By Emil Pallaske. Translated by Lady Wallace. London, Longman & Co., 1860.

'Vie de Schiller.' Par Ad. Regnier, Membre de l'Institut. Paris, Hachette, 1859.

the poet; unlimited eloquence was poured forth by professors and academicians; school-children recited Schiller's ballads; the German students shouted the most popular of his songs; nor did the ladies of Germany fail in paying their tribute of gratitude to him who, since the days of the *Minnesängers*, had been the most eloquent herald of female grace and dignity. In the evening torch processions might be seen marching through the streets, bonfires were lighted on the neighbouring hills, houses were illuminated, and even the solitary darkness of the windows of the Papal Nuncio at Vienna added to the lustre of the day¹. In every place where Schiller had spent some years of his life local recollections were revived and perpetuated by tablets and monuments. The most touching account of all came from the small village of Cleversulzbach. On the village cemetery, or, as it is called in German, 'God's-acre,' there stands a tombstone, and on it the simple inscription 'Schiller's Mother.' On the morning of her son's birthday the poor people of the village were gathered together round that grave, singing one of their sacred hymns, and planting a lime-tree in the soil which covers the heart that loved him best.

But the commemoration of Schiller's birthday was not confined to his native country. We have seen in the German papers letters from St. Petersburg and Lisbon, from Venice, Rome, and Florence, from Amsterdam, Stockholm, and Christiana, from Warsaw and Odessa, from Jassy and Bucharest, from Constantinople, Algiers, and Smyrna, and lately from America and Australia, all describing the festive gatherings which were suggested, no doubt, by Schiller's cosmo-

¹ See 'The Times' Special Correspondent from Vienna, November 14.

politan countrymen, but joined in most cheerfully by all the nations of the globe. Poets of higher rank than Schiller—Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe—have never aroused such world-wide sympathies; and it is not without interest to inquire into the causes which have secured to Schiller this universal popularity. However superlative the praises which have lately been heaped on Schiller's poetry by those who cannot praise except in superlatives, we believe that it was not only the poet, but the man, to whom the world has paid this unprecedented tribute of love and admiration. After reading Schiller's works we must read Schiller's life—the greatest of all his works. It is a life not unknown to the English public, for it has been written by Carlyle. The late festivities, however, have given birth to several new biographies. Palleske's *Life of Schiller* has met with such success in Germany that it well deserved the honour which it has lately received at the hands of Lady Wallace, and under the special patronage of the Queen, of being translated into English. Another very careful and lucid account of the poet's life is due to the pen of a member of the French Institute, M. A. Regnier, the distinguished tutor of the Comte de Paris.

In reading these lives, together with the voluminous literature which is intended to illustrate the character of the German poet, we frequently felt inclined to ask one question, to which none of Schiller's biographers has returned a satisfactory answer:—‘What were the peculiar circumstances which brought out in Germany, and in the second half of the eighteenth century, a man of the moral character, and a poet of the creative genius of Schiller?’ Granted that he was endowed by nature with the highest talents, how did he

grow to be a poet, such as we know him, different from all other German poets, and yet in thought, feeling, and language the most truly German of all the poets of Germany? Are we reduced to appeal to the mysterious working of an unknown power if we wish to explain to ourselves why, in the same country and at the same time, poetical genius assumed such different forms as are seen in the writings of Schiller and Goethe? Is it all to be ascribed to what is called individuality, a word which in truth explains nothing; or is it possible for the historian and psychologist to discover the hidden influences which act on the growing mind, and produce that striking variety of poetical genius which we admire in the works of contemporaneous poets, such as Schiller and Goethe in Germany, or Wordsworth and Byron in England? Men do not grow from within only, but also from without. We know that a poet is born—*poeta nascitur*, but we also know that his character must be formed; the seed is given, but the furrow must be ploughed in which it is to grow; and the same grain which, if thrown on cultivated soil, springs into fulness and vigour, will dwindle away, stunted and broken, if cast upon shallow and untilled land. There are certain events in the life of every man which fashion and stamp his character; they may seem small and unimportant in themselves, but they are great and important to each of us; they mark that slight bend where two lines which had been running parallel begin to diverge, never to meet again. The Greeks call such events *epochs*, i.e. halts. We halt for a moment, we look about and wonder, and then choose our further way in life. It is the duty of biographers to discover such epochs, such halting-points, in the lives of their

heroes, and we shall endeavour to do the same in the life of Schiller by watching the various influences which determined the direction of his genius at different periods of his poetical career.

The period of Schiller's childhood is generally described with great detail by his biographers. We are told who his ancestors were. I believe they were bakers. We are informed that his mother possessed in her *trousseau*, among other things, four pairs of stockings—three of cotton, one of wool. There are also long discussions on the exact date of his birth. We hear a great deal of early signs of genius, or rather, we should say, of things done and said by most children, but invested with extraordinary significance if remembered of the childhood of great men. To tell the truth, we can find nothing very important in what we thus learn of the early years of Schiller, nor does the poet himself in later years dwell much on the recollections of his dawning mind. If we must look for some determinating influences during the childhood of Schiller, they are chiefly to be found in the character of his father. The father was not what we should call a well-educated man. He had been brought up as a barber and surgeon; had joined a Bavarian regiment in 1745, during the Austrian war of succession; and had acted as a non-commissioned officer, and, when occasion required, as a chaplain in the camp. After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle he had married the daughter of an innkeeper. He was a brave man, a God-fearing man, and, as is not unfrequently the case with half-educated people, a man very fond of reading. What he had failed to attain himself, he wished to see realised in his only son. The following prayer was found among the papers of the father:—‘And Thou,

Being of all beings, I have asked Thee after the birth of my only son, that Thou wouldest add to his powers of intellect what I from deficient instruction was unable to attain. Thou hast heard me. Thanks be to Thee, bounteous Being, that Thou heedest the prayers of mortals.' A man of this stamp of mind would be sure to exercise his own peculiar influence on his children. He would make them look on life, not as a mere profession, where the son has only to follow in the steps of his father; his children would early become familiar with such ideas as '*making one's way in life*,' and would look forward to a steep path rather than to a beaten track. Their thoughts would dwell on the future at a time when other children live in the present only, and an adventurous spirit would be roused, without which no great work has ever been conceived and carried out.

When his children, young Frederick and his sisters, were growing up, their father read to them their morning and evening prayers, and so fond was the boy of the Old and New Testament stories that he would often leave his games in order to be present at his father's readings. In 1765 the family left Marbach on the Neckar. The father was ordered by the Duke of Würtemberg to Lorch, a place on the frontier, where he had to act as recruiting officer. His son received his education in the house of a clergyman, began Latin at six, Greek at seven; and, as far as we are able to see, he neither seems to have considered himself, nor to have been considered by his masters, as very superior to other boys. He was a good boy, tenderly attached to his parents, fond of games, and regular at school. There are but two marked features which we have an opportunity of

watching in him as a boy. He knew no fear, and he was full of the warmest sympathy for others. The first quality secured him the respect, the second the love, of those with whom he came in contact. His parents, who were very poor, had great difficulty in restraining his generosity. He would give away his school books and the very buckles off his shoes. Both his fearlessness and his universal sympathy are remarkable through the whole of his after-life. Not even his enemies could point out one trait of cowardice or selfishness in anything he ever did, or said, or wrote. There are some pertinent remarks on the combination of these two qualities, sympathy with others and courage, by the author of 'Friends in Council.'

'If greatness,' he writes, 'can be shut up in qualities, it will be found to consist in courage and in openness of mind and soul. These qualities may not seem at first to be so potent. But see what *growth* there is in them. The education of a man of open mind is never ended. Then with openness of soul a man sees some way into all other souls that come near him, feels with them, has their experience, is in himself a people. Sympathy is the universal solvent. Nothing is understood without it. . . . Add courage to this openness, and you have a man who can own himself in the wrong, can forgive, can trust, can adventure, can, in short, use all the means that insight and sympathy endow him with.'

A plucky and warm-hearted boy, under the care of an honest, brave, and intelligent father and a tender and religious mother,—this is all we know and care to know about Schiller during the first ten years of his life. In the year 1768 there begins a new period in the life of Schiller. His father was settled at

Ludwigsburg, the ordinary residence of the reigning Duke of Würtemberg, the Duke Charles. This man was destined to exercise a decisive influence on Schiller's character. Like many German sovereigns in the middle of the last century, Duke Charles of Würtemberg had felt the influence of those liberal ideas which had found so powerful an utterance in the works of the French and English philosophers of the eighteenth century. The philosophy which in France was smiled at by kings and statesmen, while it roused the people to insurrection and regicide, produced in Germany a deeper impression on the minds of the sovereigns and ruling classes than of the people. In the time of Frederick the Great and Joseph II it became fashionable among sovereigns to profess Liberalism, and to work for the enlightenment of the human race. It is true that this liberal policy was generally carried out in a rather despotic way, and people were emancipated and enlightened very much as the ancient Saxons were converted by Charlemagne. We have an instance of this in the case of Schiller. Duke Charles had founded an institution where orphans and the sons of poor officers were educated free of expense. He had been informed that young Schiller was a promising boy, and likely to reflect credit on his new institution, and he proceeded without further inquiry to place him on the list of his *protégés*, assigning to him a place at his military school. It was useless for the father to remonstrate, and to explain to the Duke that his son had a decided inclination for the Church. Schiller was sent to the Academy in 1773, and ordered to study law. The young student could not but see that an injustice had been done him, and the irritation which it caused

was felt by him all the more deeply because it would have been dangerous to give expression to his feelings. The result was that he made no progress in the subjects which he had been commanded to study. In 1775 he was allowed to give up law, not, however, to return to theology, but to begin the study of medicine. But medicine, though at first it seemed more attractive, failed, like law, to call forth his full energies. In the meantime another interference on the part of the Duke proved even more abortive, and to a certain extent determined the path which Schiller's genius was to take in life. The Duke had prohibited all German classics at his Academy; the boys, nevertheless, succeeded in forming a secret library, and Schiller read the works of Klopstock, Klinger, Lessing, Goethe, and Wieland's translations of Shakespeare with rapture, no doubt somewhat increased by the dangers he braved in gaining access to these treasures. In 1780, the same year in which he passed his examination and received the appointment of regimental surgeon, Schiller wrote his first tragedy, 'The Robbers.' His taste for dramatic poetry had been roused partly by Goethe's 'Goetz von Berlichingen' and Shakespeare's plays, partly by his visits to the theatre, which, under the patronage of the Duke, was then in a very flourishing state. The choice of the subject of his first dramatic composition was influenced by the circumstances of his youth. His poetical sympathy for a character such as Karl Moor, a man who sets at defiance all the laws of God and man, can only be accounted for by the revulsion of feeling produced on his boyish mind by the strict military discipline to which all the pupils at the Academy were subjected. His sense of right and wrong was strong enough to

make him paint his hero as a monster, and to make him inflict on him the punishment he merited. But the young poet could not resist the temptation of throwing a brighter light on the redeeming points in the character of a robber and murderer by pointedly placing him in contrast with the even darker shades of hypocritical respectability and saintliness in the picture of his brother Franz. The language in which Schiller paints his characters is powerful, but it is often wild and even coarse. The Duke did not approve of his former *protégé*; the very title-page of 'The Robbers' was enough to offend his Serene Highness,—it contained a rising lion, with the motto '*In tyrannos.*' The Duke gave a warning to the young military surgeon, and when, soon after, he heard of his going secretly to Mannheim to be present at the first performance of his play, he ordered him to be put under military arrest. All these vexations Schiller endured, because he knew full well there was no escape from the favours of his Royal protector. But when at last he was ordered never to publish anything except on medical subjects, and to submit all his poetical compositions to the Duke's censorship, this proved too much for our young poet. His ambition had been roused. He had sat at Mannheim a young man of twenty, unknown, amid an audience of men and women who listened with rapturous applause to his own thoughts and words. That evening at the theatre of Mannheim had been a decisive evening—it was an epoch in the history of his life; he had felt his power and the calling of his genius; he had perceived, though in a dim distance, the course he had to run and the laurels he had to gain. When he saw that the humour of the Duke was not likely

to improve he fled from a place where his wings were clipped and his voice silenced. Now this flight from one small German town to another may seem a matter of very little consequence at present. But in Schiller's time it was a matter of life and death. German sovereigns were accustomed to look upon their subjects as their property. Without even the show of a trial the poet Schubart had been condemned to lifelong confinement by this same Duke Charles. Schiller, in fleeing his benefactor's dominions, had not only thrown away all his chances in life, but he had placed his safety and the safety of his family in extreme danger. It was a bold, perhaps a reckless step. But whatever we may think of it from a moral point of view, as historians we must look upon it as the Hegira in the life of the poet.

Schiller was now a man of one or two-and-twenty, thrown upon the world penniless, with nothing to depend on but his brains. The next ten years were hard years for him; they were years of unsettledness, sometimes of penury and despair, sometimes of extravagance and folly. This third period in Schiller's life is not marked by any great literary achievements. It would be almost a blank were it not for the 'Don Carlos,' which he wrote during his stay near Dresden, between 1785-87. His 'Fiesco' and 'Cabale und Liebe,' though they came out after his flight from Stuttgart, had been conceived before, and they were only repeated protests, in the form of tragedies, against the tyranny of rulers and the despotism of society. They show no advance in the growth of Schiller's mind. Yet, that mind, though less productive than might have been expected, was growing as every mind grows between the years of twenty and

thirty; and it was growing chiefly through contact with men. We must make full allowance for the powerful influence exercised at that time by the literature of the day (by the writings of Herder, Lessing, and Goethe), and by political events, such as the French Revolution. But if we watch Schiller's career carefully we see that his character was chiefly moulded by his intercourse with men. His life was rich in friendships, and what mainly upheld him in his struggles and dangers was the sympathy of several high-born and high-minded persons, in whom the ideals of his own mind seemed to have found their fullest realisation.

Next to our faith in God, there is nothing so essential to the healthy growth of our whole being as an unshaken faith in man. This faith in man is the great feature in Schiller's character, and he owes it to a kind Providence which brought him in contact with such noble natures as Frau von Wolzogen, Körner, Dalberg; in later years with his wife; with the Duke of Weimar, the Prince of Augustenburg, and lastly with Goethe. There was at that time a powerful tension in the minds of men, and particularly of the higher classes, which led them to do things which at other times men only aspire to do. The impulses of a most exalted morality—a morality which is so apt to end in mere declamation and deceit—were not only felt by them, but obeyed and carried out. Frau von Wolzogen, knowing nothing of Schiller except that he had been at the same school with her son, received the exiled poet, though fully aware that by doing so she might have displeased the Duke and blasted her fortunes and those of her children. Schiller preserved the tenderest attachment to this motherly

friend through life, and his letters to her display a most charming innocence and purity of mind.

Another friend was Körner, a young lawyer living at Leipsic, and afterwards at Dresden—a man who had himself to earn his bread. He had learned to love Schiller from his writings; he received him at his house, a perfect stranger, and shared with the poor poet his moderate income with a generosity worthy of a prince. He, too, remained his friend through life; his son was Theodore Körner, the poet of 'Lyre and Sword,' who fell fighting as a volunteer for his country against French invaders.

A third friend and patron of Schiller was Dalberg. He was the coadjutor, and was to have been the successor, of the Elector of Hesse, then an ecclesiastical Electorate. His rank was that of a reigning prince, and he was made afterwards by Napoleon Fürst Primas—Prince Primate—of the Confederation of the Rhine. But it was not his station, his wealth and influence—it was his mind and heart which made him the friend of Schiller, Goethe, Herder, Wieland, Jean Paul, and all the most eminent intellects of his time. It is refreshing to read the letters of this Prince. Though they belong to a later period of Schiller's life, a few passages may here be quoted in order to characterise his friend and patron. Dalberg had promised Schiller a pension of 4,000 florins (not 4,000 thalers, as M. Regnier asserts) as soon as he should succeed to the Electorate, and Schiller in return had asked him for some hints with regard to his own future literary occupations. The Prince answers,—'Your letter has delighted me. To be remembered by a man of your heart and mind is a true joy to me. I do not venture to determine

what Schiller's comprehensive and vivifying genius is to undertake. But may I be allowed to humbly express a wish that spirits endowed with the powers of giants should ask themselves, "How can I be most useful to mankind?" This inquiry, I think, leads most surely to immortality, and the rewards of a peaceful conscience. May you enjoy the purest happiness, and think sometimes of your friend and servant, Dalberg.' When Schiller was hesitating between history and dramatic poetry, Dalberg's keen eye discovered at once that the stage was Schiller's calling, and that there his influence would be most beneficial. Schiller seemed to think that a professorial chair in a German University was a more honourable position than that of a poet. Dalberg writes: 'Influence on mankind' (for this he knew to be Schiller's highest ambition) 'depends on the vigour and strength which a man throws into his works. Thucydides and Xenophon would not deny that poets like Sophocles and Horace have had at least as much influence on the world as they themselves.' When the French invasion threatened the ruin of Germany and the downfall of the German Sovereigns, Dalberg writes again, in 1796, with perfect serenity,—'True courage must never fail! The friends of virtue and truth ought now to act and speak all the more vigorously and straightforwardly. In the end, what you, excellent friend, have so beautifully said in your "Ideals" remains true,—"The diligence of the righteous works slowly but surely, and friendship is soothing comfort. It is only when I hope to be hereafter of assistance to my friends that I wish for a better fate."' The society and friendship of such men, who are rare in all countries and in

all ages, served to keep up in Schiller's mind those ideal notions of mankind which he had first imbibed from his own heart and from the works of philosophers. They find expression in all his writings, but are most eloquently described in his 'Don Carlos.' We should like to give some extracts from the dialogue between King Philip and the Marquis Posa, but our space is precious, and hardly allows us to do more than just to glance at those other friends and companions whose nobility of mind and generosity of heart left so deep an impress on the poet's soul.

The name of Karl August, the Duke of Weimar, has acquired such a world-wide celebrity as the friend of Goethe and Schiller that we need not dwell long on his relation to our poet. As early as 1784 Schiller was introduced to him at Darmstadt, where he was invited to Court to read some scenes of his 'Don Carlos.' The Duke gave him then the title of 'Rath,' and from the year 1787, when Schiller first settled at Weimar, to the time of his death, in 1805, he remained his firm friend. The friendship of the Prince was returned by the poet, who, in the days of his glory, declined several advantageous offers from Vienna and other places, and remained at the Court of Weimar, satisfied with the small salary which that great Duke was able to give him.

There was but one other Prince whose bounty Schiller accepted, and his name deserves to be mentioned, not so much for his act of generosity as for the sentiment which prompted it. In 1792, when Schiller was ill and unable to write, he received a letter from the Hereditary Prince of Holstein-Augustenburg, and from Count Schimmelmann. We quote from the letter (*Chips*, vol. i, p. 364):—

‘Your shattered health, we hear, requires rest, but your circumstances do not allow it. Will you grudge us the pleasure of enabling you to enjoy that rest? We offer you for three years an annual present of 1,000 thalers. Accept this offer, noble man. Let not our titles induce you to decline it. We know what they are worth; we know no pride but that of being men, citizens of that great republic which comprises more than the life of single generations, more than the limits of this globe. You have to deal with men—your brothers—not with proud Princes, who, by this employment of their wealth, would fain indulge but in a more refined kind of pride.’

No conditions were attached to this present, though a situation in Denmark was offered if Schiller should wish to go there. Schiller accepted the gift so nobly offered, but he never saw his unknown friends¹. We owe to them, humanly speaking, the best years of Schiller’s life, and with them the masterworks of his genius, from ‘Wallenstein’ to ‘Wilhelm Tell.’ As long as these works are read and admired the names of these noble benefactors will be remembered and revered.

The name of her whom we mentioned next among Schiller’s noble friends and companions,—we mean his wife,—reminds us that we have anticipated events, and that we left Schiller after his flight in 1782, at the very beginning of his most trying years. His hopes of success at Mannheim had failed. The director of the Mannheim Theatre, also a Dalberg, declined to assist him. He spent the winter in great solitude at the country house of Frau von Wolzogen, finishing

¹ The Prince of Holstein-Augustenburg was the grandfather of the present Duke and of Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein.

‘Cabale und Liebe’ and writing ‘Fiesco.’ In the summer of 1783 he returned to Mannheim, where he received an appointment in connection with the theatre of about £40 a year. Here he stayed till 1785, when he went to Leipsic, and afterwards to Dresden, living chiefly at the expense of his friend Körner. This unsettled kind of life continued till 1787, and produced, as we saw, little more than his tragedy of ‘Don Carlos.’ In the meantime, however, his taste for history had been developed. He had been reading more systematically at Dresden, and after he had gone to Weimar in 1787 he was able to publish, in 1788, his ‘History of the Revolt of the Netherlands.’ On the strength of this he was appointed Professor at Jena in 1789, first without a salary, afterwards with about £30 a year. He tells us himself how hard he had to work:—‘Every day (he says) I must compose a whole lecture and write it out,—nearly two sheets of printed matter, not to mention the time occupied in delivering the lecture, and making extracts.’ However, he had now gained a position, and his literary works began to be better paid. In 1790 he was enabled to marry a lady of rank, who was proud to become the wife of the poor poet, and was worthy to be the ‘wife of Schiller.’ Schiller was now chiefly engaged in historical researches. He wrote his ‘History of the Thirty Years’ War’ in 1791–92, and it was his ambition to be recognised as a German professor rather than as a German poet. He had to work hard in order to make up for lost time, and under the weight of excessive labour his health broke down. He was unable to lecture, unable to write. It was then that the generous present of the Duke of Augustenburg freed him for a time from the most

pressing cares, and enabled him to recover his health.

The years of thirty to thirty-five were a period of transition and preparation in Schiller's life, to be followed by another ten years of work and triumph. These intermediate years were chiefly spent in reading history and studying philosophy, more especially the then reigning philosophy of Kant. Numerous essays on philosophy, chiefly on the Good, the Beautiful, and the Sublime, were published during this interval. But what is more important, Schiller's mind was enlarged, enriched, and invigorated; his poetical genius, by lying fallow for a time, gave promise of a richer harvest to come; his position in the world became more honourable, and his confidence in himself was strengthened by the confidence placed in him by all around him. A curious compliment was paid him by the Legislative Assembly then sitting at Paris. On the 26th of August, 1792, a decree was passed, conferring the title of *Citoyen Français* on eighteen persons belonging to various countries, friends of liberty and universal brotherhood. In the same list with Schiller were the names of Klopstock, Campe, Washington, Kosciusko, and Wilberforce. The decree was signed by Roland, Minister of the Interior, and countersigned by Danton. It did not reach Schiller till after the enthusiasm which he too had shared for the early heroes of the French Revolution had given way to disappointment and horror. In the month of December of the very year in which he had been thus honoured by the Legislative Assembly, Schiller was on the point of writing an appeal to the French nation in defence of Louis XVI. The King's head, however, had fallen before this defence was begun.

Schiller, a true friend of true liberty, never ceased to express his aversion to the violent proceedings of the French Revolutionists. 'It is the work of passion,' he said, 'and not of that wisdom which alone can lead to real liberty.' He admitted that many important ideas, which formerly existed in books only or in the heads of a few enlightened people, had become more generally current through the French Revolution. But he maintained that the real principles which ought to form the basis of a truly happy political constitution were still hidden from view. Pointing to a volume of Kant's 'Criticism of Pure Reason,' he said, 'There they are and nowhere else; the French Republic will fall as rapidly as it has risen; the Republican Government will lapse into anarchy, and sooner or later a man of genius will appear (he may come from any place) who will make himself not only master of France, but perhaps also of a great part of Europe.' This was a remarkable prophecy for a young professor of history.

The last decisive event in Schiller's life was his friendship with Goethe. It dates from 1794, and with this year begins the great and crowning period of Schiller's life. To this period belong his 'Wallenstein,' his 'Song of the Bell,' his Ballads (1797-8), his 'Mary Stuart' (1800), the 'Maid of Orleans' (1801), the 'Bride of Messina' (1803), and 'Wilhelm Tell;' in fact, all the works which have made Schiller a national poet and gained for him a world-wide reputation and an immortal name.

Goethe's character was in many respects diametrically opposed to Schiller's, and for many years it seemed impossible that there should ever be a community of thought and feeling between the two.

Attempts to bring these great rivals together were repeatedly made by their mutual friends. Schiller had long felt himself drawn by the powerful genius of Goethe, and Goethe had long felt that Schiller was the only poet who could claim to be his peer. After an early interview with Goethe, Schiller writes, 'On the whole, this meeting has not at all diminished the idea, great as it was, which I had previously formed of Goethe; but I doubt if we shall ever come into close communication with each other. Much that interests me has already had its epoch with him; his world is not my world.' Goethe had expressed the same feeling. He saw Schiller occupying the very positions which he himself had given up as untenable; he saw his powerful genius carrying out triumphantly 'those very paradoxes, moral and dramatic, from which he was struggling to get liberated.' 'No union,' as Goethe writes, 'was to be dreamt of. Between two spiritual antipodes there was more intervening than a simple diameter of the spheres. Antipodes of that sort act as a kind of poles, which can never coalesce.' How the first approach between these two opposite poles took place Goethe has himself described, in a paper entitled 'Happy Incidents.' But no happy incident could have led to that glorious friendship, which stands alone in the literary history of the whole world, if there had not been on the part of Schiller his warm sympathy for all that is great and noble, and on the part of Goethe a deep interest in every manifestation of natural genius. Their differences on almost every point of art, philosophy, and religion, which at first seemed to separate them for ever, only drew them more closely together, when they discovered in each other those completing ele-

ments which produce true harmony of souls. Nor is it right to say that Schiller owes more to Goethe than Goethe to Schiller. If Schiller received from Goethe the higher rules of art and a deeper insight into human nature, Goethe drank from the soul of his friend the youth and vigour, the purity and simplicity which we never find in any of Goethe's works before his 'Hermann and Dorothea.' And, as in most friendships, it was not so much Goethe as he was, but Goethe as reflected in his friend's soul, who henceforth became Schiller's guide and guardian. Schiller possessed the art of admiring, an art so much more rare than the art of criticising. His eye was so absorbed in all that was great, and noble, and pure, and high in Goethe's mind, that he could not, or would not, see the defects in his character. And Goethe was to Schiller what he was to no one else. He was what Schiller believed him to be; afraid to fall below his friend's ideal, he rose beyond himself until that high ideal was reached, which only a Schiller could have formed. Without this regenerating friendship it is doubtful whether some of the most perfect creations of Goethe and Schiller would ever have been called into existence.

We saw Schiller gradually sinking into a German professor, the sphere of his sympathies narrowed, the aim of his ambition lowered. His energies were absorbed in collecting materials and elaborating his 'History of the Thirty Years' War,' which was published in 1792. The conception of his great dramatic Trilogy, the 'Wallenstein,' which dates from 1791, was allowed to languish until it was taken up again for Goethe, and finished for Goethe in 1799. Goethe knew how to admire and encourage, but he also knew

how to criticise and advise. Schiller, by nature meditative rather than observant, had been most powerfully attracted by Kant's ideal philosophy. Next to his historical researches, most of his time at Jena was given to metaphysical studies. Not only his mind, but his language suffered from the attenuating influences of that rarified atmosphere which pervades the higher regions of metaphysical thought. His mind was attracted by the general and the ideal, and lost all interest in the individual and the real. This was not a right frame of mind, either for an historian or a dramatic poet. In Goethe, too, the philosophical element was strong, but it was kept under by the practical tendencies of his mind. Schiller looked for his ideal beyond the real world, and like the pictures of a Raphael, his conceptions seemed to surpass in purity and harmony all that human eye had ever seen. Goethe had discovered that the truest ideal lies hidden in real life, and like the masterworks of a Michael Angelo, his poetry reflected that highest beauty which is revealed in the endless variety of creation, and must there be discovered by the artist and the poet. In Schiller's early works every character was the personification of an idea. In his 'Wallenstein' we meet for the first time with real men and real life. In his 'Don Carlos,' Schiller, under various disguises more or less transparent, acts every part himself. In 'Wallenstein' the heroes of the 'Thirty Years' War' maintain their own individuality, and are not forced to discuss the social problems of Rousseau, or the metaphysical theories of Kant. Schiller was himself aware of this change, though he was hardly conscious of its full bearing. While engaged in composing his 'Wallenstein,' he writes to a friend:—

‘I do my business very differently from what I used to do. The subject seems to be so much outside me that I can hardly get up any feeling for it. The subject I treat leaves me cold and indifferent, and yet I am full of enthusiasm for my work. With the exception of two characters to which I feel attached, Max Piccolomini and Thekla, I treat all the rest, and particularly the principal character of the play, only with the pure love of the artist. But I can promise you that they will not suffer from this. I look to history for limitation, in order to give, through surrounding circumstances, a stricter form and reality to my ideals. I feel sure that the historical will not draw me down or cripple me. I only desire through it to impart life to my characters and their actions. The life and soul must come from another source, through that power which I have already perhaps shown elsewhere, and without which even the first conception of this work would, of course, have been impossible.’

How different is this from what Schiller felt in former years! In writing ‘Don Carlos’ he laid down as a principle, that the poet must not be the painter but the lover of his heroes, and in his early days he found it intolerable in Shakespeare’s dramas that he could nowhere lay his hand on the poet himself. He was then, as he himself expresses it, unable to understand nature, except at second-hand.

Goethe was Schiller’s friend, but he was also Schiller’s rival. There is a perilous period in the lives of great men—namely, the time when they begin to feel that their position is made, that they have no more rivals to fear. Goethe was feeling this at the time when he met Schiller. He was satiated

with applause, and his bearing towards the public at large became careless and offensive. In order to find men with whom he might measure himself, he began to write on the history of Art, and to devote himself to natural philosophy. Schiller, too, had gained his laurels, chiefly as a dramatic poet, and though he still valued the applause of the public, yet his ambition as a poet was satisfied; he was prouder of his 'Thirty Years' War' than of his 'Robbers' and 'Don Carlos.' When Goethe became intimate with Schiller, and discovered in him those powers which as yet were hidden to others, he felt that there was a man with whom even he might run a race. Goethe was never jealous of Schiller. He felt conscious of his own great powers, and he was glad to have those powers again called out by one who would be more difficult to conquer than all his former rivals. Schiller, on the other hand, perceived in Goethe the true dignity of a poet. At Jena his ambition was to have the title of Professor of History; at Weimar he saw that it was a greater honour to be called a poet, and the friend of Goethe. When he saw that Goethe treated him as his friend, and that the Duke and his brilliant Court looked upon him as his equal, Schiller, too modest to suppose he had earned such favours, was filled with a new zeal, and his poetical genius displayed for a time an almost inexhaustible energy. Scarcely had his 'Wallenstein' been finished, in 1799, when he began his 'Mary Stuart.' This play was finished in the summer of 1800, and a new one was taken in hand in the same year—the 'Maid of Orleans.' In the spring of 1801 the 'Maid of Orleans' appeared on the stage, to be followed in 1803 by the 'Bride of Messina,' and in 1804 by his last great work, his

'William Tell.' During the same time Schiller composed his best ballads, his 'Song of the Bell,' his epigrams, and his beautiful Elegy, not to mention his translations and adaptations of English and French plays for the theatre at Weimar. After his 'William Tell' Schiller could feel that he no longer owed his place by the side of Goethe to favour and friendship, but to his own work and worth. His race was run, his laurels gained. His health, however, was broken, and his bodily frame too weak to support the strain of his mighty spirit. Death came to his relief, giving rest to his mind, and immortality to his name.

Let us look back once more on the life of Schiller. The lives of great men are the lives of martyrs; we cannot regard them as examples to follow, but rather as types of human excellence to study and to admire. The life of Schiller was not one which many of us would envy; it was a life of toil and suffering, of aspiration rather than of fulfilment, a long battle with scarcely a moment of rest for the conqueror to enjoy his hard-won triumphs. To an ambitious man the last ten years of the poet's life might seem an ample reward for the thirty years' war of life which he had to fight single-handed. But Schiller was too great a man to be ambitious. Fame with him was a means, never an object. There was a higher, a nobler aim in his life, which upheld him in all his struggles. From the very beginning of his career Schiller seems to have felt that his life was not his. He never lived for himself; he lived and worked for mankind. He discovered within himself how much there was of the good, the noble, and the beautiful in human nature; he had never been deceived in his friends. And such was his sympathy with the world at large

that he could not bear to see in any rank of life the image of man, the very likeness of God, distorted by cunning, pride, and selfishness. His whole poetry may be said to be written on the simple text—‘Be true, be good, be noble!’ It may seem a short text, but truth is very short, and the work of the greatest teachers of mankind has always consisted in the unflinching inculcation of these short truths. There is in Schiller’s works a kernel full of immortal growth, which will endure long after the brilliant colours of his poetry have faded away. That kernel is the man, and without it Schiller’s poetry, like all other poetry, is but the song of sirens. Schiller’s character has been subjected to that painful scrutiny to which, in modern times, the characters of great men are subjected; everything he ever did, or said, or thought has been published, and yet it would be difficult, in the whole course of his life, to point out one act, one word, one thought that could be called mean, untrue, or selfish. From the beginning to the end Schiller remained true to himself; he never acted a part, he never bargained with the world. We may differ from him on many points of politics, ethics, and religion; but, though we differ, we must always respect and admire. His life is the best commentary on his poetry; there is never a discrepancy between the two. As mere critics, we may be able to admire a poet without admiring the man; but poetry, it should be remembered, was not meant for critics only, and its highest purpose is never fulfilled, except where, as with Schiller, we can listen to the poet and look up to the man.

REDE LECTURE,

*Delivered before the University of Cambridge the 29th of May, 1868.*¹

PART I.

ON THE STRATIFICATION OF LANGUAGE.

THERE are few sensations more pleasant than that of wondering. We have all experienced it in childhood, in youth, and in our manhood, and we may hope that even in our old age this affection of the mind will not entirely pass away. If we analyse this feeling of wonder carefully, we shall find that it consists of two elements. What we mean by wondering is not only that we are startled or stunned—that I should call the merely passive element of wonder. When we say ‘I wonder,’ we confess that we are taken aback, but there is a secret satisfaction mixed up with our feeling of surprise, a kind of hope, nay, almost of certainty, that sooner or later the wonder will cease, that our senses or our mind will recover, will grapple with these novel impressions or experiences, grasp them, it may be, throw

¹ This Lecture, translated by M. Louis Havet, forms the first fasciculus of the ‘Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes, publiée sous les auspices du Ministère de l’Instruction Publique.’ Paris, 1869.

them, and finally triumph over them. In fact, we wonder at the riddles of nature, whether animate or inanimate, with a firm conviction that there is a solution to them all, even though we ourselves may not be able to find it.

Wonder, no doubt, arises from ignorance, but from a peculiar kind of ignorance; from what might be called a fertile ignorance; an ignorance which, if we look back at the history of most of our sciences, will be found to have been the mother of all human knowledge.¹ For thousands of years men have looked at the earth with its stratifications, in some places so clearly mapped out; for thousands of years they must have seen in their quarries and mines, as well as we ourselves, the imbedded petrifications of organic creatures; yet they looked and passed on without thinking more about it—they did not wonder. Not even an Aristotle had eyes to see; and the conception of a science of the earth, of Geology, was reserved for the eighteenth century.

Still more extraordinary is the listlessness with which during all the centuries that have elapsed since the first names were given to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field, men have passed by what was much nearer to them than even the gravel on which they trod—namely, the words of their own language. Here, too, the clearly marked lines of different strata seemed almost to challenge attention, and the pulses of former life were still throbbing in the petrified forms imbedded in grammars and dictionaries. Yet not even a Plato had eyes

¹ Διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν.—Arist. Met. A. 2

to see, or ears to hear, and the conception of a science of language, of Glottology, was reserved for the nineteenth century.

I am far from saying that Plato and Aristotle knew nothing of the nature, the origin and the purpose of language, or that we have nothing to learn from their works. They, and their successors, and their predecessors too, beginning with Herakleitos and Demokritos, were startled and almost fascinated by the mysteries of human speech as much as by the mysteries of human thought; and what we call grammar and the laws of language, nay, all the technical terms which are still current in our schools, such as *noun* and *verb*, *case* and *number*, *infinitive* and *participle*, all this was first discovered and named by the philosophers and grammarians of Greece, to whom, in spite of all our new discoveries, I believe we are still beholden, whether consciously or unconsciously, for more than half of our intellectual life.

But the interest which those ancient Greek philosophers took in language was purely philosophical. It was the form, far more than the matter of speech, which seemed to them a subject worthy of philosophical speculation. The idea that there was, even in their days, an immense mass of accumulated speech, to be sifted, to be analysed, and to be accounted for somehow, before any theories on the nature of language could be safely started, hardly ever entered their minds; or, when it did, as we see here and there in Plato's *Kratylos*, it soon vanished, without leaving any permanent impression. Each nation and each generation has its own problems to solve. The problem that occupied Plato in his *Kratylos* was,

if I understand him rightly, the possibility of a perfect language, a correct, true, or ideal language, a language founded on his own philosophy, his own system of types or ideas. He was too wise a man to attempt, like Bishop Wilkins, the actual construction of a philosophical language. But, like Leibniz, he just lets us see that a perfect language is conceivable, and that the chief reason of the imperfections of real language must be found in the fact that its original framers were ignorant of the true nature of things, ignorant of dialectic philosophy, and therefore incapable of naming rightly what they had failed to apprehend correctly. Plato's view of actual language, as far as it can be made out from the critical and negative rather than didactic and positive dialogue of *Kratylos*, seems to have been very much the same as his view of actual government. Both fall short of the ideal, and both are to be tolerated only in so far as they participate in the perfections of an ideal state and an ideal language.¹ Plato's *Kratylos* is full of suggestive wisdom. It is one of those books which, as we read them again from time to time, seem every time like new books: so little do we perceive at first all that is pre-supposed in them—the accumulated mould of thought, if I may say so, in which alone a philosophy like that of Plato could strike its roots and draw its support.

But while Plato shows a deeper insight into the mysteries of language than almost any philosopher that has come after him, he has no eyes for that marvellous harvest of words garnered up in our

¹ See Benfey, 'Ueber die Aufgabe des *Kratylos*.' Göttingen, 1868.

dictionaries, and in the dictionaries of all the races of the earth. With him language is almost synonymous with Greek, and though in one passage of the *Kratylos* he suggests that certain Greek words might have been borrowed from the Barbarians, and, more particularly, from the Phrygians, yet that remark, as coming from Plato, seems to be purely ironical, and though it contains, as we know, a germ of truth that has proved most fruitful in our modern science of language, it struck no roots in the minds of Greek philosophers. How much our new science of language differs from the linguistic studies of the Greeks; how entirely the interest which Plato took in language is now supplanted by new interests, is strikingly brought home to us when we see how the *Société de Linguistique*, lately founded at Paris, and including the names of the most distinguished scholars of France, declares in one of its first statutes that 'it will receive no communication concerning the origin of language or the formation of a universal language,' the very subjects which, in the time of Herakleitos and Plato, rendered linguistic studies worthy of the consideration of a philosopher.

It may be that the world was too young in the days of Plato, and that the means of communication were wanting to enable the ancient philosopher to see very far beyond the narrow horizon of Greece. With us it is different. The world has grown older, and has left to us in the annals of its various literatures the monuments of growing and decaying speech. The world has grown larger, and we have before us, not only the relics of ancient civilisation in Asia, Africa, and America, but living languages in such

number and variety that we draw back almost aghast at the mere list of their names. The world has grown wiser too, and where Plato could only see imperfections, the failures of the founders of human speech, we see, as everywhere else in human life, a natural progress from the imperfect towards the perfect, unceasing attempts at realising the ideal, and the frequent triumphs of the human mind over the inevitable difficulties of this earthly condition—difficulties, not of man's own making, but, as I firmly believe, prepared for him, and not without a purpose, as toils and tasks, by a higher Power and by the highest Wisdom.

Let us look, then, abroad and behold the materials which the student of language has now to face. Beginning with the language of the Western Isles, we have, at the present day, at least 100,000 words, arranged as on the shelves of a Museum, in the pages of Johnson and Webster. But these 100,000 words represent only the best grains that have remained in the sieve, while clouds of chaff have been winnowed off, and while many a valuable grain too has been lost by mere carelessness. If we counted the wealth of English dialects, and if we added the treasures of the ancient language from Alfred to Wycliffe, we should easily double the herbarium of the linguistic flora of England. And what are these Western Isles as compared to Europe; and what is Europe, a mere promontory, as compared to the vast continent of Asia; and what again is Asia, as compared to the whole inhabitable world? But there is no corner of that world that is not full of language; the very desert and the isles of the sea teem with dialects, and the

more we recede from the centres of civilisation, the larger the number of independent languages, springing up in every valley, and overshadowing the smallest island.

Ἴδαν ἐς πολύδενδρον ἀνὴρ ὑλατόμος ἐνθῶν
Παπταίνει, παρέοντος ἄδην, πόθεν ἄρξεται ἔργω.¹

We are bewildered by the variety of plants, of birds, and fishes, and insects, scattered with lavish prodigality over land and sea; but what is the living wealth of that Fauna as compared to the winged words which fill the air with unceasing music! What are the scanty relics of fossil plants and animals, compared to the storehouse of what we call the dead languages! How then can we explain it that for centuries and centuries, while collecting beasts, and birds, and fishes, and insects, while studying their forms, from the largest down to the smallest and almost invisible creatures, man has passed by this forest of speech, without seeing the forest, as we say in German, for the very number of its trees (*Man sah den Wald vor lauter Bäumen nicht*), without once asking how this vast currency could have been coined, what inexhaustible mines could have supplied the metal, what cunning hands could have devised the image and superscription—without once wondering at the countless treasure inherited by him from the fathers of the human race?

Let us now turn our attention in a different direction. After it had been discovered that there was this great mass of material to be collected, to be classified, to be explained, what has the Science

¹ Theokritos, xvii. 9.

of Language, as yet, really accomplished? It has achieved much, considering that real work only began about fifty years ago; it has achieved little, if we look at what still remains to be done.

The first discovery was that languages admit of classification. Now, this was a very great discovery, and it at once changed and raised the whole character of linguistic studies. Languages might have been, for all we know, the result of individual fancy or poetry; words might have been created here and there at random, or been fixed by a convention, more or less arbitrary. In that case a scientific classification would have been as impossible as it is if applied to the changing fashions of the day. Nothing can be classified, nothing can be scientifically ruled and ordered, except what has grown up in natural order and according to rational rule.

Out of the great mass of speech that is now accessible to the student of language, a number of so-called families have been separated, such as the *Aryan*, the *Semitic*, the *Ural-Altaic*, the *Indo-Chinese*, the *Dravidian*, the *Malayo-Polynesian*, the *Kafir* or *Bá-ntu* in Africa, and the *Polysynthetic* dialects of America. The only classes, however, which have been carefully examined, and which alone have hitherto supplied the materials for what we might call the Philosophy of Language, are the *Aryan* and the *Semitic*, the former comprising the languages of India, Persia, Armenia, Greece, and Italy, and of the Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavonic races; the latter consisting of the languages of the Babylonians, the Syrians, the Jews, the Phenicians, the Ethiopians, the Arabs.

These two classes include, no doubt, the most important languages of the world, if we measure the importance of languages by the amount of influence exercised on the political and literary history of the world by those who speak them. But considered by themselves, and placed in their proper place in the vast realm of human speech, they describe but a very small segment of the entire circle. The completeness of the evidence which they place before us in the long series of their literary treasures points them out in an eminent degree as the most useful subjects on which to study the anatomy of speech, and nearly all the discoveries that have been made as to the laws of language, the process of composition, derivation, and inflexion, have been gained by Aryan and Semitic scholars.

Far be it from me, therefore, to underrate the value of Aryan and Semitic scholarship for a successful prosecution of the Science of Language. But while doing full justice to the method adopted by Semitic and Aryan scholars in the discovery of the laws that regulate the growth and decay of language, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that our field of observation has been thus far extremely limited, and that we should act in defiance of the simplest rules of sound induction, were we to generalise on such scanty evidence. Let us but clearly see what place these two so-called families, the Aryan and Semitic, occupy in the great kingdom of speech. They are in reality but two centres, two small settlements of speech, and all we know of them is their period of decay, not their period of growth, their descending, not their ascending career, their being,

as we say in German, not their becoming (*ihr Gewordensein, nicht ihr Werden*). Even in the earliest literary documents both the Aryan and Semitic speech appear before us as fixed and petrified. They had left for ever that stage during which language grows and expands, before it is arrested in its exuberant fertility by means of religious or political concentration, by means of oral tradition, or finally by means of a written literature. In the natural history of speech, writing, or, what in early times takes the place of writing, oral tradition, is something merely accidental. It represents a foreign influence which, in natural history, can only be compared to the influence exercised by domestication on plants and animals. Language would be language still, nay, would be more truly language, if the idea of a literature, whether oral or written, had never entered men's minds; and however important the effects produced by this artificial domestication of language may be, it is clear that our ideas of what language is in a natural state, and therefore what Sanskrit and Hebrew, too, must have been before they were tamed and fixed by literary cultivation, ought not to be formed from an exclusive study of Aryan and Semitic speech. I maintain that all we call Aryan and Semitic speech, wonderful as its literary representatives may be, consists of neither more nor less than so many varieties which all owe their origin to only two historical concentrations of wild unbounded speech; nay, however perfect, however powerful, however glorious in the history of the world—in the eyes of the student of language, Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, Hebrew,

Arabic, and Syriac, are what a student of natural history would not hesitate to call '*monstra*,' unnatural, exceptional formations which can never disclose to us the real character of language left to itself to follow out its own laws without let or hindrance.

For that purpose a study of Chinese and the Turanian dialects, a study even of the jargons of the savages of Africa, Polynesia, and Melanesia, is far more instructive than the most minute analysis of Sanskrit and Hebrew. The impression which a study of Greek and Latin and Sanskrit leaves on our minds is that language is a work of art, most complicated, most wonderful, most perfect. We have given so many names to its outward features, its genders and cases, its tenses and moods, its participles, gerunds, and supines, that at last we are frightened at our own devices. Who can read through all the so-called irregular verbs, or look at the thousands and thousands of words in a Greek Dictionary without feeling that he moves about in a perfect labyrinth? How then, we ask, was this labyrinth erected? How did all this come to be? We ourselves, speaking the language which we speak, move about, as it were, in the innermost chambers, in the darkest recesses of that primeval palace, but we cannot tell by what steps and through what passages we arrived there, and we look in vain for the thread of Ariadne which in leading us out of the enchanted castle of our language, would disclose to us the way by which we ourselves, or our fathers and forefathers before us, have entered into it.

The question how language came to be what it is has been asked again and again. Even a schoolboy,

if he possesses but a grain of the gift of wondering, must ask himself why *mensa* means one table, and *mensæ* many tables; why I love should be *amo*, I am loved *amor*, I shall love *amabo*, I have loved *amavi*, I should have loved *amavissem*. Until very lately two answers only could have been given to such questions. Both sound to us almost absurd, yet in their time they were supported by the highest authorities. Either, it was said, language, and particularly the grammatical framework of language, was made by *convention*, by agreeing to call one table *mensa*, and many tables *mensæ*; or, and this was Schlegel's view, language was declared to possess an organic life, and its terminations, prefixes, and suffixes were supposed to have sprouted forth from the radicals and stems and branches of language, like so many buds and flowers. To us it seems almost incredible that such theories should have been seriously maintained, and maintained by men of learning and genius. But what better answer could they have given? What better answer has been given even now? We have learnt something, chiefly from a study of the modern dialects, which often repeat the processes of ancient speech, and thus betray the secrets of the family. We have learnt that in some of the dialects of modern Sanskrit, in Bengali for instance,¹ the plural is formed,

¹ In my essay 'On the Relation of Bengali to the Aryan and Aboriginal Languages of India,' published in 1847, I tried to explain these plural suffixes, such as *dig*, *gana*, *gâti*, *varga*, *dala*. I had translated the last word by *band*, supposing from Wilson's Dictionary, and from the *Sabda-kalpa-druma* that *dala* could be used in the sense of band or multitude. I doubt, however, whether *dala* is ever used in Sanskrit in that sense, and I feel certain

as it is in Chinese, Mongolian, Turkish, Finnish, Burmese, and Siamese, also in the Dravidian and Malayo-Polynesian dialects, by adding a word expressive of plurality, and then appending again the terminations of the singular. We have learnt from French how a future, *je parlerai*, can be formed by an auxiliary verb: 'I to speak have' coming to mean, I shall speak. We have learnt from our own language, whether English or German, that suffixes, such as *head* in *godhead*, *ship* in *ladyship*, *dom* in *kingdom*, were originally substantives, having the meaning of quality, shape, and state. But I doubt

that it was not used in that sense with sufficient frequency to account for its adoption in Bengali. Dr. Friedrich Müller, in his useful abstracts of some of the grammars discovered by the 'Novara' in her journey round the earth (1857-59), has likewise referred *dala* to the Sanskrit *dala*, but he renders what I had in English rendered by *band*, by the German word *Band*. This can only be an accident. I meant *band* in the sense of a band of robbers, which in German would be *Bande*. He seems to have misunderstood me, and to have taken *band* for the German *Band*, which means a ribbon. Might *dala* in Bengali be the Dravidian *tala* or *dala*, a host, a crowd, which Dr. Caldwell (p. 197) mentions as a possible etymon of the pluralising suffix in the Dravidian languages? Bengali certainly took the idea of forming its plurals by composition with words expressive of plurality from its Dravidian neighbours, and it is not impossible that in some cases it might have transferred the very word *dala*, crowd. This *dala* or *tala* appears in Tamil as *kala* and *gala*, and as Sanskrit *k* may in Sinhalese be represented by *v* (*loka*=*lova*), I thought that the plural termination used in Sinhalese after inanimate nouns might possibly be a corruption of the Tamil *kala*. Mr. Childers, however, in his able 'Essay on the Formation of the Plural of Neuter Nouns in Sinhalese' (J. R. A. S. 1874, p. 40), thinks that the Sinhalese *vala* is a corruption of the Sanskrit *vana*, forest, an opinion which seems likewise to be held by Mr. D'Alwis (*J. c.* p. 48). As a case in point, in support of my own opinion, Mr. Childers mentioned to me the Sinhalese *mal-varu*, Sanskrit *mâlâ-kâra*, a wreath-maker, a gardener.

whether even thus we should have arrived at a thorough understanding of the real antecedents of language, unless what happened in the study of the stratification of the earth had happened in the study of language. If the formation of the crust of the earth had been throughout regular and uniform, and if none of the lower strata had been tilted up, so that even those who run might read, no shaft from the surface could have been sunk deep enough to bring the geologist from the tertiary strata down to the Silurian rocks. The same in language. Unless some languages had been arrested in their growth during their earlier stages, and had remained on the surface in this primitive state, exposed only to the decomposing influence of atmospheric action, and to the ill-treatment of literary cultivation, I doubt whether any scholar would have had the courage to say that at one time Sanskrit was like unto Chinese, and Hebrew no better than Malay. In the successive strata of language thus exposed to our view, we have in fact, as in Geology, the very thread of Ariadne, which, if we will but trust to it, will lead us out of the dark labyrinth of language in which we live, by the same road by which we and those who came before us first entered into it. The more we retrace our steps, the more we advance from stratum to stratum, from story to story, the more shall we feel almost dazzled by the daylight that breaks in upon us; the more shall we be struck, no longer by the intricacy of Greek or Sanskrit grammar, but by the marvellous simplicity of the original warp of human speech, as preserved, for instance, in Chinese; by the childlike contrivances, that are at

the bottom of Paulo-post Futures and Conditional Moods.

Let no one be frightened at the idea of studying a Chinese grammar. Those who can take an interest in the secret springs of the mind, in the elements of pure reason, in the laws of thought, will find a Chinese grammar most instructive, most fascinating. It is the faithful photograph of man in his leading-strings, trying the muscles of his mind, groping his way, and so delighted with his first successful grasps that he repeats them again and again. It is child's play, if you like, but it displays, like all child's play, that wisdom and strength which are perfect in the mouth of babes and sucklings. Every shade of thought that finds expression in the highly finished and nicely balanced system of Greek tenses, moods, and particles can be expressed, and has been expressed, in that infant language by words that have neither prefix nor suffix, no terminations to indicate number, case, tense, mood, or person. Every word in Chinese is monosyllabic, and the same word, without any change of form, may be used as a noun or verb, an adjective, an adverb, or a particle. Thus *ta*, according to its position in a sentence, may mean great, greatness, to grow, very much, very.¹

And here a very important observation has been made by Chinese grammarians, an observation which, after a very slight modification and expansion, contains indeed the secret of the whole growth of language from Chinese to English. If a word in Chinese is used with the *bonâ fide* signification of a noun or a verb, it is called a *full word* (*shi-tsé*); if

¹ Stanislas Julien, *Exercices Pratiques*, p. 14.

it is used as a particle or with a merely determinative or formal character, it is called an *empty word* (hiu-tsé¹). There is as yet no outward difference between full and empty words in Chinese, and this renders it all the more creditable to the grammarians of China that they should have perceived the inward distinction, even in the absence of any outward signs.

Let us learn then from Chinese grammarians this great lesson, that words may become empty, and without restricting the meaning of empty words as they do, let us use that term in the most general sense, as expressive of the fact that words may lose something of their full original meaning.

Let us add to this another observation, which the Chinese could not well have made, but which we shall see confirmed again and again in the history of language, viz., that empty words, or, as we may also call them, dead words, are most exposed to phonetic decay.

It is clear then that, with these two preliminary observations, we can imagine three conditions of language:—

1. There may be languages in which all words,

¹ Endlicher, *Chinesische Grammatik*, § 122. Wade, *Progressive Course*: 'On the Parts of Speech,' p. 102. A different division of words adopted by Chinese grammarians is that into *dead* and *live words*, ssè-tsé and sing-tsé, the former comprising nouns, the latter verbs. The same classes are sometimes called tsing-tsé and ho-tsé, unmoved and moved words. This shows how purposeless it would be to try to find out whether language began with nouns or verbs. In the earliest phase of speech the same word was both noun and verb, according to the use that was made of it, and it is so still to a great extent in Chinese. See Endlicher, *Chinesische Grammatik*, § 219.

both empty and full, retain their independent form. Even words which are used when we should use mere suffixes or terminations, retain their outward integrity in Chinese. Thus in Chinese, *gin* means man, *tu* means crowd, *gin-tu*, man-crowd. In this compound both *gin* and *tu* continue to be felt as independent words, more so than in our own compound *man-kind*; but nevertheless *tu* has become empty, it only serves to determine the preceding word *gin*, man, and tells us the quantity or number in which *gin* shall be taken. The compound answers in intention to our plural, but in form it is wide apart from *men*, the plural of *man*.

2. Empty words may lose their independence, may suffer phonetic decay, and dwindle down to mere suffixes and terminations. Thus in Burmese the plural is formed by *to*, in Finnish, Mordvinian, and Ostiakian by *t*. As soon as *to* ceases to be used as an independent word in the sense of number, it becomes an empty, or, if you like, an obsolete word, that has no meaning except as the exponent of plurality; nay, at last, it may dwindle down to a mere letter, which is then called by grammarians the termination of the plural. In this second stage phonetic decay may well-nigh destroy the whole body of an empty word, but—and this is important—no full words, no radicals are as yet attacked by that disintegrating process.

3. Phonetic decay may advance, and does advance still further. Full words also may lose their independence, and be attacked by the same disease that had destroyed the original features of suffixes and prefixes. In this state it is frequently impos-

sible to distinguish any longer between the radical and formative elements of words.

If we wished to represent these three stages of language algebraically, we might represent the first by RR , using R as the symbol of a root which has suffered no phonetic decay; the second, by $R + \rho$, or $\rho + R$, or $\rho + R + \rho$, representing by ρ an empty word that has suffered phonetic change; the third by $r\rho$, or ρr , or $\rho r\rho$, when both full and empty words have been changed, and have become welded together into one indistinguishable mass through the intense heat of thought, and by the constant hammering of the tongue.

Those who are acquainted with the works of Humboldt will easily recognise, in these three stages or strata, a classification of language first suggested by that eminent philosopher. According to him languages can be classified as *isolating*, *agglutinative*,¹ and *inflectional*, and his definition of these three classes agrees in the main with the description just given of the three strata or stages of language.

But what is curious is that this threefold classification, and the consequences to which it leads, should not at once have been fully reasoned out; nay, that a system most palpably erroneous should have been founded upon it. We find it repeated again and again in most works on Comparative Philology, that Chinese belongs to the *isolating* class, the Turanian languages to the *combinatory*, the Aryan and Semitic

¹ *Agglutinative* seems an unnecessarily uncouth word, and as implying a something which glues two words together, a kind of *Binder*, it is objectionable as a technical term. *Combinatory* is technically more correct, and less strange than *agglutinative*.

to the *inflectional*; nay, Professor Pott¹ and his school seem convinced that no evolution can ever take place from *isolating* to *combinatory* and from *combinatory* to *inflectional* speech. We should thus be forced to believe that by some inexplicable grammatical instinct, or by some kind of inherent necessity, languages were from the beginning created as *isolating*, or *combinatory*, or *inflectional*, and must remain so to the end.

¹ Professor Pott in his article, entitled 'Max Müller und die Kennzeichen der Sprachverwandtschaft,' published in 1855 in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. ix. p. 412, says, in confutation of Bunsen's view of a real historical progress of language from the lowest to the highest stage: 'So cautious an inquirer as W. von Humboldt declines expressly in the last chapter of his work on the *Diversity of the Structure of Human Language* (p. 414) any conclusions as to a real historical progress from one stage of language to another, or at least does not commit himself to any definite opinion. This is surely something very different from that gradual progress, and it would be a question whether by admitting such an historical progress from stage to stage, we should not commit an absurdity hardly less palpable than by trying to raise infusoria into horses or still further into men. (What was an absurdity in 1855 does not seem to be so in 1875.) Mr. Bunsen, it is true, does not hesitate to call the monosyllabic idiom of the Chinese an inorganic formation. But how can we get from an inorganic to an organic language? In nature such a thing would be impossible. No stone becomes a plant, no plant a tree, by however wonderful a metamorphosis, except, in a different sense, by the process of nutrition, *i.e.* by regeneration. The former question, which Mr. Bunsen answers in the affirmative, is disposed of by him with the short dictum: "The question whether a language can be supposed to begin with inflections, appears to us simply an absurdity"—but unfortunately he does not condescend by a clear illustration to make that absurdity palpable. Why in inflectional languages should the grammatical form always have added itself to the matter subsequently and *ab extra*? Why should it not partially from the beginning have been created with it and in it, as having a meaning with something else, but not having antecedently a meaning of its own?'

It is strange that those scholars who hold that no transition is possible from one form of language to another should not have seen that there is really no language that can be strictly called either isolating, or combinatory, or inflectional, and that the transition from one stage to another is in fact constantly taking place under our very noses. Even Chinese is not free from combinatory forms, and the more highly developed among the combinatory languages show the clearest traces of incipient inflection. The difficulty is not to show the transition of one stratum of speech into another, but rather to draw a sharp line between the different strata. The same difficulty was felt in Geology, and led Sir Charles Lyell to invent such pliant names as *Eocene*, *Meiocene*, and *Pleiocene*, names which indicate a mere dawn, a minority, or a majority of new formations, but do not draw a fast and hard line, cutting off one stratum from the other. Natural growth, and even merely mechanical accumulation and accretion, here as elsewhere, are so minute and almost imperceptible that they defy all strict scientific terminology, and force upon us the lesson that we must be satisfied with an approximate accuracy. For practical purposes Humboldt's classification of languages may be quite sufficient, and we have no difficulty in classing any given language, according to the prevailing character of its formation, as either isolating, or combinatory, or inflectional. But when we analyse each language more carefully we find there is not one exclusively isolating, or exclusively combinatory, or exclusively inflectional. The power of composition, which is retained unimpaired through every stratum, can at any moment

place an inflectional on a level with an isolating and a combinatory language. A compound such as the Sanskrit *go-duh*, cow-milking, differs little, if at all, from the Chinese *nieu-gu*, *vaccae lac*, or in the patois of Canton, *ngau ü*, cow-milk, before it takes the terminations of the nominative, which is, of course, impossible in Chinese.

So again in English *New-town*, in Greek *Neapolis*, would be simply combinatory compounds. Even *Newton* would still belong to the combinatory stratum; but *Naples* would have to be classed as belonging to the inflectional stage.

Finnish, Hungarian, Turkish, and the Dravidian languages belong in the main to the combinatory stratum; but having received a considerable amount of literary cultivation, they all alike exhibit forms which in every sense of the word are inflectional. If in Finnish, for instance, we find *käsi*, in the singular, hand, and *kädet*, in the plural, hands, we see that phonetic corruption has clearly reached the very core of the noun and given rise to a plural more decidedly inflectional than the Greek *χῆρ-ες*, or the English *hand-s*. In Tamil, where the suffix of the plural is *gal*, we have indeed a regular combinatory form in *kei-gal*, hands; but if the same plural suffix *gal* is added to *kal*, stone, the euphonic rules of Tamil require, not only a change in the suffix, which becomes *kal*, but likewise a modification in the body of the word, *kal* being changed to *kar*. We thus get the plural *karkal*, which in every sense of the word is an inflectional form. In this plural suffix *gal*, Dr. Caldwell has recognised the Dravidian *tala* or *dala*, a host, a

crowd; and though, as he admits himself in the second edition (p. 143), the evidence in support of this etymology may not be entirely satisfactory, the steps by which the learned author of the Grammar of the Dravidian languages has traced the plural termination *lu* in Telugu back to the same original suffix *kaḷ* admit of little doubt.

Evidence of a similar kind may easily be found in any grammar, whether of an isolating, combinatory, or inflectional language, wherever there is evidence as to the ascending or descending progress of any particular form of speech. Everywhere amalgamation points back to combination, and combination back to juxtaposition; everywhere isolating speech tends towards terminational forms, and terminational forms become inflectional.

I may best be able to explain the view commonly held with regard to the strata of language by a reference to the strata of the earth. Here, too, where different strata have been tilted up, it might seem at first sight as if they were arranged perpendicularly and side by side, none underlying the other, none presupposing the other. But as the geologist, on the strength of more general evidence, has to reverse this perpendicular position, and to rearrange his strata in their natural order, and as they followed each other horizontally, the student of language too is irresistibly driven to the same conclusion. No language can by any possibility be inflectional without having passed through the combinatory and isolating stratum; no language can by any possibility be combinatory without clinging with its roots to the underlying stratum of isolation. Unless

Sanskrit and Greek and Hebrew had passed through the combinatory stratum, nay, unless, at some time or other, they had been no better than Chinese, their present form would be as great a miracle as the existence of chalk (and the strata associated with it) without an underlying stratum of oolite (and the strata associated with it); or a stratum of oolite unsupported by the trias or the system of new red sandstone. Bunsen's dictum, that 'the question whether a language can begin with inflections implies an absurdity,' may have seemed too strongly worded; but if he took inflections in the commonly received meaning, in the sense of something that may be added or removed from a base in order to define or to modify its meaning, then surely the simple argument *ex nihilo nihil fit* is sufficient to prove that the inflections must have been something by themselves, before they became inflections relatively to the base, and that the base too must have existed by itself, before it could be defined and modified by the addition of such inflections.

But we need not depend on purely logical arguments, when we have historical evidence to appeal to. As far as we know the history of language, we see it everywhere confined within those three great strata or zones which we have just described. There are inflectional changes, no doubt, which cannot as yet be explained, such as the *m* in the accusative singular of masculine, feminine, and in the nominative and accusative of neuter nouns; or the change of vowels between the Hebrew *Piel* and *Pual*, *Hiphil* and *Hophal*, where we might certainly feel tempted to admit formative agencies different from juxtaposi-

tion and combination. But if we consider how in Sanskrit the Vedic instrumental plural *asvebhis* (Lat. *equobus*) becomes before our very eyes *asvais* (Lat. *equis*), and how such changes as *Bruder*, brother, and *Brüder*, brethren, *Ich weiss*, I know, A.S. *wât*, and *Wir wissen*, we know, A.S. *wit-on*, have been explained as the results of purely mechanical, *i.e.* combinatory proceedings, we need not despair of further progress in the same direction. One thing is certain, that wherever inflection has yielded to a rational analysis, it has invariably been recognised as the result of a previous combination, and wherever combination has been traced back to an earlier stage, that earlier stage has been simple juxtaposition. The primitive blocks of Chinese and the most perplexing agglomerates of Greek can be explained as the result of one continuous formative process, whatever the material elements may be on which it was exercised; nor is it possible even to imagine in the formation of language more than these three strata through which hitherto all human speech has passed.

All we can do is to subdivide each stratum, and thus, for instance, distinguish in the second stratum the suffixing ($R + \rho$) from the prefixing ($\rho + R$), and from the affixing ($\rho + R + \rho$) languages.

A fourth class, the infixing or incapsulating languages, are but a variety of the affixing class, for what in Bask or in the polysynthetic dialects of America has the appearance of actual insertion of formative elements into the body of a base, can be explained more rationally by the former existence of simpler bases to which modifying suffixes or pre-

fixes have once been added, but not so firmly as to exclude the addition of new suffixes at the end of the base, instead of, as with us, at the end of the compound. If we could say in Greek *δείκ-μι-νν*, instead of *δείκ-νν-μι*, or in Sanskrit *yu-mi-na-g*, instead of *yu-na-g-mi*, we should have a real beginning of so-called incapsulating formations.¹

A few instances will place the normal progress of language from stratum to stratum more clearly before our eyes. We have seen that in the most ancient Chinese every word is monosyllabic, every word tells, and there are, as yet, no suffixes by which one word is derived from another, no case-terminations by which the relation of one word to another could be indicated. How, then, does Chinese distinguish between the son of the father, and the father of the son? Simply by position. *Fú* is father, *tzé*, son; therefore in the oldest Chinese *fú tzé* might be son of the father, *tzé fú*, father of the son. This rule admits of no exception but one. If a Chinese wants to say *a wine glass*, he puts *wine* first and *glass* last, as in English. If he wants to say *a glass of wine*, he puts *glass* first and *wine* last. Thus *i-pei thsieu*, a cup of wine; *thsieu pei*, a wine-cup. When it was felt to be desirable to mark the word which is in the genitive more distinctly, the word *ki* was placed after it, and people said, *fú ki tzé*, the son of the father. In the Mandarin dialect this *ki* is represented by *ti*, and is added so constantly to the governed word that, to all intents and purposes, it may be treated as what we call the

¹ Cf. D. G. Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*, p. 6, note.

termination of the genitive. Originally this *ki* was a relative, or rather a demonstrative, pronoun, and it continues to be used as such in the ancient Chinese.¹

It is perfectly true that Chinese possesses no derivative suffixes; that it cannot derive, for instance, *kingly* from a noun, such as *king*, or adjectives like *visible* and *invisible* from a verb *videre*, to see. Yet the same idea which we express by *invisible* is expressed without difficulty in Chinese, only in a different way. They say *khan-pu-kien*, 'I-behold-and-do-not-see,' and this to them conveys the same idea as the English *invisible*, though more exactly *invisible* might be rendered by *kien*, to see, *pou-te*, one cannot, *tí*, which.

We cannot in Chinese derive from *ferrum*, iron, a new substantive *ferrarius*, a man who works in iron, a blacksmith; *ferraria*, an iron mine, and again *ferrariarius*, a man who works in an iron mine. All this is possible in an inflectional language only. But it is not to be supposed that in Chinese there is an independent expression for every single conception, even for those which are clearly secondary and derivative. If an arrow in Chinese is *shi*, then a maker of arrows (in Old French *fléchier*, in English *fletcher*) is called an arrow-man, *shi-gin*. *Shui* means water, *fu*, man; hence *shui-fu*, a water-man, a water-carrier. The same word *shui*, water,

¹ Julien, *Exercices Pratiques*, p. 120. Endlicher, *Chinesische Grammatik*, § 161. See also Nöldeke, *Orient und Occident*, vol. i. p. 759. *Grammar of the Bornu Language* (London, 1853), p. 55, 'In the Treaty the genitive is supplied by the relative pronoun *agu*, singularly corroborative of the Rev. R. Garnett's theory of the genitive case.'

if followed by sheu, hand, stands for steersman, literally, water-hand. Kin means gold, tsiang, maker; hence kin-tsiang, a gold-smith. Shu means writing, sheu, hand; hence shu-sheu, a writer, a copyist; literally, a writing-hand.

A transition from such compounds to really combinatory speech is extremely easy. Let sheu, in the sense of hand, become obsolete, and be replaced in the ordinary language by another word for hand; and let such names as shu-sheu, author, or shui-sheu, boatsman, be retained, and the people who speak this language will soon accustom themselves to look upon sheu as a mere derivative, and use it by a kind of false analogy, even where the original meaning of sheu, hand, would not have been applicable.¹

We can watch the same process even in comparatively modern languages. In Anglo-Saxon, for instance, *hād* means state, order. It is used as an independent word, and continued to be so used as late as Spenser, who wrote:—

‘Cuddie, I wote thou kenst little good,
So vainly t’ advaunce thy headlesse hood.’

¹ ‘Time changes the meaning of words as it does their sound. Thus, many old words are retained in compounds, but have lost their original signification. *E.g.* ‘k’eu, mouth, has been replaced in colloquial usage by ‘tsui, but it is still employed extensively in compound terms and in derived senses. Thus, k’wai’ ‘k’eu, a rapid talker, .men ‘k’eu, door, ,kwan ‘k’eu, custom house. So also muh, the original word for eye, has given place to ‘yen, tsing, or ‘yen alone. It is, however, employed with other words in derived senses. *E. g.* muh hia’, at present; muh luh, table of contents.’ ‘The primitive word for head, ‘sheu, has been replaced by .t’eu, but is retained with various words in combination. *E.g.* tseh ‘sheu, robber chief.’ Edkins, *Grammar of the Chinese Colloquial Language*, 2nd edition, 1864, p. 100.

After a time, however, *hád*, as an independent word, was lost, and its place taken by more classical expressions, such as *habit*, *nature*, or *disposition*. But there remained such compounds as *man-hád*, the state of man, *God-hád*, the nature of God; and in these words the last element, being an empty word and no longer understood, was soon looked upon as a mere suffix. Having lost its vitality, it was all the more exposed to phonetic decay, and became both *hood* and *head*.

Or, let us take another instance. The name given to the fox in ancient German poetry was *Regin-hart*. *Regin* in Old High German means thought or cunning, *hart*, the Gothic *hardu*, means strong. This *hart*¹ corresponds to the Greek *κράτος*, which, in its adjectival form of *κρατῆς*, forms as many proper names in Greek as *hart* in German. In Sanskrit the same word exists as *kratu*, meaning intellectual rather than bodily strength, a shade of meaning which is still perceivable even in the German *hart*, and in the English *hard* and *hardy*. *Regin-hart*, therefore, was originally a compound, meaning 'thought-strong,' strong in cunning. Other words formed in the same or a very similar manner are:—*Peranhart* and *Bernhart*, literally, bear-minded, or bold like a bear; *Eburhart*, boar-minded; *Engil-hart*, angel-minded; *Gothart*, god-minded; *Egin-hart*, fierce-minded; *Hugihart*, wise-minded or strong in thought, the English *Hogarth*. In Low German the second element, *hart*, lost its *h* and became *ard*. This *ard* ceased to convey any definite meaning, and though in some of the words which are formed by *ard* we

¹ Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, ii. 339.

may still discover its original power, it soon became a mere derivative, and was added promiscuously to form new words. In the Low German name for the fox, *Reinaert*, neither the first nor the second word tells us any longer anything, and the two words together have become a mere proper name. In other words the first portion retains its meaning, but the second, *ard*, is nothing but a suffix. Thus we find the Low German *dronk-ard*, a drunkard; *dick-ard*, a thick fellow; *rik-ard*, a rich fellow; *gérard*, a miser. In English *sweet-ard*, originally a very sweet person, has been changed and resuscitated as *sweet-heart*,¹ by the same process which changed *shamefast* into *shamefaced*. But, still more curious, this suffix *ard*, which had lost all life and meaning in Low German, was taken over as a convenient derivative by the Romance languages. After having borrowed a number of words such as *renard*, fox, and proper names like *Bernard*, *Richard*, *Gerard*, the framers of

¹ Cf. the German Liebhart, mignon, in Anshelm, 1, 335. Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, iii. 707. I feel more doubtful now as to *sweetard*. Dr. Morris mentions it in his *Historical Outlines of English Grammar*, p. 219; but Koch, when discussing the same derivations in his *English Grammar*, does not give the word. Mr. Skeat writes to me: 'The form really used in Middle English is *sweeting*. Three examples are given in Stratmann. One of the best is in my edition of William of Palerne, where, however, it occurs not *once* only (as given by Stratmann), but *four times*: viz. in lines 916, 1537, 2799, 3088. The lines are:

"Nai, sertes, <i>sweeting</i> , he seide that schal I neuer:"	916
"& seide aswithre <i>sweeting</i> , welcome!"	1537
"Sertes, <i>sweeting</i> , that is soth. seide william thanne."	2799
"treuli, <i>sweeting</i> , that is soth seide william thane."	3088

The date of this poem is about A.D. 1360. Shakespeare has both forms: viz. *sweeting* and *sweet-heart*. Chaucer has *sweete herte*, just as we should use *sweet-heart*.'

the new Romance dialects used the same termination even at the end of Latin words. Thus they formed not only many proper names, like *Abeillard*, *Bayard*, *Brossard*, but appellatives like *leccardo*, a gourmand, *linguardo*, a talker, *criard*, a crier, *codardo*, Prov. *coart*, Fr. *couard*, a coward.¹ That a German word *hart*, meaning strong, and originally strength, should become a Roman suffix may seem strange; yet we no longer hesitate to use even Hindustani words as English suffixes. In Hindustani *vâlâ* is used to form many substantives. If Dilli is Delhi, then Dill-*vâlâ* is a man of Delhi. Go is cow, go-*vâlâ* a cow-herd, contracted into *gvâlâ*. Innumerable words can thus be formed, and as the derivative seemed handy and useful, it was at last added even to English words, for instance in 'Competition wallah.'

These may seem isolated cases, but the principles on which they rest pervade the whole structure of language. It is surprising to see how much may be achieved by an application of those principles, how large results may be obtained by the smallest and simplest means. By means of the single radical *î* or *yâ* (originally *ya*), which in the Aryan languages means to go or to send, the almost unconscious framers of Aryan grammar formed not only their neuter, denominative, and causative verbs, but their passives, their optatives, their futures, and a considerable number of substantives and adjectives. Every one of these formations, in Sanskrit as well as in Greek, can be explained, and has been ex-

¹ Diez, *Grammatik*, ii. 358. Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, i. p. 340, 706.

plained as the result of a combination between any given verbal root and the radical *î* or *yâ*.

There is, for instance, a root *nak*, expressive of perishing or destruction. We have it in *nak*, night; Latin *nox*, Greek *νύξ*, meaning originally the waning, the disappearing, the death of day. We have the same root in composition, as for instance, *gîva-nak*, life-destroying; and by means of suffixes Greek has formed from it *νεκ-ρός*, a dead body, *νέκ-υς*, dead, and *νέκ-υ-ες*, in the plural, the departed. In Sanskrit this root is turned into a simple verb, *nas-a-ti*, he perishes. But in order to give to it a more distinctly neuter meaning, a new verbal base is formed by composition with *ya*, *nas-ya-ti*, he goes to destruction, he perishes.

By the same or a very similar process denominative verbs are formed in Sanskrit to a very large extent. From *râgan*, king, we form *râgâ-ya-te*, he behaves like a king, literally, he goes the king, he acts the king, *il a l'allure d'un roi*. From *kumârî*, girl, *kûmârâ-ya-te*, he behaves like a girl, etc.¹

After raising *nas* to *nâsa*, and adding the same radical *ya*, Sanskrit produces a causative verb, *nâsa-ya-ti*, he sends to destruction, the Latin *nêcare*.

In close analogy to the neuter verb *nasyati*, the regular passive is formed in Sanskrit by composition with *ya*, but by adding, at the same time, a different set of personal terminations. Thus *nâs-ya-ti* means he perishes, while *nas-yâ-te* means he is destroyed.

¹ See my *Sanskrit Grammar*, § 497. I doubt whether in Greek ἀγγέλλω is a denominative verb and stands for ἀγγεῖλον (Curtius, *Chronologie*, p. 58). I should prefer to explain it as ἀνα-γὰρ-λω, to proclaim, as a verb of the fourth class.

The usual terminations of the Optative in Sanskrit are :

yâm, yâs, yât, yâma, yâta, yus,

or, after bases ending in vowels :

iyam, is, it, ima, ita, iyus.

In Greek :

ιην, ιης, ιη, ιημεν, ιητε, ιεν,

or, after bases ending in o :

ιμ, ις, ι, ιμεν, ιτε, ιεν.

In Latin :

iêm iês iet — — ient,

îm, îs, ît, îmus, îtis, int.

If we add these terminations to the root AS, to be, we get the Sanskrit s-y-âm for as-yâm :

syâm, syâs, syât, syâma, syâta, syus.

Greek εἶσ-ιην, contracted to εἶην :

εἶην, εἶης, εἶη, εἶημεν, εἶητε, εἶεν,

Latin *es-iem*, changed to *siêm*, *sîm*, and *erîm* :

siêm, siês, siet,¹ — — sient,

sîm, sîs, sit,² sîmus, sîtis, sint.

erîm, erîs, erit, erîmus, erîtis, erint.

If we add the other termination to a verbal base ending in certain vowels, we get the Sanskrit bhara-iyam, contracted to bhâreyam :

bharêyam, bharês, bharêt, bharêma, bharêta, bharêyus,

¹ *Lex Repetund.*, 'ceivis romanus ex hac lege siet, nepotesque—ceivis romanei justei sunt.' Cf. Egger, *Lat. Serm. Vetust. Reliq.* p. 245. Meunier, in *Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, vol. i. p. 34.

² Still used as long by Plautus; cf. Neue, *Formenlehre*, ii. p. 340.

in Greek *φέρο-ιμι* :

φέρο-ιμι, φέρο-ις, φέρο-ι, φέρο-ιμεν, φέρο-ιτε, φέρο-ιεν,

in Latin *ferē-im*, changed to *ferem*, used in the sense of a future, but replaced¹ in the first person by *feram*, the subjunctive of the present :

feram, ferēs, feret, ferēmus, ferētis, ferent,

Perfect Subjunctive :

*tul-erīm, tul-erīs, tul-erit, tul-erimus, tul-eritis*², *tul-erint*.

Here we have clearly the same auxiliary verb, *i* or *ya*, again, and we are driven to admit that what we now call an optative or potential mood, was originally a kind of future, formed by *ya*, to go, very much like the French *je vais dire*, I am going to say, I shall say, or like the Zulu *ngi-ya¹-ku-tanda²*, I go to love, I shall love.³ The future would afterwards assume the character of a civil command, as 'thou wilt go' may be used even by us in the sense of 'go'; and the imperative would dwindle away into a potential, as we may say: 'go and you will see,' in the same sense as, 'if you go, you will see.'

¹ In old Latin the termination of the first person singular was *em*, and Bergk restores forms in *em* instead of *am* in Plautus. Thus Quintilian, i. 7. 23, says: 'Quid? non Cato Censorius *dicam* et *faciam*, *dicem* et *faciem* scripsit, eundemque in ceteris, quae similiter cadunt, modum tenuit? quod et ex veteribus ejus libris manifestum est, et a Messala in libro de s. littera positum.' Neue, *Formenlehre*, ii. p. 348. The introduction of *feram*, originally a subjunctive, to express the future in the first person, reminds us of the distinction in English between *I shall* and *thou wilt*, though the analogy fails in the first person plural. In Homer the use of the subjunctive for the future is well known. See Curtius, *Chronologie*, p. 50.

² Historically the *i* in *tuleritis* should be long in the subjunctive of the perfect, short in the future.

³ Bleek, *On the Concord*, p. lxi.

The terminations of the future are :

Sanskrit :

syâmi, syasi, syati, syâmas, syatha, syanti;

Greek :

σω, σεις, σει, : σομεν, σετε, σοντι;

Latin :

ero, eris, erit, erimus, : eritis, erunt.

In these terminations we have really two auxiliary verbs, the verb *as*, to be, and *ya*, to go, and by adding them to any given root, *as*, for instance, *DA*, to give, we have the Sanskrit (*dâ-as-yâ-mi*) :

dâ-s-yâ-mi, *dâ-s-ya-si*, *dâ-s-ya-ti*, *dâ-s-yâ-mas*, *dâ-s-ya-tha*, *dâ-s-ya-nti*;

Greek (*δω-εσ-ιω*) :

δω-σ-ω,¹ *δω-σ-εις*, *δω-σ-ει*, *δω-σ-ομεν*, *δω-σ-ετε*, *δω-σ-ουσι*.

Latin :

pot-ero, *pot-eris*, *pot-erit*, *pot-erimus*, *pot-eritis*, *pot-erunt*.

A verbal form of very frequent occurrence in Sanskrit is the so-called gerundive participle which signifies that a thing is necessary or proper to be done. Thus from *budh*, to know, is formed *bodh-ya-s*, one who is to be known, *cognoscendus*; from *guh*, to hide, *gûh-ya-s*, or *goh-ya-s*, one who is to be hidden, literally, one who goes to a state of hiding

¹ In *δω-σ-ω*, for *δωσῶ*, the *i* or *y* is lost in Greek as usual. In other verbs *s* and *y* are both lost. Hence *τενεσῶ* becomes *τενέσω*, and *τενῶ*, the so-called Attic future. Bopp, *Vergleich. Grammatik*, first ed. p. 903. In Latin we have traces of a similar future in forms like *fac-so*, *cap-so*, etc. See Neue, *Formenlehre*, ii. p. 421. The Epic dialect sometimes doubles the *σ* when the vowel is short, *αἰδέσσομαι*. But this can hardly be considered a relic of the original *σι*, because the same reduplication takes place sometimes in the Aorist, *ἐγέλασσα*.

or being hidden; from *yag*, to sacrifice, *yâg-ya-s*, one who is or ought to be worshipped. Here, again, what is going to be becomes gradually what will be, and lastly, what shall be. In Greek we find but few analogous forms, such as ἅγιος, holy, στυγ-ι-ος, to be hated; in Latin, *ex-im-i-us*, to be taken out; in Gothic *anda-ném-ja*, to be taken on, to be accepted, agreeable, German *angenehm*.¹

While the gerundive participles in *ya* are formed on the same principle as the verbal bases in *ya* of the passive, a number of substantives in *ya* seem to have been formed in close analogy to the bases of denominative verbs, or the bases of neuter verbs, in all of which the derivative *ya* expresses originally the act of going, behaving, and at last of simple being. Thus from *vid*, to know, we find in Sanskrit *vid-yâ*, knowing, knowledge; from *si*, to lie down, *sayyâ*, resting. Analogous forms in Latin are *gaud-i-um*, *stud-i-um*, or, with feminine terminations, *in-ed-i-a*, *in-vid-i-a*, *per-nic-i-es*, *scab-i-es*; in Greek, *μav-ι-a*, ἀμαρτ-ί-a or ἀμάρτ-ι-ον; in German, numerous abstract nouns in *i* and *e*.²

This shows how much can be achieved, and has been achieved, in language with the simplest mate-

¹ See Bopp, *Vergleichende Grammatik*, §§ 897, 898. These verbal adjectives should be carefully distinguished from nominal adjectives, such as Sanskrit *div-yâ-s*, *divinus*, originally *div-i-a-s*, i.e. *divi-bhavas*, being in heaven; οἰκεῖος, *domesticus*, originally οἰκεῖ-ο-s, being in the house. These are adjectives formed, it would seem, from old locatives, just as in Bask we can form from *etche*, house, *etche-tio*, of the house, and *etche-tic-acoa*, he who is of the house; or from *seme*, son, *semea-ren*, of the son, and *semea-ren-a*, he who is of the son. See W. J. van Eys, *Essai de Grammaire de la Langue Basque*, 1867, p. 16.

² Bopp, *Vergleichende Grammatik*, §§ 888–898.

rials. Neuter, denominative, causative, passive verbs, optatives and futures, gerundives, adjectives, and substantives, all are formed by one and the same process, by means of one and the same root. It is no inconsiderable portion of grammar which has thus been explained by this one root *ya*, to go, and we learn again and again how simple and yet how wonderful are the ways of language, if we follow them up from stratum to stratum to their original starting-point.

Now, what has happened in these cases has happened over and over again in the history of language. Everything that is now formal, not only derivative suffixes, but everything that constitutes the grammatical framework and articulation of language, was originally material. What we now call the terminations of cases were mostly local adverbs; what we call the personal endings of verbs were personal pronouns. Suffixes and affixes were mostly independent words, nominal, verbal, or pronominal; there is, in fact, nothing in language that is now empty, or dead, or formal, that was not originally full, and alive, and material. It is the object of Comparative Grammar to trace every formal or dead element back to its life-like form; and though this resuscitating process is by no means complete, nay, though in several cases it seems hopeless to try to discover the living type from which proceeded the petrified fragments which we call terminations or suffixes, enough evidence has been brought together to establish on the firmest basis this general maxim, that *Nothing is dead in any language that was not originally alive*; that nothing exists in a tertiary stratum that does not

find its antecedents and its explanation in the secondary or primary stratum of human speech.

After having explained, as far as it was possible in so short a time, what I consider to be the right view of the stratification of human speech, I should have wished to be able to show to you how the aspect of some of the most difficult and most interesting problems of our science is changed if we look at them again with the new light which we have gained regarding the necessary antecedents of all language. Let me only call your attention to one of the most contested points in the Science of Language. The question whether we may assign a common origin to the Aryan and Semitic languages has been discussed over and over again. No one thinks now of deriving Sanskrit from Hebrew, or Hebrew from Sanskrit; the only question is whether at some time or other the two languages could ever have formed part of one and the same body of speech. There are scholars, and very eminent scholars, who deny all similarity between the two; while others have collected materials that would seem to make it difficult to assign such numerous coincidences to mere chance. Nowhere, in fact, has Bacon's observation on this radical distinction between different men's dispositions for philosophy and the sciences been more fully verified than among the students of the Science of Language:—
Maximum et velut radicale discrimen ingeniorum, quoad philosophiam et scientias, illud est, quod alia ingenia sint fortiora et aptiora ad notandas rerum differentias; alia ad notandas rerum similitudines. Utrumque autem ingenium facile labitur in excessum, prensando aut gradus rerum, aut um-

bras.¹ Before, however, we enter upon an examination of the evidence brought forward by different scholars in support of their conflicting theories, it is our first duty to ask a preliminary question, viz. What kind of evidence have we any right to expect, considering that both Sanskrit and Hebrew belong, in the state in which we know them, to the inflectional stratum of speech?

Now, it is quite true that Sanskrit and Hebrew had a separate existence long before they reached the tertiary stratum, before they became thoroughly inflectional; and that consequently they can share nothing in common that is peculiar to the inflectional stratum in each, nothing that is the result of phonetic decay, which sets in after combinatory formations have become unintelligible and traditional. I mean, supposing that the pronoun of the first person had been originally the same in the Semitic and Aryan languages, supposing that in the Hebrew *an-oki* (Assyrian *an-aku*, Phen. *anak*) the last portion, *oki*, was originally identical with the Sanskrit *ah* in *aham*, the Greek *ἐγ* in *ἐγ-ώ*, it would still be useless to attempt to derive the termination of the first person singular, whether in *kâtal-ti* or in *ektôl*, from the same type which in Sanskrit appears as *mi* or *am*, or *a*, in *tudâ-mi*, *atud-am*, *tutod-a*. There cannot be between Hebrew and Sanskrit the same relationship as between Sanskrit and Greek, if indeed the term of relationship is applicable even to Sanskrit and Greek, which are really mere dialectic varieties of one and the same type of speech.

The question then arises, Could the Semitic and

¹ Bacon, *Novum Organum*, i. 55.

Aryan languages have been identical during the second or *combinatory* period? Here, as before, the answer must be, I believe, decidedly negative, for not only are the empty words which are used for derivative purposes different in each, but, what is far more characteristic, the manner in which they are added to the stems is different too. In the Aryan languages formative elements are attached to the ends of words only; in the Semitic languages they are found both at the end and at the beginning. In the Aryan languages grammatical compounds are all according to the formula $r\rho$; in the Semitic we have formations after the formulas $r\rho$, ρr , and $\rho r\rho$.

There remains, therefore, the first or isolating stage only in which Semitic and Aryan speech might have been identical. But even here we must make a distinction. All Aryan roots are monosyllabic, all Semitic roots have been raised to a triliteral form. Therefore it is only previous to the time when the Semitic roots assumed this secondary triliteral form that any community could possibly be admitted between these two streams of language. Supposing we knew as an historical fact that at this early period—a period which transcends the limits of everything we are accustomed to call historical—Semitic and Aryan speech had been identical, what evidence of this union could we expect to find in the actual Semitic and Aryan languages, such as we know them in their inflectional period? Let us recollect that the 100,000 words of English, nay, the many hundred thousands of words in all the dictionaries of the other Aryan languages, have been reduced to about 500 roots, and that this small number of roots admits of still

further reduction. Let us, then, bear in mind that the same holds good with regard to the Semitic languages, particularly if we accept the reduction of all triliteral to biliteral roots. What, then, could we expect in our comparison of Hebrew and Sanskrit but a small number of radical coincidences, a similarity in the form and meaning of about 500 radical syllables, everything else in Hebrew and Sanskrit being an after-growth, which could not begin before the two branches of speech were severed once and for ever.

But more, if we look at these roots we shall find that their predicative power is throughout very general, and therefore liable to an infinite amount of specification. A root that means to fall (Sk. *pat*, *πί-πτ-ω*) comes to mean to fly (Sk. *ut-pat*, *πέτομαι*). The root *dâ*, which means to give, assumes, after the preposition *â*, the sense of taking. The root *yu*, which means to join, means to separate, if preceded by the preposition *vi*. The root *ghar*, which expresses brightness, may supply, and does supply in different Aryan languages, derivations expressive of brightness (gleam), warmth (Sk. *gharma*, heat), joy (*χαίρειν*), love (*χάρις*), of the colours of green (Sk. *hari*), yellow (*gilvus*, *flavus*), and red (Sk. *harit*, *fulvus*), of the hearth (*furnus*) and of the sun (*ghramsa*). In the Semitic languages this vagueness of meaning in the radical elements forms one of the principal difficulties of the student, for according as a root is used in its different conjugations, it may convey the most startling variety of conception. It is also to be taken into account that out of the very limited number of roots which at that early time were used

in common by the ancestors of the Aryan and Semitic races, a certain portion may have been lost by each, so that the fact that there are roots in Hebrew of which no trace exists in Sanskrit, and *vice versâ*, would again be perfectly natural and intelligible.

It is right and most essential that we should see all this clearly, that we should understand how little evidence we are justified in expecting in support of a common origin of the Semitic and Aryan languages, before we commit ourselves to any opinion on this important subject. I have by no means exhausted all the influences that would naturally, nay, necessarily, have contributed towards producing the differences between the radical elements of Aryan and Semitic speech, always supposing that the two sprang originally from the same source. Even if we excluded the ravages of phonetic decay from that early period of speech, we should have to make ample allowance for the influence of dialectic variety. We know in the Aryan languages the constant play between gutturals, dentals, and labials (*quinque*, Sk. *pañka*, *πέντε*, Aeol. *πέμπε*, Goth. *fimf*). We know the dialectic interchange of Aspirate, Media, and Tenuis, which, from the very beginning, has imparted to the principal channels of Aryan speech their individual character (*τρεῖς*, Goth. *threis*, High German *drei*).¹ If this and

¹ Until a rational account of these changes, comprehended under the name of *Lautverschiebung*, is given, we must continue to look upon them, not as the result of phonetic decay, but of dialectic growth. I am glad to find that this is more and more admitted by those who think for themselves instead of simply repeating the opinions of others. Grimm's Law stands no longer alone, as peculiar to the Teutonic languages, but analogous changes have been

much more could happen within the dialectic limits of one more or less settled body of speech, what must have been the chances beyond those limits? Considering how fatal to the identity of a word the change of a single consonant would be in monosyllabic languages, we might expect that monosyllabic roots, if their meaning was so general, vague, and changeable, would all the more carefully have preserved their consonantal outline. But this is by no means the case. Monosyllabic languages have their dialects no less than polysyllabic ones; and from the rapid and decisive divergence of such dialects we may learn how rapid and decisive the divergence of language must have been during the isolating period. Mr. Edkins, who has paid particular attention to the dialects of Chinese, states that in the northern provinces the greatest changes have taken place, eight initial and one final consonant having

pointed out in the South-African, the Chinese, the Polynesian dialects, showing that these changes are everywhere collateral, not successive. I agree with Professor Curtius and other scholars that the impulse to what we call *Lautverschiebung* was given by the third modification in each series of consonants, by the *gh*, *dh*, *bh* in Sanskrit, the χ , θ , ϕ in Greek. I differ from him because I consider the changes of *Lautverschiebung* as the result of dialectic variety, while he sees their motive power in phonetic corruption. But whether we take the one view or the other, I do not see that Dr. Scherer has removed any of our difficulties. See Curtius, *Grundzüge*, 4th ed. p. 426, note. Dr. Scherer, in his thoughtful work, *Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache*, has very nearly, though not quite, apprehended the meaning of my explanation as to the effects of dialectic change contrasted with those of phonetic decay. If it is allowable to use a more homely illustration, one might say no doubt with perfect truth, that each dialect chooses its own phonetic garment, as people choose the coats and trousers which best fit them. The simile, however, like most similes, is imperfect, though it is far more exact than to compare the ravages of phonetic decay, as is frequently done, to the wear and tear of these phonetic suits.

been exchanged for others, and three finals lost. Along the southern bank of the Yang-tsi-kiang, and a little to the north of it, the old initials are all preserved, as also through Chekiang to Fuh-kien. But among the finals, *m* is exchanged for *n*; *t* and *p* are lost, and also *k*, except in some country districts. Some words have two forms, one used colloquially, and one appropriated to reading. The former is the older pronunciation, and the latter more near to Mandarin. The cities of Su-cheu, Hang-cheu, Ningpo, and Wen-cheu, with the surrounding country, may be considered as having one dialect, spoken probably by thirty millions of people, *i.e.* by more than the whole population of Great Britain and Ireland. The city of Hwei-cheu has a dialect of its own, in which the soft initial consonants are exchanged for hard and aspirated ones, a process analogous to what we call *Lautverschiebung* in the Aryan languages. At Fu-cheu-fu, in the eastern part of the province of Kiang-si, the soft initials have likewise been replaced by aspirates. In many parts of the province of Hunan the soft initials still linger on; but in the city of Chang-sha the spoken dialect has the five tones of Mandarin, and the aspirated and other initials distributed in the same manner. In the island of Hai-nan there is a distinct approach to the form which Chinese words assume in the language of Annam. Many of the hard consonants are softened, instead of the reverse taking place as in many other parts of China. Thus *ti*, *di*, both *ti* in Mandarin, are both pronounced *di* in Hai-nan. *B* and *p* are both used for many words whose initials are *w* and *f* in Mandarin. In the dialects of the province of

Fuh-kien the following changes take place in initial consonants: *k* is used for *h*; *p* for *f*; *m*, *b*, for *w*; *j* for *y*; *t* for *k*; *k* for *s*; *ng* for *i*, *y*, *w*; *n* for *g*.¹ When we have clearly realised to ourselves what such changes mean in words consisting of one consonant and one vowel, we shall be more competent to act as judges, and to determine what right we have to call for more ample and more definite evidence in support of the common origin of languages which became separated during their monosyllabic or isolating stages, and which are not known to us before they are well advanced in the inflectional stage.

It might be said:—why, if we make allowance for all this, the evidence really comes to nothing, and is hardly deserving of the attention of the scholar. I do not deny that this is, and always has been, my own opinion. All I wish to put clearly before other scholars is, that this is not our fault. We see why there can be no evidence, and we find there is no evidence, or very little, in support of a common origin of Semitic and Aryan speech. But that is very different from dogmatic assertions, so often and so confidently repeated, that there can be no kind of relationship between Sanskrit and Hebrew, that they must have had different beginnings, that they represent, in fact, two independent species of human speech. All this is pure dogmatism, and no true scholar will be satisfied with it, or turn away contemptuously from the tentative researches of scholars like Ewald, Raumer and Ascoli. These scholars, particularly Raumer and Ascoli, have given

¹ Edkins, *Grammar*, p. 84.

us, as far as I can judge, far more evidence in support of a radical relationship between Hebrew and Sanskrit than, from my point of view, we are entitled to expect. I mean this as a caution in both directions. If, on one side, we ought not to demand more than we have a right to demand, we ought, on the other, not to look for, nor attempt to bring forward, more evidence than the nature of the case admits of. We know that words which have identically the same sound and meaning in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and German, cannot be the same words, because they would contravene those phonetic laws that made these languages to differ from each other. *To doom* cannot have any connection with the Latin *damnare*; *to call* cannot be the Greek *καλεῖν*, the Latin *calare*; nor Greek *φαῦλος* the German *faul*; the English *care* cannot be identified with Latin *cura*, nor the German *Auge* with the Greek *αὐγή*. The same applies, only with a hundred-fold greater force, to words in Hebrew and Sanskrit. If any triliteral root in Hebrew were to agree with a triliteral word in Sanskrit, we should feel certain, at once, that they are not the same, or that their similarity is purely accidental. Pronouns, numerals, and a few imitative rather than predicative names for father and mother, etc., may have been preserved from the earliest stage by the Aryan and Semitic speakers; but if scholars go beyond, and compare such words as Hebrew *barak*, to bless, and Latin *precari*; Hebrew *lab*, heart, and the English *liver*; Hebrew *melech*, king, and the Latin *mulcere*, to smoothe, to quiet, to subdue, they are in great danger, I believe, of proving too much.

Attempts have lately been made to point out a number of roots which Chinese shares in common with Sanskrit. Far it be from me to stigmatise even such researches as unscientific, though it requires an effort for one brought up in the very straitest school of Bopp, to approach such inquiries without prejudice. Yet, if conducted with care and sobriety, and particularly with a clear perception of the limits within which such inquiries must be confined, they are perfectly legitimate; far more so than the learned dogmatism with which some of our most eminent scholars have declared a common origin of Sanskrit and Chinese as out of the question. I cannot bring myself to say that the method which Mr. Chalmers adopts in his interesting work on the 'Origin of Chinese' is likely to carry conviction to the mind of the *bonâ fide* sceptic. I believe, before we compare the words of Chinese with those of any other language, every effort should be made to trace Chinese words back to their most primitive form. Here Mr. Edkins has pointed out the road that ought to be followed, and has clearly shown the great advantage to be derived from an accurate study of Chinese dialects. The same scholar has done still more by pointing out how Chinese should at first be compared with its nearest relatives, the Mongolian of the North-Turanian, and the Tibetan of the South-Turanian class, before any comparisons are attempted with more distant colonies that started during the monosyllable period of speech. 'I am now seeking to compare,' he writes, 'the Mongolian and Tibetan with the Chinese, and have already obtained some interesting results;

‘1. A large proportion of Mongol words are Chinese. Perhaps a fifth are so. The identity is in the first syllable of the Mongol words, that being the root. The correspondence is most striking in the adjectives, of which perhaps one half of the most common are the same radically as in Chinese. *E.g.* *sain*, good; *begen*, low; *ic’hi*, right; *sologai*, left; *c’hihe*, straight; *gadan*, outside; *c’hohon*, few; *logon*, green; *hunggun*, light (not heavy). But the identity is also extensive in other parts of speech, and this identity of common roots seems to extend into the Turkish, Tatar, etc.; *e.g.* *su*, water, *tenri*, heaven.

‘2. To compare Mongol with Chinese it is necessary to go back at least six centuries in the development of the Chinese language. For we find in common roots final letters peculiar to the old Chinese, *e.g.* final *m*. The initial letters also need to be considered from another standpoint than the Mandarin pronunciation. If a large number of words are common to Chinese, Mongol and Tatar, we must go back at least twelve centuries to obtain a convenient epoch of comparison.

‘3. While the Mongol has no traces of tones, they are very distinctly developed in Tibetan. Csoma de Körös and Schmidt do not mention the existence of tones, but they plainly occur in the pronunciation of native Tibetans resident in Peking.

‘4. As in the case of the comparison with Mongol, it is necessary in examining the connection of Tibetan with Chinese to adopt the old form of the Chinese with its more numerous final consonants, and its full system of soft, hard, and aspirated

initials. The Tibetan numerals exemplify this with sufficient clearness.

‘5. While the Mongol is near the Chinese in the extensive prevalence of words common to the two languages, the Tibetan is near in phonal structure, as being tonic and monosyllabic. This being so, it is less remarkable that there are many words common to Chinese and Tibetan, for it might have been expected; but that there should be perhaps as many in the Mongol with its long untuned polysyllables, is a curious circumstance.’¹

¹ Having stated this on the authority of Mr. Edkins, one of our best living Chinese scholars, it is but fair that I should give the opinion of another Chinese scholar, the late Stanislas Julien, whose competence to give an opinion on this subject Mr. Edkins would probably be the first to acknowledge. All that we really want is the truth, not a momentary triumph of our own opinions. M. Julien wrote to me in July, 1868:

‘Je ne suis pas du tout de l’avis d’Edkins qui dit qu’un grand nombre de mots mongols sont chinois; c’est faux, archifaux.

Sain est mandchou et veut dire bon, en chinois *chen*.

begen, low; en chinois *hia*.

itchi, droit; en chinois *yeou*.

sologai, left, gauche; en chinois *tso*.

o’hihe, straight; en chinois *tohi* (rectus).

gadan, outside; en chinois *mai*.

logon, green; en chinois *tsing*.

o’hohon, few; en chinois *chao*.

hungun, light (not heavy); en chinois *king*.

‘Je voudrais bien savoir comment M. Edkins prouve que les mots qu’il cite sont chinois.

‘Foucaux a échoué également en voulant prouver, autrefois, que 200 mots thibétains qu’il avait choisis ressemblaient aux mots chinois correspondants.’

M. Stanislas Julien wrote again to me on the 21st of July:

‘J’ai peur que vous ne soyez fâché du jugement sévère que j’ai porté sur les identifications faites par Edkins du mongol avec le chinois. J’ai d’abord pris dans votre savant article les mots mon-

This is no doubt the right spirit in which researches into the early history of language should

gols qu'il cite et je vous ai montré qu'ils ne ressemblent pas le moins du monde au chinois.

'Je vais vous en citer d'autres tirés du Dictionnaire de Khien-lung, chinois-mandchou-mongol.

Mongol.	Chinois.
<i>tegri</i> , ciel	<i>thien</i> .
<i>naran</i> , soleil	<i>ji</i> .
<i>naran barimoni</i> , } éclipse de soleil }	<i>ji-ohi</i> .
<i>saran</i> , lune	<i>youei</i> .
<i>oudoun</i> , étoile	<i>sing</i> .
<i>egoulé</i> , nuages	<i>yun</i> .
<i>avounga</i> , le tonnerre	<i>louï</i> .
<i>tehagilgan</i> , éclair	<i>tien</i> .
<i>borogan</i> , la pluie	<i>yu</i> .
<i>sigouderi</i> , la rosée	<i>lou</i> .
<i>kirago</i> , la gelée	<i>choany</i> .
<i>lapsa</i> , la neige	<i>sious</i> .
<i>salgin</i> , le vent	<i>fong</i> .
<i>ousoun</i> , l'eau	<i>choui</i> .
<i>gal</i> , le feu	<i>ho</i> .
<i>siroi</i> , la terre	<i>thou</i> .
<i>aisin</i> , l'or	<i>altan</i> .

'Je vous donnerai, si vous le désirez, 1000 mots mongols avec leurs synonymes chinois, et je défie M. Edkins de trouver dans les 1000 mots mongols un seul qui ressemble au mot chinois synonyme.

'Comme j'ai fait assez de thibétain, je puis vous fournir aussi une multitude de mots thibétains avec leurs correspondants en chinois, et je défierai également M. Edkins de trouver un seul mot thibétain dans mille qui ressemble au mot chinois qui a le même sens.'

My old friend, M. Stanislas Julien, wrote to me once more on this subject, the 6th of August, 1868:

'Depuis une quinzaine d'années, j'ai l'avantage d'entretenir les meilleures relations avec M. Edkins. J'ai lu anciennement dans un journal que publie M. Léon de Rosny (actuellement professeur titulaire de la langue Japonaise) le travail où M. Edkins a tâché de rapprocher et d'identifier, par les sons, des mots mongols et chinois ayant la même signification. Son système m'a paru mal fondé. Quelques mots chinois peuvent être entrés dans la langue mongole par suite du contact des deux peuples, comme cela est arrivé pour

be conducted, and I hope that Mr. Edkins, Mr. Chalmers, and others, will not allow themselves to

le mandchou, dont beaucoup de mots sont entrés dans la langue mongole en en prenant les terminaisons ; mais il ne faudrait pas se servir de ces exemples pour montrer l'identité ou les ressemblances des deux langues.

‘ Quand les mandchous ont voulu traduire les livres chinois, ils ont rencontré un grand nombre de mots dont les synonymes n'existaient pas dans leur langue. Ils se sont alors emparé des mots chinois en leur donnant des terminaisons mandchoues, mais cette quasi-ressemblance de certains mots mandchous ne prouve point le moins du monde l'identité des deux langues. Par exemple, un préfet se dit en chinois tchi-fou, et un sous-préfet tchi-hien ; les mandchous, qui ne possédaient point ces fonctionnaires, se sont contentés de transcrire les sons chinois dchhifou, dchhikhiyan.

‘ Le tafetas se dit en chinois tcheou-tse ; les mandchous, n'ayant point de mots pour dire tafetas, ont transcrit les sons chinois par tchousé. Le bambou se dit tchou-tze ; ils ont écrit l'arbre (moo) tchousé. Un titre de noblesse écrit sur du papier doré s'appelle tsé ; les mandchous écrivent tche. Je pourrais vous citer un nombre considérable de mots du même genre, qui ne prouvent pas du tout l'identité du mandchou et du chinois.

‘ L'ambre s'appelle hou-pe ; les mandchous écrivent khôba. La barbe s'appelle hou-tse ; ils écrivent khôsé.

‘ Voici de quelle manière les mandchous ont fait certains verbes. Une balance s'appelle en chinois thien p'ing, ils écrivent p'ing-sé ; puis pour dire peser avec une balance, ils ont fait le verbe p'ingse-lembi ; lembi est une terminaison commune à beaucoup de verbes.

‘ Pour dire faire peser, ordonner de peser avec une balance, ils écrivent p'ingseleboumbi ; boumbi est la forme factive ou causative ; cette terminaison sert aussi pour le passif ; de sorte que ce verbe peut signifier aussi *être pesé avec une balance*.

‘ Je pourrais citer aussi des mots mandchous auxquels on a donné la terminaison mongole, et *vice versa*.’

These remarks, made by one who, during his lifetime, was recognised by friend and foe as the first Chinese scholar in Europe, ought to have their proper weight. They ought certainly to make us cautious before persuading ourselves that the connection between the Northern and Southern branches of the Turanian languages has been found in Chinese. On the other hand, I am quite aware that all that M. Stanislas Julien says against Mr. Edkins may be true, and that nevertheless Chinese may have been the central language

be discouraged by the ordinary objections that are brought against all tentative studies. Even if their researches should only lead to negative results, they would be of the highest importance. The criterion by which we test the relationship of inflectional languages, such as Sanskrit and Greek, Hebrew and Arabic, cannot, from the nature of the case, be applied to languages which are still in the combinatory or isolating stratum, nor would they answer any purpose, if we tried by them to determine whether certain languages, separated during their inflectional growth, had been united during their combinatory stage, or whether languages, separated during their combinatory progress, had started from a common centre in their monosyllabic age. Bopp's attempt to work with his Aryan tools on the Malayo-Polynesian languages, and to discover in them traces of Aryan forms, ought to serve as a warning example.

However, there are dangers also, and even greater dangers, on the opposite shore, and if Mr. Chalmers in his interesting work on the 'Origin of Chinese,' compares, for instance, the Chinese *tzé*, child, with the Bohemian *tsi*, daughter, I know that the indignation of the Aryan scholars will be roused to a very

from which Mongolian in the north and Tibetan in the south branched off. A language, such as Chinese, with a small number of sounds and an immense number of meanings, can easily give birth to dialects which, in their later development, might branch off in totally different directions. Even with languages so closely connected as Sanskrit and Latin, it would be easy to make out a list of a thousand words in Latin which could not be matched in Sanskrit. The question, therefore, is not decided. What is wanted are researches carried on by competent scholars in an unprejudiced and at the same time a thoroughly scientific spirit.

high pitch, considering how they have proved most minutely that *tsi* or *dci* in Bohemian is the regular modification of *dugte*, and that *dugte* is the Sanskrit *duhitar*, the Greek *θυγάτηρ*, daughter, originally a pet-name, meaning a milk-maid, and given by the Aryan shepherds, and by them only, to the daughters of their house. Such accidents¹ will happen in so comprehensive a subject as the Science of Language. They have happened to scholars like Bopp, Grimm, and Burnouf, and they will happen again. I do not defend haste or inaccuracy: I only say, we must venture on, and not imagine that all is done, and that nothing remains to conquer in our science. Our watchword, here as elsewhere, should be *Festina lente!* but, by all means, *Festina! Festina! Festina!*

¹ If Mr. Chalmers' comparison of the Chinese and Bohemian names for daughter is so unpardonable, what shall we say of Bopp's comparison of the Bengali and Sanskrit names for sister? Sister in Bengali is *bohini*, the Hindi *bahin* and *bhân*, the Prakrit *bahini*, the Sanskrit *bhagini*. Yet Bopp, in the most elaborate way, derives *bohini* from the Sanskrit *svasri*, sister. Bopp, *Vergleichende Grammatik*, Vorrede zur vierten Abtheilung, p. x.

PART II.

ON CURTIUS' CHRONOLOGY OF THE INDO-GERMANIC LANGUAGES.

IN a former Lecture on the 'Stratification of Language' I ventured to assert that wherever *inflection* has yielded to a rational analysis, it has invariably been recognised as the result of a previous *combination*, and wherever *combination* has been traced back to an earlier stage, that earlier stage has been simply *juxtaposition*.

Professor Pott in his 'Etymologische Forschungen' (1871, p. 16), a work which worthily holds its place by the side of Bopp's 'Comparative Grammar,' questions the correctness of that statement; but in doing so he seems to me to have overlooked the restrictions which I myself had introduced, in order to avoid the danger of committing myself to what might seem too general a statement. I did not say that every form of inflection had been proved to spring from a previous combination, but I spoke of those cases only where we have succeeded in a rational analysis of inflectional forms, and it was in these that I maintained that inflection had always been found to be the result of previous combination. What is the object of the analysis of grammatical inflections, or of Comparative Grammar in general, if not to find out what terminations originally were, before they

had assumed a purely formal character? If we take the French adverb *sincèrement*, sincerely, and trace it back to the Latin *sincerâ mente*, we have for a second time the three stages of juxtaposition, combination, and, to a certain extent, inflection, repeated before our eyes. I say inflection, for *ment*, though originally an independent word, soon becomes a mere adverbial suffix, the speakers so little thinking of its original purport that we may say of a stone that it falls *lourdement*, heavily, without wishing to imply that it falls *luridâ mente*, with a heavy, lit. with a lurid mind.

If we take the nom. sing. of a noun in Sanskrit, Greek, or Latin, we find that masculine nouns end frequently in *s*. We have, for instance, Sk. *vesa-s*, Gr. *oîko-s*, Lat. *vîcu-s*. These three words are identical in their termination, in their base, and in their root. The root is the Sk. *vis*, to settle down, to enter upon or into a thing. This root, without undergoing any further change, may answer the purpose both of a verbal and a nominal base. In the precative, for instance, we have *vis-yâ-t*, he may enter, which yields to a rational analysis into *vis*, the root *yâ*, to go, and the old pronominal stem of the third person, *t*, he. We reduplicate the root, and we get the perfect *vi-vis-us*, they have entered. Here I can understand that objections might be raised against accepting *us* as a mere phonetic corruption of *ant* and *anti*; but if, as in Greek, we find as the termination of the third pers. plur. of the perfect *âσι*, we know that this is a merely phonetic change of the original *anti*,¹ and this *anti* has been

¹ Curtius, *Verbum*, p. 72.

traced back by Pott himself (whether rightly or wrongly, we need not here inquire) to the pronominal stems *ana*, *that*, and *ti*, *he*. These two stems, when joined together, become *anti*,¹ meaning *those and he*, and are gradually reduced to *âsi*, and in Sanskrit to *us* for *ant*. What we call reduplication has likewise been traced back by Pott himself to an original repetition of the whole root, so that *vi-vis* stands for an original or intentional *vis-vis*; thus showing again the succession of the three stages, juxtaposition, *vis-vis*, combination, *vi-vis*, inflection, the same, *vi-vis*, though liable to further phonetic modification.

Used as a nominal base the same root *vis* appears, without any change, in the nom. plur. *vis-as*, the settlers, the clans, the people. Now, here again Professor Pott himself has endeavoured to explain the inflection *as* by tracing it back to the pronominal base *as*, in *asau*, *ille*. He therefore takes the plural *vis-as* as a compound, meaning ‘man and that’: that is to say, he traces the inflection back to a combinatory origin.

By raising the simple base *vis* to *visa*, we arrive at new verbal forms, such as *vis-â-mi*, I enter, *vis-a-si*, thou enterest, *vis-a-ti*, he enters. In all these inflectional forms, the antecedent combinatory stage is still more or less visible, for *mi*, *si*, *ti*, whatever their exact history may have been, are clearly varieties of the pronominal bases of the first, second, and third persons, *ma*, *tva*, *ta*.

Lastly, by raising *vis* to *vesa*, we arrive at a new

¹ Pott, *E. F.* 1871, p. 21.

nominal base, and by adding to it the stem of a demonstrative pronoun *s*, we form the so-called nom. sing. *vesa-s*, *oĩkos*, *vicu-s*, from which we started, meaning originally house-here, this house, the house.

In all this Professor Pott would fully agree, but where he would differ would be when we proceed to generalise, and to lay it down as an axiom that all inflectional forms *must* have had the same combinatory origin. He may be right in thus guarding against too hasty generalisation, to which we are but too prone in all inductive sciences. I am well aware that there are many inflections which have not yielded, as yet, to any rational analysis, but, with that reservation, I thought, and I still think, it right to say that, until some other process of forming those inflections has been pointed out, inflection may be considered as the invariable result of combination.

It is impossible in writing, always to repeat such qualifications and reservations. They must be taken as understood. Take for instance the augment in Greek and Sanskrit. Some scholars have explained it as a negative particle, others as a demonstrative pronoun; others, again, took it as a mere symbol of differentiation. If the last explanation could be established by more general analogies, then, no doubt, we should have here an inflection that cannot be referred to combination. Again, it would be difficult to say what independent element was added to the pronoun *sa*, he, in order to make it *sâ*, she. This, too, may, for all we know, be a case of phonetic symbolism, and, if so, it should be treated on its own merits. The lengthening of the vowel in the subjunctive mood was formerly represented by Professor

Curtius as a symbolic expression of hesitation, but he has lately recalled that explanation as untenable. I pointed out that when in Hebrew we meet with such forms as *Piel* and *Pual*, *Hiphil* and *Hophal*, we feel tempted to admit formative agencies, different from mere juxtaposition and combination. But before we admit this purely phonetic symbolism, we should bear in mind that the changes of *bruder*, brother, into *brüder*, brethren, *ich weiss*, I know, into *wir wissen*, we know, which seem at first sight purely phonetic, have after all been proved to be the indirect result of juxtaposition and combination, so that we ought to be extremely careful, and first exhaust every possible rational explanation, before we have recourse to phonetic symbolism as an element in the production of inflectional forms.

The chief object, however, of my lecture on the 'Stratification of Language' was not so much to show that inflection everywhere presupposes combination, and combination juxtaposition, but rather to call attention to a fact that had not been noticed before, viz. that there is hardly any language which is not at the same time *isolating*, *combinatory* and *inflectional*.

It had been the custom in classifying languages morphologically to represent some languages, for instance Chinese, as *isolating*; others, such as Turkish or Finnish, as *combinatory*; others, such as Sanskrit or Hebrew, as *inflectional*. Without contesting the value of this classification for certain purposes, I pointed out that even Chinese, the very type of the isolating class, is not free from combinatory forms, and that the more highly developed

among the combinatory languages, such as Hungarian, Finnish, Tamil, etc., show the clearest traces of incipient inflection. 'The difficulty is not,' as I said, 'to show the transition of one stratum of speech into another, but rather to draw a sharp line between the different strata. The same difficulty was felt in Geology, and led Sir Charles Lyell to invent such pliant names as *Eocene*, *Meiocene*, and *Pleiocene*, names which indicate a mere dawn, a minority, or a majority of new formations, but do not draw a fast and hard line, cutting off one stratum from the other. Natural growth and even merely mechanical accumulation and accretion, here, as elsewhere, are so minute and almost imperceptible that they defy all strict scientific terminology, and force upon us the lesson that we must be satisfied with an approximate accuracy.'

Holding these opinions, and having established them by an amount of evidence which, though it might easily be increased, seemed to me sufficient, I did not think it safe to assign to the three stages in the history of the Aryan languages, the *juxtapositional*, the *combinatory*, and the *inflectional*, a strictly successive character, still less to admit in the growth of the Aryan languages a number of definite stages which should be sharply separated from each other and assume an almost chronological character. I fully admit that wherever *inflectional* forms in the Aryan languages have yielded to a rational analysis, we see that they are preceded chronologically by *combinatory* formations; nor should I deny for one moment that *combinatory* forms presuppose an antecedent, and therefore chronologically more ancient, stage of mere juxtaposition. What I doubt is

whether, as soon as combination sets in, juxtaposition ceases, and whether the first appearance of inflection puts an end to the continued working of combination.

It seems to me, even if we argue only on *à priori* grounds, that there must have been at least a period of transition during which both principles were at work together, and I hardly can understand what certain scholars mean if they represent the principle of inflection as a sudden psychological change which, as soon as it has taken place, makes a return to combination altogether impossible. If, instead of arguing *à priori*, we look the facts of language in the face, we cannot help seeing that, even after that period during which it is supposed that the united Aryan language had attained its full development—I mean at a time when Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin had become completely separated, as so many national dialects, each with its own fully developed inflectional grammar—the power of combination was by no means extinct. The free power of composition, which is so manifest in Sanskrit and Greek, testifies to the continued working of combination in strictly historical times. I see no real distinction between the transition of *Néa pólis*, i.e. new town, into *Neápolis*, and into *Naples*, and the most primitive combination in Chinese, and I maintain that as long as a language retains that unbounded faculty of composition which we see in Sanskrit, in Greek, and in German, the growth of new inflectional forms from combinatory germs must be admitted as possible. Forms such as the passive aorist in Greek, *ἐτέθην*, or the weak preterite in Gothic, *nas-i-da*, *nas-i-dédjan*, need not

have been formed before the Aryan family broke up into national languages; and forms such as Italian *meco*, *fratelmo*, or the future *avro*, I shall have, though not exactly of the same workmanship, show at all events that analogous powers are at work even in the latest periods of linguistic growth.

Holding these opinions, which, as far as I know, have never been controverted, I ought perhaps, when I came to publish the preceding Lecture, to have defended my position against the powerful arguments advanced in the meantime by my old friend Professor G. Curtius, in support of a diametrically opposite opinion, in his classical essay, 'On the Chronology of the Indo-Germanic Languages,' published in 1867, new edition, 1873. While I had endeavoured to show that juxtaposition, combination, and inflection, though following each other in succession, do not represent chronological periods, but represent phases, strongly developed, it is true, in certain languages, but extending their influence far beyond the limits commonly assigned to them, Professor Curtius tried to establish the chronological character not only of these three, but of four other phases or periods in the history of Aryan speech. Confining himself to what he considers the undivided Aryan language to have been before it was broken up into national dialects, such as Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, he proceeds to subdivide the antecedent periods of its growth into *seven* definite stages, each marked by a definite character, and each representing a sum of years in the chronology of the Aryan language. As I had found it difficult to treat Chinese as entirely *juxtapositional*, or Turkish as entirely *combinatory*,

or Sanskrit as entirely *inflectional*, it was perhaps not to be wondered at that not even the persuasive pleading of my learned friend could convince me of the truth of the more minute chronological division proposed by him in his learned essay. But it would hardly have been fair if, on the present occasion, I had reprinted my 'Rede Lecture' without explaining why I had altered nothing in my theory of linguistic growth, why I retained these three phases and no more, and why I treated even these, not as chronological periods, in the strict sense of the word, but as preponderating tendencies, giving an individual character to certain classes of language, without being totally absent in others. Professor Curtius is one of the few scholars with whom it is pleasant to differ. He has shown again and again that what he cares for is truth, not victory, and when he has defended his position against attacks not always courteous, he has invariably done so, not with hard words, but with hard arguments. I therefore feel no hesitation in stating plainly to him where his theories seem to me either not fully supported or even contradicted by the facts of language, and I trust that this free exchange of ideas, though in public, will be as pleasant as our conversations in private used to be, now more than thirty years ago.

Let us begin with the *First Period*, which Professor Curtius calls the *Root-Period*. There must have been, as I have tried to explain before, a period for the Aryan languages, during which they stood on a level with Chinese, using nothing but roots, or radical words, without having reduced any of them to a purely formal character, without having gone through

the process of changing what Chinese grammarians call *full* words into *empty* words. I have always held that to speak of roots as mere abstractions, as the result of grammatical theory, is self-contradictory. Roots which never had any real or historical existence may have been invented both in modern and ancient collections or Dhâtupâthas; but that is simply the fault of our etymological analysis, and in no way affects the fact that the Aryan, like all other languages we know, began with roots. We may doubt the legitimacy of certain chemical elements, but not the reality of chemical elements in general. Language, in the sense in which we use the word, begins with roots, which are not only the ultimate facts for the Science of Language, but real facts in the history of human speech. To deny their historical reality would be tantamount to denying cause and effect.

Logically, no doubt, it is possible to distinguish between a root as a mere postulate, and a root used as an actual word. That distinction has been carefully elaborated by Indian grammarians and philosophers, but it does in no way concern us in purely historical researches. What I mean by a root used in real language is this: when we analyse a cluster of Sanskrit words, such as yodha-s, a fighter, yodhaka-s, a fighter, yoddhâ, a fighter, yodhana-m, fighting, yuddhi-s, a fight, yuyutsu-s, wishing to fight, â-yudha-m, a weapon, we easily see that they presuppose an element yudh, to fight, and that they are all derived from that element by well-known grammatical suffixes. Now, is this yudh, which we call the root of all these words, a mere

abstraction? Far from it. We find it as *yudh* used in the Veda either as a nominal or as a verbal base, according to suffixes by which it is followed. Thus *yudh* by itself would be a fighter, only that *dh* when final has to be changed into *t*. We have *goshu-yúdh-am*, 'an accusative, the fighter among cows. In the plural we have *yúdh-as*, fighters; in the locative *yudh-i*, in the fight; in the instrumental, *yudh-â*, with the weapon. That is to say, we find that as a nominal base, *yudh*, without any determinative suffixes, may express fighting, the place of fighting, the instrument of fighting, and a fighter. If our grammatical analysis is right, we should have *yudh* as a nominal base in *yúdh-ya-ti*, lit. he goes to fighting, *yudh-yá-te*, pass.; (a)-*yut-smahi*, aor., either we were to fight, or we were fighters; *yú-yut-sa-ti*, he is to fight-fight; *yudh-ya-s*, to be fought (p. 60), etc. As a verbal base we find *yudh*, for instance, or *yu-yudh-e*, I have fought; in *a-yud-dha*, for *a-yudh-ta*, he fought. In the other Aryan languages this root has left hardly any traces; yet the Greek *ὑσμῖν*, and *ὑσμίνη*, would be impossible without the root *yudh*.

The only difference between Chinese and these Sanskrit forms which we have just examined is that while in Chinese such a form as *yudh-i*, in the battle, would have for its last element a word clearly meaning middle, and having an independent accent, Sanskrit has lost the consciousness of the original material meaning of the *i* of the locative, and uses it traditionally as an empty word, as a formal element, as a mere termination.

I also agree with Curtius that during the earliest

stage, not of Sanskrit, but of Aryan speech in general, we have to admit two classes of roots, the *predicative* and *demonstrative*, and that what we now call the plural of yudh, yudh-as, fighters, was, or may have been, originally a compound consisting of the predicative root yudh, and the demonstrative root, as or sa, possibly repeated twice, meaning 'fight-he-he,' or 'fight-there-there' *i.e.* fighters.

There is another point with regard to the character of this earliest radical stage of the Aryan language, on which formerly I should have agreed with Curtius, but where now I begin to feel more doubtful—I mean the necessarily monosyllabic form of all original roots. There is, no doubt, much to be said for this view. We always like to begin with what is simple. We imagine, as it has been said, that 'the simple idea must break forth, like lightning, in a simple body of sound, to be perceived in one single moment.' But, on the other hand, the simple, so far as it is the general, is frequently, to us at least, the last result of repeated complex conceptions, and therefore there is at all events no *à priori* argument against treating the simplest roots as the latest rather than the earliest products of language. Languages in a low state of development are rich in words expressive of the most minute differences: they are poor in general expressions—a fact which ought to be taken into account as an important qualification of a remark made by Curtius that language supplies necessities first, luxuries afterwards (p. 32). I quote the following excellent remarks from Mr. Sayce's 'Principles of Comparative Philology' (p. 208): 'Among modern

savages the individual objects of sense have names enough, while general terms are very rare. The Mohicans have words for cutting various objects, but none to signify cutting simple.’¹ In taking this view, we certainly are better able to explain the actual forms of the Aryan roots, viz. by *elimination* rather than by *composition*. If we look for instance, as I did myself formerly, on such roots as yudh, yug, and yaut, as developed from the simpler root yu, or on mardh, marg, mark, marp, mard, smar, as developed from mar, then we are bound to account for the modificatory elements, such as *dh*, *g*, *k*, *p*, *d*, *s*, *n*, *t*, *r*, as remnants of other roots, whether predicative or demonstrative. Thus Curtius compares tar or tra, with tras, tram, trak, trap; tri and tru with trup, trib, taking the final consonants as modificatory letters. But what are these modificatory letters? Every attempt to account for them has failed. If it could be proved that these modificatory elements, which Curtius calls *Determinatives*, produced always the *same* modification of meaning, they might then be classed with the verbal suffixes which change simple verbs into causative, desiderative, or intensive verbs. But this is not the

¹ Dr. Callaway in his *Remarks on the Zulu Language* (1870), p. 2, says: ‘The Zulu language contains upwards of 20,000 words in *bonâ fide* use among the people. Those curious appellations for different coloured cattle, or for different maize cobs, to express certain minute peculiarities of colour or arrangement of colour, which it is difficult for us to grasp, are not synonymous, but instances in which a new noun or name is used instead of adding adjectives to one name to express the various conditions of an object. Neither are these various verbs used to express varieties of the same action synonyms, such as *ukupata*, to carry in the hand, *ukmetshata*, to carry on the shoulder, *ukubeleta*, to carry on the back.’

case. On the other hand, it would be perfectly intelligible that such roots as mark, marg, mard, mardh, expressing different kinds of crushing, became fixed side by side, that by a process of elimination their distinguishing features were gradually removed, and the root mar left as the simplest form, expressive of the most general meaning. Without entering here on that process of mutual friction by which, I believe, the development of roots can best be explained, we may say at least so much, that whatever process will account for the root yu, will likewise account for the root yug: nay, that roots like mark or mard are more graphic, expressive, and more easily intelligible than the root mar.

However, if this view of the origin of roots has to be adopted, it need not altogether exclude the other view. In the process of simplification, certain final letters may have become typical, may have seemed invested with a certain function or determinative power, and may therefore have been added independently to other roots, by that powerful imitative tendency which asserts itself again and again through the whole working of language. But however that may be, the sharp line of distinction which Curtius draws between the First Period, represented by simple, and the Second Period, represented by derivative, roots, seems certainly no longer tenable, least of all as dividing *chronologically* two distinct periods in the growth of language.

When we approach the Third Period, it might seem that here, at least, there could be no difference of opinion between Professor Curtius and myself. That Third Period represents simply what I called

the first setting in of *combination*, following after the *isolating* stage. Curtius calls it the *primary verbal period*, and ascribes to it the origin of such combinatory forms as dá-ma, give-I, dê-tva, give-thou, dá-ta, give-he; dê-ma-tvi, give-we, dê-tva-tvi, give-you, dê-(a)nti, give-they. These verbal forms he considers as much earlier than any attempts at declension in nouns. No one who has read Curtius' arguments in support of this chronological arrangement would deny their extreme plausibility; but there are grave difficulties which made me hesitate in adopting this hypothetical framework of linguistic chronology. I shall only mention one, which seemed to me insurmountable. We know that during what we called the First Radical Period the sway of phonetic laws was already so firmly established that, from that period onward to the present day, we can say, with perfect certainty, which phonetic changes are possible, and which are not. It is through these phonetic laws that the most distant past in the history of the Aryan language is connected with the present. It is on them that the whole science of etymology is founded. Only because a certain root has a tenuis, a media, an aspirate, or a sibilant, is it possible to keep it distinct from other roots. If t and s could be interchanged, then the root tar, to cross, would not be distinct from the root sar, to go. If d and dh could vary, then dar, to tear, would run together with dhar, to hold. These phonetic distinctions were firmly established in the radical period, and continue to be maintained, both in the undivided Aryan speech, and in the divided national dialects, such as Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and Gothic. How then can

we allow an intervening period, during which *ma-tvi* could become *masi*, *tva-tvi*, *thas*, and the same *tva-tvi* appear also as *sai*? Such changes, always most startling, may have been possible in earlier periods; but when phonetic order had once been established, as it was in what Curtius calls his first and second periods, to admit them as possible would be, as far as I can judge, to admit a complete anachronism. Of two things one: either we must altogether surrender those chaotic changes which are required for identifying Sanskrit *e* with Greek *μαι*, and Greek *μαι* with *mâ-ma*, etc., or we must throw them back to a period anterior to the final settlement of the Aryan roots.

I now proceed to point out a second difficulty. If Curtius uses these same personal terminations, *masi*, *tvasi*, and *anti*, as proof positive that they must have been compounded out of *ma+tva*, and *tva-tva*, before there were any case-terminations, I do not think his argument is quite stringent. Curtius says: 'If plural suffixes had existed before the coining of these terminations, we should expect them here, as well as in the noun' (p. 33). But the plural of the pronoun *I* could never have been formed by a plural suffix, like the plural of *horse*. *I* admits of no plural, as little as *thou*, and hence the plural of these very pronouns in the Aryan language is not formed by the mere addition of a plural termination, but by a new base. We say *I*, but *we*; *thou*, but *you*, and so through all the Aryan languages. According to Curtius himself, *masi*, the termination of the plural, is not formed by repeating *ma*, by saying, *I* and *I*, and by *ma* and *tva*, *I* and *thou*, the most primitive

way, he thinks, of expressing *we*. The termination of the second person plural might be expressed by repeating *thou*. 'You did it' might have been rendered by 'thou and thou did it;' but hardly by treating *thou* like a noun, and adding to it a plural termination. The absence of plural terminations, therefore, at the end of the personal suffixes of the verbs, does not prove, as far as I can see, that plurals of nouns were unknown when the first, second, and third persons plural of the Aryan verbs were called into existence.

Again, what Curtius says, that 'what language has once learnt it does not forget again, and that therefore if the plural had once found expression in nouns, the verb would have claimed the same distinction,' is true, no doubt, in many cases, but not so generally true as to supply a safe footing for a deductive argument. In so late a formation as the periphrastic future in Sanskrit, we say *dâtâ-smah*, as it were *dator sumus*, not *dâtârah smah*; and in the second person plural of the passive in Latin *amamini*, though the plural is marked, the gender is always disregarded.

Further, even if we admit with Bopp and Curtius that the terminations of the medium are composed of two pronouns, that the *te* of the third person singular stands for *ta-ti*, to-him-he, that *καλύπτεται* in fact meant originally hide-himself-he, it does not follow that in such a compound one pronominal element should have taken the termination of the accusative, any more than the other takes the termination of the nominative. The first element in every composition takes necessarily its Pada or Thematic form; the

second or final element has suffered so much, according to Bopp's own explanation, that nothing would be easier to explain than the disappearance of a final consonant, if it had existed. The absence of case-terminations in such compounds cannot therefore be used as a proof of the non-existence of case-terminations at a time when the medial and other personal endings took their origin. On the contrary, these terminations seem to me to indicate, though I do not say to prove, that the conception of a subjective, as distinct from an objective case, had been fully realised by those who framed them. I do not myself venture to speak very positively of such minute processes of analysis as that which discovers in the Sk. first pers. sing. ind. pres. of the middle, *tude*, I strike, an original *tuda + a + i*, *tuda + ma + i*, *tuda + ma + mi*, *tuda + mâ + ma* ; but, admitting that the middle was formed in that way, and that it meant originally *strike-to-me-I*, then surely we have in the first *mâ* an oblique case, and in the compound itself the clearest indication that the distinction between a nominative and an oblique case, whether dative or accusative, was no longer a mystery. Anyhow—and this is the real point at issue—the presence of such compounds as *mâ-ma*, *to-me-I*, is in no way a proof that at the time of their formation people could not distinguish between *yudh(s)*, nom. a fighter, and *yudh(am)*, acc. a fighter ; and we must wait for more irrefragable evidence before admitting, what would under all circumstances be a most startling conclusion, viz. that the Aryan language was spoken for a long time without case-terminations, but with a complete set of personal terminations, both in the

singular and the plural. For though it is quite true that the want of cases could only be felt in a sentence, the same seems to me to apply to personal terminations of the verb. The one, in most languages we know, implies the other, and the very question whether conjugation or declension came first is one of those dangerous questions which take something for granted which has never been proved.

During all this time, according to Curtius, our Aryan language would have consisted of nothing but roots, used for nominal and verbal purposes, but without any purely derivative suffixes, whether verbal or nominal, and without declension. The only advance, in fact, made beyond the purely Chinese standard, would have consisted in a few combinations of personal pronouns with verbal stems, which combinations assumed rapidly a typical character, and led to the formation of a skeleton of conjugation, containing a *present*, an *aorist* with an augment, and a *reduplicated perfect*. Why, during the same period, nominal bases should not have assumed at least some case-terminations, does not appear; and it certainly seems strange that people who could say vak-ti, speak-he, vak-anti, speak-this-he, should not have been able to say vâk-s, whether in the sense of speak-there, *i.e.* speech, or speak-there, *i.e.* speaker.

The next step which, according to Curtius, the Aryan language had to make, in order to emerge from its purely radical phase, was the creation of bases, both verbal and nominal, by the addition of verbal and nominal suffixes to roots, both primary and secondary. Curtius calls this fourth the Period

of the *Formation of Themes*. These suffixes are very numerous, and it is by them that the Aryan languages have been able to make their limited number of roots supply the vast materials of their dictionary. From *bhar*, to carry, they formed *bhar-a*, a carrier, but sometimes also a burden. In addition to *bhar-ti*, carry-he, they formed *bhara-ti*, meaning possibly carrying-he. The growth of these early themes may have been very luxuriant, and, as Professor Curtius expresses it, chiefly *paraschematic*. It may have been left to a later age to assign to that large number of possible synonyms more definite meanings. Thus, from *φέρω*, I carry, we have *φορά*, the act of carrying, used also in the sense of *impetus* (being carried away), and of *provectus*, i.e. what is brought in. *Φορός* means carrying, but also violent, and lucrative; *φέρετρον*, an instrument of carrying, means a bier; *φαρέτρα*, a quiver, for carrying arrows. *Φορμός* comes to mean a basket; *φορτός*, a burden; *φορός*, tribute.

All this is perfectly intelligible, both with regard to nominal and verbal themes. Curtius admits four kinds of verbal themes as the outcome of his Fourth Period. He had assigned to his Third Period the simple verbal themes *εσ-τί*, and the reduplicated themes such as *δίδω-σι*. To these were added, in the Fourth Period, the following four secondary themes:

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| (1) <i>πλέκ-ε-(τ)-ι</i> | Sanskrit <i>lipa-ti</i> |
| (2) <i>ἀλείφ-ε-(τ)-ι</i> | „ <i>laipa-ti</i> |
| (3) <i>δείκ-νῦ-σι</i> | „ <i>lip-nau-ti</i> |
| (4) <i>δάμ-νῃ-σι</i> | „ <i>lip-nâ-ti</i> |

He also explains the formation of the subjunctive in analogy with bases such as *lipa-ti*, as derived from *lip-ti*.

Some scholars would probably feel inclined to add one or two of the more primitive verbal themes, such as

limpa-ti	<i>rumpo</i>
limpana-ti	λαμ-βάνε(τ)ι,

but all would probably agree with Curtius in placing the formation of these themes, both verbal and nominal, between the radical and the latest inflectional period. One point, however, on which there would probably be considerable difference of opinion is this, whether it is credible that, at a time when so many nominal themes were formed—for Curtius ascribes to this Fourth Period the formation of such nominal bases as

λόγ-ο, intellect,	=	lipa-ti	
λοιπ-ο, left,	=	laipa-ti	.
λεγ-νύ, smoke,	=	lip-nau-ti	
δάφ-νη, laurel,	=	lip-nâ-ti—	

the simplest nominal compounds, which we now call nominative and accusative, singular and plural, were still unknown; that people could say *dhrish-nu-más*, we dare, but not *dhrish-nú-s*, daring-he; that they had an imperative, *dhrishnuhí*, dare, but not a vocative, *dhrishno*. Curtius strongly holds to that opinion, but with regard to this period too, he does not seem to me to establish it by a regular and complete argument. Some arguments which he refers to occasionally have been answered before. Another, which he brings in incidentally when discussing the abbreviation of certain suffixes, can hardly be said to carry conviction. After tracing the suffixes *ant* and *tar* back to what he supposes

to have been their more primitive forms, an-ta and ta-ra, he remarks that the dropping of the final vowel would hardly be conceivable at a time when there existed case-terminations. Still this dropping of the vowel is very common, in late historical times, in Latin, for instance, and other Italian dialects, where it causes frequent confusion and heteroclitism.¹ Thus the Augustan *innocua* was shortened in common pronunciation to *innoca*, and this dwindles down in Christian inscriptions to *innocæ*. In Greek, too, *διάκτορος* is older than *διάκτωρ*; *φύλακος* older than *φύλαξ*.

Nor can it be admitted that the nominal suffixes have suffered less from phonetic corruption than the terminations of the verb, and that therefore they must belong to a more modern period (pp. 39, 40). In spite of all the changes which the personal terminations are supposed to have undergone, their connection with the personal pronouns has always been apparent, while the tracing back of the nominal suffixes, and, still more, of the case-terminations to their typical elements, forms still one of the greatest difficulties of comparative grammarians.²

Professor Curtius is so much impressed with the later origin of declension that he establishes one more period, the fifth, to which he assigns the growth of all compound verbal forms, compound stems, compound tenses, and compound moods, before he allows the first beginnings of declension, and the formation even of such simple forms as the nominative and accusative. It is difficult, no doubt, to dis-

¹ Bruppacher, *Lautlehre der Oskischen Sprache*, p. 48. Büchler, *Grundriss der Lateinischen Declination*, p. 1.

² 'Die Entstehung der Casus ist noch das allerdunkelste im weiten Bereich des indogermanischen Formensystems.' Curtius, *Chronologie*, p. 71.

prove such an opinion by facts or dates, because there are none to be found on either side: but we have a right to expect very strong arguments indeed before we can admit that at a time when an aorist, like *ἔδεικ-σα*, Sanskrit a-dik-sha-t, was possible; that is to say, at a time when the verb *as*, which meant originally to breathe, had by constant use been reduced to the meaning of being; at a time when that verb, as a mere auxiliary, was joined to a verbal base in order to impart to it a general historical power; when the persons of the verb were distinguished by pronominal elements, and when the augment, no longer purely demonstrative, had become the symbol of time past—that at such a time people were still unable to distinguish, except by a kind of Chinese law of position, between ‘the father struck the child,’ and ‘the child struck the father.’ Before we can admit this, we want much stronger proofs than any adduced by Curtius. He says, for instance, that compound verbal bases formed with *yâ*, to go, and afterwards fixed as causatives, would be inconceivable during a period in which accusatives existed. From *nas*, to perish, we form in Sanskrit *nâsa-yâmi*, I make perish. This, according to Curtius, would have meant originally, I send to perishing. Therefore *nâsa*, would have been in the accusative, *nâsam*, and the causative would have been *nâsamyâmi*, if the accusative had then been known. But we have in Latin ¹ *pessum dare*, *venum ire*, and no one would say that compounds like *calefacio*, *liquefacio*, *putrefacio*, were impossible after the first Aryan separation, or after that still earlier period to which Curtius assigns the formation of the

¹ Corssen, ii. 888.

Aryan case-terminations. Does Professor Curtius hold that compound forms like Gothic *nasi-da* were formed not only before the Aryan separation, but before the introduction of case-terminations? I hold, on the contrary, that such really old compositions never required, nay never admitted, the accusative. We say in Sanskrit, *dyu-gat*, going to the sky, *dyu-ksha*, dwelling in the sky, without any case-terminations at the end of the first part of the compound. We say in Greek, *σακέσ-παλος*, not *σάκοσ-παλος*, *παιδοφόνος*, not *παιδαφόνος*, *ὄρεσ-κῆος*, mountain-bred, and also *ὄρεσί-τροφος*, mountain-fed. We say in Latin, *agri-cola*, not *agrum-cola*, *fratri-cīda*, not *fratrem-cīda*, *rēgī-fugium*, not *regis-fugium*. Are we to suppose that all these words were formed before there was an outward mark of distinction between nominative and accusative in the primitive Aryan language? Such compounds, we know, can be formed at pleasure, and they continued to be formed long after the full development of the Aryan declension, and the same would apply to the compound stems of causal verbs. To say, as Curtius does, that composition was possible only before the development of declension, because when cases had once sprung up, the people would no longer have known the bases of nouns, is far too strong an assertion. In Sanskrit¹ the really difficult bases are generally sufficiently visible in the so-called Pada-cases, *i.e.* before certain terminations beginning with consonants, and there is besides a strong feeling of analogy in language, which would generally, though not always (for compounds are fre-

¹ Cf. Clemm, *Die neusten Forschungen auf dem Gebiet der Griechischen Composita*, p. 9.

quently framed by false analogy), guide the framers of new compounds rightly in the selection of the proper nominal base. It seems to me that even with us there is still a kind of instinctive feeling against using nouns, articulated with case-terminations, for purposes of composition, although there are exceptions to that rule in ancient, and many more in modern languages. We can hardly realise to ourselves a Latin *pontemfex*, or *pontisfex*, still less *ponsfex* instead of *pontifex*, and when the Romans drove away their kings, they did not speak of a *regisfugium* or a *regumfugium*, but they took, by habit or by instinct, the base *regi*, though none of them, if they had been asked, knew what a base was. Composition, we ought not to forget, is after all only another name for combination, and the very essence of combination consists in joining together words which are not yet articulated grammatically. Whenever we form compounds, such as *railway*, we are still moving in the combinatory stage, and we have here the strongest proof that the life of language is not capable of chronological division. There was a period in the growth of the Aryan language when the principle of combination preponderated, when inflection was as yet unknown. But inflection itself was the result of combination, and unless combination had continued long after inflection set in, the very life of language would have become extinct.

I have thus tried to explain why I cannot accept the fundamental fact on which the seven-fold division of the history of the Aryan language is founded, viz. that the combinatory process which led to the Aryan system of conjugation would have been impossible,

if at the time nominal bases had already been articulated with terminations of case and number. I see no reason why the earliest case-formations—I mean particularly the nominative and accusative in the singular, plural, and dual—should not date from the same time as the earliest formations of conjugation. The same process that leads to the formation of *vak-ti*, speak-he, would account for the formation of *vak-s*, speak-there, *i.e.* speaker. Necessity, which after all is the mother of all inventions, would much sooner have required the clear distinction of singular and plural, of nominative and accusative, than of the three persons of the verb. It is far more important to be able to distinguish the subject and the object in such sentences as ‘the son has killed the father,’ or ‘the father has killed the son,’ than to be able to indicate the person and tense of the verb. Of course we may say that in Chinese the two cases are distinguished without any outward signs, and by mere position; but we have no evidence that the law of position was preserved in the Aryan languages, after verbal inflection had once set in. Chinese dispenses with verbal inflection as well as with nominal, and an appeal to it would therefore prove either too much or too little.

At the end of the five periods which we have examined, but still before the Aryan separation, Curtius places the sixth, which he calls the Period of the Formation of Cases, and the seventh, the Period of Adverbs. Why I cannot bring myself to accept the late date here assigned to declension, I have tried to explain before. That adverbs existed before the great branches of Aryan speech became definitely

separated has been fully proved by Professor Curtius. I only doubt whether the adverbial period can be separated chronologically from the case period. I should say, on the contrary, that some of the adverbs in Sanskrit and the other Aryan languages exhibit the most primitive and obsolete case-terminations, and that they existed probably long before the system of case-terminations assumed its completeness.

If we look back at the results at which we have arrived in examining the attempt of Professor Curtius to establish seven distinct chronological periods in the history of the Aryan speech, previous to its separation into Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Slavonic, Teutonic, and Celtic, I think we shall find two principles clearly established :

1. That it is impossible to distinguish more than *three* successive phases in the growth of the Aryan language. In the first phase or period the only materials were roots, not yet compounded, still less articulated grammatically, a form of language to us almost inconceivable, yet even at present preserved in the literature and conversation of millions of human beings, the Chinese. In that stage of language, 'king rule man heap law instrument,' would mean, the king rules men legally.

The *second* phase is characterised by the combination of roots, by which process one loses its independence and its accent, and is changed from a full and material into an empty or formal element. That phase comprehends the formation of compound roots, of certain nominal and verbal stems, and of the most necessary forms of declension and conjugation. What distinguishes this phase from the inflectional

is the consciousness of the speaker that one part of his word is the stem or the body, and all the rest its environment, a feeling analogous to that which we have when we speak of *man-hood*, *man-ly*, *man-ful*, *man-kind*, but which fails us when we speak of *man* and *men*, or if we speak of *wo-man*, instead of *wif-man*. The principle of combination preponderated when inflection was as yet unknown. But inflection itself was the result of combination, and I repeat that unless it had continued long after inflection set in, the very life of language would have become extinct.

The *third* phase is the inflectional, when the base and the modificatory elements of words coalesce, lose their independence in the mind of the speaker, and simply produce the impression of modification taking place in the body of words, but without any intelligible reason. This is the feeling which we have throughout nearly the whole of our own language, and it is only by means of scientific reflection that we distinguish between the root, the base, the suffix, and the termination. To attempt more than this three-fold division seems to me impossible.

2. The second principle which I tried to establish was that the growth of language does not lend itself to a chronological division, in the strict sense of the word. Whatever forces are at work in the formation of languages, none of them ceases suddenly to make room for another, but they work on with a certain continuity from beginning to end, only on a larger or smaller scale. Inflection does not put a sudden end to combination, nor combination to juxtaposition. When even in so modern a language as English we

can form by mere combination such words as *man-like*, and reduce them to *manly*, the power of combination cannot be said to be extinct, although it may no longer be sufficiently strong to produce new cases or new personal terminations. We may admit, in the development of the Aryan language, previous to its division, three successive strata of formation, a *juxtapositional*, a *combinatory*, and an *inflectional*; but we shall have to confess that these strata are not regularly superimposed, but tilted, broken up, and convulsed. They are very prominent each for a time, but even after that time is over, they may be traced at different points, pervading the very latest formations of tertiary speech. The true motive power in the progress of all language is combination, and that power is not extinct even in our own time.

INAUGURAL LECTURE

ON THE VALUE OF COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY AS A
BRANCH OF ACADEMIC STUDY.

Delivered before the University of Oxford, the 27th of October, 1868.

THE foundation of a professorial chair in the University of Oxford marks an important epoch in the history of every new science.¹ There are other

¹ The following statute was approved by the University of Oxford in 1868 ('Statuta Universitatis Oxoniensis,' IV. i. 37, §§ 1-3):—

'1. Professor philologiæ comparativæ a Vice-Cancellario, et professoribus linguarum Hebraicæ, Sanscriticæ, Græcæ, Latinæ, et Anglo-Saxonicæ eligatur. In æqualitate suffragantium rem decidat Vice-Cancellarius.

'Proviso tamen ut si vir cl. M. Müller, M.A., hodie linguarum modernarum Europæ professor Taylorianus, eam professionem intra mensem post hoc statutum sancitum resignaverit, seque professoris philologiæ comparativæ munus suscipere paratum esse scripto Vice-Cancellarium certiorem fecerit, is primus admittatur professor.

'2. Professor quotannis per sex menses in Universitate incolat et commoretur inter decimum diem Octobris et primum diem Julii sequentis.

'3. Professor duas lectionum series in duobus discretis terminis legat, terminis Paschatis et S. Trinitatis pro uno reputatis; scilicet per sex septimanas in utroque termino, et bis ad minimum in unaquaque septimana: atque insuper per sex septimanas unius alicujus termini bis ad minimum in unaquaque septimana per unius horæ spatium vacet instruendis auditoribus in iis quæ melius sine solen-

universities far more ready to confer this academical recognition on new branches of scientific research, and it would be easy to mention several subjects, and no doubt important subjects, which have long had their accredited representatives in the universities of France and Germany, but which at Oxford have not yet received this well-merited recognition.

If we take into account the study of ancient languages only, we see that as soon as Champollion's discoveries had given to the study of hieroglyphics and Egyptian antiquities a truly scientific character, the French Government thought it its duty to found a chair for this promising branch of Oriental scholarship. Italy soon followed this generous example; nor was the Prussian Government long behindhand in doing honour to the new-born science, as soon as in Professor Lepsius it had found a scholar worthy to occupy a chair of Egyptology at Berlin.

If France had possessed the brilliant genius to whom so much is due in the deciphering of the cuneiform inscriptions, I have little doubt that long ago a chair would have been founded at the *Collège de France* expressly for Sir Henry Rawlinson.

England possesses some of the best, if not the best, of Persian scholars (alas! he who was here in my mind, Lord Strangford, is no longer among us), yet there is no chair for Persian at Oxford or Cambridge, in spite of the charms of its modern literature, and the vast importance of the ancient language of Persia

nitae tradi possunt. Unam porro ad minimum lectionem quotannis publice habeat ab academicis quibuscunque sine mercede audiendam. De die hora et loco quibus hæc lectio solennis habenda sit academiam modo consueto certiore faciat.'

and Bactria, the Zend, a language full of interest, not only to the comparative philologist, but also to the student of Comparative Theology.

There are few of the great universities of Europe without a chair for that language which, from the very beginning of history, as far as it is known to us, seems always to have been spoken by the largest number of human beings—I mean Chinese. In Paris we find not one, but two chairs for Chinese: one for the ancient, another for the modern language of that wonderful empire; and if we consider the light which a study of that curious form of human speech is intended to throw on the nature and growth of language, if we measure the importance of its enormous literature by the materials which it supplies to the student of ancient religions, and likewise to the historian who wishes to observe the earliest rise of the principal sciences and arts in countries beyond the influence of Aryan and Semitic civilisation—if, lastly, we take into account the important evidence which the Chinese language, reflecting, like a never-failing photograph, the earliest workings of the human mind, is able to supply to the student of psychology, and to the careful analyser of the elements and laws of thought, we should feel less inclined to ignore or ridicule the claims of such a language to a chair in our ancient university.¹

I could go on and mention several other subjects, well worthy of the same distinction. If the study of Celtic languages and Celtic antiquities deserves to be encouraged anywhere, it is surely in England—not, as

¹ A Chair of Chinese has since been founded at Oxford, and Dr. Legge was appointed Professor of Chinese in 1876.

has been suggested, in order to keep English literature from falling into the abyss of German platitudes, nor to put Aneurin and Taliesin in the place of Shakespeare and Burns, and to counteract by their 'suavity and brilliancy' the Philistine tendencies of the Saxon and the Northman, but in order to supply sound materials and guiding principles to the critical student of the ancient history and the ancient language of Britain, to excite an interest in what still remains of Celtic antiquities, whether in manuscripts or in genuine stone monuments, and thus to preserve such national heirlooms from neglect or utter destruction. If we consider that Oxford possesses a Welsh College, and that England possesses the best of Celtic scholars, it is surely a pity that he should have to publish the results of his studies in the short intervals of official work at Calcutta, and not in the more congenial atmosphere of Rytichin.¹

For those who know the history of the ancient universities of England, it is not difficult to find out why they should have been less inclined than their Continental sisters to make timely provision for the encouragement of these and other important branches of linguistic research. Oxford and Cambridge, as independent corporations, withdrawn alike from the support and from the control of the state, have always looked upon the instruction of the youth of England as their proper work; and nowhere has the tradition of classical learning been handed down more faithfully from one generation to another than in England—nowhere has its generous spirit more thoroughly

¹ A Chair of Celtic has since been founded at Oxford, and Mr John Rhys was appointed Professor of Celtic in 1877.

pervaded the minds of statesmen, poets, artists, and moulded the character of that large and important class of independent and cultivated men, without which this country would cease to be what it has been for the last two centuries, a *res publica*, a commonwealth, in the best sense of the word. Oxford and Cambridge have supplied what England expected and demanded, and as English parents did not send their sons to learn Chinese or to study Cornish, there was naturally no supply where there was no demand. The professorial element in the university, the true representative of higher learning and independent research, withered away; the tutorial assumed the vastest proportions during this and the last centuries.

But looking back to the earlier history of the English universities, I believe it is a mistake to suppose that Oxford, one of the most celebrated universities during the middle ages and in the modern history of Europe, could ever have ignored the duty, so fully recognised by other European universities, of not only handing down intact, and laid up, as it were, in a napkin, the traditional stock of human knowledge, but of constantly adding to it, and increasing it fivefold and tenfold. Nay, unless I am much mistaken, there was really no university in which more ample provision had been made by founders and benefactors than at Oxford, for the support and encouragement of a class of students who should follow up new lines of study, devote their energies to work which, from its very nature, could not be lucrative or even self-supporting, and maintain the fame of English learn-

ing, English industry, and English genius in that great and time-honoured republic of learning which claims the allegiance of the whole of Europe, nay, of the whole civilised world. That work was meant to be done at Oxford and Cambridge by the Fellows of Colleges. In times, no doubt, when every kind of learning was in the hands of the clergy, these fellowships might seem to have been intended exclusively for the support of theological students. But when other studies, once mere germs and shoots on the tree of knowledge, separated from the old stem and assumed an independent growth, whether under the name of natural science, or history, or scholarship, or jurisprudence, a fair division ought to have been made at once of the funds which, in accordance with the letter, it may be, but certainly not with the spirit of the ancient statutes, have remained for so many years appropriated to the exclusive support of theological learning, if learning it could be called. Fortunately, that mistake has now been remedied, and the funds originally intended without distinction for the support of 'true religion and useful learning' are now again more equally apportioned among those who, in the age in which we live, have divided and subdivided the vast intellectual inheritance of the middle ages, in order to cultivate the more thoroughly every nook and every corner in the boundless field of human knowledge.

Something, however, remains still to be done in order to restore these fellowships more fully and more efficiently to their original purpose, and thus to secure to the university not only a staff of zealous teachers, which it certainly possesses, but likewise a

class of independent workers, of men who by original research, by critical editions of the classics, by an acquisition of a scholarlike knowledge of other languages besides Greek and Latin, by an honest devotion to one or the other among the numerous branches of physical science, by fearless researches into the ancient history of mankind, by a careful collection or revision of the materials for the history of politics, jurisprudence, medicine, literature, and arts, by a life-long occupation with the problems of philosophy, and last, not least, by a real study of theology, or the science of religion, should perform again those duties which, in the stillness of the middle ages, were performed by learned friars within the walls of our colleges. Those duties have remained in abeyance for several generations, and they must now be performed with increased vigour, in order to retain for Oxford that high position which it once held, not simply as a place of education, but as a seat of learning, amid the most celebrated universities of Europe.

‘*Noblesse oblige*’ is an old saying that is sometimes addressed to those who have inherited an illustrious name, and who are proud of their ancestors. But what are the ancestors of the oldest and proudest of families compared with the ancestors of this university! ‘*Noblesse oblige*’ applies to Oxford at the present moment more than ever, when knowledge for its own sake, and a chivalrous devotion to studies which command no price in the fair of the world, and lead to no places of emolument in Church or State, are looked down upon and ridiculed by almost everybody.

There is no career in England at the present moment for scholars and students. No father could honestly advise his son, whatever talent he might display, to devote himself exclusively to classical, historical, or physical studies. The few men who still keep up the fair name of England by independent research and new discoveries in the fields of political and natural history, do not always come from our universities; and unless they possess independent means, they cannot devote more than the leisure hours, left by their official duties in Church or State, to the prosecution of their favourite studies. This ought not to be, nor need it be so. If only twenty men in Oxford and Cambridge had the will, everything is ready for a reform—that is, for a restoration of the ancient glory of Oxford. The funds which are now frittered away in so-called prize-fellowships, would enable the universities tomorrow to invite the best talent of England back to its legitimate home. And what should we lose if we had no longer that long retinue of non-resident fellows? It is true, no doubt, that a fellowship has been a help in the early career of many a poor and hard-working man, and how could it be otherwise? But in many cases I know that it has proved a drag rather than a spur for further efforts. Students at English universities belong, as a rule, to the wealthier classes, and England is the wealthiest country in Europe. Yet in no country in the world would a young man, after his education is finished, expect assistance from public sources. Other countries tax themselves to the utmost in order to enable the largest possible number of young men to enjoy

the best possible education in schools and universities. But when that is done, the community feels that it has fulfilled its duty, and it says to the young generation, Now swim or drown. A manly struggle against poverty, it may be even against actual hunger, will form a stronger and sounder metal than a lotus-eating club-life in London or Paris. Whatever fellowships were intended to be, they were never intended to be mere sinecures, as most of them are at present. It is a national blessing that the two ancient universities of England should have saved such large funds from the shipwreck that swallowed up the corporate funds of the Continental universities. But, in order to secure their safety for the future, it is absolutely necessary that these funds should be utilised again for the advancement of learning. Why should not a fellowship be made into a career for life, beginning with little, but rising like the incomes of other professions? Why should the grotesque condition of celibacy be imposed on a fellowship, instead of the really salutary condition of—No work, no pay? Why should not some special literary or scientific work be assigned to each fellow, whether resident in Oxford or sent abroad on scientific missions? Why, instead of having fifty young men scattered about in England, should we not have ten of the best workers in every branch of human knowledge resident at Oxford, whether as teachers, or as guides, or as examples? The very presence of such men would have a stimulating and elevating effect: *ipso nutu, vultu, incessu prosunt*. They would show to the young men that there are higher objects of human ambition than the bâton of a field-marshal,

the mitre of a bishop, the ermine of a judge, or the money-bags of a merchant ; they would create for the future a supply of new workers as soon as there was for them, if not an avenue to wealth and power, at least a fair opening for hard work and proper pay. All this might be done to-morrow, without any injury to anybody, and with every chance of producing results of the greatest value to the universities, to the country, and to the world at large. Let the university continue to do the excellent work which it does at present as a body of teachers, but let it not forget the equally important duty of a university, that of a body of workers. Our century has inherited the intellectual wealth of former centuries, and with it the duty, not only to preserve it or to dole it out in schools and universities, but to increase it far beyond the limits which it has reached at present. Where there is no advance, there is retrogression : rest is impossible for the human mind.

Much of the work, therefore, which in other universities falls to the lot of the professors, ought in Oxford to be performed by a staff of student-fellows, whose labours should be properly organised, as they are in the Institute of France or in the Academy of Berlin. With or without teaching, they could perform the work which no university can safely neglect, the work of constantly testing the soundness of our intellectual food, and of steadily expanding the realms of knowledge. We want pioneers, explorers, conquerors, and we could have them in abundance, if we cared to have them. What other universities do by founding new chairs for new sciences, the colleges of Oxford could do to-morrow by applying

the funds which are not required for teaching purposes, and which are now spent on sinecure fellowships, for making either temporary or permanent provision for the endowment of original research.

It is true that new chairs have from time to time been founded in Oxford also ; but if we inquire into the circumstances under which provision was made for the teaching of new subjects, we shall find that it generally took place, not so much for the encouragement of any new branch of scientific research, however interesting to the philosopher and the historian, as in order to satisfy some practical wants that could no longer be ignored, whether in Church or State, or in the university itself.

Confining ourselves to the chairs of languages, or as they used to be called, 'the readerships of tongues,' we find that as early as 1311, while the crusades were still fresh in the memory of the people of Europe, an appeal was made by Pope Clement V., at the Council of Vienne, calling upon the principal universities in Christendom to appoint lecturers for the study of Hebrew, Arabic, and Chaldaic. It was considered at the time a great honour for Oxford to be mentioned by name, together with Paris, Bologna, and Salamanca, as one of the four great seats of learning in which the Pope and the Council of Vienne desired that provision should be made for the teaching of these languages. It is quite clear, however, from the wording of the resolution of the Council,¹

¹ *Liber Sextus Decretalium* (Lugduni, 1572), p. 1027 : 'Ut igitur peritia linguarum hujusmodi possit habiliter per instructionem efficaciam obtinere, hoc sacro approbante concilio scholas in subscriptarum linguarum generibus ubicunque Romanam curiam residere contigerit, necnon in Parisiensi, et Oxoniensi, Bononiensi, et

that the chief object in the foundation of these readerships was to supply men capable of defending the interests of the Church, of taking an active part in the controversies with Jews and Mohammedans, who were then considered dangerous, and of propagating the faith among unbelievers.

Nor does it seem that this papal exhortation produced much effect, for we find that Henry VIII. in 1540 had to make new provision in order to secure efficient teachers of Hebrew and Greek in the University of Oxford. At that time these two languages, but more particularly Greek, had assumed not only a theological, but a political importance, and it was but natural that the king should do all in his power to foster and spread a knowledge of a language which had been one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of the Reformers. At Oxford itself this new chair was by no means popular: on the contrary, those who studied Greek were for a long time looked upon with great suspicion and dislike.¹

Henry VIII. did nothing for the support of Arabic; but a century later (1636) we find Archbishop Laud, whose attention had been attracted by Eastern questions, full of anxiety to resuscitate the study of Arabic at Oxford, partly by collecting Arabic MSS. in the East and depositing them in the Bodleian Library,

Salmantino studiis providimus erigendas; statuantes ut in quolibet locorum ipsorum teneantur viri catholici, sufficienter habentes Hebraicæ, Arabicæ, et Chaldææ linguarum notitiam.

¹ Greaves, *Oratio Oxonii habita*, 1637, p. 19: 'Paucos ultra centum annos numeramus ex quo Græcæ primum literæ oras hasce appulerunt, antea ignotæ prorsus, nonnullis exosæ etiam et invisæ, indoctissimis scilicet fraterculis, quibus religio erat græce scire, et levissimus Atticæ eruditionis gustus hæresin sapiebat.'

partly by founding a new chair of Arabic, inaugurated by Pococke, and rendered illustrious by such names as Greaves, Thomas Hyde, John Wallis, and Thomas Hunt.

The foundation of a chair of Anglo-Saxon, too, was due, not so much to a patriotic interest excited by the ancient national literature of the Saxons, still less to the importance of that ancient language for philological studies, but it received its first impulse from the divines of the sixteenth century, who wished to strengthen the position of the English Church in its controversy with the Church of Rome. Under the auspices of Archbishop Parker, Anglo-Saxon MSS. were first collected, and the Anglo-Saxon translations of the Bible, as well as Anglo-Saxon homilies, and treatises on theological and ecclesiastical subjects were studied by Fox, the martyrologist, and others,¹ to be quoted as witnesses to the purity and simplicity of the primitive Church founded in this realm, free in its origin from the later faults and fancies of the Church of Rome. Without this practical object, Anglo-Saxon would hardly have excited so much interest in the sixteenth century, and Oxford would probably have remained much longer without its professorial chair of the ancient national language of England, which was founded by Rawlinson, but was not inaugurated before the end of the last century (1795).

Of the two remaining chairs of languages, of Sanskrit and of Latin, the former owes its origin, not to an admiration for the classical literature of

¹ See *Biographia Britannica Literaria*, vol. i. p. 110.

India, nor to a recognition of the importance of Sanskrit for the purposes of Comparative Philology, but to an express desire on the part of its founder to provide efficient missionaries for India; while the creation of a chair of Latin, though long delayed, was at last rendered imperative by the urgent wants of the university.

Nor does the chair of Comparative Philology, just founded by the university, form altogether an exception to this general rule. It is curious to remark that while Comparative Philology has for more than half a century excited the deepest interest, not only among Continental, but likewise among English scholars, and while chairs of this new science have been founded long ago in almost every university of France, Germany, and Italy, the foundation of a new chair of Comparative Philology at Oxford should coincide very closely with a decided change that has taken place in the treatment of that science, and which has given to its results a more practical importance for the study of Greek and Latin, such as could hardly be claimed for it during the first fifty years of its growth.

We may date the origin of Comparative Philology, as distinct from the Science of Language, from the foundation of the Asiatic Society of Calcutta in 1784. From that time dates the study of Sanskrit, and it was the study of Sanskrit which formed the foundation of Comparative Philology.

It is perfectly true that Sanskrit had been studied before by Italian, German, and French missionaries; it is likewise perfectly true that several of these missionaries were fully aware of the close relation-

ship between Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin. A man must be blind who, after looking at a Sanskrit grammar, does not see at once the striking coincidences between the declensions and conjugations of the classical language of India and those of Greece and Italy.¹

Filippo Sassetti, who spent some time at Goa, between 1581 and 1588, had only acquired a very slight knowledge of Sanskrit before he wrote home to his friends 'that it has many words in common with Italian, particularly in the numerals, in the names for God, serpent, and many others.' This was in the sixteenth century.

Some of the Jesuit missionaries, however, went far beyond this. A few among them had acquired a real and comprehensive knowledge of the ancient language and literature of India, and we see them anticipate in their letters several of the most brilliant discoveries of Sir W. Jones and Professor Bopp. The Père Cœurdoux,² a French Jesuit, writes in 1767 from Pondicherry to the French Academy, asking that learned society for a solution of the question, '*How is it that Sanskrit has so many words in common with Greek and Latin?*' He not only presents long lists of words, but he calls attention to the still more curious fact that the grammatical forms in Sanskrit show the most startling similarity with Greek and Latin. After him almost everybody who had looked at Sanskrit, and who knew Greek and Latin, made the same remark and asked the same question.

¹ M. M.'s *Science of Language*, vol. i. p. 221.

² *Ibid.* p. 176.

But the fire only smouldered on; it would not burn up, it would not light, it would not warm. At last, owing to the exertions of the founders of the Asiatic Society at Calcutta, the necessary materials for a real study of Sanskrit became accessible to the students of Europe. The voice of Frederick Schlegel roused the attention of the world at large to the startling problem that had been thrown into the arena of the intellectual chivalry of the world, and at last the glove was taken up, and men like Bopp, and Burnouf, and Pott, and Grimm, did not rest till some answer could be returned, and some account rendered of Sanskrit, that strange intruder, and great disturber of the peace of classical scholarship.

The work which then began was incessant. It was not enough that some words in Greek and Latin should be traced in Sanskrit. A kind of silent conviction began to spread that there must be in Sanskrit a remedy for all evils; people could not rest till every word in Greek and Latin had, in some disguise or other, been discovered in Sanskrit. Nor were Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit enough to satisfy the thirst of the new discoverers. The Teutonic languages were soon annexed, the Celtic languages yielded to some gentle pressure, the Slavonic languages clamoured for incorporation, the sacred idiom of ancient Persia, the Zend, demanded its place by the side of Sanskrit, the Armenian followed in its wake; and when even the Ossetic from the valleys of Mount Caucasus, and the Albanian from the ancient hills of Epirus, had proved their birthright, the whole family, the Aryan family of language, seemed complete, and an historical fact, the original

unity of all these languages, was established on a basis which even the most sceptical could not touch or shake. Scholars rushed in as diggers rush into a new gold-field, picking up whatever is within reach, and trying to carry off more than they could carry, so that they might be the foremost in the race, and claim as their own all that they had been the first to look at or to touch. There was a rush, and now and then an ugly rush, and when the armfuls of nuggets that were thrown down before the world in articles, pamphlets, essays, and ponderous volumes, came to be more carefully sifted, it was but natural that not everything that glittered should turn out to be gold. Even in the works of more critical scholars, such as Bopp, Burnouf, Pott, and Benfey—at least in those which were published in the first enthusiasm of discovery—many things may now be pointed out which no assayer would venture to pass. It was the great merit of Bopp that he called the attention away from this tempting field to the more laborious work of grammatical analysis, though even in his ‘Comparative Grammar,’ in that comprehensive survey of the grammatical outlines of the Aryan languages, the spirit of conquest and centralisation still predominates. All languages are, if possible, to submit to the same laws; what is common to all of them is welcome, what is peculiar to each is treated as anomalous, or explained as the result of later corruption.

This period in the history of Comparative Philology has sometimes been characterised as *syncretistic*, and to a certain extent that name and the censure implied in it are justified. But to a very

small extent only. It was in the nature of things that a comparative study of languages should at first be directed to what is common to all: nay, without having first become thoroughly acquainted with the general features of the whole family, it would have been impossible to discover and fully to appreciate what is peculiar to each of its members.

Nor was it long before a reaction set in. One scholar from the very first, and almost contemporaneously with Bopp's first essays on Comparative Grammar, devoted himself to the study of one branch of languages only, availing himself, as far as he was able, of the new light which a knowledge of Sanskrit had thrown on the secret history of the whole Aryan family of speech, but concentrating his energies on the Teutonic: I mean, of course, Jacob Grimm, the author of the great historical grammar of the German language; a work which will live and last long after other works of that early period shall have been forgotten, or replaced, at least, by better books.

After a time Grimm's example was followed by others. Zeuss, in his '*Grammatica Celtica*,' established the study of the Celtic languages on the broad foundations of Comparative Grammar. Miklosich and Schleicher achieved similar results by adopting the same method for the study of the Slavonic dialects. Curtius, by devoting himself to an elucidation of Greek, opened the eyes of classical scholars to the immense advantages of this new treatment of grammar and etymology; while Corsen, in his more recent works on Latin, has struck a mine which may well tempt the curiosity of every

student of the ancient dialects of Italy. At the present moment the reaction is complete ; and there is certainly some danger lest what was called a *syncretistic* spirit should now be replaced by an *isolating* spirit in the science of language.

It cannot be denied, however, that this isolating, or rather discriminating, tendency has produced already the most valuable results, and I believe that it is chiefly due to the works of Curtius and Corssen, if Greek and Latin scholars have been roused at last from their apathy and been made aware of the absolute necessity of Comparative Philology, as a subject to be taught, not only in every university, but in every school. I believe it is due to their works that a conviction has gradually been gaining ground among the best scholars at Oxford also, that Comparative Philology could no longer be ignored as an important ingredient in the teaching of Greek and Latin ; and while a comparative analysis of Sanskrit, Zend, Armenian, Greek, Latin, Gothic, High-German, Lithuanian, Slavonic, and Celtic, such as we find it in Bopp's 'Comparative Grammar,' would hardly be considered as a subject of practical utility even in a school of philology, it was recognised at last that, not only for sound principles of etymology, not only for a rational treatment of Greek and Latin grammar, not only for a right understanding of classical mythology, but even for a critical restoration of the very texts of Homer and Plautus, a knowledge of Comparative Philology, as applied to Greek and Latin, had become indispensable.

My chief object, therefore, as Professor of Comparative Philology at Oxford, will be to treat the

classical languages under that new aspect which they have assumed, as viewed by the microscope of Curtius and Corssen rather than by the telescope of Bopp, Pott, and Benfey. I shall try not only to give results, but to explain what is far more important, the method by which these results were obtained, so far as this is possible without, for the present at least, presupposing among my hearers a knowledge of Sanskrit. Sanskrit certainly forms the only sound foundation of Comparative Philology, and it will always remain the only safe guide through all its intricacies. A comparative philologist without a knowledge of Sanskrit is like an astronomer without a knowledge of mathematics. He may admire, he may observe, he may discover, but he will never feel satisfied, he will never feel certain, he will never feel quite at home.

I hope, therefore, that, besides those who attend my public lectures, there will be at least a few to form a private class for the study of the elements of Sanskrit. Sanskrit, no doubt, is a very difficult language, and it requires the study of a whole life to master its enormous literature. Its grammar, too, has been elaborated with such incredible minuteness by native grammarians, that I am not surprised if many scholars who begin the study of Sanskrit turn back from it in dismay. But it is quite possible to learn the rules of Sanskrit declension and conjugation, and to gain an insight into the grammatical organisation of that language, without burdening one's memory with all the phonetic rules which generally form the first chapter of every Sanskrit grammar, or without devoting years of study to the

unravelling of the intricacies of the greatest of Indian, if not of all, grammarians—Pânini. There are but few among our very best comparative philologists who are able to understand Pânini. Professor Benfey, whose powers of work are truly astounding, stands almost alone in his minute knowledge of that greatest of all grammarians. Neither Bopp, nor Pott, nor Curtius, nor Corssen, ever attempted to master Pânini's wonderful system. But a study of Sanskrit, as taught by European grammarians, cannot be recommended too strongly to all students of language. A good sailor may for a time steer without a compass, but even he feels safer when he knows that he may consult it, if necessary; and whenever he comes near the rocks—and there are many in the Aryan sea—he will hardly escape shipwreck without this magnetic needle.¹

It will be asked, no doubt, by Greek and Latin scholars who have never as yet devoted themselves seriously to a study of Comparative Philology, what is to be gained after all the trouble of learning Sanskrit, and after mastering the works of Bopp, and Benfey, and Curtius? Would a man be a better Greek and Latin scholar for knowing Sanskrit? Would he write better Latin and Greek verse? Would he be better able to read and compare Greek and Latin MSS., and to prepare a critical edition of classical authors? To all these questions I reply both *No* and *Yes*.

If there is one branch of classical philology where the advantages derived from Comparative Philology have been most readily admitted, it is etymology.

¹ See Notes A and B, pp. 152, 154.

More than fifty years ago, Otfried Müller told classical scholars that that province at least must be surrendered. And yet it is strange to see how long it takes before old erroneous derivations are exploded and finally expelled from our dictionaries; and how, in spite of all warnings, similarity of sound and similarity of meaning are still considered the chief criteria of Greek and Latin etymologies. I do not address this reproach to classical scholars only; it applies equally to many comparative philologists who, for the sake of some striking similarity of sound and meaning, will now and then break the phonetic laws which they themselves have helped to establish.

If we go back to earlier days, we find, for instance, that Sanskrit scholars who had discovered that one of the names of the god of love in Bengali was *Dipuc*, i.e. the inflamer, derived from it by inversion the name of the god of love in Latin, *Cupid*. Sir William Jones identified *Janus* with the Sanskrit *Ganesa*, i.e. lord of hosts,¹ and even later scholars allowed themselves to be tempted to see the Indian prototype of *Ganymedes* in the *Kanva-medhâtithi* or *Kanva-mesha* of the *Veda*.²

After the phonetic laws of each language had been more carefully elaborated, it was but too frequently forgotten that words have a history as well as a growth, and that the history of a word must be explored first, before an attempt is made to unravel its growth. Thus it was extremely tempting to derive *paradise* from the Sanskrit *paradesa*.

¹ See M. M., *Science of Religion*, 1873, p. 293.

² See Weber, *Indische Studien*, vol. i. p. 38.

The compound para-*desa* was supposed to mean the highest or a distant country, and all the rest seemed so evident as to require no further elucidation. Paradesa, however, does not mean the highest or a distant country in Sanskrit, but is always used in the sense of a foreign country, an enemy's country. Further, as early as the Song of Solomon (iv. 13), the word occurs in Hebrew as *pardés*, and how it could have got there straight from Sanskrit requires at all events some historical explanation. In Hebrew the word might have been borrowed from Persian, but the Sanskrit word paradesa, if it existed at all in Persian, would have been *paradaesa*, the *s* being a palatal, not a dental sibilant. Such a compound, however, does not exist in Persian, and therefore the Sanskrit word paradesa could not have reached Hebrew *viâ* Persia.

It is true, nevertheless, that the ancient Hebrew word *pardés* is borrowed from Persian, viz. from the Zend *pairidaēza*, which means *circumvallatio*, a piece of ground enclosed by high walls, afterwards a park, a garden.¹ The root in Sanskrit is DIH or DHIH (for Sanskrit *h* is Zend *z*), and means originally to knead, to squeeze together, to shape. From it we have the Sanskrit *dehî*, a wall, while in Greek the same root, according to the strictest phonetic rules, yielded *τοίχος*, wall. In Latin our root is regularly changed into *fig*, and gives us *figulus*, a potter, *figura*, form or shape, and *figere*. In Gothic it could only appear as *deig-an*, to knead, to form anything out of soft substances; hence *daig-s*, the English *dough*, German *Deich*.

¹ See Haug, in Ewald's *Biblische Jahrbücher*, vol. vi. p. 162.

But the Greek *παράδεισος* did not come from Hebrew, because here again there is no historical bridge between the two languages. In Greek we trace the word to Xenophon, who brought it back from his repeated journeys in Persia, and who uses it in the sense of pleasure ground, or deer park.¹

Lastly, we find the same word used in the LXX, as the name given to the garden of Eden, the word having been borrowed either a third time from Persia, or taken from the Greek, and indirectly from the works of Xenophon.

This is the real history of the word. It is an Aryan word, but it does not exist in Sanskrit. It was first formed in Zend, transferred from thence as a foreign word into Hebrew, and again into Greek. Its modern Persian form is *firdaus*.

All this is matter of history rather than philology. Yet we read in one of the best classical dictionaries: 'The root of *παράδεισος* appears to be Semitic, Arab. *firdaus*, Hebr. *pardés*: borrowed also in Sanskrit *paradêsa*.'² Nearly every word is wrong.

From the same root DIH springs the Sanskrit word *deha*, body; body, like figure, being conceived as that which is formed or shaped. Bopp identified this *deha* with Gothic *leik*, body, particularly dead body, the modern German *Leiche* and *Leichnam*, the English *lich* in *lich-gate*. In this case the master of Comparative Philology disregarded the phonetic

¹ Anab. i. 2, 7: 'Ἐνταῦθα Κύρῳ βασίλεια ἦν καὶ παράδεισος μέγας, ἀγρίων θηρίων πλήρης, ἃ ἐκεῖνος ἐθήρευσεν ἀπὸ ἵππου, ὁπότε γυμνάσαι βούλοιτο ἑαυτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς ἵππους. Διὰ μέσου δὲ τοῦ παραδείσου ῥεῖ δ Μαίανδρος ποταμός κ. τ. λ. Hell. iv. 1, 15: 'Ἐν περιειργμένοις παραδείσοις κ. τ. λ.

² See *Indian Antiquary*, 1874, p. 332.

laws which he had himself helped to establish. The transition of *d* into *l* is no doubt common enough as between Sanskrit, Latin, and Greek, but it has never been established as yet on good evidence as taking place between Sanskrit and Gothic. Besides, the Sanskrit *h* ought in Gothic to appear as *g*, as we have it in *deig-s*, dough, and not as a *tenuis*.

Another Sanskrit word for body is *kalevara*, and this proved again a stumbling-block to Bopp, who compares it with the Latin *cadaver*. Here one might plead that *l* and *d* are frequently interchanged in Sanskrit and Latin words, but, as far as our evidence goes at present, we have no doubt many cases where an original Sanskrit *d* is represented in Latin by *l*, but no really trustworthy instance in which an original Sanskrit *l* appears in Latin as *d*. Besides, the Sanskrit diphthong *e* cannot, as a rule, in Latin be represented by long *d*.

If such things could happen to Bopp, we must not be too severe on similar breaches of the peace committed by classical scholars. What classical scholars seem to find most difficult to learn is that there are various degrees of certainty in etymologies, even in those proposed by our best comparative scholars, and that not everything that is mentioned by Bopp, or Pott, or Benfey as possible, as plausible, as probable, and even as more than probable, ought therefore to be set down, for instance, in a grammar or dictionary, as simply a matter of fact. With certain qualifications, an etymology may have a scientific value; without those qualifications, it may become not only unscientific, but mischievous. Again, nothing seems a more difficult lesson for an etymologist to learn

than to say, I do not know. Yet, to my mind, nothing shows, for instance, the truly scholarlike mind of Professor Curtius better than the very fact for which he has been so often blamed, viz. his passing over in silence the words about which he has nothing certain to say.

Let us take an instance. If we open our best Greek dictionaries, we find that the Greek *αὐγή*, light, splendour, is compared with the German word for eye, *Auge*. No doubt every letter in the two words is the same, and the meaning of the Greek word could easily be supposed to have been specialised or localised in German. Sophocles (Aj. 70) speaks of the *ὀμμάτων αὐγαί*, the lights of the eyes, and Euripides (Andr. 1180) uses *αὐγαί* by itself for eyes, like the Latin *lumina*. The verb *αὐγάζω*, too, is used in Greek in the sense of seeing or viewing. Why, then, it was asked, should *αὐγή* not be referred to the same source as the German *Auge*, and why should not both be traced back to the same root that yielded the Latin *oc-ulus*? As long as we trust to our ears, or to what is complacently called common sense, it would seem mere fastidiousness to reject so evident an etymology. But as soon as we know the real chemistry of vowels and consonants, we shrink instinctively from such combinations. If a German word has the same sound as a Greek word, the two words cannot be the same, unless we ignore that independent process of phonetic growth which made Greek Greek, and German German. Whenever we find in Greek a media, a *g*, we expect in Gothic the corresponding tenuis. Thus the root *gan*, which we have in Greek *γιννώσκω*, is in Gothic *kann*. The

Greek γόνυ, Lat. *genu*, is in Gothic *knīu*. If, therefore, *αὐγή* existed in Gothic it would be *auko*, and not *augo*. Secondly, the diphthong *au* in *augo* would be different from the Greek diphthong. Grimm supposed that the Gothic *augo* came from the same etymon which yields the Latin *oc-ulus*, the Sanskrit *ak-sh-i*, eye, the Greek ὄσσε for ὄκυ-ε, and likewise the Greek stem ὀπ in ὀπ-ωπ-α, ὄμμα, and ὀφ-θ-αλμός. It is true that the short radical vowel *a* in Sanskrit, *o* in Greek, *u* in Latin, sinks down to *u* in Gothic, and it is equally true, as Grimm has shown, that, according to a phonetic law peculiar to Gothic, *u* before *h* and *r* is changed to *aú*. Grimm therefore takes the Gothic *aúgó* for **aúhó*, and this for **uhó*, which, as he shows, would be a proper representative in Gothic of the Sanskrit *ak-an*, or *aksh-an*.

But here Grimm seems wrong. If the *au* of *augó* were this peculiar Gothic *aú*, which represents an original short *a*, changed to *u*, and then raised to a diphthong by the insertion of a short *a*, then that diphthong would be restricted to Gothic; and the other Teutonic dialects would have their own representatives for an original short *a*. But in Anglo-Saxon we find *eáge*, in Old High German *augá*, both pointing to a labial diphthong, i.e. to a radical *u* raised to *au*.¹

Professor Ebel,² in order to avoid this difficulty, proposed a different explanation. He supposed that the *k* of the root *ak* was softened to *kv*, and that *augó* represents an original *agvá* or *ahvá*, the *v* of *hvá* being inserted before the *h* and changed to *u*. As

¹ Grassmann, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. ix. p. 23

² Ebel, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 242.

an analogous case he quoted the Sanskrit enclitic particle *ka*, Latin *que*, Gothic **hva*, which **hva* appears always under the form of *uh*. Leo Meyer takes the same view, and quotes, as an analogon, *haubida* as possibly identical with *caput*, originally **kapvat*.

These cases, however, are not quite analogous. The enclitic particle *ka*, in Gothic **hva*, had to lose its final vowel. It thus became unpronounceable, and the short vowel *u* was added simply to facilitate its pronunciation.¹ There was no such difficulty in pronouncing **ah* or **uh* in Gothic, still less the derivative form **ahvó*, if such a form had ever existed.

Another explanation was therefore attempted by the late Dr. Lottner.² He supposed that the root *ak* existed also with a nasal as *ank*, and that *ankó* could be changed to *aukó*, and *aukó* to *augó*. In reply to this we must remark that in the Teutonic dialects the root *ak* never appears as *ank*, and that the transition of *an* into *au*, though possible under certain conditions, is not a phonetic process of frequent occurrence.

Besides, in all these derivations there is a difficulty, though not a serious one, viz. that an original tenuis, the *k*, is supposed irregularly to have been changed into *g*, instead of what it ought to be, an *h*. Although this is not altogether anomalous,³ yet it has to be taken into account. Professor Curtius, therefore, though he admits a possible connection between Gothic *augó* and the root *ak*, speaks cau-

¹ Schleicher, *Compendium*, § 112.

² Lottner, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. ix. p. 319.

³ Leo Meyer, *Die Gothische Sprache*, § 31.

tiously on the subject.¹ He speaks of *augo* as more distantly connected with that root, but he simply refers to the attempts of Ebel, Grassmann, and Lottner to explain the diphthong *au*, without himself expressing any decided opinion. Nor does he commit himself to any opinion as to the origin of *αὐγή*, though, of course, he never thinks of connecting the two words, Gothic *augó* and Greek *αὐγή*, as coming from the same root.

The etymology of the Greek *αὐγή*, in the sense of light or splendour, is, in fact, unknown, nor can we connect it with the Sanskrit *ogas*, which means vigour rather than splendour. The etymology of *oculus*, on the contrary, is clear; it comes from a root *ak*, to be sharp, to point, to fix, and it is closely connected with the Sanskrit word for eye, *akshi*, and with the Greek *ὄσσε*. The etymology of the German word *Auge* is, as yet, unknown. All we may safely assert is, that, in spite of the most favourable appearances, it cannot for the present be traced back to the same source as either the Greek *αὐγή* or the Latin *oculus*.

If we simply transliterated the Gothic *augó* into Sanskrit, we should expect some word like *ohan*, nom. *ohâ*. The question is, may we take the liberty, which many of the most eminent comparative philologists allow themselves, of deriving Gothic, Greek, and Latin words from roots which occur in Sanskrit only, but which have left no trace of their former presence in any other language? If so, then there would be little difficulty in finding an etymology for the Gothic *augo*. There is in Sanskrit a root *ûh*,

¹ Curtius, *Grundzüge*, pp. 99, 457.

which means to watch, to spy, to look. It occurs frequently in the Veda, and from it we have likewise a substantive, oha-s, look or appearance. If in Sanskrit itself this root had yielded a name for eye, such as ohan, the instrument of looking, I should not hesitate for a moment to identify this Sanskrit word ohan with the Gothic *augô*. No objection could be raised on phonetic grounds. Phonetically the two words would be one and the same. But as in Sanskrit such a derivation has not been found, and as in Gothic the root *ûh* never occurs, such an etymology would not be satisfactory. The number of words of unknown origin is very considerable as yet in Sanskrit, in Greek, in Latin, and in every one of the Aryan languages; and it is far better to acknowledge this fact, than to sanction the smallest violation of any of those phonetic laws, which some have called the straight jacket, but which are in reality, the leading strings of all true etymology.

If we now turn to grammar, properly so called, and ask what Comparative Philology has done for it, we must distinguish between two kinds of grammatical knowledge. Grammar may be looked upon as a mere art, and as taught at present in most schools, it is nothing but an art. We learn to play on a foreign language as we learn to play on a musical instrument, and we may arrive at the highest perfection in performing on any instrument, without having a notion of thorough bass or the laws of harmony. For practical purposes this purely empirical knowledge is all that is required. But though it would be a mistake to attempt in our elementary schools to replace an empirical by a scientific know-

ledge of grammar, that empirical knowledge of grammar ought in time to be raised to a real, rational, and satisfying knowledge, a knowledge not only of facts, but of reasons; a knowledge that teaches us not only what grammar is, but how it came to be what it is. To know grammar is very well, but to speak all one's life of gerunds and supines and infinitives, without having an idea what these formations really are, is a kind of knowledge not quite worthy of a scholar.

We laugh at people who still believe in ghosts and witches, but a belief in infinitives and supines is not only tolerated, but inculcated in our best schools and universities. Now, what do we really mean if we speak of an infinitive? It is a time-honoured name, no doubt, handed down to us from the middle ages; it has its distant roots in Rome, Alexandria, and Athens—but has it any real kernel? Has it any more body or substance than such names as *Satyr*s and *Lamias*?

Let us look at the history of the name before we look at the mischief which it, like many other names, has caused by making people believe that whenever there is a name, there must be something behind it. The name was invented by Greek philosophers who, in their first attempts at classifying and giving names to the various forms of language, did not know whether to class such forms as *γράφειν*, *γράφειν*, *γράφαι*, *γεγραφέναι*, *γράφεσθαι*, *γράψεσθαι*, *γεγράφθαι*, *γράψασθαι*, *γραφθῆναι*, *γραφθήσεσθαι*, as nouns or as verbs. They had established for their own satisfaction the broad distinction between nouns (*ὀνόματα*) and verbs (*ῥήματα*); they had assigned

to each a definition, but after having done so, they found that forms like *γράφειν* would not fit their definition either of noun or verb.¹ What could they do? Some (the Stoics) represented the forms in *ειν*, etc. as a subdivision of the verb, and introduced for them the name *ῥῆμα ἀπαρέμφατον* or *γενικώτατον*. Others recognised them as a separate part of speech, raising their number from eight to nine or ten. Others again classed them under the adverb (*ἐπίρρημα*) as one of the eight recognised parts of speech. The Stoics, taking their stand on Aristotle's definition of *ῥῆμα*, could not but regard the infinitive as *ῥῆμα*, because it implied time, past, present, or future, which was with them recognised as the specific characteristic of the verb (*Zeitwort*). But they went further, and called forms such as *γράφειν*, etc. *ῥῆμα*, in the highest or most general sense, distinguishing other verbal forms, such as *γράφει*, etc. by the names of *κατηγόρημα* or *σύμβημα*. Afterwards, in the progress of grammatical science, the definition of *ῥῆμα* became more explicit and complete. It was pointed out that a verb, besides its predicative meaning (*ἔμφασις*), is able to express² several additional meanings (*παρακολουθήματα* or *παρεμφάσεις*), viz., not only time, as already pointed out by Aristotle, but also person and number. The two latter meanings, however, being absent in *γράφειν*, this was now called *ῥῆμα ἀπαρέμφατον* (without by-meanings), or *γενικώτατον*, and, for practical pur-

¹ Chæroboscus, B.A., p. 1274, 29: Τὰ ἀπαρέμφατα ἀμφιβάλλεται εἰ ἄρα εἰς ῥήματα ἢ οὐχί. Schoemann, 'Redetheile,' p. 49.

² Apollonius, De Constr. i. c. 8, p. 32: Δυνάμει αὐτὸ τὸ ῥῆμα οὔτε πρόσωπα ἐπιδέχεται οὔτε ἀριθμούς, ἀλλὰ ἐγγενόμενον ἐν προσώποις τότε καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα διέσπειλεν . . . καὶ ψυχικὴν διάθεσιν. Schoemann, l. c. p. 19.

poses, this ῥῆμα ἀπαρέμφατον soon became the prototype of conjugation.

So far there was only confusion, arising from a want of precision in classifying the different forms of the verb. But when the Greek terminology was transplanted to Rome, real mischief began. Instead of ῥῆμα γενικώτατον, we now find the erroneous, or at all events inaccurate, translation, *modus infinitus*, and *infinitivus* by itself. What was originally meant as an adjective belonging to ῥῆμα, became a substantive, 'the infinitive,' and though the question arose again and again what this infinitive really was, whether a noun, or a verb, or an adverb; whether a mood or not a mood; the real existence of such a thing as an infinitive could no longer be doubted. One can hardly trust one's eyes in reading the extraordinary discussions on the nature of the infinitive in grammatical works of successive centuries up to the nineteenth. Suffice it to say that Gottfried Hermann, the great reformer of classical grammar, treated the infinitive again as an adverb, and therefore, as a part of speech, belonging to the particles. We ourselves were brought up to believe in infinitives; and to doubt the existence of this grammatical entity would have been considered in our younger days a most dangerous heresy.

And yet, how much confused thought, and how much controversy might have been avoided, if this grammatical term of infinitive had never been invented.¹ The fact is that what we call infinitives are nothing more or less than cases of verbal nouns,

¹ Note C, p. 157.

and not till they are treated as what they are, shall we ever gain an insight into the nature and the historical development of these grammatical monsters.

Take the old Homeric infinitive in *μεναι*, and you find its explanation in the Sanskrit termination *manē*, i.e. *manai*, the dative of the suffix *man* (not, as others suppose, the locative of a suffix *mana*), by which a large number of nouns are formed in Sanskrit. From *gnâ*, to know, we have (*g*)*nāman*, Latin (*g*)*nomen*, that by which a thing is known, its name; from *gan* to be born, *gān-man*, birth. In Greek this suffix *man* is chiefly used for forming masculine nouns, such as *γνώ-μων*, *γνώ-μονος*, literally a knower; *τλή-μων*, a sufferer; or as *μην* in *ποι-μήν* a shepherd, literally a feeder. In Latin, on the contrary, *men* occurs frequently at the end of abstract nouns in the neuter gender, such as *teg-men*, the covering, or *tegu-men* or *tegi-men*; *sola-men*, consolation; *voca-men*, an appellation; *certa-men*, a contest; and many more, particularly in ancient Latin; while in classical Latin the fuller suffix *mentum* predominates. If, then, we read in Homer, *κύνας ἔτευξε δῶμα φυλασσέμεναι*, we may call *φυλασσέμεναι* an infinitive, if we like, and translate 'he made dogs to protect the house;' but the form which we have before us is simply a dative of an old abstract noun in *μεν*, and the original meaning was 'for the protection of the house,' or 'for protecting the house;' as if we said in Latin, *tutamini domum*.

The infinitives in *μεν* may be corruptions of those in *μεναι*, unless we take *μεν* as an archaic accusative which, though without analogy in Greek, would correspond to Latin accusatives like *tegmen*, and express

the general object of certain acts or movements. In Sanskrit, at least in the Veda, infinitives in *mane* occur, such as *dā-mane*, to give, Greek *δό-μεναι*; *vid-māne*, to know, Greek *φιδ-μεναι*.¹

The question next arises,—if this is a satisfactory explanation of the infinitives in *μεναι*, how are we to explain the infinitives in *εναι*? We find in Homer, not only *ἵμεναι*, to go; but also *ἰέναι*; not only *ἔμμεναι*, to be, but also *εἶναι*, *i.e.* *ἔσ-εναι*. Bopp simply says that the *m* is lost, but he brings no evidence that in Greek an *m* can thus be lost without any provocation. The real explanation, here as elsewhere, is supplied by the *Beieinander* (the collateral growth), not by the *Nacheinander* (the successive growth) of language. Besides the suffix *man*, the Aryan languages possessed two other suffixes, *van* and *an*, which were added to verbal bases just like *man*. By the side of *dāman*, the act of giving, we find in the Veda *dā-van*, the act of giving, and a dative *dā-vāne*, with the accent on the suffix, meaning for the giving, *i.e.* to give. Now, in Greek this *v* would necessarily disappear, though its former presence might be indicated by the *digamma æolicum*. Thus, instead of Sanskrit *dāvāne*, we should have in Greek *δαφέναι*, *δοέναι*, and contracted *δοῦναι*, the regular form of the infinitive of the aorist, a form in which the diphthong *ou* would remain inexplicable, except for the former presence of the lost syllable *φε*. In the same manner *εἶναι* stands for *ἔσ-φέναι*, *ἔσ-έναι*, *ἔέναι*, *εἶναι*. Hence *ἰέναι* stands for *ἰφέναι*, and even the accent remains on the suffix *van*, just as it did in Sanskrit.

¹ Benfey, *Orient und Occident*, vol. i. p. 606; vol. ii. pp. 98. 137.

As the infinitives in *μεναι* were traced back to the suffix *man*, and those in *γεναι* to a suffix *van*, the regular infinitives in *εναι* after consonants, and *ναι* after vowels, must be referred to the suffix *an*, dat. *ane*. Here, too, we find analogous forms in the Veda. From *dhûrv*, to hurt, we have *dhûrv-ane*, for the purpose of hurting, in order to hurt; in Rv. IX. 61, 30, we find, *vibhṽ-áne*, Rv. VI. 61, 13, in order to conquer, and by the same suffix the Greeks formed their infinitives of the perfect, *λελοιπ-έναι*, and the infinitives of the verbs in *μι*, *τιθέ-ναι*, *διδό-ναι*, *ίστά-ναι*, etc.

In order to explain, after these antecedents, the origin of the infinitive in *ειν*, as *τύπτειν*, we must admit either the shortening of *ναι* to *νι*, which is difficult; or the existence of a locative in *ι* by the side of a dative in *αι*. That the locative can take the place of the dative we see clearly in the Sanskrit forms of the aorist, *parsháni*, to cross, *ne-sháni*, to lead, which, as far as their form, not their origin, is concerned, would well match Greek forms like *λύσειν* in the future. In either case, *τύπτε-νι* in Greek would have become *τύπτειν*, just as *τύπτε-σι* became *τύπτεις*. In the Doric dialect this throwing back of the final *ι* is omitted in the second person singular, where the Dorians may say *ἀμέλγες* for *ἀμέλγεις*; and in the same Doric dialect the infinitive, too, occurs in *εν*, instead of *ειν*; e.g. *αἰίδεν* instead of *αἰίδειν*. (Buttman, Gr. Gr. § 103, 10. 11.)

In this manner the growth of grammatical forms can be made as clear as the sequence of any historical events in the history of the world, nay I should say, far clearer, far more intelligible; and I

should think that even the first learning of these grammatical forms might be somewhat seasoned and rendered more really instructive by allowing the pupil, from time to time, a glimpse into the past history of the Greek and Latin languages. In English what we call the infinitive is clearly a dative; *to speak* shows by its very preposition what it was intended for. How easy, then, to explain to a beginner that if he translates ‘able to speak’ by *ἰκανὸς εἰπεῖν*, the Greek infinitive is really the same as the English, and that *εἰπεῖν* stands for *εἴπεν*, and this for *εἴπεναι*, which to a certain extent answers the same purpose as the Greek *ἔπει*, the dative of *ἔπος*, and therefore originally *ἔπεσ-ι*.

And remark, these very datives or locatives of nouns formed by the suffix *os* in Greek, *as* in Sanskrit, *es* in Latin, though they yield no infinitives in Greek, yield the most common form of the infinitive in Latin, and may be traced also in Sanskrit. As from *genus* we form a dative *generi*, and a locative *genere*, which stands for *genese*, so from *gigno* an abstract noun would be formed, *gignus*, and from it a dative, *gigneri*, and a locative, *gignere*. I do not say that the intermediate form *gignus* existed in the spoken Latin, I only maintain that such a form would be analogous to *gen-us*, *op-us*, *fœd-us*, and that in Sanskrit the process is exactly the same. We form in Sanskrit a substantive *kákshas*, sight, *kákshus*, eye; and we find the dative of *kákshas*, *i.e.* *kákshase*, used as what we should call an infinitive, meaning ‘in order to see.’ But we also find another so-called infinitive, *gîvâse*, in order to live, although there is no noun, *gîvas*, life; we find *áyase*, to

go, although there is no noun *áyas*, going. This Sanskrit *áyase* explains the Latin *i-re*, as **i-vane* explained the Greek *ἵναι*. The intention of the old framers of language is throughout the same. They differ only in the means which they use, one might almost say, at random; and the differences between Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin are often due to the simple fact that out of many possible forms that might be used and had been used before the Aryan languages became traditional, settled and national, one family or clan or nation fancied one, another another. While this one became fixed and classical, all others became useless, remained perhaps here and there in proverbial sayings or in sacred songs, but were given up at last completely, as strange, obsolete, and unintelligible.

And even then, after a grammatical form has become obsolete and unintelligible, it by no means loses its power of further development. Though the Greeks did not themselves, we still imagine that we feel the infinitive as the case of an abstract noun in many constructions. Thus *χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν*, difficult to find, was originally, difficult in the finding, or, difficult for the act of finding; *δεινὸς λέγειν*, meant literally, powerful in speaking; *ἄρχομαι λέγειν*, I begin to speak, *i.e.* I direct myself to the act of speaking; *κέλευί με μυθήσασθαι*, you bid me to speak, *i.e.* you order me towards the act of speaking; *φοβοῦμαι διελέγχειν σε*, I am afraid of refuting you, *i.e.* I fear in the act, or, I shrink when brought towards the act, of refuting you; *σὸν ἔργον λέγειν*, your business is in or towards speaking, you have to speak; *πᾶσιν ἀδεῖν χαλεπὸν*, there is something diffi-

cult in pleasing everybody, or, in our endeavour after pleasing everybody. In all these cases the so-called infinitive can, with an effort, still be felt as a noun in an oblique case. But in course of time expressions such as χαλεπὸν ἀδεῖν, it is difficult to please, ἀγαθὸν λέγειν, it is good to speak, left in the mind of the speaker the impression that ἀδεῖν and λέγειν were subjects in the nominative, the pleasing is difficult, the speaking is good; and by adding the article, these oblique cases of verbal nouns actually became nominatives—τὸ ἀδεῖν, the act of pleasing, τὸ λέγειν, the act of speaking—capable of being used in every case, e.g. ἐπιθυμία τοῦ πιεῖν, *desiderium bibendi*. This regeneration, this process of creating new words out of decaying and decayed materials, may seem at first sight incredible, yet it is as certain as the change with which we began our discussion of the infinitive, I mean the change of the conception of a ῥῆμα γενικώτατον, a *verbum generalissimum*, into a *generalissimus* or *infinitivus*. Nor is the process without analogy in modern languages. The French *l'avenir*, the future (*Zukunft*), is hardly the Latin *advenire*. That would mean the arriving, the coming, but not what is to come. I believe *l'avenir* was (*quod est*) *ad venire*, what is to come, contracted to *l'avenir*. In Low-German *to come* assumes even the character of an adjective, and we can speak not only of a year to come, but of a to-come year, *de tokum Jahr*.¹

This process of grammatical vivisection may be painful in the eyes of classical scholars, yet even they must see how great a difference there is in the

¹ Chips, 1st ed., vol. iii. p. 141.

quality of knowledge imparted by our Greek and Latin grammars, and by comparative grammar. I do not deny that at first children must learn Greek and Latin mechanically, but it is not right that they should remain satisfied with mere paradigms and technical terms, without knowing the real nature and origin of so-called infinitives, gerunds, and supines. Every child will learn the construction of the accusative with the infinitive, but I well remember my utter amazement when I first was taught to say *Miror te ad me nihil scribere*, I am surprised that you write nothing to me. How easy would it have been to explain that *scribere* was originally a locative of a verbal noun, and that there was nothing strange or irrational in saying, I wonder at thee in the act of not writing to me. This first step once taken, everything else followed by slow degrees, but even in phrases like *Spero te mihi ignoscere*, we can still see the first steps which led from 'I hope or I desire thee, toward the act of forgiving me,' to 'I trust thee to forgive me.' It is the object of the comparative philologist to gather up the scattered fragments, to arrange them and fit them, and thus to show that language is something rational, human, intelligible, the very embodiment of the mind of man in its growth from the lowest to the highest stage, and with capabilities for further growth far beyond what we can at present conceive or imagine.

As to writing Greek and Latin verse, I do not maintain that a knowledge of Comparative Philology will help us much. It is simply an art that must be acquired by practice, if in these our busy days it is still worth acquiring. A good memory will no

doubt enable us to say at a moment's notice whether certain syllables are long or short. But is it not far more interesting to know why certain vowels are long and others short, than to be able to string longs and shorts together in imitation of Greek and Latin hexameters? Now, in many cases the reason why certain vowels are long or short can be supplied by Comparative Philology alone. We may learn from Latin grammar that the *i* in *fīdus*, trusty, and in *fīdo*, I trust, is long, and that it is short in *fides*, trust, and *perfidus*, faithless; but as all these words are derived from the same root, why should some have a long, others a short vowel? A comparison of Sanskrit at once supplies an answer. Certain derivatives, not only in Latin but in Sanskrit and Greek too, require what is called Guna of the radical vowel. In *fīdus* and *fīdo*, the *i* is really a diphthong, and represents a more ancient *ei* or *oi*, the former appearing in Greek *πείθω*, the latter in Latin *fædus*, a truce.

We learn from our Greek grammars that the second syllable in *δείκνυμι* is long, but in the plural, *δείκνυμεν*, it is short. This cannot be by accident, and we may observe the same change in *δάμνημι* and *δάμναμεν*, and similar words. Nothing, however, but a study of Sanskrit would have enabled us to discover the reason of this change, which is really the accent in its most primitive working, such as we can watch it in the Vedic Sanskrit, where it produces exactly the same change, only with far greater regularity and perspicuity.

Why, again, do we say in Greek, *οἶδα*, I know, but *ἴσμεν*, we know? Why *τέτληκα*, but *τέτλαμεν*?

Why μέμονα, but μέμαμεν? There is no recollection in the minds of the Greeks of the motive power that was once at work, and left its traces in these grammatical convulsions: but in Sanskrit we still see, as it were, a lower stratum of grammatical growth, and we can there watch the regular working of laws which required these changes, and which have left their impress not only on Greek, but on Sanskrit, and even on German. The same necessity which made Homer say οἶδα and ἴδμεν, and the Vedic poet véda and vidmás, still holds good, and makes us say in German, *Ich weiss*, I know, but *wir wissen*, we know.

All this becomes clear and intelligible by the light of Comparative Grammar; anomalies vanish, exceptions prove the rule, and we perceive more plainly every day how in language, as elsewhere, the conflict between the freedom claimed by each individual and the resistance offered by the community at large, establishes in the end a reign of law most wonderful, yet perfectly rational and intelligible.

These are but a few small specimens to show you what Comparative Philology can do for Greek and Latin; and how it has given a new life to the study of languages by discovering, so to say, and laying bare, the traces of that old life, that prehistoric growth, which made language what we find it in the oldest literary monuments, and which still supplies the vigour of the language of our own time. A knowledge of the mere facts of language is interesting enough; nay, if you ask yourself what grammars really are—those very Greek and Latin grammars which we hated so much in our schoolboy

days—you will find that they are storehouses, richer than the richest museums of plants or minerals, more carefully classified and labelled than the productions of any of the great kingdoms of nature. Every form of declension and conjugation, every genitive and every so-called infinitive and gerund, is the result of a long succession of efforts, and of intelligent efforts. There is nothing accidental, nothing irregular, nothing without a purpose and meaning in any part of Greek or Latin grammar. No one who has once discovered this hidden life of language, no one who has once found out that what seemed to be merely anomalous and whimsical in language is but, as it were, a petrification of thought, of deep, curious, poetical, philosophical thought, will ever rest again till he has descended as far as he can descend into the ancient shafts of human speech, exploring level after level, and testing every successive foundation which supports the surface of each spoken language.

One of the great charms of this new science is that there is still so much to explore, so much to sift, so much to arrange. I shall not, therefore, be satisfied with merely lecturing on Comparative Philology, but I hope I shall be able to form a small philological society of more advanced students, who will come and work with me, and bring the results of their special studies as materials for the advancement of our science. If there are scholars here who have devoted their attention to the study of Homer, Comparative Philology will place in their hands a light with which to explore the dark crypt on which the temple of the Homeric language was erected. If there are scholars who know their Plautus or

Lucretius, Comparative Philology will give them a key to grammatical forms in ancient Latin, which, even if supported by an Ambrosian palimpsest, might still seem hazardous and problematical. As there is no field and no garden that has not its geological antecedents, there is no language and no dialect which does not receive light from a study of Comparative Philology, and reflect light in return on more general problems. As in geology, again, so in Comparative Philology, no progress is possible without a division of labour, and without the most general co-operation. The most experienced geologist may learn something from a miner or from a plough-boy; the most experienced comparative philologist may learn something from a schoolboy or from a child.

I have thus explained to you what, if you will but assist me, I should like to do as the first occupant of this new chair of Comparative Philology. In my public lectures I must be satisfied with teaching. In my private lectures, I hope I shall not only teach, but also learn, and receive back as much as I have to give.

NOTES.

NOTE A.

ON THE FINAL DENTAL OF THE PRONOMINAL STEM *tad*.¹

ONE or two instances may here suffice to show how compassless even the best comparative philologists find themselves if, without a knowledge of Sanskrit, they venture into the deep waters of grammatical research. What can be clearer at first sight than that the demonstrative pronoun *that* has the same base in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and German? Bopp places together (§ 349) the following forms of the neuter :

Sanskrit	Zend	Greek	Latin	Gothic
t a t	taḍ	ró	is-tud	thata

and he draws from them the following conclusions :—

In the Sanskrit *ta-t* we have the same pronominal element repeated twice, and this repeated pronominal element became afterwards the general sign of the neuter after other pronominal stems, such as *ya-t*, *ka-t*.

Such a conclusion seems extremely probable, particularly when we compare the masculine form *sa-s*, the old nom. sing., instead of the ordinary *sa*. But the first question that has to be answered is, whether this is phonetically possible, and how.

If *tat* in Sanskrit is *ta+ta*, then we expect in Gothic *tha+tha*, instead of which we find *tha+ta*. We expect in Latin *is-tut*, not *istud*, *illut*, not *illud*, *it*, not *id*; for Latin represents final *t* in Sanskrit by *t*, not by *d*. The old Latin ablative in *d* is not a case in point, as we shall see afterwards.

Both Gothic *tha-ta*, therefore, and Latin *istud*, postulate a Sanskrit *tad*, while Zend and Greek at all events do not

¹ See Bréal, *Mémoires de la Société de linguistique*, vol. i.

conflict with an original final media. Everything, therefore, depends on what was the original form in Sanskrit; and here no Sanskrit scholar would hesitate for one moment between *tat* and *tad*. Whatever the origin of *tat* may have been, it is quite certain that Sanskrit knows only of *tad*, never of *tat*. There are various ways of testing the original surd or sonant nature of final consonants in Sanskrit. One of the safest seems to me to see how those consonants behave before *taddhita* or secondary suffixes, which require no change in the final consonant of the base. Thus before the suffix *îya* (called *kha* by Pânini) the final consonant is never changed, yet we find *tad-îya*, like *mad-îya*, *tvad-îya*, *asmad-îya*, *yushmad-îya*, &c. Again, before the possessive suffix *vat* final consonants of nominal bases suffer no change. This is distinctly stated by Pânini I. 4, 19. Hence we have *vidyut-vân*, from *vidyut*, lightning, from the root *dyut*; we have *udasvit-vân*, from *uda-svit*. In both cases the original final tenuis remains unchanged. Hence, if we find *tad-vân*, *kad-vân*, our test shows us again that the final consonant in *tad* and *kad* is a media, and that the *d* of these words is not a modification of *t*.

Taking our stand therefore on the undoubted facts of Sanskrit grammar, we cannot recognise *t* as the termination of the neuter of pronominal stems, but only *d*¹; nor can we accept Bopp's explanation of *tad* as a compound of *ta*+*t*, unless the transition of an original *t* into a Sanskrit and Latin *d* can be established by sufficient evidence. Even then that transition would have to be referred to a time before Sanskrit and Gothic became distinct languages, for

¹ Dr. Kielhorn in his grammar gives correctly *tad* as base, *tat* as nom. and acc. sing., because in the latter case phonetic rules either require or allow the change of *d* into *t*. Boehtlingk, Roth, and Benfey also give the right forms. Curtius, like Bopp, gives *yat*, Schleicher *tat*, which he supposes to have been changed at an early time into *tad* (§ 203).

the Gothic *tha-ta* is the counterpart of the Sanskrit *tad*, and not of *tat*.

Bopp endeavours to defend the transition of an original *t* into Latin *d* by the termination of the old ablatives, such as *gnaivod*, &c. But here again it is certain that the original termination was *d*, and not *t*. It is so in Latin, it may be so in Zend, where, as Justi points out, the *d* of the ablative is probably a media.¹ In Sanskrit it is certainly a media in such forms as *mad*, *tvad*, *asmad*, which Bopp considers as old ablatives, and which in *madîya*, &c., show the original media. In other cases it is impossible in Sanskrit to test the nature of the final dental in the ablative, because *d* is always determined by its position in a sentence. But under no circumstances could we appeal to Latin *gnaivod* in order to prove a transition of an original *t* into *d*; while on the contrary all the evidence at present is in favour of a media, as the final letter both of the ablative and of the neuter bases of pronouns, such as *tad* and *yad*.

These may seem *minutiae*, but the whole of Comparative Grammar is made up of *minutiae*, which, nevertheless, if carefully joined together and cemented, lead to conclusions of unexpected magnitude.

NOTE B.

DID FEMININE BASES IN *d* TAKE *s* IN THE NOMINATIVE SINGULAR?

I ADD one other instance to show how a more accurate knowledge of Sanskrit would have guarded comparative philologists against rash conclusions. With regard to the nominative singular of feminine bases ending in derivative

¹ Weich ist es (*t* oder *d*) wohl im abl. sing. *gafnât* (*gafnâdha*). Justi, *Handbuch der Zendsprache*, p. 362.

ā, the question arose, whether words like *bona* in Latin, *ἀγαθά* in Greek, *śivā* in Sanskrit, had originally an *s* as the sign of the nom. sing., which was afterwards lost, or whether they never took that termination. Bopp (§ 136), Schleicher (§ 246), and others seem to believe in the loss of the *s*, chiefly, it would seem, because the *s* is added to feminine bases ending in *ī* and *ū*. Benfey¹ takes the opposite view, viz. that feminines in *ā* never took the *s* of the nom. sing. But he adds one exception, the Vedic *gnâ-s*. This remark has caused much mischief. Without verifying Benfey's statements, Schleicher (*l. c.*) quotes the same exception, though cautiously referring to the Sanskrit dictionary of Boehtlingk and Roth as his authority. Later writers, for instance Merguet,² leave out all restrictions, simply appealing to this Vedic form *gnâ-s* in support of the theory that feminine bases in *ā*, too, took originally *s* as sign of the nom. sing., and afterwards dropped it. Even so careful a scholar as Bûchler³ speaks of the *s* as lost.

There is, first of all, no reason whatever why the *s* should have been added⁴; secondly, there is none why it should have been lost. But, whatever opinion we may hold in this respect, the appeal to the Vedic *gnâ-s* cannot certainly be sustained, and the word should at all events be obelised till there is better evidence for it than we possess at present.⁵

¹ *Orient und Occident*, vol. i. p. 298.

² *Entwicklung der Lateinischen Formenlehre*, 1870, p. 20.

³ *Grundriss der Lateinischen Declination*, 1866, p. 9.

⁴ See Benfey, *l. c.* p. 298.

⁵ In the dictionary of Boehtlingk and Roth we read *s.v.* *gnâ*, 'scarce in the singular; nom. sing. seems to be *gnâs*, according to the passage Rv. IV. 9, 4, and Naigh. I. 11, in one text, while the other text gives the form *gnâ*.' Against that it should be remarked that it would make no difference whether the MSS. of the Naighantuka give *gnâ* or *gnâs*. *Gnâ* would be the nom. sing., *gnâs* would be the form in which the word occurs most frequently in the Veda. It is easy to see that the collector of the Naighantuka allowed himself to quote words according to either principle. Cf. Aufrecht, *Rig-Veda*, 2nd ed. p. v. note.

The passage which is always quoted from the Rv. IV. 9, 4, as showing gnâ-s to be a nom. sing. in *s*, is extremely difficult, and, as it stands at present, most likely corrupt:

Utâ gnâh agnîh adhvaré utó grîhâ-patîh dâme, utâ brahmâ ní sîdati.

This could only be translated :

‘Agni sits down at the sacrifice as a woman, as lord in the house, and as priest.’

Devarâga in his commentary on gnâ explains it: *Gamer dhâtor dhâprîvasyagyatibhyo nah* (U. S. III. 6) *iti bahulakân napratyayo bhavati tilopas ka; tap.* *Gatyarthâ buddhyarthâh; gânantî karmeti gnâh.* *Yadvâ gakkhati yagneshu; abhî yagnâm grîñhi no gnâvañ (patnîvañ).* Rv. I. 15, 3. *Khandâmsi vai gnâ iti brâhmanam iti Mâdhavañ.* *Asmâ id u gnâs kid* (Rv. I. 61, 8) *ity api; gâyatryâdyâ devapatnya iti sa eva.* *Tasmâh khandasâm gâyatryâdinâm vâgrû-patvâd gnâvyapadesah.*

In his remarks on Nigh. III. 29, it is quite clear that Devarâga takes gnâh as a nom. plur., not as a nom. sing. He says: *Menâ gnâ iti strînam; ubhâv api sabdau vyâkhyâtau vâñnâmasu.* *Mânayanti hi tâh patisvasuramâtulâdayah, pûgyâ bhûshayitavyâs keti smaranât.* *Gakkhanti enâh patayo patnyârthinañ.* The passage quoted in the Nirukta III. 29, *gnâs tvâkrîntann apaso 'tanvata vayitryo 'vayan,* is taken from the Tândya-brâhmana I. 8, 9: ‘O dress! the women cut thee out, the workers stretched thee out, the weavers wove thee.’

Thus every support which the Nighantu or the Nirukta was supposed to give to the form gnâh as a nom. sing. vanishes. And if it is said *s.v.* *gnâs-pati*, that in this compound gnâh might be taken as a nom. sing., and that the Pada-text separates gnâh-patîh, it has been overlooked that the separation in Rv. II. 38, 10, is a mere misprint. See Prâtisâkhya, 738. The compound gnâspatîh has been correctly explained as standing for gnâyâspatîh, and the same old genitive is also found in *gâspatîh* and *gâspatyam*. See also Vâgasan. Prâtisâkhya IV. 39. It is important to observe that the metre requires us to pronounce gnâspati either as gnââspâtîh or as gâñâspâtîh.

There is, as far as I know, no passage where gnâh in the Veda can be taken as a nom. sing., and it should be observed that gnâh as nom. plur. is almost always disyllabic in the Rig-veda, excepting the tenth Mandala; that the acc. sing. (V. 43, 6) is, however, disyllabic, but the acc. plur. monosyllabic (I. 22, 10). In V. 43, 13, we must either read gnâh or ôshâdhîh.

This, however, is impossible, for Agni, the god of fire, is never represented in the Veda as a woman. If we took *gnâh* as a genitive, we might translate, 'Agni sits down in the sacrifice of the lady of the house,' but this again would be utterly incongruous in Vedic poetry.

I believe the verse is corrupt, and I should propose to read:—

Utá agnâv agnîh adhvaré.

'Agni sits down at the sacrifice in the fire, as lord in the house, and as a priest.'

The ideas that Agni, the god of fire, sits down in the fire, or that Agni is lighted by Agni, or that Agni is both the sacrificial fire and the priest, are familiar to every reader of the Veda. Thus we read I. 12, 6, *agnínâ agnîh sám idhyate*, Agni is lighted by Agni; X. 88, 1, we find Agni invoked as *â-hutam agnáu*, &c.

But whether this emendation be right or wrong, it must be quite clear how unsafe it would be to support the theory that feminine bases in *â* ended originally in *s* by this solitary passage from the Veda.¹ Possibly *gnâs* may depend on *patih* in *griha-patih*.

NOTE C.

GRAMMATICAL FORMS IN SANSKRIT CORRESPONDING TO SO-CALLED INFINITIVES IN GREEK AND LATIN.

THERE is no trace of such a term as infinitive in Sanskrit, and yet exactly the same forms, or, at all events, forms strictly analogous to those which we call infinitives in Greek and Latin, exist in Sanskrit. Here, however, they are treated in the simplest way.

Sanskrit grammarians, when giving the rules according to which nouns and adjectives are derived from verbal roots by means of primary suffixes (*Krit*), mention among the rest the suffixes *tum* (*Pân.* III. 3, 10), *se*, *ase*, *adhyai*,

¹ See Havet, *Mémoires de la Société de linguistique*, vol. ii. p. 27.

tavai, tave, shyai, e, am, tos, as (IV. 4, 9-17), defining their meaning in general by that of tum (III. 3, 10). This tum is said to express immediate futurity in a verb, if governed by another word conveying an intention. An example will make this clearer. In order to say he goes to cook, where 'he goes' expresses an intention, and 'to cook' is the object of that intention which is to follow immediately, we place the suffix tum at the end of the verb pak, to cook, and say in Sanskrit vragati pak-tum. We might also say pâkako vragati, he goes as one who means to cook, or vragati pâkâya, he goes to the act of cooking, placing the abstract noun in the dative; and all these constructions are mentioned together by Sanskrit grammarians. The same takes place after verbs which express a wish (III. 3, 158); *e.g.* ikkhati paktum, he wishes to cook, and after such words as kâla, time, samaya, opportunity, velâ, right moment (III. 3, 167); *e.g.* kâlah paktum, it is time to cook, &c. Other verbs which govern forms in tum are (III. 4, 65) sak, to be able; dhriśh, to dare; gñâ, to know; glai, to be weary; ghat, to endeavour; ârabh, to begin; labh, to get; prakram, to begin; utsah, to endure; arh, to deserve; and words like asti, there is; *e.g.* asti bhoktum, it is (possible) to eat; not, it is (necessary) to eat. The forms in tum are also enjoined (III. 4, 66) after words like a lam, expressing fitness; *e.g.* paryâpto bhoktum, alam bhoktum, kusalo bhoktum, fit or able to eat.

Here we have everything that is given by Sanskrit grammarians in place of what we should call the Chapter on the Infinitive in Greek and Latin. The only thing that has to be added is the provision, understood in Pânini's grammar, that such suffixes as tum, &c., are indeclinable.

And why are they indeclinable? For the simple reason that they are themselves case-terminations. Whether Pânini was aware of this, we cannot tell with certainty. From some of his remarks it would seem to be so. When

treating of the cases, Pāṇini (I. 4, 32) explains what we should call the dative by *Sampradāna*. *Sampradāna* means giving (δοτική), but Pāṇini uses it here as a technical term, and assigns to it the definite meaning of 'he whom one looks to by any act' (not only the act of giving, as the commentators imply). It is therefore what we should call the 'remote object.' Ex. *Brāhmanāya dhanam dadāti*, he gives wealth to the Brāhman. This is afterwards extended by several rules, explaining that the *Sampradāna* comes in after verbs expressive of pleasure caused to somebody (I. 4, 33); after *slagha*, to applaud, *hnu*, to dissemble, to conceal, *sthā*,¹ to reveal, *sap*, to curse (I. 4, 34); after *dhāray*, to owe (I. 4, 35); *sprīh*, to long for (I. 4, 36); after verbs expressive of anger, ill-will, envy, detraction (I. 4, 37); after *rādha* and *īksh*, if they mean to consider concerning a person (I. 4, 39); after *pratisru* and *āsrū*, in the sense of according (I. 4, 40); *anugri* and *pratigri*, in the sense of acting in accordance with (I. 4, 41); after *parikrī*, to buy, to hire (I. 4, 44). Other cases of *Sampradāna* are mentioned after such words as *namaḥ*, salutation to, *svasti*, hail, *svāhā*, salutation to the gods, *svadhā*, salutation to the manes, *alam*, sufficient for, *vashat*, offered to, a sacrificial invocation, &c. (II. 3, 16); and in such expressions as *na tvām trināya manye*, I do not value thee a straw (II. 3, 17); *grāmāya gakkhati*, he goes to the village (II. 2, 12); where, however, the accusative, too, is equally admissible. Some other cases of *Sampradāna* are mentioned in the *Vārttikas*; e.g. I. 4, 44, *muktaye harim bhagati*, for the sake of liberation he worships Hari; *vātāya kapilā vidyut*, a dark red lightning indicates wind. Very interesting, too, is the construction

¹ *Sthā*, *svābhīprāyabodhanānukūlasthiti*, to reveal by gestures, a meaning not found in our dictionaries. Wilson renders it wrongly by to stay with, which would govern the instrumental. *Sap*, cursing, means to use curses in order to convey some meaning or intention to another person.

with the prohibitive mâ; *e.g.* mâ kâpalâya, lit. not for unsteadiness, *i.e.* do not act unsteadily.¹

In all these cases we easily recognise the identity of Sampradâna with the dative in Greek and Latin. If, therefore, we see that Pânini in some of his rules states that Sampradâna takes the place of tum, the so-called infinitive, we can hardly doubt that he had perceived the similarity in the functions of what we call dative and infinitive. Thus, he says, that instead of phalâny âhartum yâti, he goes to take the fruits, we may use the dative and say phalebhyo yâti, he goes for the fruits; instead of yash-tum yâti, he goes to sacrifice, yâgâya yâti, he goes to the act of sacrificing (II. 3, 14-15).

But whether Pânini recognised this fact or not, certain it is that we have only to look at the forms which in the Veda take the place of tum, in order to convince ourselves that most of them are datives of verbal nouns. As far as Sanskrit grammar is concerned, we may safely cancel the name of infinitive altogether, and speak instead boldly of datives and other cases of verbal nouns. Whether these verbal nouns admit of the dative case only, and whether some of those datival terminations have become obsolete, are questions which do not really concern the grammarian, and nothing would be more unphilosophical than to make such points the specific characteristic of a new grammatical category, the infinitive. The very idea that every noun must possess a complete set of cases, is contrary to all the lessons of the history of language; and though the fact that some of these forms belong to an antiquated phase of language has undoubtedly contributed towards their being used more readily for certain syntactical purposes, the fact remains that in their origin and their original intention they were datives and nothing else. Neither could the fact that these datives of verbal nouns may

¹ Wilson, *Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 390.

govern the same case which is governed by the verb be used as a specific mark, because it is well known that, in Sanskrit more particularly, many nouns retain the power of governing the accusative. We shall now examine some of these so-called infinitives in Sanskrit.

Datives in *e*.

The simplest dative is that in *e*, after verbal bases ending in consonants or *â*, e.g. *dris-é*, for the sake of seeing, to see; *vid-é*, to know; *paribh-vê*,¹ to overcome; *srad-dhé kām*, to believe.

Datives in *ai*.

After some verbs ending in *â*, the dative is irregularly (Grammar, §§ 239, 240) formed in *ai*; Rv. VII. 19, 7, *parâd-ái*, to surrender; III. 60, 4, *pratim-ái*, to compare; and the important form *vayodh-ái*, of which more by and by.

Accusatives in *am*. Genitives and Ablatives in *as*.
Locatives in *i*.

By the side of these datives we have analogous accusatives in *am*, genitives and ablatives in *as*, locatives in *i*.

Accusative: I. 73, 10, *sakéma yámam*, May we be able to get. I. 94, 3, *sakéma tvâ samídhan*, May we be able to light thee. This may be the Oscan and Umbrian infinitive in *um*, *om* (*u*, *o*), if we take *yama* as a base in *a*, and *m* as the sign of the accusative. In Sanskrit it is impossible to determine this question, for that bases in *a* are also used for similar purposes is clearly seen in datives like *dá-bhâya*; e.g. Rv. V. 44, 2, *ná dábhâya*, not to conquer; VIII. 96, 1, *nṛbhyah tárâya sindhavaḥ su-pârâh*, the rivers easy to cross for men. Whether the Vedic imperatives in *âya*

¹ In verbs compounded with prepositions the accent is on the penultimate: e.g. *samídhe*, *atikráme*, etc.

(sâyak) admit of a similar explanation is doubtful on account of the accent.

Genitive: vilikhah, in âsvaro vilikhah, cognisant of drawing; and possibly X. 108, 2, atiskâdah bhiyâsâ, from fear of crossing.

Ablative: Rv. VIII. 1, 12, purâ âtridah, before striking.

Locative: Rv. V. 52, 12, drisî tvishé, to shine in glancing (?).

Datives in *s-e*.

The same termination of the dative is added to verbal bases which have taken the increment of the aorist, the *s*. Thus from *gi*, to conquer, we have *gi-sh*, and *ge-sh*, and from both datival forms with infinitival function. I. 111, 4, té nah hinvantu sâtâye dhiyé *gishé*, May they bring us to wealth, wisdom, victory!

I. 100, 11, apâm tokâsya tânayasya *geshé*, May Indra help us for getting water, children and descendants. Cf. VI. 44, 18.

Or, after bases ending in consonants, *upaparakshé*; V. 47, 6, *upa-prakshé vrîshanah---vadhvâh yanti âkkha*, the men go towards their wives to embrace.

These forms correspond to Greek infinitives like *λῦσαι* and *τίψαι*, possibly to Latin infinitives like *ferre*, for *fer-se*, *velle* for *vel-se*, and *voluis-se*; for *se*, following immediately on a consonant, can never represent the Sanskrit *ase*. With regard to infinitives like *fac-se*, *dic-se*, I do not venture to decide whether they are primitive forms, or contracted, though *fac-se* could hardly be called a contraction of *fecisse*. The 2nd pers. sing. of the imperative of the 1st aorist middle, *λῦσαι*, is identical with the infinitive in form, and the transition of meaning from the infinitive to the imperative is well known in Greek and other languages, e.g. Παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λῦσαι τε φίλην τὰ τ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι, Deliver up my dear child and accept the ransom. Several of these aoristic forms are very perplexing in Vedic Sanskrit. If we find, for instance, *stushé*, we cannot at

once tell whether it is the infinitive ($\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\alpha\iota$); or the 1st pers. sing. of the aor. $\hat{A}tmanep.$ in the subjunctive (for *stushai*), let me praise ($\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\iota$); or lastly, the 2nd pers. sing. $\hat{A}tmanep.$ in the indicative ($\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\eta$). If *stushe* has no accent, we know, of course, that it cannot be the infinitive, as in X. 93, 9; but when it has the accent on the last, it may, in certain constructions, be either infinitive, or 1st pers. sing. aor. $\hat{A}tm.$ subj. Here we want far more careful grammatical studies on the language of the Veda before we can venture to translate with certainty. In places, for instance, where, as in I. 122, 7, we have a nominative with *stushé*, it is clear that it must be taken as an infinitive, *stushé sã vâm---râtík*, your gift, Varuna and Mitra, is to be praised; but in other places, such as VIII. 5, 4, the choice is difficult. In VIII. 65, 5, *índra grínîshé u stushé*, I should propose to translate, Indra, thou longest for praising, thou desirest to be praised, cf. VIII. 71, 15; while in II. 20, 4, *tám u stushe índram tám grínîshe*, I translate, Let me praise Indra, let me laud him, admitting here the irregular retention of *Vikarana* in the aorist, which can be defended by analogous forms such as *grí-nî-sh-áni*, *strí-nî-sh-áni*, of which more hereafter. However, all these translations, as every real scholar knows, are, and can for the present be, tentative only. Nothing but a complete Vedic grammar, such as we may soon expect from Professor Benfey, will give us safe ground to stand on.

Datives in *âyai*.

Feminine bases in *â* form their dative in *âyai*, and thus we find *karâyai* used in the Veda, VII. 77, 1, as what we should call an infinitive, in the sense of to go. No other cases of *karâ* have as yet been met with. A similar form is *garâyai*, to praise, I. 38, 13.

Datives in *aye*.

We have next to consider bases in *i*, forming their

dative in *aye*. Here, whenever we are acquainted with the word in other cases, we naturally take *aye* as a simple dative of a noun. Thus in I. 31, 8, we should translate *sanáye dhánânâm*, for the acquisition of treasures, because we are accustomed to other cases, such as I. 100, 13, *sanáyas*, acquisitions, V. 27, 3, *saním*, wealth. But if we find, V. 80, 5, *drisáye nah asthât*, she stood to be seen by us, lit. for our seeing, then we prefer, though wrongly, to look upon such datives as infinitives, simply because we have not met with other cases of *drisi-s*.

Datives in *taye*.

What applies to datives of nouns in *i*, applies with still greater force to datives of nouns in *ti*. There is no reason why in IX. 96, 4 we should call *áhataye*, to be without hurt, an infinitive, simply because no other case of *áhati-s* occurs in the Rig-Veda; while *ágítaye*, not to fail, in the same line, is called a dative of *ágîti-s*, because it occurs again in the accusative *ágîti-m*.

Datives in *tyai*.

In *ityái*, to go, I. 113, 6; 124, 1, we have a dative of *iti-s*, the act of going, of which the instrumental *ityâ* occurs likewise, I. 167, 5. This *tyâ*, shortened to *tya*, became afterwards the regular termination of the gerund of compound verbs in *tya* (Grammar, § 446), while *ya* (§ 445) points to an original *yâ* or *yai*.

Datives in *as-e*.

Next follow datives from bases in *as*, partly with accent on the first syllable, like neuter nouns in *as*, partly with the accent on *as*; partly with Guna, partly without. With regard to them it becomes still clearer how impossible it would be to distinguish between datives of abstract nouns, and other grammatical forms, to be called infinitives. Thus Rv. I. 7, 3 we read, *dirgháya kákshase*, Indra made the

sun rise for long glancing, *i.e.* that it might glance far and wide. It is quite true that no other cases of *kakshas*, seeing, occur, on which ground modern grammarians would probably class it as an infinitive; but the qualifying dative *dirghāya* clearly shows that the poet felt *kákshase* as the dative of a noun, and did not trouble himself whether that noun was defective in other cases or not.

These datives of verbal nouns in *as* correspond exactly to Latin infinitives in *ēre*, like *vivere* (*gīváse*), and explain likewise infinitives in *āre*, *ēre*, and *īre*, forms which cannot be separated. It has been thought that the nearest approach to an infinitive is to be found in such forms as *gīváse*, *bhiyáse*, to fear (V. 29, 4), because in such cases the ordinary nominal form would be *bháyas-e*. There is, however, the instrumental *bhiyásâ*, X. 108, 2, which shows that we must admit a nominal base *bhíyas*.

Datives in *mane*.

Next follow datives from nouns in *man*, *van*, and *an*. The suffix *man* is very common in Sanskrit, for forming verbal nouns, such as *kar-man*, doing, deed, from *kar*. *Van* is almost restricted to forming *nomina agentis*, such as *druh-van*, hating; but we find also substantives like *pat-van*, still used in the sense of flying. *An* also is generally used like *van*, but we can see traces of its employment to form *nomina actionis* in Greek *áywv*, Lat. *turbo*, etc.

Datives of nouns in *man*, used with infinitival functions, are very common in the Veda; *e. g.* I. 164, 6 *prikkhâmi vidmâne*, I ask to know; VIII. 93, 8, *dāmane kritâh*, made to give. We find also the instrumental case *vidmânâ*, *e.g.* VI. 14, 5, *vidmânâ urushyâti*, he protects by his knowledge. These correspond to Homeric infinitives, like *ἰδμεναι*, *δόμεναι*, etc., old datives, and not locatives, as Schleicher and Curtius supposed; while forms like *δόμεν* are to be explained either as abbreviated, or as obsolete accusatives.

Datives in *vane*.

Of datives in *váne* I only know *dâváne*, a most valuable grammatical relic, by which Professor Benfey was enabled to explain the Greek *δοῦναι*, *i. e.* *δοῦέναι*.¹

Datives in *ane*.

Of datives in *áne* I pointed out (1. c.) *dhŭrv-ane* and *vibhv-áne*, VI. 61, 13, taking the latter as synonymous with *vibhvē*, and translating, 'Sarasvatî, the great, made to conquer, like a chariot.' Professor Roth, *s. v.* *vibhván*, takes the dative for an instrumental, and translates 'made by an artificer.' It is, however, not the chariot that is spoken of, but *Sarasvatî*, and of her it could hardly be said that she was made either by or for an artificer.

Locatives in *sani*.

As we saw before that aoristic bases in *s* take the datival *e*, so that we had *prák-sh-e* by the side of *prík-e*, we shall have to consider here aoristic bases in *s*, taking the suffix *an*, not, however, with the termination of the dative, but with that of the locative *i*. Thus we read X. 126, 3, *náyishthâh u nah nesháni párshishthâh u nah parsháni áti dvishah*, they who are the best leaders to lead us, the best helpers to help us to overcome our enemies, lit. in leading us, in helping us. In VIII. 12, 19, *grinîsháni*, *i. e.* *grinî-shán-i*, stands parallel with *turv-án-e*, thus showing how both cases can answer nearly the same purpose. If these forms existed in Greek, they would, after consonantal bases, be identical with the infinitives of the future.

Cases of verbal nouns in *tu*.

We next come to a large number of datives, ablatives, or genitives, and accusatives of verbal nouns in *tu*. This

¹ See M. M.'s *Translation of the Rîg-Veda*, I. p. 34.

tu occurs in Sanskrit in abstract nouns such as gâtú, going, way, etc., in Latin in *adven-tus*, etc. As these forms have been often treated, and as some of them occur frequently in later Sanskrit also, it will suffice to give one example of each :

Dative in tave: gántave, to go, I. 46, 7.

Old form in tavai: gántavái, X. 95, 14.

Genitive in toh: dǎto^h, governed by îse, VII. 4, 6.

Ablative in toh: gánto^h, I. 89, 9.

Accusative in tum: gántum. This is the supine in *tum* in Latin.

Cases of verbal nouns in *tva*.

Next follow cases of verbal nouns in tvá, the accent being on the suffix.

Datives in tvǎya: hatvǎya, X. 84, 2.

Instrumentals in tvǎ: hatvǎ, I. 100, 18.

Older form in tvî: hatvî, II. 17, 6; gatvî, IV. 41. 5.

Datives in *dhai* and *dhyai*.

I have left to the end datives in dhai and dhyai, which properly belong to the datives in ai, treated before, but differ from them as being datives of compound nouns. As from máyah, delight, we have mayaskará, delight-making, mayobhú, delight-causing, and constructions like máyo dádhe, so from váyas, life, vigour, we have vayaskrít, life-giving, and constructions like váyo dhât. From dhâ we can frame two substantival forms, dhâ and dhi-s, *e. g.* puro-dhâ, and puro-dhis, like vi-dhi-s. As an ordinary substantive, purodhâ takes the feminine termination á, and is declined like sivâ. But if the verbal base remains at the end of a compound without the feminine suffix, a compound like vayodhâ would form its dative vayodhe (Grammar, § 239); and as in analogous cases we found old datives in ai, instead of e, *e. g.* parâdai, nothing can be said against vayodhai, as a

Vedic dative of *vayodhâ*. The dative of *purodhi* would be *purodhaye*, but here again, as, besides forms like *drisaye*, we met with datives such as *ityai*, *rohishyai*, there is no difficulty in admitting an analogous dative of *purodhi*, viz. *purodhyaï*.

The old dative *dhai* has been preserved to us in one form only, which for that reason is all the more valuable and important, offering the key to the mysterious Greek infinitives in *θαι*, I mean *vayodhái*, which occurs twice in the Rig-Veda, X. 55, 1, and X. 67, 11. The importance of this relic would have been perceived long ago, if there had not been some uncertainty as to whether such a form really existed in the Veda. By some accident or other, Professor Aufrecht had printed in both passages *vayodhaih*, instead of *vayodhai*. But for this, no one, I believe, would have doubted that in this form *vayodhai* we have not only the most valuable prototype of the Greek infinitives in *(σ)θαι*, but at the same time their full explanation. *Vayodhai* stands for *vayas-dhai*, in which composition the first part *vayas* is a neuter base in *as*, the second a dative of the auxiliary verb *dhâ*, used as a substantive. If, therefore, we find corresponding to *vayodhai* a Greek infinitive *βέεσθαι*, we must divide it into *βέεσ-θαι*, as we divide *ψεύδεσθαι* into *ψεύδεσ-θαι*, and translate it literally by 'to do lying.'

It has been common to identify Greek infinitives in *σθαι* with corresponding Sanskrit forms ending in *dhyai*. No doubt these forms in *dhyai* are much more frequent than forms in *dhai*, but as we can only take them as old datives of substantives in *dhi*, it would be difficult to identify the two. The Sanskrit *dhy* appears, no doubt, in Greek as *σθ*, *dh* being represented by the surd *θ*, and then assibilated by *y*; but we could hardly attempt to explain *σθ=θy*, because *σδ=ζ=ιγ*. Therefore, unless we are prepared to see with Bopp in the *σ* before *θ*, in this and similar forms, a remnant of the reflexive pronoun,

nothing remains but to accept the explanation offered by the Vedic *vayodhai*, and to separate *ψεύδεσθαι* into *ψεύδες-θαι*, lying to do. That this grammatical compound, if once found successful, should have been repeated in other tenses, giving us not only *γράφεισ-θαι*, but *γράφεισ-θαι*, *γράφεισ-θαι*, and even *γραφθήσεσ-θαι*, is no more than what we may see again and again in the grammatical development of ancient and modern languages. Some scholars have objected on the same ground to Bopp's explanation of *ama-mini*, as the nom. plur. of a participle, because they think it impossible to look upon *amemini*, *amabâmini*, *amaremini*, *amabimini* as participial formations. But if a mould is once made in language, it is used again and again, and little account is taken of its original intention. If we object to *γράφεισ-θαι*, why not to *κελευ-σέ-μεναι*, or *τεθιρά-μεναι*, or *μυχθή-μεναι*? In Sanskrit, too, we should hesitate to form a compound of a modified verbal base, such as *prina*, with *dhi*, doing: yet as the Sanskrit ear was accustomed to *yagadhyai* from *yaga*, *gamadhyai* from *gama*, it did not protest against *prinadhyai*, *vâvri-dhadhyai*, etc.

Historical Importance of these Grammatical Forms.

And while these ancient grammatical forms which supply the foundation of what in Greek, Latin, and other languages we are accustomed to call infinitives, are of the highest interest to the grammarian and the logician, their importance is hardly less in the eyes of the historian. Every honest student of antiquity, whether his special field be India, Persia, Assyria, or Egypt, knows how often he is filled with fear and trembling when he meets with thoughts and expressions which, as he is apt to say, cannot be ancient. I have frequently confessed to that feeling with regard to some of the hymns of the Rig-Veda, and I well remember the time when I felt inclined to throw up the whole work as modern and unworthy of the time and labour

bestowed upon it. At that time I was always comforted by these so-called infinitives and other relics of ancient language. They could not have been fabricated in India. They are unknown in ordinary Sanskrit, they are unintelligible as far as their origin is concerned in Greek and Latin, and yet in the Vedic language we find these forms, not only identical with Greek and Latin forms, but furnishing the key to their formation in Greece and Italy. The Vedic *vayas-dhái* compared with Greek *βέεσ-θαι*, the Vedic *stushe* compared with *λῦσαι* are to my mind evidence in support of the antiquity and genuineness of the Veda that cannot be shaken by any arguments.

The Infinitive in English.

I add a few words on the infinitive in English, though it has been well treated by Dr. March in his 'Grammar of the Anglo-Saxon Language,' by Dr. Morris, and others. We find in Anglo-Saxon two forms, one generally called the infinitive, *nim-an*, to take, the other the gerund, *to nimanne*, to take. Dr. March explains the first as identical with Greek *νέμ-ειν* and *νέμ-εν-αι*, i.e. as an oblique case, probably the dative, of a verbal noun in *an*. He himself quotes only the dative of nominal bases in *a*, e.g. *na manâ ya*, because he was probably unacquainted with the nearer forms in *an-e* supplied by the Veda. This infinitive exists in Gothic as *nim-an*, in Old Saxon as *nim-an*, in Old Norse as *nem-a*, in Old High German as *nem-an*. 'The so-called gerund, *to nimanne*, is rightly traced back by Dr. March to Old Saxon *nim-annia*, but he can hardly be right in identifying these old datival forms with the Sanskrit base *na-m-anîya*. In the Second Period of English (1100-1250)¹ the termination of the infinitive became *en*, and frequently dropped the final *n*, as *smelle*=*smellen*; while the termination of the gerund at the same time became *enne* (*ende*),

¹ Morris, *Historic Outlines of English Accidence*, p. 52.

ene, en, or e, so that outwardly the two forms appeared to be identical as early as the 12th century.¹ Still later, towards the end of the 14th century, the terminations were entirely lost, though Spenser and Shakespeare have occasionally *to killen, passen, delven*, when they wish to impart an archaic character to their language. In modern English the infinitive with *to* is used as a verbal substantive. When we say, 'I wish you to do this,' 'you are able to do this,' we can still perceive the datival function of the infinitive. Likewise in such phrases as 'it is time,' 'it is proper,' 'it is wrong to do that,' *to do* may still be felt as an oblique case. But we have only to invert these sentences, and say, 'to do this is wrong,' and we have a new substantive in the nom. sing., just as in the Greek τὸ λέγειν. Expressions like *for to do*, show that the simple *to* was not always felt to be sufficiently expressive to convey the meaning of an original dative.

Works on the Infinitive.

The infinitive has formed the subject of many learned treatises. I divide them into two classes, those which appeared before and those which appeared after Wilhelm's excellent essay, written in Latin, 'De infinitivi vi et natura,' 1868; and in a new and improved edition, 'De infinitivo linguarum Sanscritæ Bactricæ Persicæ Græcæ Oscæ Umbricæ Latinæ Gothicæ forma et usu,' Isenaci, 1873. In this essay the evidence supplied by the Veda was for the first time fully collected, and the whole question of the nature of the infinitive placed in its true historical light. Before Wilhelm the more important works were Höfer's book, 'Vom Infinitiv, besonders im Sanskrit,' Berlin, 1840; Bopp's paragraphs in his 'Comparative Grammar'; Humboldt's paper, in Schlegel's 'Indische Bibliothek' (II. 74), 1824; and his posthumous paper in Kuhn's 'Zeitschrift' (II. 245), 1853; some dissertations by L. Meyer, Merguet, and Golenski. Benfey's

¹ Morris, *l. c.* p. 177

'Sanskrit Grammar' (1852), too, ought to be mentioned, as having laid the first solid foundations for this and all other branches of grammatical research, as far as Sanskrit is concerned. After Wilhelm the same subject has been treated with great independence by Ludwig, 'Der Infinitif im Veda,' 1871, and again 'Agglutination oder Adaptation,' 1873; and also by Jolly, 'Geschichte des Infinitivs,' 1873. I have just time to add the title of a very careful paper, by Brunnhofer, 'Über Dialectspuren im Vedischen Gebrauch der Infinitivformen,' in Kuhn's 'Zeitschrift,' 1880.

I had myself discussed some questions connected with the nature of the infinitive in my 'Science of Language,' vol. ii. p. 14 *seq.*, and I had pointed out in Kuhn's 'Zeitschrift,' XV. 215 (1866), the great importance of the Vedic *vayodhai* for unravelling the formation of Greek infinitives in *σ-θαι*.

The Infinitive in Bengali.

At a still earlier time, in 1847, in my 'Essay on Bengali,' I said: 'As the infinitives of the Indo-Germanic languages must be regarded as the absolute cases of a verbal noun, it is probable that in Bengali the infinitive in *ite* was also originally a locative, which expressed not only local situation, but also movement towards some object, as an end, whether real or imaginary. Thus the Bengali infinitive corresponds exactly with the English, where the relation of case is expressed by the preposition *to*. Ex. *tâhâke mârîte âmi âsiyâchi*, means, I came to the state of beating him, or, I came to beat him; *âmâke mârîte deo*, give me (permission), let me (go) to the action of beating, *i.e.* allow me to beat. Now, as the form of the participle is the same as that of the infinitive, it may be doubted if there is really a distinction between these two forms as to their origin. For instance, the phrase *âpan putrake mârîte âmi tâhâka dekhi-lâm* can be translated, I saw him beating his own son; but

it can be explained also as what is commonly called in Latin grammar *accusativus cum infinitivo* : that is to say, the infinitive can be taken for a locative of the verbal noun, and the whole phrase be translated, I saw him in the act of beating his own son, (*vidi patrem cædere ipsius filium*). As in every Bengali phrase the participle in *ite* can be understood in this manner, I think it admissible to ascribe this origin to it, and instead of taking it for a nominative of a verbal adjective, to consider it as a locative of a verbal noun.'

The Infinitive in the Dravidian Languages.

I also tried to show that the infinitive in the Dravidian languages is a verbal noun with or without a case suffix. This view has been confirmed by Dr. Caldwell, but, in deference to him, I gladly withdraw the explanation which I proposed in reference to the infinitive in Tamil. I quote from Dr. Caldwell's 'Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages,' 2nd ed. p. 423 : 'Professor Max Müller, noticing that the majority of Tamil infinitives terminate in *ka*, supposed this *ka* to be identical in origin with *kô*, the dative-accusative case-sign of the Hindi, and concluded that the Dravidian infinitive was the accusative of a verbal noun. It is true that the Sanskrit infinitive and Latin supine in *tum* are correctly regarded as an accusative, and that our English infinitive *to do*, is the dative of a verbal noun ; it is also true that the Dravidian infinitive is a verbal noun in origin, and never altogether loses that character ; nevertheless, the supposition that the final *ka* of most Tamil infinitives is in any manner connected with *ku*, the sign of the Dravidian dative, or of *kô*, the Hindi dative-accusative, is inadmissible. A comparison of various classes of verbs and of the various dialects shows that the *kâ* in question proceeds from a totally different source.'

INAUGURAL LECTURE.

ON THE RESULTS OF THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE.

*Delivered before the Imperial University of Strassburg,
the 23rd of May, 1872.*

YOU will easily understand that, in giving my first lecture in a German University, I feel some difficulty in mastering and repressing the feelings which stir within my heart. I wish to speak to you as it becomes a teacher, with perfect calmness, thinking of nothing but of the subject which I have to treat. But here where we are gathered together to-day, in this old free imperial town, in this University, full of the brightest recollections of Alsatian history and German literature, even a somewhat grey-headed German professor may be pardoned if, for some moments at least, he gives free vent to the thoughts that are foremost in his mind. You will see, at least, that he feels and thinks as you all feel and think, and that in living away from Germany he has not forgotten his German language, or lost his German heart.

The times in which we live are great, so great that we can hardly conceive them great enough; so great that we, old and young, cannot be great

and good and brave and hardworking enough ourselves, if we do not wish to appear quite unworthy of the times in which our lot has been cast.

We older people have lived through darker times, when to a German learning was the only refuge, the only comfort, the only pride; times when there was no Germany except in our recollection, and perhaps in our secret hopes. And those who have lived through those sadder days feel all the more deeply the blessings of the present. We have a Germany again, a united, great, and strong country; and I call this a blessing, not only in a material sense, as giving at last to our homes a real and lasting security against the inroads of our powerful neighbours, but also in a moral sense, as placing every German under a greater responsibility, as reminding us of our higher duties, as inspiring us with courage and energy for the battle of the mind even more than for the battle of the arm.

That blessing has cost us dear, fearfully dear, dearer than the friends of humanity had hoped; for, proud as we may be of our victories and our victors, let us not deceive ourselves in this, that there is in the history of humanity nothing so inhuman, nothing that makes us so entirely despair of the genius of mankind, nothing that bows us so low to the very dust, as war—unless even war becomes ennobled and sanctified, as it was with us, by the sense of duty, duty towards our country, duty towards our town, duty towards our home, towards our fathers and mothers, our wives and children. Thus, and thus only, can even war become the highest and brightest of sacrifices; thus,

and thus only, may we look history straight in the face, and ask, 'Who would have acted differently?'

I do not speak here of politics in the ordinary sense of the word—nay, I gladly leave the groping for the petty causes of the late war to the scrutiny of those foreign statesmen who have eyes only for the infinitesimally small, but cannot or will not see the powerful handiwork of Divine justice that reveals itself in the history of nations as in the lives of individuals. I speak of politics in their true and original meaning, as a branch of ethics, as Kant has proved them to be; and from this point of view, politics become a duty from which no one may shrink, be he young or old. Every nation must have a conscience, like every individual; a nation must be able to give to itself an account of the moral justification of a war in which it is to sacrifice everything that is most dear to man. And that is the greatest blessing of the late war, that every German, however deep he may delve in his heart, can say without a qualm or a quiver, 'The German people did not wish for war, nor for conquest.' We wanted peace and freedom in our internal development. Another nation, or rather its rulers, claimed the right to draw for us lines of the Main, if not new frontiers of the Rhine; they wished to prevent the accomplishment of that German union for which our fathers had worked and suffered. The German nation would gladly have waited longer still, if thereby war could have been averted. We knew that the union of Germany was inevitable, and the inevitable is in no hurry. But when the gauntlet was thrown in our

face, and, be it remembered, with the acclamation of the whole French nation, then we knew what, under Napoleonic sway, we might expect from our powerful neighbour, and the whole German people rose as one man for defence, not for defiance. The object of our war was peace, and a lasting peace, and therefore now, after peace has been won, after our often menaced, often violated, western frontier has been made secure for ever by bastions such as nature only can build, it becomes our duty to prove to the world that we Germans are the same after as before the war, that military glory has nothing intoxicating to us, and that we want peace with all the world.

You know that the world at large does not prophesy well for us. We are told that the old and simple German manners will go, that the ideal interests of our life will be forgotten, that, as in other countries, so with us, our love for the True and the Beautiful will be replaced by love of pleasure, enjoyment, and vanities. It rests with us with all our might to confound such evil prophecies, and to carry the banner of the German mind higher than ever. Germany can remain great only by what has made her great—by simplicity of manners, contentment, industry, honesty, high ideals, contempt of luxury, of display, and of vain-glory. ‘*Non propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*’—‘Not for the sake of life to lose the real objects of life,’ this must be our watchword for ever, and the *causæ vitæ*, the highest objects of life, are for us to-day, and will, I trust, remain for coming generations too, the same as they were in the days of Lessing, of Kant, of Schiller, and of Humboldt.

And nowhere, methinks, can this return to the work of peace be better inaugurated than here in this very place, in Strassburg. It was a bold conception to begin the building of the new temple of learning in the very midst of the old German frontier fortress. We are summoned here, as in the days of Nehemiah, when 'the builders everyone had his sword girded by his side, and so builded.' It rests with us, the young as well as the old, that this bold conception shall not fail. And therefore I could not resist the voice of my heart, or gainsay the wish of my friends who believed that I, too, might bring a stone, however small, to the building of this new temple of German science. And here I am among you to try and do my best. Though I have lived long abroad, and pitched my workshop for nearly twenty-five years on English soil, you know that I have always remained German in heart and mind. And this I must say for my English friends, that they esteem a German who remains German far more highly than one who wishes to pass himself off as English. An Englishman wishes every man to be what he is. I am, and I always have been, a German living and working in England. The work of my life, the edition of the Rig-Veda, the oldest book of the Indian, ay, of the whole Aryan world, could be carried out satisfactorily nowhere but in England, where the rich collections of Oriental MSS., and the easy communications with India, offer to an Oriental scholar advantages such as no other country can offer. That by living and working in England I have made some sacrifices, that I have lost many advantages which the free intercourse with German scholars in a German

university so richly offers, no one knows better than myself. Whatever I have seen of life, I know of no life more perfect than that of a German professor in a German school or university. You know what Niebuhr thought of such a life, even though he was a Prussian minister and ambassador at Rome. I must read you some of his words, they sound so honest and sincere: 'There is no more grateful, more serene life than that of a German teacher or professor, none that, through the nature of its duties and its work, secures so well the peace of our heart and our conscience. How many times have I deplored it with a sad heart, that I should ever have left that path of life to enter upon a life of trouble which, even at the approach of old age, will probably never give me lasting peace. The office of a schoolmaster, in particular, is one of the most honourable, and despite of all the evils which now and then disturb its ideal beauty, it is for a truly noble heart the happiest path of life. It was the path which I had once chosen for myself, and how I wish I had been allowed to follow it!'

I could quote to you the words of another Prussian ambassador, Bunsen. He, too, often complained with sadness that he had missed his true path in life. He, too, would gladly have exchanged the noisy hotel of the ambassador for the quiet home of a German professor.

From my earliest youth it has been the goal of my life to act as a professor in a German university, and if this dream of my youth was not to be fulfilled in its entirety, I feel all the more grateful that, through the kindness of my friends and German

colleagues, I have been allowed, at least once in my life, to act during the present spring and summer as a real German professor in a German university.

This was in my heart, and I wanted to say it, in order that you might know with what purpose I have come, and with what real joy I begin the work which has brought us together to-day.

I shall lecture during the present term on 'The Results of the Science of Language'; but you will easily understand that to sum up in one course of lectures the results of researches which have been carried on with unflagging industry by three generations of scholars, would be a sheer impossibility. Besides, a mere detailing of results, though it is possible, is hardly calculated to subserve the real objects of academic teaching. You would not be satisfied with mere results; you want to know and to understand the method by which they have been obtained. You want to follow step by step that glorious progress of discovery which has led us to where we stand now. What is the use of knowing the Pythagorean problem, if we cannot prove it? What would be the use of knowing that the French *larme* is the same as the German *Zähre* (tear), if we could not with mathematical exactness trace every step by which these two words have diverged till they became what they are?

The results of the Science of Language are enormous. There is no sphere of intellectual activity which has not felt more or less the influence of this new science. Nor is this to be wondered at. Language is the organ of all knowledge, and though we flatter ourselves that we are the lords of language,

that we handle it as a useful tool, and no more, believe me there are but few who can maintain their complete independence with respect to language, few who can say of her, Ἐχὼ Λατῖδα οὐκ ἔχομαι. To know language historically and genetically, to be able more particularly to follow up the growth of our technical terms to their very roots, this is in every science the best means to keep up a living connection between the past and the present, the only way to make us feel the ground on which we stand.

Let us begin with what is nearest to us, *Philology*. Its whole character has been changed as if by magic. The two classical languages, Greek and Latin, which looked as if they had fallen from the sky or been found behind a hedge, have now recovered their title-deeds, and have taken their legitimate place in that old and noble family which we call the Indo-European, the Indo-Germanic, or by a shorter if not a better name, the Aryan.¹ In this way not only have their antecedents been cleared up, but their mutual relationship, too, has for the first time been placed in its proper light. The idea that Latin was derived from Greek, an idea excusable in scholars of the Scipionic period, or that Latin was a language made up of Italic, Greek, and Pelasgic elements, a view that had maintained itself to the time of Niebuhr, all this has now been shown to be a physical impossibility. Greek and Latin stand together on terms of perfect equality; they are sisters, like French and Italian :

‘Facies non omnibus una,
Nec diversa tamen qualem decet esse sororum.’

¹ Note A, p. 204.

If it could be a scientific question which of the two is the elder sister, Greek or Latin, Latin, I believe, could produce better claims of seniority than Greek. Now, as in the modern history of language we are able to explain many things that are obscure in French and Italian by calling in the Provençal, the Spanish, the Portuguese, nay, even the Wallachian and the Churwälsch, we can do the same in the ancient history of language, and get light for many things which are difficult and unintelligible in Greek and Latin, by consulting Sanskrit, Zend, Gothic, Irish, and even Old Bulgarian. We can hardly form an idea of the surprise which was occasioned among the scholars of Europe by the discovery of the Aryan family of languages, reaching with its branches from the Himalayan mountains to the Pyrenees. Not that scholars of any eminence believed at the end of the last century that Greek and Latin were derived from Hebrew: that prejudice had been disposed of once for all, in Germany at least, by Leibniz. But after that theory had been given up, no new truly scientific theory had taken its place. The languages of the world, with the exception of the Semitic, the family type of which was not to be mistaken, lay scattered about as *disjecta membra poëtæ*, and no one thought of uniting them again into one organic whole. It was the discovery of Sanskrit which led to the re-union of the Aryan languages, and if Sanskrit had taught us nothing else, this alone would establish its claim to a place among the academic sciences of our century.

When Greek and Latin had once been restored to their true place in the natural system of the Aryan

languages, their special treatment, too, became necessarily a different one. In grammar, for instance, scholars were no longer satisfied to give forms and rules, and to place what was irregular by the side of what was regular. They wished to know the reasons of the rules as well as of the exceptions; they asked why the forms were such as they were, and not otherwise; they required not only a logical, but also an historical foundation of grammar. People asked themselves for the first time, why so small a change as *mensa* and *mensæ* could express the difference between one and many tables; why a single letter, like *r*, could possess the charm of changing I love, *amo*, into I am loved, *amor*. Instead of indulging in general speculations on the logic of grammar, the riddles of grammar received their solution from a study of the historical development of language. For every language there was to be an historical grammar, and in this way a revolution was produced in philological studies to be compared only to the revolution produced in chemistry by the discoveries of Lavoisier, or in geology by the theories of Lyell. For instance, instead of attempting an explanation why the genitive singular and the ablative plural of the first and second declensions could express rest in a place—*Romæ*, at Rome; *Tarenti*, at Tarentum; *Athenis*, at Athens; *Gabiis*, at Gabii—one glance at the past history of these languages showed that these so-called genitives were not and never had been genitives, but corresponded to the old locatives in *i* and *su* in Sanskrit. No doubt, a pupil can be made to learn anything that stands in a grammar; but I do not believe that it can conduce

to a sound development of his intellectual powers if he first learns at school the real meaning of the genitive and ablative, and then has to accept on trust that, somehow or other, the same cases may express rest in a place. A well-known English divine, opposed to reform in spelling, as in everything else, once declared that the fearful orthography of English formed the best psychological foundation of English orthodoxy, because a child that had once been brought to believe that t-h-r-o-u-g-h sounded like 'through,' t-h-o-u-g-h like 'though,' r-o-u-g-h like 'rough,' would afterwards believe anything. Be that as it may, I do not consider that grammatical rules like those just quoted on the genitive and ablative assuming the power of the locative, are likely to strengthen the reasoning powers of any schoolboy.

Even more pernicious to the growth of sound ideas was the study of etymology, as formerly carried on in schools and universities. Everything here was left to chance or to authority, and it was not unusual that two or three etymologies of the same word had to be learnt, as if the same word might have had more than one parent. Yet it is many years since Otfried Müller told classical scholars that they must either surrender the whole subject of the historical growth of language, etymology, and grammatical morphology, or trust in these matters entirely to the guidance of Comparative Philology. As a student at Leipzig, I lived to see old Gottfried Hermann quoting the paradigms of Sanskrit grammar in one of his last *Programmes*; and Boeckh declared in 1850, at the eleventh meeting of German philologists, that, in the present state of the science

of language, the grammar of the classical languages cannot dispense with the co-operation of comparative grammar. And yet there are scholars even now who would exclude the Science of Language from schools and universities. What gigantic steps truly scientific etymology has made in Greek and Latin, every scholar may see in the excellent works of Curtius and Corssen. The essential difference between the old and the new systems consists here, too, in this, that while formerly people were satisfied if they knew, or imagined they knew, from what source a certain word was derived, little value is now attached to the mere etymology of a word, unless at the same time it is possible to account, according to fixed phonetic laws, for all the changes which a word has undergone in its passage through Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit. How far this conscientiousness may be carried is shown by the fact that the best comparative philologists decline to admit, on phonetic grounds, the identity of such words as the Latin *Deus* and the Greek *Θεός*, although the strongest internal arguments may be urged in favour of the identity of these words.¹

Let us go on to *Mythology*. If mythology is an old dialect, that has outlived itself, and, on the strength of its sacred character, has been carried on to a new period of language, it is easy to perceive that the historical method of the Science of Language would naturally lead here to most important results. Take only the one fact, which no one at present would dare to question, that the name of the highest deity among the Greeks and Romans, *Ζεύς* and *Jupiter*, is the

¹ See note B, p. 216

same as the Vedic Dyaus, the sky, and the old German *Zio*, Old Norse *Týr*, whose name survives in the modern names of *Dienstag*, or *Tuesday*. Does not this one word prove the union of those ancient races? Does it not show us, at the earliest dawn of history, the fathers of the Aryan race, the fathers of our own race, gathered together in the great temple of nature, like brothers of the same house, and looking up in adoration to the sky as the emblem of what they yearned for, a father and a God? Nay, can we not hear in that old name of *Jupiter*, *i.e.* Heaven-Father, the true key-note which still sounds on in our own prayer, 'Our Father which art in heaven,' and which imparts to these words their deepest tone and their fullest import? By an accurate study of these words we are able to draw the bonds of language and belief even more closely together. You know that the nom. sing. of *Ζεύς* has the acute, and so has the nom. sing. of Dyaus; but the vocative of *Ζεύς* has the circumflex, and so has likewise the vocative of Dyaus in the Veda.¹ Formerly the accent might have been considered as something late, artificial, and purely grammatical; the Science of Language has shown that it is as old as language itself, and it has rightly called it the very soul of words. Thus even in these faint pulsations of language, in the changes of accent in Greek and Sanskrit, may we feel the common blood that runs in the veins of the old Aryan dialects.

History, too, particularly the most ancient history, has received new light and life from a comparative study of languages. Nations and languages were in

¹ Note C, p. 220.

ancient times almost synonymous, and what constitutes the ideal unity of a nation lies far more in the intellectual factors, in religion and language, than in common descent and common blood. But for that very reason we must here be most cautious. It is but too easily forgotten that if we speak of Aryan and Semitic families, the ground of classification is language, and language only. There are Aryan and Semitic languages, but it is against all rules of logic to speak, without an expressed or implied qualification, of an Aryan race, of Aryan blood, of Aryan skulls, and to attempt ethnological classification on purely linguistic grounds. These two sciences, the Science of language and the Science of man, cannot, at least for the present, be kept too much asunder; and many misunderstandings, many controversies, would have been avoided, if scholars had not attempted to draw conclusions from language to blood, or from blood to language. When each of these sciences shall have carried out independently its own classification of men and of languages, then, and then only, will it be time to compare their results; but even then, I must repeat, what I have said many times before, it would be as wrong to speak of Aryan blood as of dolichocephalic grammar.¹

We have all accustomed ourselves to look for the cradle of the Aryan languages in Asia, and to imagine these dialects flowing like streams from the centre of Asia to the South, the West, and the

¹ See M. M.'s *Letter to Chevalier Bunsen, On the Turanian Languages*, 1854, second chapter, second section, 'Ethnology versus Phonology.'

North. I must confess that Professor Benfey's protest against this theory seems to be very opportune, and his arguments in favour of a more northern, if not European, origin of the whole Aryan family of speech, deserve, at all events, far more attention than they have hitherto received.

For the same reasons it seems to me at least a premature undertaking to use the greater or smaller number of coincidences between two or more of the Aryan languages as arguments in support of an earlier or later separation of the people who spoke them. First of all, there are few points on which the opinions of competent judges differ more decidedly than when the exact degrees of relationship between the single Aryan languages have to be settled. There is agreement on one point only, viz. that Sanskrit and Zend are more closely united than any other languages. But though on this point there can hardly be any doubt, no satisfactory explanation of this extraordinary agreement has as yet been given. In fact, it has been doubted whether what I called the 'Southern Division' of the Aryan family could properly be called a division at all, as it consisted only of varieties of one and the same type of Aryan speech. As soon as we go beyond Sanskrit and Zend, the best authorities are found to be in open conflict. Bopp maintained that the Slavonic languages were most closely allied to Sanskrit, an opinion shared by Pott. Grimm, on the contrary, maintained a closer relationship between Slavonic and German. In this view he was supported by Lottner, Schleicher, and others, while Bopp to the last opposed it. After this Schleicher

(as, before him, Newman in England) endeavoured to prove a closer contact between Celtic and Latin and, accepting Greek as most closely united with Latin, he proceeded to establish a South-Western European division, consisting of Celtic, Latin, and Greek, and running parallel with the North-Western division, consisting of Teutonic and Slavonic; or, according to Ebel, of Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavonic.

But while these scholars classed Greek with Latin, others, such as Grassmann and Sonne, pointed out striking peculiarities which Greek shares with Sanskrit, and with Sanskrit only, as, for instance, the augment, the voiceless aspirates, the *alpha privativum* (a, not an), the *mâ* and *μή* *prohibitivum*, the *tara* and *τερο* as the suffix of the comparative, and some others. A most decided divergence of opinion manifested itself as touching the real relation of Greek and Latin. While some regarded these languages not only as sisters, but as twins, others were not inclined to concede to them any closer relationship than that which unites all the members of the Aryan family. While this conflict of opinions lasts (and they are not mere assertions, but opinions supported by arguments), it is clear that it would be premature to establish any historical conclusions, such, for instance, as that the Slaves remained longer united with the Indians and Persians than the Greeks, Romans, Germans, and Celts; or, if we follow Professor Sonne, that the Greeks remained longer united with the Indians than the other Aryan nations.

I must confess that I doubt whether the whole problem admits of a scientific solution. If in a

large family of languages we discover closer coincidences between some languages than between others, this is no more than what we should expect, according to the working of what I call the Dialectic Process. All these languages sprang up and grew and diverged, before they were finally separated; some retained one form, others another, so that even the apparently most distant members of the same family might, on certain points, preserve relics in common which were lost in all the other dialects, and *vice versâ*. No two languages, not even Lithuanian and Old Slavonic, are so closely united as Sanskrit and Zend, which share together even technical terms connected with a complicated sacrificial ceremonial. Yet there are words occurring in Zend, and absent in Sanskrit, which crop up again sometimes in Greek, sometimes in Latin, sometimes in German.¹ As soon as we attempt to draw from such coincidences and divergences historical conclusions as to the earlier or later separation of the nations who developed these languages, we fall into contradictions like those which I pointed out just now between Bopp, Grimm, Schleicher, Ebel, Grassmann, Sonne, and others. Much depends, in all scientific researches, on seeing that the question is properly put. To me the question whether the closer relations between certain independent dialects furnish evidence as to the successive times of their separation seems, by its very nature, fruitless. Nor have the answers been at all satisfactory. After a number of coincidences between the various members of the Aryan family have been carefully collected, we know

¹ Note D, p. 225.

no more in the end than what we knew at first, viz. that all the Aryan dialects are closely connected with each other. We know—

1. That Slavonic is most closely united with German (Bopp, Grimm, Zeuss, Schleicher;)

2. That German is most closely united with Celtic (Ebel, Lottner);

3. That Celtic is most closely united with Latin (Newman, Schleicher);

4. That Latin is most closely united with Greek (Mommesen, Curtius);

5. That Greek is most closely united with Sanskrit (Grassman, Sonne, Kern);

6. That Sanskrit is most closely united with Zend (Burnouf).

Let a mathematician draw out the result, and it will be seen that we know in the end no more than we knew at the beginning. Far be it from me to use a mere trick in arguing, and to say that none of these conclusions can be right, because each is contradicted by others. Quite the contrary. I admit that there is some truth in every one of these conclusions, and I maintain, for that very reason, that the only way to reconcile them all is to admit that the single dialects of the Aryan family did not break off in regular succession, but that, after a long-continued community, they separated slowly, and, in some cases, contemporaneously, from their family-circle, till they established at last, under varying circumstances, their complete national independence. This seems to me all that at present one may say with a good conscience, and all that is really in keeping with the law of development in all dialects.

If now we turn away from the purely philological results of the Science of Language, in order to glance at the advantages which other sciences have derived from it, we shall find that they consist mostly in the light that has been shed on obscure words and old customs. This advantage is greater than, at first sight, it might seem to be. Every word has its history, and the beginning of this history, which is brought to light by etymology, leads us back far beyond its first historical appearance. Every word, as we know, had originally a predicative meaning, and that predicative meaning differs often very considerably from the later traditional or technical meaning. This predicative meaning, however, being the most original meaning of the word, allows us an insight into the most primitive ideas of a nation.

Let us take an instance from jurisprudence. *Pœna*, in classical Latin, means simply punishment, particularly what is either paid or suffered in order to atone for an injury. (*Si injuriam faxit alteri, viginti quinque æris pœnæ sunt*: Fragm. XII. Tab.) The word agrees so remarkably, both in form and meaning, with the Greek *ποινή*, that Mommsen assigned to it a place in what he calls Græco-Italic ideas.¹ We might suppose, therefore, that the ancient Italians took *pœna* originally in the sense of ransom, simply as a civil act, by which he who had inflicted injury on another was, as far as he and the injured person were concerned, restored *in integrum*. The etymology of the word, however, leads us back into a far

¹ 'Judgmēt (*crimen*, κρίνειν), penance (*pœna*, ποινή), retribution (*talio*, τάλω, τλῆναι), are Græco-Italic conceptions.'—Mommsen, *Röm. Geschichte*, vol. i. p. 25.

more distant past, and shows us that when the word *pœna* was first framed, punishment was conceived from a higher moral and religious point of view, as a purification from sin; for *pœna*, as first shown by Professor Pott (and what has he not been the first to show?), is closely connected with the root *pu*, to purify. Thus we read in the 'Atharva-veda,' xix. 33, 3:

‘Tvám bhūmim átyeshi ógasâ
 Tvám védyâm sídasi kārur adhvaré
 Tvám pavítram ríshayo bhárantas
 Tvám puníhi duritāni asmát,’

‘Thou, O God of Fire, goest mightily across the earth; thou sittest brilliantly on the altar at the sacrifice. The prophets carry Thee as the Purifier: clear away all misdeeds from us.’

From this root *pu* we have, in Latin, *pūrus* and *pūtus*, as in *argentum purum putum*, fine silver, or in *purus putus est ipse*, Plaut. Ps. 4, 2, 31. From it we also have the verb *purgare*, for *purigare*, to purge, used particularly with reference to purification from crime by means of religious observances. If this transition from the idea of purging to that of punishing should seem strange, we have only to think of *castigare*, meaning originally to purify, but afterwards in such expressions as *verbis et verberibus castigare*, to chide and to chasten.¹

¹ Sophus Bugge (Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, 1870, p. 406) connects the Greek ποινή with Zend *kaená*, the Old Slav. *cěna*, and derives these words from the root *ki*, Greek *τι* in *τίνα*, *τίεις*, etc. I accept this etymology, but it does not follow that therefore the Latin *poena* must have been borrowed by Latin from Greek. For if *poena* had been a foreign word in Latin, how should we account for such words as *punio* or *impunis*, which seem of thoroughly native growth,

I cannot convince myself that the Latin *crimen* has anything in common with κρίνειν. The Greek κρίνειν is no doubt connected with Latin *cer-no*, from which *cri-brum*, sieve. It means to separate, to sift, so that κριτής may well signify a judge, and κρίμα a judgment, lit. a sifting, but never a crime or misdeed. *Crimen*, as every scholar knows or ought to know, meant originally an accusation, not a crime, and, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, has nothing whatever in common with *dis-crimen*, which means what separates two things, a difference, a critical point. *In crimen venire* means to get into bad repute, to be calumniated; *in discrimine esse* means to be in a critical and dangerous position.

It is one of the fundamental laws of etymology that in tracing words back to their roots, we have to show that their primary, not their secondary meanings agree with the meaning of the root. Therefore even if *crimen* had assumed in later times the meaning of judgment, yet its derivation from the Greek κρίνειν would have to be rejected, because it would explain the secondary only, but not the primary meaning of *crimen*. Nothing is clearer than the historical development of the meanings of *crimen*, beginning with accusation, and ending with guilt, while no possible transition of meaning has yet been shown from *cerno*, to separate, to *crimen*, bad repute.¹

and can hardly be derived from ποινή? As to the vowel-changes, see *lub*, *loub*, *loib*, *loeb*, Brugmann, I. 49.

¹ We have an analogous case in the German word *Laster*, O.H.G. *lahstar*, from *lahan*, to blame, to abuse. In A.S. *leahstor* means reproach and sin, in German it means sin (*crimen*) only.

I believe I have proved that *crīmen* is really and truly the same word as the German *Verleumdung*, calumny.¹ *Verleumdung* comes from *Leumund*, the Old High-German *hliumunt*, and this *hliumunt* is the exact representative of the Vedic *sromata*, derived from the root *sru*, to hear, *cluere*, and signifying good report, glory, the Greek *κλέος*, the Old High-German *hruom*. The German word *Leumund* can be used in a good and a bad sense, as good or evil report, while the Latin *crī-men*, for *croe-men*, like *liber* (for *loeber*) is used in *malam partem* only. It meant originally what is heard, report, *on dit*, gossip, accusation; lastly, the object of an accusation, a crime, but never judgment, in the technical sense of the word.

The only important objection that could be raised against tracing *crīmen* back to the root *sru*, is that this root has in the North-Western branch of the Aryan family assumed the form *clu*, instead of *cru*, as in *κλέος*, *cliens*, *gloria*, O. Sl. *slovo*, A.S. *hlūd*, loud, *in-clutus*. I myself hesitated for a long time on account of this phonetic difficulty, nor do I think it is quite removed by the fact that Bopp ('Comp. Gr.' § 20) identified the German *scriu-u-mēs*, we cry (instead of *scriw-u-mēs*), with Sk. *srâv-ayâ-mas*, we make hear; nor by the *r* in *in-cre-p-are*, in *κράζω*, as compared with *κλάζω*, nor even by the *r* in *ἀ-κρο-ά-ομαι*, which Curtius seems inclined to derive from *sru*. The question is whether this phonetic difficulty is such as to force us to surrender the common origin of *sromata*, *hliumunt*, and *crīmen*; but even if

¹ See my article in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xix. p 46.

this should be the case, the derivation of *crimen* from *cerno* or *κρίνειν* would remain as impossible as ever.

This will give you an idea in what manner the Science of Language can open before our eyes a period in the history of law, customs, and manners, which hitherto was either entirely closed, or reached only by devious paths. Formerly, for instance, it was supposed that the Latin word *lex*, law, was connected with the Greek *λόγος*. This is wrong, for *λόγος* never means law in the sense in which *lex* does. *Λόγος*, from *λέγειν*, to collect, to gather, signifies, like *κατάλογος*, a gathering, a collection, an ordering, be it of words or thoughts. The idea that there is a *λόγος*, an order or law, for instance, in nature, is not classical, but purely modern. It is not improbable that *lex* is connected with the English word *law*, only not by way of the Norman *loi*. English *law* is A.S. *lagu* (as *saw* corresponds both to the German *Sage* and *Säge*), and it meant originally what was laid down or settled, with exactly the same conception as the German *Gesetz*. It has been attempted to derive the Latin *lex*, too, from the same root, though there is this difficulty, that the root of *liegen* and *legen* does not elsewhere occur in Latin. The mere disappearance of the aspiration would be no serious obstacle. If, however, the Latin *lex* cannot be derived from that root, we must, with Corssen, refer it to the same cluster of words to which *ligare*, to bind, *obligatio*, binding, and the Oscan ablative *lig-ud* belong, and assign to it the original meaning of *bond*. On no account can it be derived from *legere*, to read, as if it meant a bill first read before the people, and afterwards receiving legal sanction by their approval.

From these considerations we gain at least this negative result, that, before their separation, the Aryan languages had no settled word for law; and even such negative results have their importance. The Sanskrit word for law is *dharma*, derived from *dhar*, to hold fast. The Greek word is *νόμος*, derived from *νέμειν*, to dispense, from which *Nemesis*, the dispensing deity, and perhaps even *Numa*, the name of the fabulous king and lawgiver of Rome.¹

Other words might easily be added which, by the disclosure of their original meaning, give us interesting hints as to the development of legal conceptions and customs, such as marriage, inheritance, ordeals, and the like. But it is time to cast a glance at theology, which, more even than jurisprudence, has experienced the influence of the Science of Language. What was said with regard to mythology applies with equal force to theology. Here, too, words harden, and remain unchanged longer even than in other spheres of intellectual life; nay, their influence often becomes greater the more they harden, and the more their original meaning is forgotten. Here it is most important that an intelligent theologian should be able to follow up the historical development of the *termini technici* and *sacrosancti* of his science. Not only words like *priest*, *bishop*, *sacrament*, or *testament*, have to be correctly apprehended in that meaning which they had in the first century, but expressions like *λόγος*, *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*, *δικαιοσύνη* have to be traced historically to the beginnings of Christianity, and beyond, if we wish to gain a conception of their full purport.

¹ On *rita* as an old name of law and order, see M.M., *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 237 *seq.*

In addition to this, the philosophy of religion, which must always form the true foundation of theological science, owes it to the Science of Language that the deepest germs of the consciousness of God among the different nations of the world have for the first time been laid open. We know now with perfect certainty that the names—that is, the most original conceptions—of the Deity among the Aryan nations are as widely removed from coarse fetishism as from abstract idealism. The Aryans, as far as the annals of their language allow us to see, recognised the presence of the Divine in the bright and sunny aspects of nature, and they, therefore, called the blue sky, the fertile earth, the genial fire, the bright day, the golden dawn their *Devas*—that is, their bright ones. The same word, *Deva* in Sanskrit, *Deus* in Latin, remained unchanged in all their prayers, their rites, their superstitions, their philosophies, and even to-day it rises up to heaven from thousands of churches and cathedrals—a word which, before there were Brahmans or Germans, had been framed in the dark workshop of the Aryan mind.

That the natural sciences, too, should have felt the electric shock of our new science is not surprising, considering that man is the crown of nature, the apex to which all other forces of nature point and tend. But that which makes man man, is language. *Homo animal rationale, quia orationale* as Hobbes said. Buffon called the plant a sleeping animal; living philosophers speak of the animal as a dumb man. Both, however, forget that the plant would cease to be a plant if it awoke, and that the brute would cease to be a brute the moment it began to

speak. There is, no doubt, in language a transition from the material to the spiritual: the raw material of language belongs to nature, but the form of language, that which really makes language, belongs to the spirit. Were it possible to trace human language *directly* back to natural sounds, to interjections or imitations, the question whether the Science of Language belongs to the sphere of the natural or the historical sciences would at once be solved. But I doubt whether this crude view of the origin of language counts one single supporter in Germany. With one foot language stands, no doubt, in the realm of nature, but with the other it stands in the realm of spirit. Some years ago, when I thought it necessary to bring out as clearly as possible the much-neglected natural element in language, I tried to explain in what sense the Science of Language had a right to be called the last and the highest of the natural sciences. But I need hardly say that I did not lose sight, therefore, of the intellectual and historical character of language; and I may here express my conviction that the Science of Language will yet enable us to withstand the extreme theories of the evolutionists, and to draw a hard and fast line between spirit and matter, between man and brute.

This short survey must suffice to show you how omnipresent the Science of Language has become in all spheres of human knowledge, and how far its limits have been extended, so that it often seems impossible for one man to embrace the whole of its vast domain. From this I wish, in conclusion, to draw some necessary advice.

Whoever devotes himself to the study of so com-

prehensive a science must try never to lose sight of two virtues : conscientiousness and modesty. The older we grow, the more we feel the limits of human knowledge. ' Good care is taken,' as Goethe said, ' that trees should not grow into the sky.' Every one of us can make himself real master of a small field of knowledge only, and what we gain in extent, we inevitably lose in depth. It was impossible that Bopp should know Sanskrit like Colebrooke, Zend like Burnouf, Greek like Hermann, Latin like Lachmann, German like Grimm, Slavonic like Miklosich, Celtic like Zeuss. That drawback lies in the nature of all comparative studies. But it follows by no means that, as the French proverb says, *qui trop embrasse, mal étreint*. Bopp's ' Comparative Grammar ' will always mark an epoch in linguistic studies, and no one has accused the old master of superficiality. There are, in fact, two kinds of knowledge : the one which we take in as real nourishment, which we convert *in succum et sanguinem*, which is always present, which we can never lose ; the other which, if I may say so, we put into our pockets, in order to find it there whenever it is wanted. For comparative studies the second kind of knowledge is as important as the first, but in order to use it properly, the greatest conscientiousness is required. Not only ought we, whenever we have to use it, to go back to the original sources, to accept nothing on trust, to quote nothing at second-hand, and to verify every single point before we rely on it for comparative purposes, but, even after we have done everything to guard against error, we ought to proceed with the greatest caution and modesty. I consider, for in-

stance, that an accurate knowledge of Sanskrit is a *conditio sine quâ non* in the study of Comparative Philology. According to my conviction, though I know it is not shared by others, Sanskrit must for ever remain the real pivot of our studies. But it is clearly impossible for us, while engaged in a scholarlike study of Sanskrit, to follow at the same time the gigantic strides of Latin, Greek, German, Slavonic, and Celtic philology. Here we must learn to be satisfied with what is possible, and apply for advice, whenever we want it, to those who are masters in these different departments of philology. Much has of late been said of the antagonism between comparative and classical philology. To me it seems that these two depend so much on each other for help and advice that their representatives ought to be united by the closest ties of fellowship. We must work on side by side, and accept counsel as readily as we give it. Without the help of Comparative Philology, for instance, Greek scholars would never have arrived at a correct understanding of the digamma—nay, a freer intercourse with his colleague, Bopp, would have preserved Bekker from several mistakes in his restoration of the digamma in Homer. Latin scholars would have felt far more hesitation in introducing the old *d* of the ablative in Plautus,¹ if the analogy of Sanskrit had not so clearly proved its legitimacy.

On the other hand, we, comparative philologists, should readily ask and gladly accept the advice and help of our classical colleagues. Without their

¹ Note E, p. 228.

guidance, we can never advance securely: their warnings are to us of the greatest advantage, their approval our best reward. We are often too bold, we do not see all the difficulties that stand in the way of our speculations, we are too apt to forget that, in addition to its general Aryan character, every language has its own peculiar genius. Let us all be on our guard against omniscience and infallibility. Only through a frank, honest, and truly brotherly co-operation can we hope for a true advancement of knowledge. We all want the same thing; we all are *etymologists*—that is, lovers of truth. For this, before all things, the spirit of truth, which is the living spirit of all science, must dwell within us. Whoever cannot yield to the voice of truth, whoever cannot say, ‘I was wrong,’ knows little as yet of the true spirit of science.

Allow me, in conclusion, to recall to your remembrance another passage from Niebuhr. He belongs to the good old race of German scholars. ‘Above all things,’ he writes, ‘we must in all scientific pursuits preserve our truthfulness so pure that we thoroughly eschew every false appearance; that we represent not even the smallest thing as certain of which we are not completely convinced; that if we have to propose a conjecture, we spare no effort in representing the exact degree of its probability. If we do not ourselves, when it is possible, indicate our errors, even such as no one else is likely to discover; if, in laying down our pen, we cannot say in the sight of God, “Upon strict examination, I have knowingly written nothing that is not true;” and if, without deceiving either ourselves or others,

we have not presented even our most odious opponents in such a light only that we could justify it upon our death-beds—if we cannot do this, study and literature serve only to make us unrighteous and sinful.’

Few, I fear, could add, with Niebuhr: ‘In this I am convinced that I do not require from others anything of which a higher spirit, if he could read my soul, could convict me of having done the contrary.’ But all of us, young as well as old, should keep these words before our eyes and in our hearts. Thus, and thus only, will our studies not miss their highest goal: thus, and thus only, may we hope to become true etymologists—*i.e.* true lovers, seekers, and, I trust, finders also of truth.

NOTES.

NOTE A.

ARYAN AS A TECHNICAL TERM

As I am chiefly responsible for the use of the term *Aryan* in the technical sense of Indo-European, and as that term has not yet been so generally received in Germany as in England and France, I subjoin some remarks in justification of it, which were published some years ago in the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

Friedrich Schlegel, who first recognised the family relationship of the Aryan languages (*Die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, 1808), assigned to them the name of *Indo-Germanic*, a name still used by preference by Pott, Benfey, and other German scholars. Bopp (*Vergleichende Grammatik*, vol. i. p. xxiv.) decided in favour of *Indo-European* as a more appropriate name for that large family of speech. Other scholars have used the names *Japhetic*, *Sanskritic* (W. von Humboldt), and *Mediterranean* (Ewald).

The objection to *Indo-Germanic* as the technical name of the whole family is that it is too long, and yet not sufficiently extensive. If the family is to be distinguished by the names of its two extreme members, the name ought to be *Indo-Celtic*, rather than *Indo-Germanic*; if by its most important members, then, as remarked by Bopp, the name should be *Indo-Classic*. *Indo-European* is an equally cumbersome name, and less correct even than *Indo-Germanic*, considering that there are many languages spoken

both in India and Europe which do not belong to the Aryan family. *Sanskritic* would be a misleading name, as countenancing the idea that all the members of this family are derived from Sanskrit. *Japhetic* seems to revive the Jewish conception of the three ancestors of the human race, *Shem*, *Ham*, and *Japhet*, and would, from the strictly Hebrew point of view, comprehend many tribes in the north of Asia and Europe who speak Turanian languages. Ewald, who suggested the name of *Mediterranean*, distinguishes, besides the Mediterranean, three other families of speech, the *Northern*, commonly called North Turanian or Altaic, the *Semitic*, and the *Copto-African*. He explains the name of *Mediterranean* by saying, that 'the races speaking these languages inhabited the large central circle, surrounded by Semitic, South-Indian, Chinese, Turko-Tartaric, and Bask languages' (*Lehrbuch der Hebräischen Sprache*, p. 17, note). The reason why this name has not been accepted seems to be that locality has little to do with the essential character of languages, and that the central position once occupied by the people who spoke these tongues, belongs to them no longer.

Aryan, as a name for a whole family of languages, has the advantage of being short, and, being a word of foreign origin, of lending itself more easily to any technical definition that may be assigned to it. It has been accepted by many writers in England, France, and India. In Germany, too, it is used in this wide sense by Lassen and others. Some scholars have used the term in the more restricted sense of *Indo-Iranian*—i.e. as comprehending the languages of India and Persia, which constitute the south-eastern as distinct from the north-western (Greek, Latin, Celtic, Teutonic, Slavonic) branch of the family; while *Eranian* has, through Spiegel, become the recognised name for Persian, as distinguished from Indian.

Origin of the Word.—Aryan, as a technical term, has been borrowed from the Sanskrit *arya* or *ârya*, the Zend

airya. In the later Sanskrit ârya means, of a good family, and is used as a complimentary title. Originally, however, it was used as a national name, and even as late as the time of the Laws of Manu, India is still called Ârya-âvarta, *i.e.* the abode of the Âryas. In the Veda, Ârya is the name by which the believers in the gods of the Veda call themselves in opposition to their enemies, who are called Dâsas or Dasyus. The distinction appears in passages such as the following:—

I. 51, 8. 'Distinguish, Indra, the Âryâs and those who are Dasyus' (ví gânihi âryân yé ka dasyavah).

X. 86, 19. 'I, Indra, distinguishing the Dâsa and the Ârya' (vikinvân dâsam âryam).

We frequently read of the gods protecting the Ârya and destroying his enemies.

III. 34, 9. 'Indra, having killed the Dasyus, protected the Âryan colour' (hatvî dasyûn prá âryam vârnânam âvat). This looks like an ethnological distinction of colour between Âryas and Dasyus.

X. 49, 3. 'I (Indra) who do not give over the Âryan name to the Dasyu' (ná yâh raré âryam nâma dasyâve).

In X. 11, 4, we read of Âryan clans, âryâh vîsah.

I. 103, 3. 'Indra, increase the Âryan power' (âryam sâbah vardhaya).

VIII. 103, 1. 'Agni, the increaser of the Ârya' (Âryasya vârdhanam).

VII. 18, 7. 'Indra, the companion of the Ârya' (sadhamâh âryasya).

I. 130, 8. 'Indra protected in battles the Âryan sacrificer' (Índrah samâtsu yágamânam âryam prá âvat).

The gods, it is said, bring light for the Ârya.

I. 59, 2. 'Agni is made a light for the Ârya' (tâm tvâ devâsah aganayanta devâm vaîsvanara gyótiḥ ít âryâya); or, 'Agni creates broad light for the Ârya, driving the Dasyus from the house' (VII. 5, 6).

II. 11. 18. 'Thou (Indra) uncoveredst the light for the

Ârya, the Dasyu sat down on the left hand' (*âpa avri-noh gyótiĥ âryâya ní savyatâĥ sâdi dâsyuh indra*).

IV. 26, 2. 'I gave the earth to the Ârya, and rain to the liberal mortal' (*Ahám bhūmim adadâm âryâya ahám vrishtīm dâsūshe mârtyâya*).

I. 117, 21. 'The two Asvins have made the light wide for the Ârya' (*urú gyótiĥ kakrathuh âryâya*).

That light itself, the light of the day or the daily light and life, are called the Âryan light, X. 43, 4; and some of the gods, too, are addressed by the name of Ârya. In V. 34, 6, we read of Indra, 'that he, the Ârya, leads the Dâsa, according to his will' (*yathâvasám nayati dâsam âryah*). In X. 138, 3, too, Indra seems to be called by that name.

Most frequently, no doubt, the Ârya is conceived as the worshipper of the gods. He was called so in I. 130, 8; again in I. 156, 5, Ârya and Yagamâna, sacrificer, are mentioned together.

In IX. 63, 5, the Ârya is opposed to the *árâvân*, the enemy, the man who offers no sacrifices; and I. 51, 8, the same distinction is drawn between the *barhishmat*, the sacrificer or Ârya, and the *avratâ*, the lawless, the Dasyu.

But the enemies of the poets and their friends are not only among the Dasyus, but also among the Âryas, and in their tribal feuds one Ârya speaks of the other as *adeva*, godless, in the original sense of the word. Thus we read:—

X. 102, 3. 'Turn away the weapon of the Dâsa or the Ârya' (*dâsasya vâ maghavan âryasya vâ sanutâĥ yavaya vadhâm*).

X. 83, 1. 'Let us withstand the Dâsa, the Ârya, with thee as helper' (*sahyâma dâsam âryam tvâyâ yugâ*).

VI. 33, 3. 'Thou, O hero, struckest these two enemies, the Dâsa fiends and the Ârya' (*tvám tñn indra ubháyân amitrân dâsâ vritrâni âryâ ka sūra vâdhîĥ*).

VI. 60, 6. 'They (Indra and Agni) kill the *Ârya* fiends, they kill the *Dâsa* fiends, they strike off all haters (fem.)' (*hatâh vritrâni âryâ hatâh dâsâni sâtpatî hatâh vîsvâh âpa dvîshah*).

Similar passages, mentioning *Ârya* and *Dâsa* enemies, occur, VI. 22, 10; VII. 83, 1; X. 69, 6, &c. In VIII. 24, 27, the *Ârya* enemy is contrasted with the *riksha*, literally, the bear.

The *Ârya* enemy is called godless in X. 38, 3, 'Whatever *Dâsa* or godless *Ârya* means to fight us' (*yâh nah dâsah âryah vâ purustuta âdevah indra yudhâye kîketati*).

Lastly, *Ârya* means in some passages what befits or belongs to an *Ârya*, what is proper and right.

X. 65, 11. 'The gods spread all over the earth the *Âryan* laws' (*sudânavah, âryâ vratâ vi srigântah âdhi kshâmi*).

In IX. 63, 14, the sacred receptacles of the Soma are called *ârya* (*etê dhârmâni âryâ sukrâh ritâsya dhârayâ vâgam gômantam aksharan*).

It is clear from these passages that *Ârya* is one of the oldest names by which people belonging to this great family of speech called themselves in distinct opposition to their enemies. It is admitted also that the Veda, in which this name occurs, surpasses in antiquity every other literary document belonging to the same race, and it would be difficult, therefore, to find another name better adapted to serve as a technical term for the whole Aryan family of languages.

As *Ârya* had become a proper name as early as the poems of the Veda, its original and etymological meaning would be of little consequence, had it not been used as an additional argument both in favour of and against the technical use of *Ârya*. Professor Bopp derived *ârya* from the root *ar*, to go, or even from *ark*, to venerate. The former etymology would give no adequate sense: the latter is impossible. Lassen explains *ârya* as *adeundus*, like

âkârya, teacher. But in explaining ârya, it must be remembered that it cannot be separated from ârya, with a short a, and that, in consequence, no etymology of ârya can be entertained which does not at the same time account for ârya. This word is used in the Yagurveda in exactly the same sense as ârya in the Rig-veda. Thus we read, Vâgasaneyi-Samhitâ, XX. 17, 'Whatever sin we have committed against an Arya, or against a Sûdra' (*yák khudré yád ârye yád énas kakrimã vayám*).

Here Arya is used in opposition to Sûdra, as Ârya was used in the Rig-veda in opposition to Dâsa. In the Rig-veda, too, we find at least some traces of arya, used in the sense of ârya, and in opposition to dâsa, viz. in the compound aryâ-patnî, having an Arya as husband, as opposed to dâsâ-patnî, having a Dâsa as husband.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that ârya, the word which, as soon as the system of the four castes became more firmly established, took the technical meaning of 'belonging to the three upper castes,' viz. the Brâhmanas, Kshatriyas, and Vaisyas, came from ârya, and that in ârya must be discovered the original etymological meaning of the word.

Here it is of great importance to observe, that ârya is not only used as a comprehensive title of the three upper castes, but also as the special name of one of them, viz. the third caste, the householders or cultivators of the soil.

In Vâg.-Samhitâ, XXVI. 2, it can mean nothing but Vaisya, a man of the third class, for it is used together with Brahman, Râganya, and Sûdra. It is therefore not the commentator only, as Dr. Roth says, who here gives the meaning of Vaisya to the word ârya, but the context itself demands that meaning. This meaning is still clearer in a passage from the Lâtyâyana Sûtras, IV. 3, 6. Here it is said that some sacrificial act should be performed, primarily by an Arya, but if no Ârya is forthcoming, then by any Ârya, i.e. either by a Brâhmana or

Kshatriya (Aryābhāve yaḥ kas kâryo varnaḥ. Comment, yadi vaiśyo na labhyate yaḥ kas kâryo varnaḥ syât, brâhmano vâ kshatriyo vâ).

Pânini (III. 1, 103) distinctly ascribes to árya the meaning of Vaisya and master; in IV. 1, 49, the 7th Vârttika distinguishes between Arya and Kshatriya; and what is still more important, both the author of a Vârttika to Pân., III. 1, 103, and the author of the Phit-sûtras, state that when árya means Vaisya, it has the accent on the first syllable, like ārya.

Having thus traced the connection of ārya and árya, both in form and meaning, we have now to consider how árya came to mean Vaisya. Vāśya is formed from vis, house, settlement, like ārya and árya, from ar. We have also vesyām in the Veda, meaning, as it seems, family or clan. Vaisya meant a householder, and vis also, plural visah, is frequently used in the Veda as a name for people. Other old names for people in the Veda are kshiti, a dwelling and a dweller, from kshi, to dwell; Greek, κτι in ἀμφι-κτίονες; or kríshṭi, ploughing or ploughers.

If, therefore, there was a Sanskrit word A R, meaning earth, then árya, in the sense of landholder, or country-man, would have been formed regularly like kshámya, χθόνιος, from kshám, χθών, earth; like gávya, from go, cow, nárya, from nár, man. It is true that A R, in the sense of earth, does not occur in Sanskrit; but that such a word once existed is proved by its derivatives. The Greek ἱρα in ἱραζε would correspond to a Sanskrit irâ, which irâ, again, stands to ir, like kshudhâ, hunger, to kshudh. Finally, ir must be traced back to a radical ar, the change of a to i being analogous to that of Sk. pitar, father, as compared with πατήρ, pater, Goth. fadar.

The question now arises, whether irâ or ir ever occurs in Sanskrit as a name of earth. The native dictionaries, such as the Amarakosha, assign that meaning to irâ, and

to *ilâ*, and the latter form occurs in the famous name of *Ilâvrita* (explained as *ilâ prithivî vritâ yena*), the district of *Ilâ*, the centre of *Gambudvîpa* or India, *Gambudvîpa* itself being the centre of the seven great continents of the world (*Vishnu-Purâna*, B. II. cap. 2).

In the *Rig-veda* *irâ* occurs but once, and there, V. 83, 4, it has the meaning of food springing from the earth. 'Food is produced for every being, when *Parganya* quickens the earth with seed' (*irâ vîvasmai bhûvanâya gâyate yât parganyah prithivîm rétasâ ávati*).

Here *irâ* cannot mean simply 'a liquid, a draught, feast, particularly a draught of milk;' for the simile shows that the rain is taken as seed, and that from it the food (*irâ*) is supposed to spring (*gâyate*).

In another passage in the *Atharva-veda*, IV. 11, 10, *irâ* may mean earth, but the sense is doubtful. If it be asked how *irâ*, originally meaning earth, could take the meaning of food, we must remember the tendency of ancient language to mix up cause and effect, the producer and the produced. *Irâ*, meaning originally earth, would be used in many circumstances as the food and sustenance supplied by the earth, just as *gauh*, cow, in the *Veda* is used, not only for milk, but even for leather.

The adjective *irâvat* means possessed of nourishment, nourishing. *Anira* means without food, and *anirâ amîvâ* seems to be a name for famine. In one place *Rig-veda*, IX. 97, 17, *ilâvat* stands for *irâvat*; *vrihîm nah arsha divyâm gîgatnûm ilâvatîm*, 'Give us the heavenly, streaming, fruitful rain.'

Considering the antiquity of the name *arya*, we may refer its origin to a period in the history of the Aryan language, when the primitive substantive *ar* was still used instead of the later **arâ*, *irâ*, *ἔρα*. As from *χαμᾶς* we should be justified in postulating the former existence, not only of *χαμᾶ*, earth, but even of a more primitive substantive *χαμ*, which is actually preserved in *χθών*, so from

ἔραζε, we conclude the former existence not only of ἔρα, but also of a substantive ἔρ, Sk. ar.

Whether ārya means born of the earth, or holding, cultivating, possessing the earth, in either case such a name finds ample analogies in the names by which the early dwellers on the earth spoke of themselves. It is not in modern languages only that people call those of their own country *Landsmann*, countryman, but in Greek, too, γήτης is used in that sense, while γείτ-ων, equally derived from γῆ, means neighbour. The Latin *vicinus*, neighbour, is derived from *vicus*, the Greek, οἶκος, the Sanskrit, *vesa*; all connected with the Sanskrit *vis*, dwelling or dweller, the synonym of ārya in Sanskrit. In Gothic, *gaujan*, a countryman, is derived from *gauja*, land, probably connected with χαμ in χαμ-ᾱ-ζε. Connected with this same χαμ (χθών, χθαμαλός) is the Gothic *guma(n)*, man; Lithuanian, *zmón-es*, plur., men; and the Latin, *hemōnes* (*ne-hemo=nemo*), and *homines*, men, a word not derived from *humus*, but from an older nominal base, *ham*, *hem*, or *hom*.

Mythology also supplies several instances showing that man was conceived as born of the earth, the son and then the lord of the earth, made of dust, and meant to 'till the ground from whence he was taken.' Erechtheus or Erichthonios (both chtheus and chthonios point to χαμ), the national hero of the Athenians, worshipped in the oldest shrine on the Acropolis, was represented as γηγενής or αὐτόχθων (Her. VIII. 55), while Homer (Il. II. 548) says of him that the Earth bore him (τέκε δὲ ζεῖδωρος ἄρουρα). Hellen is the son of Pyrrha, and Pyrrha, the red, was the oldest name of Thessaly. The Germans derive their race from Mannus, who was the son of Tuisco, the heavenly, who was the son of the Earth.

The root A R, which as a substantive supplied the oldest names for the ploughed earth, expresses in its verbal application the meaning of ploughing, at least among the mem-

bers of the north-western branch, Gr., ἀρο-τρον, ἀρο-τήρ, ἀρό-ω; Lat., *ar-ā-re*, *ar-ā-trum*, *ar-ā-tor*; Goth., *ar-jan*, to ear; Lith., *ar-ti*, to plough; Old Slav., *oralo*, plough; Irish, *airim*, I plough, *arathar*, plough. In the south-eastern branch it took the technical meaning of ploughing the sea, Sanskrit, *ari-tram*, meaning rudder, never plough (*cf.* κύματα τέμνειν and ἄρουραν τέμνειν). The original meaning of the root AR was probably that of moving, stirring up, and though we ought not to derive *ar, *arā, irā, ἴρα, from a root AR, restricted to the definite meaning of to plough, as little as *homo* should be derived from *humus*, we may well understand how AR, as the broken, reclaimed, arable land, could be used, even before the Aryan separation, as one of the names of earth.

The common etymology which would assign to *ārya* the meaning of 'belonging to the faithful' (Roth) is untenable, because *aryá*, with the short *a* and accent on the last syllable, never means faithful or devoted, and it is extremely doubtful whether *arí*, from which *aryá* is said to be derived, occurs anywhere in the Veda with the meaning of desirous, devoted, or faithful. But even if it did, it would be impossible to leave out of consideration the name *árya*, meaning simply landholder, *Vaisya*, without any admixture of the meaning of faithful or devoted. The national name, *ārya*, comes directly from this *árya*, landholder, and *árya*, landholder, comes from *ar*, land, not from *ari*, which means enemy. To distinguish *aryá*, as a term of honour, in the sense of lord or master, from *árya*, the mere appellative, a change of accent was admitted, which is recognised by the earliest grammarians who mention *aryá*, lord, as distinguished from *árya*, landlord, while no native authority ever assigns to *arya*, still less to *ari*, the meaning of faithful.

Arya and *Ārya*, as national names, can be traced from India to Persia. In the Avesta, *airya* means venerable, and is at the same time the name of the people. The fabulous

country, the first created by Ahuramazda, is called in the Avesta, *Airyanem vaêgañh*, *Arianum robur*. The whole extent of country occupied by the worshippers of Ormuzd is also called *Airyâ*. As opposed to the Aryan clans (*airyâo dainhâvô*), we hear in the Avesta of the un-Aryan clans (*anairyâo dainhâvô*), and the same name is contained in the *'Avapiâkai* of Strabo, a people and town on the frontiers of Hyrcania. Greek geographers use the name of *Ariana* in a wider sense than the Avesta. All the country between the Indian Ocean in the south and the Indus on the east, the Hindu-Kush and Paropamisus in the north, the Caspian gates, Karamania, and the mouth of the Persian Gulf in the west, is included by Strabo under the name of *Ariana*. Bactria is called by him the ornament of the whole of *Ariana*. As the Zoroastrian religion spread westward, Persia, Elymais, and Media, all claimed the Aryan title. Hellanicus, who wrote before Herodotus, gives *Aria* as a name of Persia. Herodotus attests that the Medians were called *Arii*; and for the northernmost part of Media, Atropatene, the name of *Ariana* has been preserved by Stephanus Byzantinus. Even Elymais has been supposed to be derived from *Ailama*, a modification of *Airyama*. That *airya* was considered a name of honour we see from the cuneiform inscriptions. There Darius calls himself *Ariya* and *Ariyakitra*, an Aryan, and of Aryan descent. The same element enters into many historical Persian names, *Ariaramnes*, *Ariobarzanes*, &c. When after centuries of foreign invasion and occupation Persia rose once more under the sceptre of the Sassanians to the rank of a national kingdom, the kings, the worshippers of Masdanes, called themselves again in their inscriptions, Kings of the Aryan and un-Aryan races, *Irân va Anirân*, *'Apiâvov* καὶ *'Avapiâvov*. Hence the modern name of Persia, *Irân*.

In the name of Armenia the same element of *arya* has been supposed to exist. The old name of the country is

Armina, and its etymology is doubtful. In the language of Armenia, however, *ari* exists, used in the widest sense for Aryan or Iranian, and also with the meaning of brave.

More westward still traces of the name have been discovered in Aghovan, the name of the Albanians on the border of the Caspian Sea, the *gh* being the true representative of an original *r* or *l*. In the Caucasus itself the only clan speaking an Iranian language, the Os of Ossethi, call themselves Iron.

Along the Caspian and in the country washed by the Oxus and Yaxartes, Aryan and non-Aryan tribes were mingled together. Their wars find their poetical record in the Persian epic, the *Shahnameh*, describing the feuds and friendships between Iran and Turan. Many Scythian names, preserved by Greek writers, have an Aryan character. Beyond the Oxus, in Transoxiana, too, people are mentioned under the name of *Ariacæ* and *Antariani*. Here, however, all certain traces of the word, as a geographical term, vanish. We have, indeed, *Aria* as an old name of Thrace, and on the Vistula we meet a German tribe called *Arii*; but nothing is known of the origin of these names, and no conclusions should be built on them.

It should be mentioned that some scholars (Curtius) connect the Greek *ἄριστος* with Sanskrit *arya*, though deriving it from a different root; while others (Pictet) recognise *arya* in the Irish *er*, good, brave, hero.

NOTE B.

Θεός AND *Deus*.

THAT Greek *θ* does not legitimately represent a Sanskrit, Latin, Slavonic, and Celtic *d* is a fact that ought never to have been overlooked by comparative philologists, and

nothing could be more useful than the strong protest entered by Windischmann, Schleicher, Curtius, and others, against the favourite identification of Sk. *deva*, *deus*, and *θεός*. Considering it as one of the first duties, in all etymological researches, that we should pay implicit obedience to phonetic laws, I have hardly ever, so far as I remember, quoted *θεός* as phonetically identical with *deus*, together with the other derivatives of the root *div*, such as *Dyaus*, *Ζεύς*, *Jupiter*, *deva*, Lith. *deva-s*, Irish *día*.

But with all due respect for phonetic laws, I have never in my own heart doubted that *θεός* belonged to the same cluster of words which the early Aryans employed to express the brightness of the sky and of the day, and which helped them to utter their first conception of a god of the bright sky (*Dyaus*), of bright beings in heaven, as opposed to the powers of night and darkness and winter (*deva*), and, lastly, of deity in the abstract.¹ I have never become an atheist; and though I did not undervalue the powerful arguments advanced against the identity of *deus* and *θεός*, I thought that other arguments also possessed their value, and could not be ignored with impunity. If, with our eyes shut, we submit to the dictates of phonetic laws, we are forced to believe that while the Greeks shared with the Hindus, the Italians, and Germans the name for the bright god of the sky, *Ζεύς*, *Dyaus*, *Jovis*, *Zio*, and while they again shared with them such derivatives as *διός*, heavenly, Sk. *divyas*, they threw away the intermediate old Aryan word for god, *deva*, *deus*, and formed a new one from a different root, but agreeing with the word which they had rejected in all letters but one. I suppose that even the strongest supporters of the atheistic theory would have accepted *δευός*, if it existed in Greek, as a correlative of *deva* and *deus*; and I ask, would it not be an almost incredible coincidence, if the Greeks, after giving up the common Aryan word, which would have

¹ *Science of Language*, vol. ii. p. 563.

been *δοιφός* or *δειφός* or *δεφός*, had coined a new word for god from a different root, yet coming so near to *δεφός* as *θεφός*? These internal difficulties seem to me nearly as great as the external; at all events it would not be right to attempt to extenuate either.

Now, I think that, though much has been said against *θεός* for *δεφός*, something may also be said in support of *δειφός* assuming the form of *θεός*. Curtius is quite right in repelling all arguments derived from Sk. *duhitar* = *θυγάτηρ*, or Sk. *dvâr* = *θύρ-α*; but I think he does not do full justice to the argument derived from *φιάλη* and *φιαρός*. The Greek *φιάλη* has been explained as originally *πιφάλη*, the lost digamma causing the aspiration of the initial *π*. Curtius says: 'This etymology of *φιάλη* is wrecked on the fact that in Homer the word does not mean a vessel for drinking, but a kind of kettle.' This is true, but the fact remains that in later Greek *φιάλη* means a drinking-cup. Thus Pindar ('Isthm.' v. 58) says:

Ἄνδωκε δ' αὐτῷ φέρτατος
οἶνοδόκον φιάλαν χρυσῷ πεφρικυῖαν Τελαμών,

which refers clearly to a golden goblet, and not to a kettle. Besides, we have an exactly analogous case in the Sk. *pâtram*. This, too, is clearly derived from *pâ*, to drink, but it is used far more frequently in the sense of vessel in general, and its etymological meaning vanishes altogether when it comes to mean a vessel for something, or even a fit person. I see no etymology for *φιάλη*, except *πιφάλη*, a drinking-vessel.

Secondly, as to *φιαρός*, which is supposed to be the same as *πιαρός*, and to represent the Sanskrit *pîvaras*, fat, Curtius says that it occurs in Alexandrian poets only, that it there means bright, resplendent, and is used as an adjective of the dawn, while *πιαρός* means fat, and fat only. Against this I venture to remark, first, that there are passages where *φιαρός* means sleek, as in Theocr. ii. 21, *φιαρωτέρα ὄμφακος ὠμᾶς*, said of a young plump girl, who in

Sanskrit would be called pîvarî; secondly, that while *πῑαρ* is used for cream, *φιαρός* is used as an adjective of cream; and, thirdly, that the application of *φιαρός* to the dawn is hardly surprising, if we remember the change of meaning in *λιπαρός* in Greek, and the application in the Veda of such words as *ghrîta-pratîka* to the dawn. Lastly, as in *φιάλη*, I see no etymology for *φιαρός* except *πιφιαρός*.

I think it is but fair, therefore, to admit that *θεός* for *δεφός* would find some support by the analogy of *φιάλη* for *πιφάλη*, and of *φιαρός* for *πιφαρός*. There still remain difficulties enough to make us cautious in asserting the identity of *θεός* and *deus*; but in forming our own opinion these difficulties should be weighed impartially against the internal difficulties involved in placing *θεός*, as a totally independent word, by the side of *deva* and *deus*. And, as in *φιάλη* and *φιαρός*, may we not say of *θεός* also, that there is no etymology for it if we separate it from *Ζεύς* and *δῖος*, from *Dyaus* and *divyas*? Curtius himself rejects Plato's and Schleicher's derivation of *θεός* from *θέω*, to run; likewise C. Hoffmann's from *dhava*, man; likewise Bühler's from a root *dhi*, to think or to shine; likewise that of Herodotus and A. Göbel from *θες*, a secondary form of *θε*, to settle. Ascoli's analysis is highly sagacious, but it is too artificial. Ascoli¹ identifies *θεός*, not with *deva*, but with *divyá-s*. *Divyás* becoming *δεφός* (like *satya*, *εἰτέος*), the accent on the last syllable would produce the change to *δεφός*, *f* would cause aspiration in the preceding consonant and then disappear, leaving *θεός*=*divyás*. All these changes are just possible phonetically, but, as Curtius observes, the chief point for which the theists contend is not gained, for we should still have to admit that the Greeks lost the common word for god, *deva* and *deus*, and that they alone replaced it by a derivative *divya*, meaning heavenly, not bright.

¹ *Rendiconti del Reale Istituto Lombardo*, classe di lettere, iv. fasc. 6.

Curtius himself seems in favour of deriving *θεός* from *θεσ*, to implore, which we have in *θεσ-σάμενοι*, *θέσαντο*, *πολύθεστος*, etc. *Θεός*, taken as a passive derivative, might, he thinks, have the meaning of *ἀρητός* in *πολύαρητος*, and mean the implored being. I cannot think that this is a satisfactory derivation. It might be defended phonetically and etymologically, though I cannot think of any analogous passive derivatives of a root ending in *s*. Where it fails to carry conviction is in leaving unexplained the loss of the common Aryan word for deity, and in putting in its place a name that savours of very modern thought.

I think the strongest argument against the supposed aspirating power of medial *v*, and its subsequent disappearance, lies in the fact that there are so many words having medial *v* which show no traces of this phonetic process (Curtius, p. 507). On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the Greeks might have felt a natural objection to the forms which would have rendered *deva* with real exactness, I mean *δοιός* or *δέος*, the former conveying the meaning of double, the latter of fear. A mere wish to keep the name for god distinct from these words might have produced the phonetic anomaly of which we complain; and, after all, though I do not like to use that excuse, there are exceptions to phonetic laws. No one can fully explain how *ὄγδοος* was derived from *ὀκτώ*, or *ἑβδομος* from *ἑπτά*, yet the internal evidence is too strong to be shaken by phonetic objections. In the case of *θεός* and *deus* the internal evidence seems to me nearly as strong as in *ὄγδοος* and *ἑβδομος*, and, though unwilling to give a final verdict, I think the question of the loss in Greek of the Aryan word for god and its replacement by another word nearly identical in form, but totally distinct in origin, should be left for the present an open question in Comparative Philology.

NOTE C.

THE VOCATIVE OF Dyaūs AND Ζεῦς.

THE vocative of Dyaus, having the circumflex, is one of those linguistic gems which one finds now and then in the Rig-Veda, and which by right ought to have a place of honour in a Museum of Antiquities. It is a unique form. It occurs but once in the Rig-Veda, never again, as far as we know at present, in the whole of Vedic literature, and yet it is exactly that form which a student of language would expect who is familiar with the working of the laws of accent in Sanskrit and in Greek. Without a thorough knowledge of these laws, the circumflexed vocative in Sanskrit, Dyaūs, corresponding to Greek Ζεῦ, would seem a mere anomaly, possibly an accidental coincidence, whereas in reality it affords the most striking proof of the organic working of the laws of accent, and at the same time an unanswerable testimony in favour of the genuineness of the ancient text of the Rig-Veda.

The laws of accent bearing on this circumflexed vocative are so simple that I thought they would have been understood by everybody. As this does not seem to have been the case, I add a few explanatory remarks.

It was Benfey who, as on so many other points, so on the accent of vocatives, was the first to point out (in 1845) that it was a fundamental law of the Aryan language to place the acute on the first syllable of all vocatives, both in the singular and in the dual and plural.¹ In Sanskrit this law admits of no exception; in Greek and Latin the rhythmic accent has prevailed to that extent that we only find a few traces left of the original Aryan accentuation. It is well known that in vocatives of nouns ending in

¹ See Benfey, *Über die Entstehung des Indo-germanischen Vocativs*, Göttingen, 1872, p. 35.

ius, the ancient Romans preserved the accent on the first syllable, that they said *Virgili*, *Valéri*, from *Virgilius* and *Valérius*. This statement of Nigidius Figulus, preserved by Gellius, though with the remark that in his time no one would say so, is the only evidence of the former existence of the Aryan law of accentuation in Latin. In Greek the evidence is more considerable, but the vocatives with the accent on the first syllable are, by the supreme law of the rhythmic accent in Greek, reduced to vocatives drawing back their accent as far as they can, consistently with the law which restricts the accent to one of the last three syllables. Thus while in Sanskrit a word like 'Αγαμέμνων would in the vocative retract the accent on the first syllable, 'Αγαμεμνον, the Greek could do no more than say 'Αγάμεμνον with the accent on the antepenultimate. In the same manner the vocative of 'Αριστοτέλης can only be 'Αριστότελες, whereas in Sanskrit it would have been *'Αριστοτελες.

Here, however, the question arises, whether in words like 'Αγαμέμνων¹ and 'Αριστοτέλης² the accent was not originally on the antepenultimate, but drawn on the penultimate by the rhythmic law. This is certainly the case in ἥδιον, as the vocative of ἡδίων, for we know that both in Sanskrit and Greek, comparatives in *ων* retract their accent as far as possible, and have it always on the first syllable in Sanskrit, always on the penultimate in Greek, if the last syllable is long. But, *cessante causâ cessat effectus*, and therefore the accent goes back on the antepenultimate, not only in the vocative, but likewise in the nom. neuter ἥδιον.

It is possible that the same process may explain the

¹ The rule is that vocatives in *ον* from proper names in *ων* retract the accent, except Λακεδαῖμον, and those in *φρον*, as Λυκόφρον from Λυκόφρων.

² Vocatives in *ες* from proper names in *ης* retract the accent, as Σώκρατες, except those in *ωδες*, *ωλες*, *ωρες*, *ηρες*, *ις* Δειῶδες.

vocative *δέσποτα* from *δεσπότης*, if we compare Sanskrit compounds with *pati*, such as *dâsâpati*, *gâspati*, *dâmpati*, which leave the accent on the first member of the compound. In *Δημήτηρ* also all becomes regular, if we admit the original accentuation to have been *Δήμητερ*, changed in *Δημήτηρ*, but preserved in the genitive *Δήμητρος*, and the vocative *Δήμητερ*.¹

But there are other words in which this cannot be the case: for instance, *ἄδελφε*, *πόνηρε*, *μόχθηρε*, from *ἀδελφός*, *πονηρός*, *μοχθηρός*. Here the accent is the old Aryan vocative accent. Again, in *πατήρ*, *πατέρα*, Sk. *pitā*, *pitāram*, in *μήτηρ*, *μητέρα*, Sk. *mâtā*, *mâtāram*, in *θυγάτηρ*, *θυγατέρα*, Sk. *duhitā*, *duhitāram*, the radical accent was throughout on the suffix *tār*, nor would the rules of the rhythmic accent in Greek prevent it from being on the antepenultimate in the accusative. The fact, therefore, that it is retracted on the penultimate and antepenultimate in the vocative shows clearly that we have here, too, the last working of the original Aryan accentuation. The irregular accent in the nom. sing. of *μήτηρ*, instead of *μητήρ*, is probably due to the frequent use of the vocative (an explanation which I had adopted before I had seen Benfey's essay), and the same cause may explain the apparently irregular accentuation in *θύγατρα*, by the side of *θυγατέρα*, in *θύγατρες* and *θύγατρας*. Similar vocatives with retracted accent are *dāēr*, nom. *δαήρ*, *εἵνατερ*, nom. *εἰνάτηρ*, *γύναι*, nom. *γυνή*, *σῶτερ*, nom. *σωτήρ*, *ἄνερ*, nom. *ἀνήρ*, "Ἀπολλων", nom. *Ἀπόλλων*, *Πόσειδον*, nom. *Ποσειδῶν*, "Ἡρακλεις", nom. *Ἡρακλῆς*.

We have thus established the fact that one feature of the primitive Aryan accentuation, which consisted in the very natural process of placing the high accent on the first syllable of vocatives, was strictly preserved in Sanskrit, while in Greek and Latin it only left some scattered traces of its former existence. Without the light derived from Sanskrit, the changes in the accent of vocatives in Greek

¹ Benfey, *l.c.* p. 40.

and Latin would be inexplicable, they would be, what they are in Greek grammar, mere anomalies; while, if placed by the side of Sanskrit, they are readily recognised as what they really are, remnants of a former age, preserved by frequent usage or by an agent whom we do not like to recognise, though we cannot altogether ignore him—viz. chance.

Taking our position on the fact that change of accent in the vocative in Greek is due to the continued influence of an older system of Aryan accentuation, we now see how the change of nom. Ζεύς into voc. Ζεῦ, and of nom. Δυαύς, into voc. Δυαῦς, rests on the same principle. In Sanskrit the change, though at first sight irregular, admits of explanation. What we call the circumflex in Sanskrit is the combination of a rising and falling of the voice, or, as we should say in Greek, of an acute and grave accent. As Δυαύς was originally Δίαύς, and is frequently used as two syllables in the Veda, the vocative would have been Δίαῦς, and this contracted would become Δυαῦς. On exactly the same principle we have *paribh v ē* from *paribh ūs*. In Greek the facts are the same, but the explanation is more difficult. The general rule in Greek is that vocatives in *ου*, *οι*, and *ευ*, from oxytone or perispome nominatives, are perispome; as *πλακοῦ*, *βοῦ*, *Λητοῦ*, *Πηλεῦ*, *βασιλεῦ*, from *πλακοῦς*, *οὔντος*, *placenta*, *βοῦς*, *Λητώ*, *Πηλεύς*, *βασιλεύς*. The rationale of that rule has never been explained, as far as Greek is concerned. Under this rule the vocative of Ζεύς becomes Ζεῦ; but no Greek grammarian has attempted to explain the process by which Ζεύς becomes Ζεῦ, and nothing remains for the present but to admit that we have in it an ancient Aryan relic, preserved in Greek long after the causes which had produced it had ceased to act. It would fall into the same category as *εἶμι* and *ἔμην*. Here, too, the efficient cause of the length and shortness of the radical vowel *i*—viz. the change of accent, Sk. *émi*, but *imás*—has disappeared in Greek, while its effect has been

preserved. But whatever explanation may hereafter be adopted, the simple fact which I had pointed out remains: the motive power which changed the nom. *dyaús* into the vocative *dyaũs* is the same which changed *Ζεύς* into *Ζεῦ*. Those who do not understand or do not admit this are bound to produce, from the resources of Greek itself, another motive power to account for the change of *Ζεύς* into *Ζεῦ*; but they must not imagine that a mere reference to a Greek elementary grammar suffices for explaining that process.

The passage in the Rig-Veda (VI. 51, 5) to which I referred is unique, and I therefore give it here, though it has in the meantime been most ably discussed by Benfey in his 'Essay on the Vocative' (1872).

‘Dyaũh pítah prithivi mātah ádhruk
Zēũ πάτερ πλατεῖα μήτερ ἀτρεκ(ές)
A'gne bhrātah vasavaḥ mrilāta nah¹
Ignis φράτερ *FeΣηες* μέλδετε nos.’

This passage is clearly one of great antiquity, for it still recognises *Dyaús*, the father, as the supreme god; Earth, the mother, by his side; and Agni, fire, as the brother, not of Heaven and Earth, but of man, because living with men on the hearth of their houses. *Vasu*, as a general name of the bright gods, like *deva* in other hymns, corresponds, I believe, to the Greek adjective *εὔς*. The genitive plural *εἰών* is likewise derived from *εὔς* or *vásus*, by Benfey (*l. c.* p. 57), and *dâtã vásûnâm* (Rv. VIII. 51, 5), comes certainly very near to *δοτήρ εἰών*. The only difficulty would be the *ã* instead of the *η*, as in *εἷος*, the gen. sing. of *εὔς* in Homer, a difficulty which might be removed by tracing the gen. plur. *εἰών* back to a fem. *εἰά*, corresponding to a Sk. *vasavî* or *vasavyâ*. As to *μέλδετε*, it is phonetically the nearest approach to *mrilata*, i.e. *mar-

¹ See also M. M.'s *Science of Language*, vol. ii. p. 541.

data, though in Greek it means 'make mild' rather than 'be mild.' Mild and *mollis* come from the same root.

What gives to this passage its special value is, that in all other passages when *dyaus* occurs as a vocative and as bisyllabic, it appears simply with the *udâta*, thus showing at how early a time even the Hindus forgot the meaning of the circumflex on *dyaûs*, and its legitimate appearance in that place. Thus in Rv. VIII. 100, 12, we read,

‘Sákhe Vishno vitarám ví kramasva,
Dyaúh dehí lokám vágrâya viskábhe
Hánâva vritrá^m rinákâva síndhûn
Índrasya yantu prasavé vísrishâtâh.’

‘Friend Vishnu, stride further,
Dyaus, give room for the lightning to leap,
Let us both kill Vritra and free the rivers,
Let them go, sent forth at the command of Indra.’

Here, I have little doubt, the ancient Rishis pronounced *Dyaûs*, but the later poets, and the still later *Âkâryas*, were satisfied with the acute, and with the acute the word is written here in all the MSS. I know.

NOTE D.

ARYAN WORDS OCCURRING IN ZEND, BUT NOT IN SANSKRIT.

It has been objected that the three instances which I had quoted of Zend words, not occurring in Sanskrit, but preserved in one or the other of the Indo-European languages, were not sufficient to establish the fact which I wished to establish, particularly as one of them, *kehrp*, existed in

Sanskrit, or, at least, in Vedic Sanskrit, as *krip*. I admit that I ought to have mentioned the Vedic *krip*, rather than the later *kalpa*; but I doubt whether the conclusions which I wished to draw would have been at all affected by this. For what I remarked with regard to *kalpa* applies with equal force to *krip*; it does not in Sanskrit mean body or flesh, like *kehrp*, and *corpus*, but simply form. But even if *kehrp* were not a case in point, nothing would have been easier than to replace it by other words, if at the time of printing my lecture I had had my collectanea at hand. I now subjoin a more complete list of words, present in Zend, absent in Sanskrit, but preserved in Greek, Latin, or German.

Zend *ana*, prep., upon; Greek *ἀνά*; Goth. *ana*, upon.

Zend *erezataêna*, adj., made of silver; Lat. *argentinus*. In Sk. we have *ragatam*, silver, but no corresponding adjective.

Zend *içi*, ice; O.N. *íss*; A.S. *ís*; O.H.S. *ís*.

Grimm compares the Irish *eírr*, snow, and he remarks that the other Aryan languages have each framed their own words for ice, Lith. *ledas*, O.S. *led'*, and distantly connected with these, through the Russian *chłodnyi*, the Latin *glacies*, for *gelacies*; Greek *κρύος*, *κρυμός*, *κρύσταλλος*.

The root from which these Greek words for ice are derived has left several derivatives in other languages, such as Lat. *cru-s-ta*, and O.N. *hrí-m*, rime, hoar-frost, and in Zend *kh-rû-ta*, used as an adjective of *zim*, winter, originally the hard winter. In Zend *kh-rû-ma*, and *kh-rû-ra*, Sk. *krû-ra*, as in Greek *κρύοεις*, the meaning has changed to *crudus*, *crudelis*. In the English *raw*, O.H.G. *hráo*, a similar change of meaning may be observed.

Another name connected with ice and winter is the Zend *zyâo*, frost, from the root *hi*, which has given us *χι-ών*, Sk. *hi-ma*, Lat. *hiem-s*, O.S. *zima*, but which in the simplest form has been preserved in Zend only and in the O.N. *ge*. Fick quotes *ge* with the doubtful meanings of cold and snow,

Curtius with that of storm, identifying it with Norw. *gjö*, *nix autumnni recens*.

There is still another name for snow, absent in Sanskrit, but fully represented in Zend and the other Aryan languages, viz. Zend *çnizh*, to snow, Lat. *nix*, Goth. *snaiv-s*, Lith. *snig-ti*, to snow, Ir. *snechta*, snow, Gr. *νιφ-α* (acc.).¹

Zend *aêva*, one; Gr. *οἶος*. In Sanskrit there is the adverb *eva*, only.

Zend *kamara*, girdle, vault; Gr. *καμάρα*, vault, covered carriage; A.S. *himil*. Connected with this we find the Zend *kameredhe*, skull, vault of head, very nearly connected with *κμέλεθρον*, *μέλαθρον*.

Zend *kareta*, knife; Lith. *kalta-s*, knife; cf. *culter*, Sk. *kart-ari*, etc. The Slav. *korda*, O.N. *kordi*, Hung. *kard*, are treated by Justi as words borrowed from Persian.

Zend *thrâfanh*, food; Gr. *-τρέφεις*.

Zend *da*, e.g. *vaêçmen-da*, towards the house; Gr. *οἰκόνδε*.

Zend *daiti*, gift; Gr. *δότης*; Lat. *dôs*, *dôti-s*, Lith. *ûti-s*.

Zend *dâmi*, creation; Gr. *θέμις*, law.

Zend *naçu*, corpse; Gr. *νέκυς*; Goth. *nau-s*.

Zend *napo*, nom. sing.; A.S. *nefa*; O.H.G. *nefo*.

Zend *paithya* in *qaêpaithya*, own; Lat. *sua-pte*, *ipse*; Lith. *patis*, self; cf. Corssen, s.v. *pote*, *potis*.

Zend *peretu*, bridge; Lat. *portus*.

Zend *fraêsta*, most, best; Gr. *πλεῖστος*.

Zend *brvat*, brow; Gr. *ἀβροῦτες* (Macedon.); Lat. *frons*.

Zend *madh*, to cure; Lat. *mederi*.

Zend *man*, in *upa-man*, to wait; Lat. *manere*.

Zend *yâre*, year; Goth. *jer*; O.S. *jarŭ*, spring.

Zend *yâonh*, *yâh*, to gird; *yâonha*, dress; Gr. *ζωσ* in *ζώννυμι*; O.S. *po-yasŭ*, girdle.

¹ See M. M.'s *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, p. 372, note.

Zend râçta, straight; Lat. *rectus*; Goth. *raiht-s*.

Zend rap, to go; Lat. *repere*.

Zend ravañ, space; Lat. *rus*, field.¹

Zend varez, to work, vareza, work, varstva, work;
Goth. *vaurkjan*, to work; Gr. ἔργα, ῥέζω; Goth.
vaurstv. See, however, Vedic *vrikta*; Darmesteter,
'Ormazd et Ahriman,' p. 40; Roth, 'Mélanges Asia-
tiques,' vii. p. 612.

Zend vaêti, willow; Lith. *vỹti-s*, withy; Lat. *vitis*.

Zend çtaman, mouth; Gr. στόμα.

NOTE E.

Letter to Professor Fleckeisen: 'Are there Ablatives in D with the meaning of the Locative?'

'I GLADLY comply with your wish that I should write down for you my views on the restoration of *d* as the termination of the ablative in ancient Latin, such as they have shaped themselves in my own mind while reading lately Ritschl's new "Excursus on Plautus" (Leipzig, 1869), and Bergk's "Beiträge zur Lateinischen Grammatik" (Halle, 1870); and, more particularly, while discussing the subject with you in our late walks and talks at Dresden. Often have I expressed my conviction that nothing could be more advantageous to the true Science of Language than a free exchange of our opinions, which we have reached each of us in his own way, some while working at Greek or Latin, others while studying Sanskrit and Comparative Philology. In my lecture at Strassburg I dwelt even more on this point, and said:—

"Much has of late been said of the antagonism between comparative and classical philology. To me it seems that these two depend so much on each other for help and

¹ See James Darmesteter, in his able review in the *Revue Critique*, December 23, 1876.

advice that their representatives ought to be united by the closest ties of fellowship. We must work on side by side, and accept counsel as readily as we give it. Without the help of Comparative Philology, for instance, Greek scholars would never have arrived at a correct understanding of the Digamma—nay, a freer intercourse with his colleague, Bopp, would have preserved Bekker from several mistakes in his restoration of the Digamma in Homer. Latin scholars would have felt far more hesitation in introducing the old *d* of the ablative in Plautus, if the analogy of Sanskrit had not so clearly proved its legitimacy.

“On the other hand, we, comparative philologists, should readily ask and gladly accept the advice and help of our classical colleagues. Without their guidance, we can never advance securely: their warnings are to us of the greatest advantage, their approval our best reward. We are often too bold, we do not see all the difficulties that stand in the way of our speculations, we are too apt to forget that, in addition to its general Aryan character, every language has its peculiar genius. Let us all be on our guard against omniscience and infallibility. Only through a frank, honest, and truly brotherly co-operation can we hope for a true advancement of knowledge.”

‘It is to such a frank and honest co-operation that the following remarks owe their origin. Without your friendly encouragement I should never have thought of giving publicity to my misgivings as to certain emendations introduced by so high an authority as Ritschl into the text of Plautus. Since I left Gottfried Hermann’s Seminary—and that is now many years ago—I have not had much time for Greek and Latin, least of all for the study of that most difficult of all Latin poets, Plautus, which seems to be in a constant state of fermentation. Only after the completion of my edition of the Rig-Veda have I found again a little leisure for reading at least the more important books which during many years, while I

was working for others rather than for myself, I had to lay aside unread. Foremost among them were the original works of Ritschl on the development of the oldest Latin which offers to the comparative philologist so many instructive facts and inspiring views. That some of his views excite not only our admiration but also our surprise, is but natural. But never should I have dreamt of giving public expression to this surprise, had I not, during the unrestrained exchange of our ideas on some of his rather startling theories, conceived a hope that what received the approbation of a Fleckeisen might not be altogether unwelcome to other classical scholars also.

‘I shall try, therefore, to explain as shortly as possible, first my own views on the origin and the disappearance of the *d* of the ablative in Latin, such as they were formed by a comparative study of analogous facts; and then to consider the objections which Latin scholars might bring forward against them, chiefly on the strength of facts collected from Latin inscriptions and the text of Plautus. If I succeed in bringing these facts of language into harmony with the postulates of the science of language, a conviction which we all, to whatever school we may belong, share, will perhaps have been strengthened, viz. that there is in no language anything anomalous, in the strict sense of that word, or nothing, at all events, irrational. If I fail in this, nothing remains but to re-examine afresh the correctness of our theories and the true bearing of the facts before us; and this, too, can only be advantageous both to classical and comparative scholars.

‘The view of comparative philologists with regard to the *d* of the ablative is shortly this:—

‘(1) Latin, like Sanskrit and Zend, and like Greek also, possessed originally an ablative in *d* (not in *t*, as has been frequently maintained; see p. 154), which was intended to express motion from a place; and a locative in *i*, intended to express rest in a place. So long as these two

cases remained phonetically distinct, their functions also remained distinct: the ablative had the meaning of an ablative only; the locative, that of a locative only. As in Sanskrit *nagarât* means from the town, *nagare*, in the town, so in Latin also, as long as *Tarentod* stood by the side of *Tarentoi* or *Tarenti*, the former meant "from Tarentum" only, the latter "at Tarentum," and nothing else. The same applies to *Româd*, by the side of *Romai* or *Romae*, to *rurîd* by the side of *rurî*. To say *in Româd*, at Rome, would, during that early stage of language, have been quite as impossible as to say *ex Romai* or *ex Romae*. I leave out of consideration the old instrumental, because, though it had been developed as a grammatical category in Latin as well as in Sanskrit, it had at an early period ceased to be phonetically distinguishable from other cases. *Hastâ percussi* can still be felt as an instrumental; but, as spoken, *hastâ* is to the Roman an ablative—i.e. the Whence has taken the place of the Whereby.

“(2) We then come to a consideration of the second stage, when, through a general phonetic process, the final *d* was dropped, and the ablative of words of the third declension became identical with the locative. Thus *rurĕ*, the new representative of *rurîd* and *rurî*, was used to express both motion from (*a rure*) and rest in (*in rure*). This phonetic change, we must remember, does not take place on a sudden. For a time the original and the modified forms co-exist side by side, and the speakers are hardly aware of any important change. Afterwards the old form begins to make the impression of something old-fashioned and strange, and it is on that ground more and more avoided by the rising generation. We can watch this process in the few documents of Latin dating from the sixth century. We do not find *rurîd* at once driven out by *rurĕ*, but the form of the ablative passes through several intermediate stages before it arrives at the other extreme of *rurĕ*. Though it might be desirable, it is hardly pos-

sible, considering the scarcity of ancient ablatives, to distinguish those of bases of the third declension ending in *i* from those of bases ending in consonants. We take **eid* as the oldest form of the ablative which we have a right to postulate after nouns of the third declension, the *ei* representing really *guna* of the final vowel, which from an early time encroached on bases with final consonants. The oldest form which actually occurs is *îd*, in *airîd*, *coventionîd*, (*no*)*minîd*. The remaining forms cannot be arranged in strictly chronological order, so as to show the transition from *ê* to *ei*, and from *ei* to *î*. The forms in *ei* occur as early as those in *ê* and *î*, and even forms in *e* belong, according to Bücheler ("Lateinische Declination," p. 50), to the sixth century. Thus we place together as collateral forms—

‘I. Ablatives in *ê*: *patrê* (tit. Scip. 30), *facilê* (tit. Scip. 33), *aire* (I.L.A. 181), *ordinê* (Nævius), *montê* (Ennius).

‘II. Ablatives in *ei*: *virtutei* (tit. Scip. 34), *fontei* (tab. Gen. a. 637; but *ibid.* *fonte*), *dotei* (Plautus).

‘III. Ablatives in *î*: *sortî* (l. repet.), *parti* and *parte* (l. repet.), *mulierî*, etc. (Plautus).

‘IV. Ablatives in *ě*, since the end of the sixth century, but often changing with *î*, without any rule, in spite of the rules of grammarians.

‘Without insisting too strongly on a strictly chronological order, we see that in the end all ablatives of nouns of the third declension dwindle down to *ě*, and that in certain nouns only *î* was retained.

‘The same short *ě*, however, is likewise the last result of the termination of the locative. Here, too, we find, after bases ending in consonants and in *i*, the two locative terminations *î* and *e*. The *î*, however, is here decidedly older than the *ě*, and we see that names of places, forming their ablative in *ě*, retain a locative in *î*. Still older than this *î* is the locative *ê* in *manê*, *rurê* (Bücheler, *l.c.* p. 62).

‘While thus the old forms of the ablative and locative

became phonetically identical, a new case, which was neither ablative nor locative, but both together, developed itself in the grammatical consciousness of the Romans. It expressed simply locality, and corresponded perhaps most closely to Greek forms in $\phi\iota$. It was chiefly due to the phonetic levelling in the forms of the third declension—in which, according to Mommsen ("Rhein. Museum," ix. p. 463), the final d disappeared first—that this new indifferent local case sprang up. In the first and second declensions the process was different. Here the old exclusive locatives disappeared owing to their frequent employment as genitives, or, according to others, owing to their phonetic identity with the genitives; while the ablatives, after losing their d , became in the second—and for a time also in the first—declension identical in form with the datives. In the second declension the difference between the locative and dative was for a time as palpable in Latin as in Greek. As in Sanskrit we have the dative $dev\ \hat{a}ya$, by the side of the locative $deve$ (i.e. $deva+i$), we have in Greek $\omicron\kappa\epsilon\varphi$, by the side of the locative $\omicron\kappa\omicron\iota$; and in Latin $humoi$ (trisyllabic), by the side of the locative $humoi$ (disyllabic).

'This last oi of the locative became e (in *hume*), ei (in *die septime*), a form established by you (Dr. Fleckeisen) in Plautus ("Persa," v. 260; "Dichterfragmente bei Gellius," p. 31), and lastly i in *hum* i . It never becomes o . The oi of the dative, on the contrary, became $\acute{o}$ from the sixth century, and thus identical with the ablative—never with the locative. Even in the first declension the ablative in $\acute{a}$ became, for a time at least, identical with the dative, but never with the locative. The ablative *Romád* became *Romá*; the locative *Romai* (disyllabic) became *Romæ*, the dative *Romai* (trisyllabic) became for a time *Romá* (Bücheler, l.c. p. 53), but, as a rule, *Romæ*.

'We thus see that, owing to purely phonetic causes, the sharp distinction established during the earliest Aryan

period between the cases expressing the Where and the Whence became lost. In the first declension the Whence case in *ā* was not encroached upon, but the Where case in *ai* was absorbed by the genitive and dative. It was impossible to say *in Romæ*, because *Romai* had become too exclusively genitive and locative. But as it was right to say *ex villā*, it was not thought to be wrong to say *in villā* also.

‘In the second declension the ablative and dative, the locative and genitive ran together. It was impossible to say *in agri*, because the *i* had been too exclusively appropriated by the genitive. But, as it was right to say *ex agro*, it was not thought to be wrong to say *in agro* also.

‘In the third declension the grammatical conscience revolted neither against *ex rure* nor against *in rure*.

‘Thus the ablative had become in different ways, yet in the end with the same result, a general local or paratactic case, no longer restricted to express the Whence only; while the exclusive Where case served in the first and second declensions as genitive, being besides identical with the dative in the first declension.

‘For (to mention this in passing) I see no arguments in support of the theory that the genitive sing. of the first declension in *æ* should be taken for the old genitive in *æs*, with the final *s* dropped. True, the loss of a final *s* in Latin is very common, in prose as well as in poetry. But we must here too distinguish, viz. between an occasional and a permanent loss of final *s*. No doubt the Romans said and wrote *filio* and *filiu*, but they never forgot that the real nominative was *filius*. The Romans said *palmi*, nay, even *palm* (cf. Cic. *Or.* § 153), but the typical grammatical form always remained *palmis*. What would have become of Latin, if it had thrown off permanently every final *s*; and if *palmi* had taken the place of *palmis*, *palma* of *palmas*, *cibi* of *cibis*, *cibo* of *cibos*, *voce* of *voces*, *ama* of *amas*? If *familiai* were in reality nothing but a phoneti-

cally impaired *familiais*; if *familiaë* were no more than a quickly pronounced *familiaës*, why should not the far more frequently used genitive *familias* have dwindled down to a genitive *familiâ*? I believe one may lay it down almost as a general rule that, after a long vowel, Latin never drops a final *s* permanently. That there was also a genitive sing. in *s*, both in the first and the second declensions, is not denied. Oscan and Umbrian forms make this clearer even than Latin. What I doubt, and more than doubt, is that from the old genitives in *s* we can derive those without an *s* by the easy phrase that "final *s* was dropped." The nearest analogy is offered by the nominative plur. in the second declension, where, by the side of the old forms in *is*, we have the more modern forms in *i*. But these two forms also should, according to my opinion, not be treated as successive, but as parallel forms, like the corresponding nom. plur. in certain Sanskrit words, such as *samâs* and *same*. Another analogy might be discovered in the nom. sing. of the first declension, if only it could be proved that there ever was an *s* after the long *â*. I know very well that Bopp, Schleicher, and even Bücheler, hold that opinion, but I believe I have proved (*supra*, p. 154) that the only example of a nom. sing. fem. ending in *â-s*, which was quoted from the Veda, has hardly any authority, and cannot serve as a support of such a theory. On the other hand, nothing is more natural than that a locative should take the functions of a genitive. A "king at Rome" becomes easily a "king of Rome" (*un roi de Rome*), and after that first stage, everything else follows naturally. In Sanskrit it is well known that in the dual genitive and locative are identical in form, thus showing how easily the two angles of vision of the locative and genitive can be made to coincide. In the dialect of Thessaly the genitives of the second declension are said to end in *oi*.¹ I hold, therefore, that the genitives in *æ* and

¹ Cf. Ahrens, *De Dial. Æol.* p. 221; *De Dial. Dor.* p. 528.

i are locatives functionally enlarged, not genitives phonetically reduced. If there is a difficulty in assuming *âi* to stand for the locative *âi*, it is, as Curtius remarked, the lengthening of the final *i*; but the same difficulty would apply to *familiâi*, if explained as a corruption of *familiâis*.

‘If we clearly place before our eyes events of this character, which affect both the form and the inner life of language, if we take part in them ourselves, as we do in historical events, whether of past or present times, then certain things become perfectly intelligible, others disclose at once their impossible character. It is perfectly intelligible that, after a change of pronunciation has taken place—for instance, after the *d* of the ablative has ceased to be pronounced—the old forms, such as the ablative with final *d*, should be maintained in certain expressions and typical formulas, or that they should live on in the language of the common people, long after they were avoided as old-fashioned or vulgar by the higher classes and in literary society. As we say “by rights,” the Roman may have said *meritod* long after in ordinary parlance he had dropped the *d*. Certain classes of poetry, too, may have retained a taste for such real relics of ancient speech; and nothing is more natural than that they should have been made to do service in the lapidary style of composition and the curial style of legislation. Similar proceedings may be discovered everywhere, in modern as well as in ancient languages. Thus in French the final *t* of *il aime(t)* has completely disappeared, both in writing and speaking, and the final *e* has become mute. In poetry, however, the *e* is not yet mute, but counts as a syllable, e.g. *il âimě sēs âmīs*; and in certain cases, as, for instance, in *aime-t-il*, even the old *t* has maintained itself both in speaking and in writing. The same state of things may be seen in so-called ancient languages. In Sanskrit the accusative plural ended originally in *ns*. The accus. plur. of *sa*, *he*, was *tâns* (τοῖς=τούς), not *tân*, which in Greek would

have been $\tau\omega\iota$. But as Sanskrit never tolerates two consonants at the end of words, nor final *s* before initial sonants, *tâns* would, on purely phonetic grounds, dwindle down to *tân*. In *pausâ* *tâns* became *tân*; before sonants *tâns* *atti*, *tâns* *dadâti* was impossible, and became *tân* *atti*, *tân* *dadâti*. Before gutturals and labials, the *gihvâmmûliya* (tongue-root spirant) and *upadhmanîya* (labial spirant) disappeared; hence *tân* *karoti*, *tân* *pâti*. Only before dentals and palatals the *s* was retained, and so we find *tâns* *te*, and *tâns* *ka*, never *tân* *te*, and *tân* *ka*. Grammarians, not understanding the historical development of these forms, invert the process, and instead of trying to account for the loss of the original final *s*, give a purely phonetic rule, viz. that an *s* must be inserted after final *n*, if followed by dentals and palatals.

‘But while such *survivals* are perfectly intelligible, whether in the history of language or in the history of manners and customs, while no one would be startled by the retention of such forms as *Gnaivod* or *meritod*, whether in inscriptions, laws, formulas, or in certain kinds of poetry, it would be not only startling but perfectly unintelligible that during a time when such forms could still be retained in the memory of language, the same forms should be used with a meaning which they never had or could have had before they suffered that change which rendered them phonetically undistinguishable from other forms, and thus seemed to transfer to them the powers of those other forms with which they had become phonetically identical. To take an instance: *Gnaivod* as expressing Whence, *belli, proxumæ viciniæ* as expressing Where, are perfectly legitimate forms, long after the final *d* has been thrown off in most words, and long after *i* and *æ* have ceased to be felt as terminations of the locative, and were used for the purposes of the genitive and dative cases only. But without a shadow of excuse, without any historical legitimacy, would be a phrase such as *in altod marid*, retaining the old *d* of

the ablative, which never expressed anything but whence, preceded by *in*, which always expresses the where. No one would dream of saying *e belli* or *e viciniae*, or in Greek ἐκ χθονί, ἐξ ἀγοῶ, or ἐν χθονός. Such incongruities and anachronisms are impossible in the natural growth of any language. Yet we know that they exist in Latin, and the question which we have to answer is, what are we to make of such monstrosities?

‘We saw and could easily understand that, after the disappearance of the final *d* of the ablative, forms such as *meritod*, *de sententiad* might be retained, and leave in the mind of the speakers the impression that to add these final *d*’s imparted to a speech a certain air of antiquity. Quintilian, I. vii. 11, has expressed this very sentiment. He says: “Verum orthographia quoque consuetudini servit ideoque sæpe mutata est, nam illa vetustissima transeo tempora, quibus et pauciores literæ nec similes his nostris earum formæ fuerunt et vis quoque diversa: sicut apud Græcos . . . , ut a Latinis veteribus *d* plurimis in verbis adjectam ultimam, quod manifestum est etiam [here *nunc* should be added with Bergk] ex columna rostrata, quæ est Duilio in foro posita” (cf. Ritschl, *l.c.* p. 3). Quintilian looks upon the *d* as something added. He probably never heard it in conversation, but may have seen it on the *columna rostrata* and elsewhere, and known that the old Romans used it more frequently. Charisius expresses a similar opinion (p. 112 K): “Quibus (antiquis) mos erat *d* litteram omnibus pæne vocibus vocali littera finitis adjungere” (cf. Ritschl, *l.c.* p. 4); and Marius Victorinus, “De Orthogr.” p. 2462 P. (17 G.) says: “Et adjecta *d* littera, quam plerisque verbis adiciebant” (cf. Ritschl, *l.c.* p. 5).

‘When this idea, as here expressed by Quintilian and others, once took possession of the public mind, or of the mind of literary people at Rome, two things were perfectly intelligible: 1. That whenever one wished to give to one’s language a more ancient appearance, real old forms and

formulas with ablatives in *d* might be chosen with a certain predilection. 2. That for the same purpose a final *d* was added, *omnibus pæne vocibus vocali littera finitis*, thus giving birth to such monsters as *in altod marid*.

‘This might happen, as it does with us, in the legal jargon of solicitors’ clerks or in inscriptions affecting an archaic character, but hardly, and not even hardly, in a living language—not in authors who wrote as they spoke, least of all in poets who wrote for the public stage. So long as *ôd* and *ô*, *ád* and *á*, *íd* and *í* existed peacefully side by side in the spoken language, we can well understand their retaining and even showing a certain preference for real old ablatives; but never, unless I am greatly mistaken, their adding a purely paragogic and utterly unhistoric *d* to words which at no time in the history of the language could have ended in *d*, except when used as real ablatives. Phrases such as *in altod marid*, forms such as *credod* for *credo*, *potavid* for *potavi*, which Bothe has ventured to introduce into Plautus and even into Terence (*cf.* Ritschl, *l.c.* p. 8), are intolerable. We can well understand that Nævius should have written *Noctu Trojad exhibant*, never *Noctud Trojad exhibant*.

‘Classical scholars will probably say that all this is quite plausible *a priori*, but what is to become of the facts of language? Shall we find fault with Nævius and Plautus because their language runs counter to the theories of comparative philologists? Shall we correct inscriptions, or declare them altogether spurious, because they upset our grammatical speculations? I answer, Certainly not. But what we ought to do is to look twice at the facts of Latin before we declare that they run counter to the theories of comparative philologists, or that they cannot be brought into harmony with the laws established by the Science of Language.

‘The principal witnesses brought into court to prove that in the sixth century the old forms in *d* were no longer

restricted to express the Whence, but that, like the so-called ablatives of classical Latin, they could express the Where also, are the inscriptions on the *Columna Rostrata*, and the *Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus*.

‘No one will at present seriously maintain that the inscription of the *Columna Rostrata* which we possess is the same which was put up in the year 494/260. That inscription, whether we place it under Claudius (41–54 A.D.) or under Augustus, is the work of learned grammarians. The material, viz. Parian marble, the forms of the letters, the lengthy style, phonetic peculiarities such as *ae* instead of *ai*, all speak against an early republican date. The strict retention of *O* for *G* is no counter proof. People knew perfectly well that *O* was the old sign for *G*, and it was chosen throughout for the new Duilian inscription, while in the inscription of Scipio Barbatus *G* and *O* still stand side by side. The inscription of the *Barbati filius*, which Ritschl holds to be more ancient (“*Rhein. Museum*,” ix. p. 9), offers no opportunity for the *G*, which, as is well known, was introduced by Spurius Carvilius, 520/234. What from the first gave me the strongest feeling against the genuineness of that inscription were forms such as *in altod marid*, i.e. ablatives with a purely local meaning; and, besides this, the fact that this inscription and the S.C. de Bacchanalibus are the only larger inscriptions which add the *d* systematically to all ablatives without exception. They are a little better than Quintilian, in so far as they do not add *d* to every final vowel, but only to the final vowels of ablatives; but while the almost contemporaneous Scipionic inscriptions use both forms side by side, as in *Gnaivod patre*, etc., the restorers of the Duilian inscription allowed not a single ablative to escape, but added the paragogic *d* to every one. All this together puts the Duilian inscription, such as we have it, out of court.

‘The matter becomes much more serious when we turn to the S.C. de Bacchanalibus. It is true we do not possess

the S.C. itself (568/186), but a copy only. That copy, however, is contemporaneous, and if it were only for the L with its acute angle (Ritschl, "Rhein. Mus." ix. p. 2), no one would doubt that it belonged to the sixth century.

'Then comes the question, Does that document represent the language of Rome as it was then spoken—for instance, by Plautus, who died two years later, 570/184? Surely, even if we restored the final *d* in Plautus by the dozen, no one would place his Latin on the same level as that of the S.C. de Bacchanalibus. No one would insert the *d* after every ablative in Plautus, as it is in the S.C., even in cases where the metre repudiates the *d*, and requires elision or synizesis of a final vowel before an initial vowel. While, therefore, on the stage the metre requires ever so many times an *â*, *ô*, and *ê* as the final vowel of the ablative, are we to believe that at the same time in the Senate no ablative, without any exception,¹ was allowed to drop its *d*, as is the case in the S.C. de Bacchanalibus? Is it not much more likely that the secretaries employed in the Senate looked upon the final *d* as part and parcel of the regular office style, handed down to them by their predecessors, and not lightly to be departed from? Thus and thus only can we account for the many ablatives in *d* occurring in the S.C., even where the ablative is no true ablative, but a locative that never could have ended in *d*. Expressions like *in oquoltod*, *in poblicod*, *in preivatod*, *in coventionid*, are quite as objectionable as *in altod marid*. They can be accounted for as grammatical red tape, never as the outcome of the natural growth of language.

'Such a view of the nature of the S. C. de Bacchanalibus is considerably supported by its address. Here we have again the ordinary language of the day, and here we find, therefore, the only ablative in the document not ornamented with the archaic *d*, viz. *in agro Teurano*. Here

¹ There is one exception, *pro magistratuo*, but that most likely should be read *pro magistratud*.

we have the language of Plautus. We have an ablative in the modern sense of the word, *i.e.* a paratactic case that is no longer either ablative or locative, but capable of either employment, according to circumstances, but we have it without a final *d*.

‘What evidence then remains, after disposing of the Duilian inscription and the S. C. de Bacchanalibus, to prove that any Roman, speaking or writing his native tongue, ever used a case in *d* with a local meaning? So far as I know, none. And may we not ask why an ancient Roman should ever have been driven to employ such a *hysteron proteron* as an ablative in *d* with a locative meaning? If he wished to use a locative case, were not the old forms of the locative ready at hand, quite as much as the old forms of the ablative? Could he not say *Romai*? Then why say *Romad*? The really genuine inscriptions leave no doubt on this point. Three years before the S. C. de Bacchanalibus, we read in the decree of Æmilius Paulus *ea tempestate*, not *ead tempestated*; *ibid. in turri Lascutana*; in the Scipionic inscriptions N. 33, *in longa vita*, N. 34, *aetate quom parva*. Whenever we find the final *d*, it always expresses a Whence or Whereby: *e.g.* *Benventod* (a coin of the fifth century) *aire moltaticod* (Picene bronze tablet, I.L.A. 181) *de praedad* (*ibid.* 63, 64); *meritod* (*ibid.* 190), but *mereto* (*ibid.* 183); *Hinnad cepit*, 543/211, but a little later, 565/189, *Aetolia cepit*. Adverbs also ending in *d* may be conceived as ablatives, so that *meritod* meant originally ‘from merit, on account of merit, well-merited,’ *facilumed*, ‘from the easiest side or way, easily.’ Expressions like *ex facili*, and adverbs such as *peni-tus*, *clari-tus*, show the way on which language, starting from ablatives, reached these purely adverbial expressions. (Bergk, *l.c.* p. 19.)

‘Let us ask, then, without entering into further detail, what is the sum total and the final result of our researches? It is neither more nor less than that we must not force into the text of Plautus anything which runs counter to

the character of Latin inscriptions contemporaneous with Plautus. After Ritschl has successfully proved from still extant MSS. the existence of *d* in *med*, *ted*, *sed*, after he has rendered the former existence of that *d* in MSS. of Plautus more than probable, it is perfectly free to classical scholars to have recourse to that *d*, wherever the restoration of corrupt passages in the *textus receptus* seems to require it. It is a question of critical tact, which can be acquired by long practice only, how far this remedy may be applied, and how far it should be preferred to other remedies. Here I should not venture to pass any judgment. One observation only I should like to make with regard to controversies respecting the hiatus. No language, as is well known, is more inexorable with regard to hiatus than Sanskrit. Nevertheless, there are exceptions. If the hiatus is due to the omission of a final consonant, for instance, it is tolerated. Thus, if *tâ v iti* has been changed to *tâ iti*, the final and initial vowels remain unaffected and must not be contracted. When *savindra* has become *saindra*, a further change to *sendra* is exceptional only. Thus hiatus might have been tolerated in Latin also in cases where the consciousness of the former presence of the final *d* remained. However, instead of discussing the generalities and possibilities, let us look at some of these cases of hiatus in the MSS. of Plautus. We read, Amph. 169, *quo facto aut dicto adest opus, quietus ne sis*. How could a copyist think of introducing here a totally unidiomatic expression, *opus adest aliqua re*? I believe Ritschl has found the only possible explanation. The old MS. gave *quo facto aut dictod est opus*, and some scribe put *dicto adest*, instead of *dictod est*. This is so evident that, as Ritschl remarked in the "Nachträge," Pareus had already, on the suggestion of Gulielmius, adopted that reading. If we adopted Bergk's conjecture, l.c. 68, *quo facto aut dicto adeost opus*, it would be difficult to understand the cause of the corrupt reading.

‘An equally certain proof of the former presence of *d* in ancient MSS. occurs in Mil. glor. 267. You have shown in your journal (1873, p. 502) that *vi pugnando* is a recognised phrase in Latin. Such idiomatic expressions are never interfered with. They are what they are only so long as they remain untouched and unchanged. No one will say in English *to and also fro* instead of *to and fro*. Nor would Plautus ever have thought of saying *vi pugnandoque*, instead of *vi pugnando*. Yet the MSS. read: *res paratast: vi pugnandoque hominem caperest certa res*. How did this *que* creep in? Your answer seems to me convincing. Every student of MSS. knows how often *D* is mistaken for an *O*. In our case *D* was for once mistaken for *Q*. We must restore the text, *vi pugnandod hominem caperest certa res*, and we must see in a former really written *D* the origin of the letter *Q*, *i.e.* *que*.

‘We must not forget that the text of Plautus, as it is almost inevitable with popular plays, had to accommodate itself to the changes of the spoken language. Ritschl shows that the popularity of the plays of Plautus revived in the first *decennia* of the seventh century (*cf.* Bergk, *l.c.* p. 130), a time when Latin had long shaken off its old pronunciation. This being so, it is really astonishing that any palpable traces of the old-fashioned *d* should have remained in our MSS. If we want a text of Plautus, such as he may have written it himself, not as the theatrical managers of the seventh century arranged it, I see no reason why the final *d* should not be restored, when necessary, though in each single case a free choice must be left to the critic between the restitution of the *d* or some other more plausible restoration of the metre. Here the criticism of the text of Plautus rests very much on the same principles as that of the text of Shakespeare, where we have always to ask ourselves whether we wish to have a text such as Shakespeare might have written, or such as it was

used on the stage, and handed down in the books of the managers of the theatres.

‘The only point against which the student and the historical critic of language must protest is the attempt to force a final ablative *d* on Plautus in cases where even the oldest Latin inscriptions do not tolerate it. Until some much stronger arguments have been advanced, Plautine critics must abstain from all ablatives in *d* with the local or temporal meaning of Where and When. There is no serious objection to expressions such as *fer aequod animo* (Mil. glor. 1343), because *aequod animo* may be taken as an adverbial expression like *meritod*. And much may be said in favour of *aurod onustam, famed emortuos, clementid animo*. Impossible, however, are constructions such as *hoc in equod insunt milites* (Bacch. 941); *in platead ultuma*, etc. Plautus could not have spoken like the learned scholars who restored the inscription on the Duilian column, nor like the secretaries of the Senate who drafted the S. C. de Bacchanalibus. He may have allowed himself the use of expressions such as we find in the Scipionic inscriptions, or in the decree of Æmilius Paulus, or in other ancient documents. But what would have been impossible in them, is impossible in Plautus also. Every effort has been made to point out one single ablative in *d* with the meaning of a locative, but in vain. *Eod die* in the *Fasti* of Amiternum, after the year 769, seemed at first to supply the missing link. Ritschl thought it possible that *eod* might by accident have been preserved in our copy from a very ancient original, but admitted its doubtful character. Bücheler formerly suspected a clerical blunder (“Lat. Decl.” p. 47), but at present it seems generally admitted that *eod* is an abbreviation of *eodem* (Bücheler, in “Jahrbücher für class. Philol.,” 1869, p. 488). *Eodem die* occurs frequently in the *Fasti Iuliani*, as printed by Mommsen in the “Ephemeris epigraphica,” 1872, pp. 35–41.

'The same "Ephemeris," however (1874, p. 205), contains the following inscription, which, I confess, disturbed me considerably for some time.

IN · HOCE · LOVCARID · STIRCVS
NE //IS · FVNDATID · NEVE · CADAVER
PROIECITAD · NEVE · PARENTATID
SEI · QVIS · ARVORSV · HAC · FAXIT ///IVM
QVIS · VOLET · PRO · IOVDICATOD · NI
MANVM · INIECTO · ESTOD · SEIVE
MAC// STERATVS · VOLET · MOLTARE
///CETOD

'Mommson reads it: *in hoc loucarid stircus ne [qu]is fundatid, neve cadaver proiecitat, neve parentatid. sei quis arvorsu hac faxit, [in] ium quis volet pro ioudicatod n(umum) [L] manum inieci [i]o estod. seive mac[i]steratus volet moltare, licetod.*

'Put into ordinary Latin it is: *in hoc luco stercus ne quis fundito, neve cadaver proicito, neve parentato. si quis adversus hoc fecerit, in eum ei qui volet pro iudicato nummum L manus iniectio esto. sive magistratus volet multare, liceto.*

'Every scholar will see at once that the inscription contains a number of the greatest linguistic treasures: (1) a problematical locative in *id*, (2) an ablative in *od*, (3) an old construction such as *manum injectio*, (4) a new verb, *fundare*, (5) a *c* for *g*, in *macisteratus*, which would place this inscription before that of Scipio Barbatus, (6) the mixture of *u* and *o*, the latter after *v* only and before *l*, (7) imperatives in *tād*, *tod*, *atid*, the first and last forms being entirely new, the second hitherto very doubtfully authenticated, at least in inscriptions¹ (Ritschl, "Neue Excursus," pp. 100-102).

¹ Even *tud* in *facitud* in the bronze tablet of the Museum at Bologna rests on a conjecture only. Mommson reads: [*Iunon*]e *Loucinai* [*die nef*]astud *facitud*; Ritschl: [*Iunon*]e *Loucinai* [*sacrom c*]astud *facitud*, in the sense of *castu facto*; while Bergk translates the last words by *caste facito*.

'The value of this inscription of the stone of Luceria would be immense, if the copy could be entirely trusted. It was published by J. B. d'Amelis in the "Storia della città di Lucera," 1861. Mommsen, who went to Luceria in order to inspect the valuable stone, writes: "Hujus lapidis videndi causa a. 1873 Luceriam profectus vidi eum, sed conjectum in fundamenta domus. . scripta parte latente et sepulta." Nothing remains but to wait till the stone can be disinterred, nor would it be prudent till then to build on it any theories as to the history of the Latin language. Even now, I must confess that my fears as to a real locative in *id* have been considerably diminished by your conjectural emendation, viz.: IN HOCE LOVCARIO, instead of LOVCARID. O and D have frequently been mistaken one for the other (Ritschl, *l. c.* pp. 23, 27, 32, 61), and a substantive *lucarium* might well be accounted for. *Lucar* signifies money levied for sacred groves. Here it would have been used for *lucus*, supposing *lucarid* to be the right reading. If we accept this otherwise unsupported meaning, *lucarium* might well claim the same meaning, considering that *pulvinarium* also does not differ much from *pulvinar*. Or, again, *lucarium* might signify the place where the taxes levied from sacred groves were kept, and would then have been formed in analogy with *aer-arium*, *vas-arium*. Lastly, as the inscription is found at *Luceria*, the word may really have been somehow connected with the name of the place. At all events, the one problematical form *loucarid*, preceded by *hoco*, is not sufficient to legitimise old ablatives in *d* with the meaning of a locative either in Plautus, or for a period in the history of the Latin language when it was still possible to form imperatives in *tod*, and even in *tád*.

'For the present, therefore, the fact remains that ablatives in *d* cannot express Where and When in genuine documents of ancient Latin, and that emendations of the text of Plautus carried out by means of such forms must be

surrendered and replaced by others. For instance, in Bacch. 941, instead of *hoc in equod insunt milites*, read *hoc insunt in equo milites*; in Curc. 278, instead of *in plateadultima*, read *platea in ultima*, as Ritschl himself suggests. It is curious that a scholar such as he was, after admitting that he had no understanding for a case like the ablative, combining the opposite meanings of Whence and Whither, should have become reconciled with ablatives in *d*, expressing both motion from and rest in a place. It is necessary, therefore, to consider one more argument produced by him in support of his view.

‘Ritschl remarks (p. 79) that if, by a confusion in the grammatical consciousness of a people, an ablative could assume the power of an accusative, the use of old ablatives in *d* to convey the meaning of Where, need not disturb us. This argument after all would never amount to more than an explanation of the *ignotum per ignotius*, for the fact that an ablative may be used instead of an accusative throws no light whatever on how the same ablative may be used instead of a locative. Besides, I doubt very much whether the ablatives to which he refers as being accusatives also, *med*, *ted* and *sed* did ever become accusatives; and I think that we have to look for another explanation.

‘Let us consider, first, that these pronominal ablatives have something very peculiar both in Sanskrit and in Latin. In Sanskrit they and they alone have short *a* mad, tvad, and not, as one should expect, long *ā*; in Latin they and they alone have *ēd* instead of *ōd*, supposing that they are ablatives of bases in *o*.¹

‘Secondly, mad and tvad in Sanskrit are not ablatives only, but also—and, it would seem, originally—bases. We say mad-rogas, my illness, tvad-rogos, thy illness, just as we say hrid-rogas, heart illness.

¹ In the S. C. de Bacchan. *facilumed* instead of *facilumod* looks artificial; cf. Bergk, *l.c.* p. 17.

‘Thirdly, by the side of *mad* and *tvad* we find secondary ablatives, *mat-tas*, *tvat-tas*, formed like *penitus*, from within, *radicitus*, from the root, radically.

‘We have therefore to deal, not with a transition of a real ablative into an accusative, as if *Romād* were used in the sense of *Romam*, but it is far more likely, to say no more, that the old forms *med*, *ted*, *sed*, if used as accusatives, represent the original bases, *mad* and *tvad*, and that these have afterwards lost their final *d* and become *me*, *te*, and *se*, forms which otherwise it would really be difficult to explain, because phonetically they neither agree with Greek μέ, τέ, έ, nor with Sk. mām, tvām. In Sanskrit these bases are used as ablatives, just as *asmad* and *yushmad* are in the plural. This is, no doubt, peculiar, but not altogether unintelligible with a pronoun which had developed special forms for all other cases. In Latin *med*, *ted*, and *sed* are analogous forms which, after dropping final *d*, become *me*, *te*, *se*, used as accusatives. By some such explanation the facts in Latin can be accounted for without having recourse to the view that a specialised and fully-developed ablative should ever have assumed in Latin the functions of the accusative. It seems to me historically impossible that, after the ablatives *med*, *ted*, and *sed* had lost their final *d*, a confusion of thought should have taken place by which even the unabbreviated forms, *med*, *ted*, *sed*, could be used as accusatives. I do not deny that the explanation which I have proposed, and which, as Professor Curtius informs me, he too has advocated, is not without some difficulties. That the base *mad* should be used as an ablative is strange; still it is less strange with pronouns than with nouns, considering that in Sanskrit the grammatically little specialised forms, *nas* (nos), and *vas* (vos), can be made to do duty as accusatives, datives, and even genitives. What remains to be accounted for is that in Latin the bases should be used as accusatives likewise. This, as we know, happens with the neuter only, never with

the masculine; and perhaps it may be argued that the personal pronouns, too, are neuter, or, at all events, sexless.

‘But enough. My chief object was to show how a free exchange of ideas between classical and comparative philologists may be of real advantage to both parties, and thus, in the end, to science itself. I cannot understand the stiff and absurd tone which these two schools adopt towards each other. Are they not perfect equals? Is it something so much greater to collect and collate MSS., to interpret texts, and to correct corrupt passages, than to collect and collate grammatical forms from cognate languages, such as Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Gothic, Lithuanian, and Irish, to interpret their true etymological purport, and to correct the corrupt views handed down to us on the development of language in India, Greece, and Italy? The one study is neither easier nor harder than the other, and in the end, to tell the truth, neither is beyond the reach of honest work. It is in human nature that few can be equally strong in both. If, therefore, a comparative philologist does not always know the latest emendation in Plautus, or has rendered himself guilty of a false quantity in Plautine metres—which, I must say, do not seem governed by strictly Median laws—he should not for that reason be put down as a mere *tiro*. It is not easy for a comparative philologist to suppress a smile, if, for instance, we see that the final *d* of the ablative, which exists in Sanskrit as well as in Latin, and cannot well have a different mother in Latin and in Sanskrit, is derived by classical scholars from the purely Latin preposition *de*, and if it is argued that *de* and *di* correspond to Greek $\theta\epsilon(\nu)$ and $\theta\iota$, and are therefore fit to express both the Whence and the Where. Such things will in time become impossible, whenever the relations between classical and comparative philologists have assumed a natural and more friendly aspect. I am quite aware that in speaking of the grammar and metres of Plautus, I have ventured on ground where even the best

Latin scholars have not always proved invulnerable, and I am quite prepared to be told that I have overlooked this and that which "every scholar ought to know." Very well; I care for things, not for words. What I care for is to know whether the same objections which I feel against ablatives in *d* with the meaning of locatives, are shared by classical scholars. If this be the case, Comparative Philology would for once have rendered some small service to classical studies; and a number of emendations in Plautus would have to be reconsidered. If, on the contrary, my objections can be answered, I am quite willing to surrender the position which I have taken up, as no longer tenable. For the present I feel convinced that it is a tenable position, and nothing could have confirmed me more in that opinion than your invitation to allow this letter of mine to be published in your own journal, the "*Jahrbücher für classische Philologie.*" "

ON SPELLING.

THE remarks which I venture to offer in these pages on the corrupt state of the present spelling of English, and on the advantages and disadvantages connected with a reform of English orthography, were written in fulfilment of a promise of very long standing. Ever since the publication of the Second Volume of my "Lectures on the Science of Language" in 1863, where I had expressed my sincere admiration for the courage and perseverance with which Mr. Isaac Pitman and some of his friends, (particularly Mr. A. J. Ellis, for six years his most active associate,) had fought the battle of a reform in English spelling, Mr. Pitman had been requesting me to state more explicitly than I had done in my "Lectures" my general approval of his life-long endeavours. He wished more particularly that I should explain why I, though by profession an etymologist, was not frightened by the spectre of phonetic spelling, while such high authorities as Archbishop Trench and Dean Alford had declared that phonetic spelling would necessarily destroy the historical and etymological character of the English language.

If I ask myself why I put off the fulfilment of my promise from year to year, the principal reason I find

is, that really I had nothing more to say than what, though in few words, I had said before. Everything that can be said on this subject has been said and well said, not only by Mr. Pitman, but by a host of writers and lecturers, among whom I might mention Mr. Alexander J. Ellis, Dr. Latham, Professors Haldeman, Whitney, and Hadley, Mr. Withers, Mr. E. Jones, Dr. J. H. Gladstone, and many others. The whole matter is no longer a matter for argument; and the older I grow, the more I feel convinced that nothing vexes people so much, and hardens them in their unbelief and in their dogged resistance to reforms, as undeniable facts and unanswerable arguments. Reforms are carried by Time, and what generally prevails in the end, are not logical deductions, but some haphazard and frequently irrational motives. I do not say, therefore, with Dean Swift, that "there is a degree of corruption wherein some nations, as bad as the world is, will proceed to an amendment; till which time particular men should be quiet." On the contrary, I feel convinced that practical reformers, like Mr. Pitman, should never slumber nor sleep. They should keep their grievances before the public in season and out of season. They should have their lamps burning, to be ready whenever the right time comes. They should repeat the same thing over and over again, undismayed by indifference, ridicule, contempt, and all the other weapons which the lazy world knows so well how to employ against those who venture to disturb its peace.

I myself, however, am not a practical reformer; least of all in a matter which concerns Englishmen only—namely, the spelling of the English language. I should much rather, therefore, have left the fight to others, content

with being merely a looker-on. But when I was on the point of leaving England my conscience smote me. Though I had not actually given a pledge, I remembered how, again and again, I had said to Mr. Pitman that I would much rather keep than make a promise; and though overwhelmed with other work at the time, I felt that before my departure I ought, if possible, to satisfy Mr. Pitman's demands. The article was written; and though my own plans have since been changed, and I remain at Oxford, it may as well be published in discharge of a debt which has been for some time heavy on my conscience.

What I wish most strongly to impress on my readers is that I do not write as an advocate. I am not an agitator for phonetic reform in England. My interest in the matter is, and always has been, purely theoretical and scientific. Spelling and the reform of spelling are problems which concern every student of the science of language. It does not matter whether the language be English, German, or Dutch. In every written language the problem of reforming its antiquated spelling must sooner or later arise; and we must form some clear notion whether anything can be done to remove or alleviate a complaint inherent in the very life of language. If my friends tell me that the idea of a reform of spelling is entirely Quixotic, that it is a mere waste of time to try to influence a whole nation to surrender its historical orthography and to write phonetically, I bow to their superior wisdom as men of the world. But as I am not a man of the world, but rather an observer of the world, my interest in the subject, my convictions as to what is right and wrong, remain just the same. It is the duty of scholars and

philosophers not to shrink from holding and expressing what men of the world call Quixotic opinions ; for, if I read the history of the world rightly, the victory of reason over unreason, and the whole progress of our race, have generally been achieved by such fools as ourselves “rushing in where angels fear to tread,” till after a time the track becomes beaten, and even angels are no longer afraid. I hold, and have confessed, much more Quixotic theories on language than this belief,—that what has been done before by Spaniards and Dutchmen—what is at this very moment being done by Germans, namely, to reform their corrupt spelling—may be achieved even by Englishmen and Americans.

I have expressed my belief that the time will come when not only the various alphabets and systems of spelling, but many of the languages themselves which are now spoken in Europe, to say nothing of the rest of the world, will have to be improved away from the face of the earth and abolished. Knowing that nothing rouses the ire of a Welshman or a Gael so much as to assert the expediency, nay, necessity, of suppressing the teaching of their languages at school, it seems madness to hint that it would be a blessing to every child born in Holland, in Portugal, or in Denmark—nay, in Sweden and even in Russia—if, instead of learning a language which is for life a barrier between them and the rest of mankind, they were at once to learn one of the great historical languages which confer intellectual and social fellowship with the whole world. If, as a first step in the right direction, four languages only, namely, English, French, German, Italian, (or possibly Spanish,) were taught at school, the saving of time—and what is more precious than time?—would be infinitely greater than

what has been effected by railways and telegraphs. But I know that no name in any of the doomed languages would be too strong to stigmatise such folly. We should be told that a Japanese only could conceive such an idea; that for a people deliberately to give up its language was a thing never heard of before; that a nation would cease to be a nation if it changed its language; that it would, in fact, commit "the happy despatch," *à la Japonaise*. All this may be true, but I hold that language is meant to be an instrument of communication, and that in the struggle for life, the most efficient instrument of communication must certainly carry the day, as long as natural selection, or, as we formerly called it, reason, rules the world.

The following figures may be of use for forming an opinion as to the fates of the great languages of Europe :¹—

Portuguese is spoken in					
Portugal, by	3,980,000				
Brazil, by ..	10,000,000	—		13,980,000	
Italian, by ..	..	..	..	..	27,524,238
French, in France, Belgium, Swit-					
zerland, etc., by ..	..	..	..	..	40,188,000
Spanish, in Spain by ..	16,301,000				
in South America by	27,408,082	—		43,709,082	
Russian, by ..	..	..	..	..	51,370,000
German, by ..	..	..	..	..	55,789,000
English, in					
Europe, by ..	31,000,000				
America, by ..	45,000,000				
Australia, etc., by	2,000,000				
the Colonies, by ..	1,050,000	—		79,050,000	

According to De Candolle, the population doubles in

England in ..	..	56 years	Spain in ..	112 years
America, among the Ger-			South America in	27½ "
man races, in ..	25	"	Germany in ..	100 "
Italy in ..	135	"	France in ..	140 "
Russia in ..	100	"		

¹ See W. E. A. Axon's "The Future of the English Language," the *Almanach de Gotha*, and De Candolle's *Histoire des Sciences*, 1873.

Therefore, in 200 years (barring accidents)

Italian will be spoken by		53,370,000
French " "		72,571,000
German " "		157,480,000
Spanish, in Europe, by		36,938,338
South America, by	468,347,904	— 505,286,242
English will be spoken in		
Europe by		178,846,153
United States & British		
dependencies, by	1,658,440,000	— 1,837,286,153

But I shall say no more on this, for as it is, I know I shall never hear the end of it, and shall go down to posterity, if for nothing else, at least for this the most suicidal folly in a student of languages; a folly comparable only to that of Leibniz, who actually conceived the possibility of one universal language.

To return, however, to the problem to the solution of which Mr. Pitman has devoted the whole of his active life, let me say again that my interest in it is purely philological; or, if you like, historical. The problem which has to be solved in England and the United States of America is not a new one, nor an isolated one. It occurs again and again in the history of language; in fact, it must occur. When languages are reduced to writing, they are at first written phonetically, though always in a very rough and ready manner. One dialect, that of the dominant, the literary, or priestly class, is generally selected; and the spelling, once adopted, becomes in a very short time traditional and authoritative. What took place thousands of years ago, we can see taking place, if we like, at the present moment. A missionary from the island of Mangaia, the Rev. W. Gill, first introduced the art of writing among his converts. He learned their language, at least one dialect of it, he translated part of the Bible into it, and adopted, of necessity, a phonetic spelling.

That dialect is gradually becoming the recognised literary language of the whole island, and his spelling is taught at school. Other dialects, however, continue to be spoken, and they may in time influence the literary dialect. For the present, however, the missionary dialect, as it is called by the natives themselves, and the missionary spelling, rule supreme, and it will be some time before a spelling reform is wanted out there.

Among the more ancient nations of Europe, not only does the pronunciation of a language maintain its inherent dialectic variety, and fluctuate through the prevalence of provincial speakers, but the whole body of a language changes, while yet the spelling, once adopted in public documents, and taught to children, remains for a long time the same. In early times when literature was in its infancy, when copies of books could easily be counted, and when the *norma scribendi* was in the hands of a few persons, the difficulty of adapting the writing to the ever-varying pronunciation of a language was comparatively small. We see it when we compare the Latin of early Roman inscriptions with the Latin of Cicero. We know from Cicero himself that when he settled among the patricians of Rome, he had on some small points to change both his pronunciation and his spelling of Latin. The reform of spelling was a favourite subject with Roman scholars, and even emperors were not too proud to dabble in inventing new letters and diacritical signs. The difficulty, however, never assumed serious proportions. The small minority of people who were able to read and write, pleased themselves as best they could; and, by timely concessions, prevented a complete estrangement between the written and the spoken language.

Then came the time when Latin ceased to be Latin, and the vulgar dialects, such as Italian, French, and Spanish, took its place. At that time the spelling was again phonetic, though here and there tinged by reminiscences of Latin spelling. There was much variety, but considering how limited the literary intercourse must have been between different parts of France, Spain, or Italy, it is surprising that on the whole there should have been so much uniformity in the spelling of these modern dialects. A certain local and individual freedom of spelling, however, was retained; and we can easily detect in mediæval MSS. the spelling of literate and illiterate writers, the hand of the learned cleric, the professional clerk, and the layman.

[A style of spelling will now be introduced which corrects the errors of the common spelling, and is regulated by the following Three Rules :—

RULE 1.—Reject “c, q, x” as redundant, use the other 18 consonants for the sounds usually associated with them, and supply the deficiency of 12 other letters by the usual digraphs, distinguishing the non-vocal “th” in *thin*, thus—’th.

RULE 2.—Let “a, e, o, u,” when *ending a syllable*, (except at the end of a word, as *sofa*,) represent a *long* vowel; as in “fa-vor, fe-ver, ho-li, tru-li.”

RULE 3.—Let the five vowels of the present alphabet, “a, e, i, o, u,” in *close* syllables, (and *a* at the end of a word,) represent the short sounds in “pat, pet, pit, pot, put;” and use “ü” for the “u” in *but*.”

Concede to custom—“I” instead of “ei” for the first personal pronoun; “n” for “ng” when followed by “k” or “g” in monosyllables, and sometimes in other words; as, “bauk (bangk), anger (ang-ger);” and “father” for “faather.”]

The grait event which formz a deseisiv epok in the histori ov speling, iz the introdükshon ov printing. With printed buks, and partikiularli with printed Beibelz, skaterd over the küntri, the speling ov würdz bekaim rijid, and yuniversali beinding. Süm langwejez, süch az Italian, wer moar fortiunet than ütherz in having a moar rashonal sistem ov speling tu start with. Süm, agen, leik German, wer abel tu maik teimli kon-seshonz, wheil ütherz, süch az Spanish, Dutch, and French, had Akademiz tu help them at kritikal periodz ov thair histori. The moast ünfortiunet in aul theez respekts woz English. It started with a Latin alfabet,

the pronünsiashon ov which woz ünseteld, and which had tu be apleid tu a Teutonic langwej. After this ferst fonetik kompromeiz it had tu pas 'thru a konfiúzd sistem ov speleng, haaf Saxon, haaf Norman; haaf fonetik, haaf tradishonal. The histori ov the speleng, and even ov the pronünsiashon, ov English, in its pasej from Anglo-Saxon tu midel and modern English, haz laitli been stüdid with grait sükses bei Mr Ellis and Mr Sweet. I müst refer tu thair buks "On Early English Pronunciation," and "On the History of English Sounds," which kontain a wel'th ov ilüstrashon, aulmoast bewildering. And even after English reechez the period ov printing, the konfiuzhon iz bei no meenz terminated; on the kontrari, for a teim it iz graiter than ever. How this kaim tu pas haz been wel ilüstraited bei Mr Marsh in hiz ekselent "Lectures on the English Language," p. 687. *seq*(¹). Whot we now kaul the establisht sistem ov English or'thografi may, in the main, be traist bak tu Johnson's Dictionary, and tu the stil moar kaprishüs sway ekserseizd bei larj printing-ofisez and püblisherz. It iz tru that the evil ov printing karid tu a serten ekstent its oan remedi. If the speleng bekaim ünchainjabel, the langwej itself, too, woz, bei meenz ov a printed literatiur, chekt konsiderabli in its natural groa'th and its deialektik vareieti. Nevertheles English haz chainjd sins the invenshon ov printing; English iz chainjing, tho bei imperseptibel degreez, even now; and if we kompair English az spoaken with English az

¹ The pronoun *it* woz speld in ait diferent wayz bei Tyndale, thüs, *hyt*, *hytt*, *hit*, *hitt*, *it*, *itt*, *yt*, *ytt*. Anöther au'thor speld *tongue* in the folowing wayz: *tung*, *tong*, *tunge*, *tonge*, *tounge*. The wörd *head* woz variüsli speld *hed*, *heede*, *hede*, *hefode*. The spelengz *obay*, *survay*, *pray*, *vail*, *vain*, ar often yund for *obey*, *survey*, *prey*, *veil*, *vein*.

riten, thay seem aulmoast leuk tú diferent langwejez; az diferent az Latin iz from Italian.

This, no dout, iz a nashonal misfortiun, büt it iz inevitabel. Litel az we perseev it, langwejez, and aulwayz müst be, in a stait ov fermentashon; and whether within hündredz or within 'thouzandz ov yeerz, aul living langwejez müst be prepaired tu enkounter the difikülti which in England stairz üs in the fais at prezent. "Whot shal we du?" ask our frendz. "Ther iz our hoal nashonal literatiur," thay say; "our leibrariz aktiuali бүrsting with buks and niuzpaperz. Ar aul theez tu be 'throan away? Ar aul valiubel buks tu be reprinted? Ar we ourselvz tu ünlern whot we hav lernd with so müch trübel, and whot we hav taut tu our children with graiter trübel stil? Ar we tu sakrifeiz aul that iz historikal in our langwejez, and sink doun tu the lo level ov the *Fonetik Nuz*?" I kud go on mültipleiing theez kwestionz til even thoaz men ov the wүrld hu now hav oanli a shrүg ov the shoalder for the reformerz ov speling shud say, "We had no eidea how strong our pozishon reali iz."

Büt with aul thát, the problem remainz ünsolvd. Whot ar pepel tu du when langwejez and pronүnsiashon chainj, wheil thair speling iz deklaird tu be ünchainjabel? It iz, I beleev, hardli neseseri that I shud proov how korүpt, efeit, and үterli irrashonal the prezent sistem ov speling iz, for nowүн seemz inkleind tu denei aul thát. I shal oanli kwoat, thairfor, the жүjment ov wүн man, the lait Bishop Thirlwall, a man hu never yuzd ekzajeraited langwejez. "I luk," he sez, "үpon the establisht sistem, if an aksidental күstom may be so kauld, az a mas ov anomaliz, the groa'th ov ignorans and chans, ekwali repүgnant tu gud taist and tu komon

sens. Büt I am awair that the püblik kling tu theez anomaliz with a tenasiti propoارشond tu thair absürditi, and ar jelüs ov aul enkroachment on ground konse-kraited tu the free play ov bleind kaprees.”

It may be yusful, however, tu kwoat the testimonialz ov a fiu praktikal men in order tu sho that this sistem ov speleng haz reali beküm wün ov the graitest nashonal misfortiunz, swolo'ing üp milionz ov münü everi yeer and bleiting aul atempts at nashonal ediukashon. Mr Edward Jones, a skoolmaster ov grait eksperiens, having then the siuperintendens ov the Hibernian Schools, Liverpool, roat in the yeer 1868:

“The Güvernment haz for the last twenti yeerz taiken ediukashon ünder its kair. Thay diveided the sübjekts ov instrükshon intu siks graidz. The heiest point that woz atempts in the Güvernment Skoolz woz, that a piupil shud be abel tu reed with tolerabel eez and ekspresshon a pasej from a niuzpaper, and tu spel the saim with a tolerabel amount ov akiurasi.”

Let üs luk at the rezülts az thay apeer in the Repoart ov the Komítee ov Kounsil on Ediukashon for 1870-71:

Skoolz or Departments ünder separet hed teecheerz in			
England and Wales inspektet diuring the yeer			
31st August, 1870 ...	...	...	15,287
Sertifikaitet, asistant, and piupil teecheerz emplot			
in theez skoolz ...	...	...	28,033
Skolarz in daili averej atendants 'thruout the yeer			1,168,981
Skolarz present on the day ov inspekshon ...			1,473,883
Skolarz prezentet for ekzaminashon: —			
Under ten yeerz ov aij ...	473,444		
Over ten yeerz ov aij ...	292,144	——	765,588
Skolarz prezentet for Standard VI: —			
Under ten yeerz ov aij ...	227		
Over ten yeerz ov aij ...	32,953	——	33,180
Skolarz hu past in Standard VI.:—			
1. Reeding a short paragraf from a niuzpaper			30,985
2. Reiting the saim from diktashon ...			27,989
3. Ari'thmetik ...			22,839

Thairfor, les than wūn skolar for eech teecher, and les than tú skolarz for eech skool inspekted, reecht Standard VI.

In 1873 the stait ov 'thingz, akording tu the ofishal retūrnz ov the Ediukashon Department, woz mūch the saim. Ferst ov aul, ther aut tu hav been at skool 4,600,000 children between the aijeز ov 'three and 'thirteen. The nūmber ov children on the rejister ov inspekted skoolz woz 2,218,598. Out ov thát nūmber, about 200,000 leev skool aniuali, thair ediukashon being sūpoazd tu be finisht. Out ov theez 200,000, neinti per sent. leev without reeching the 6'th Standard, aiti per sent. without reeching the 5'th, and siksti per sent. without reeching the 4'th Standard.

The Repoart for 1874-75 shoaz an inkrees ov children on the buks, bŭt the propoarshon ov children pasing in the variūs standardz iz sŭbstanshali the saim. (See "Popular Education," bei E. Jones, B.A., an eks-skoolmaster, 1875.) It iz kalkiulaited that for sŭch rezŭlts az theez the kŭntri, whether bei taksashon or bei volŭnteri kontribiushonz, payz aniuali neerli £3,500,000.

Akording tu the saim au'thoriti, Mr E. Jones, it now taiks from siks tu seven yeez tu lern the arts ov reeding and speleng with a fair degree ov intelijens—thát iz, about 2,000 ourz; and tu meni meindz the difikŭltiz ov or'thografi ar insŭrmountabel. The bŭlk ov the children pas 'thru the Gŭvernment skoolz without having akweird the abiliti tu reed with eez and intelijens.

"An averej cheild," sez anŭther skoolmaster, "begining skool at seven, aut tu be abel tu reed the New Testament fluientli at eleven or twelv yeez ov aij, and

at 'thirteen or foarten aut tu be abel tu reed a gud leeding artikel with eez and ekspreshon." Thát iz, with seven ourz a week for forti weeks for feiv yearz, a cheild rekweirz 1,400 ourz' wùrk tu be abel tu reed the New Testament.

After a kairful ekzaminashon ov yǔng men and wimen from 'thirteen tu twenti yearz ov aij in the faktoriz ov Birmingham, it woz proovd that oanli $4\frac{1}{2}$ per sent. wer abel tu reed a simpel sentens from an ordineri skool-buk with intelijens and akiurasi.

This apleiz tu the loer klasez. Bût with regard tu the heier klasez the kais seemz aulmoast wùrs; for Dr Morell, in hiz "Manual of Spelling," aserts that out ov 1,972 failiurz in the Sivil Servis Ekzaminashonz, 1,866 kandidaits wer plùkt for speling.

So mûch for the piupilz. Amǔng the teecheرز themselvz it woz found in America that out ov wǔn hǔndred komon wùrdz, the best speler amǔng the aiti or neinti teecheرز ekzamind faild in wǔn, sǔm preiz-taikerز faild in foar or feiv, and sǔm ùtherز mist over forti. The Depiuti Stait Siuperintendent deklaird that on an averej the teecheرز ov the Stait wud fail in speling tu the ekstent ov 25 per sent.

Whot, however, iz even moar seriùs than aul this iz, not the grait waist ov teim in lerning tu reed, and the aulmoast kompleet failiur in nashonal ediukashon, bût the aktiual mischef dǔn bei sǔbjekting yǔng meindz tu the illojikal and tediùs drǔjeri ov lerning tu reed English az speld at prezent. Everi'thing thay hav tu lern in reeding (or pronǔnsiashon) and speling iz irrashonal; wǔn rool kontradikts the ùther, and eech staitment haz tu be aksepted simpli on au'thoriti, and with a kompleet disregard ov aul thoaz rashonal instinkts which lei dor-

mant in the cheild, and aut tu be awaikend bei everi keind ov hel'thi ekserseiz.

I nó ther ar personz hu kan defend eni'thing, and hu hoald that it iz diu tu this veri disiplin that the English karakter iz whot it iz: that it retainz respekt for au'thoriti; that it düz not rekweir a rezon for everi'thing; and that it düz not admit that whot iz inkonseevabel iz thairfor imposibel. Even English or'thodoksi haz been traist bak tu thát hiden soars, bekauz a cheild aküstomd tu beleev that t-h-o-u-g-h iz *tho*, and that t-h-r-o-u-g-h iz *throo*, wud afterwerdz beleev eni'thing. It may be so; stil I dout whether even sűch objekts wud jűstifei sűch meenz. Lord Lytton sez, "A moar leing, round-about, pűzel-heded deliuzhon than thát bei which we konfiűz the kleeer instinkts ov tru'th in our akűrsed sistem ov speling woz never konkokted bei the father ov fols'hud. [Instans, *see-ay-tee*, cat.] How kan a sistem ov ediukashon flűrish that beginz bei so monstrűs a fols'hud, which the sens ov heering sűfeizez tu kontradikt?"

Tho it may seem a wűrk ov siupererogashon tu bring forwerd stil moar fakts in sűpoart ov the jeneral kondemnashon past on English speling, a fiu ekstrakts from a pamflet bei Mr Meiklejohn, lait Asistant-Komishoner ov the Endowd Skoolz Komishon for Scotland, may heer feind a plais.

"Ther ar 'thirteen diferent wayz ov reprezenting the sound ov long o:—*Note, boat, toe, yeoman, soul, row, sew, hautboy, beau, owe, floor, oh! O!*"

And agen (p. 16),—

Double-you-aitch-eye-see-aitch	is	<i>which</i>
Tea-are-you-tea-aitch	„	<i>truth</i>
Bee-o-you-gee-aitch	„	<i>bough</i>

See-are-eh-bee ...	...	...	is	<i>crab</i>
Bee-ee-eh-see-aitch	...	...	„	<i>beach</i>
Oh-you-gee-aitch-tee	...	...	„	<i>ought</i>
Oh-enn-see-ee ...	...	...	„	<i>once</i>

“Or, tu süm ūp the hoal indeitment agenst the kŭlpriit: 1. Out ov the twenti-siks leterz, oanli ait ar tru, fikst, and permanent kwolitiz—thát iz, ar tru boa'th tu eí and eer. 2. Ther ar 'therti-ait distinkt soundz in our spoaken langwej; [34 simpel soundz; 2 konsonant dif'thongz, *ch, j*; and 2 vouel dif'thongz, *i, ū*;] and ther ar about 400 distinkt simbolz (simpel and kompond) tu reprezent theez 'therti-ait soundz. In ūther wŭrdz, ther ar 400 servants tu du the wŭrk ov 'therti-ait. 3. Ov the twenti-siks leterz, fifteen hav akweird a habit ov heiding themselvz. Thay ar riten and printed; bŭt the eer haz no akount ov them; sŭch ar *w* in *wrong*, and *gh* in *right*. 4. The vouel soundz ar printed in diferent wayz; a long *o* for ekzampel haz 'thirteen printed simbolz tu reprezent it. 5. Foarten vouel soundz hav 190 printed simbolz atácht tu thair servis. 6. The singel vouel *e* haz feiv diferent fŭnkshonz; it aut oanli tu hav wŭn. 7. Ther ar at leest 1,300 wŭrdz in which the simbol and the sound ar at varians—in which the wŭrd iz not sounded az it iz printed. 8. Ov theez 1,300, 800 ar monosilabelz—the komonest wŭrdz, and sŭpoazd tu be eezier for children. 9. The hoal langwej ov kŭntri children leiz within theez wŭrdz; and meni agrikŭltiural laborerz go from the kradel tu the graiv with a stok ov no moar than 500 wŭrdz.”

The kwestion, then, that wil hav tu be anserd sooner or laiter iz this:—Kan this ūnsistematik sistem ov speleng English be aloud tu go on for ever? Iz everi

English cheild, az kompaird with ūther children, tu be mŭlkted in tú or 'three yeerz ov hiz leif in order tu lern it? Ar the loer klasez tu go 'thru skool without lerning tu reed and reit thair oan langwej intelijentli? And iz the kŭntri tu pay milionz everi yeer for this ūter failiur ov nashonal ediukashon? I du not beleev that sŭch a stait ov 'thingz wil be aloud tu kontiniu for ever, partikiularli az a remedi iz at hand—a remedi that haz now [1894] been tested for fifti yeerz, and that haz anserd ekstreemli wel. I meen Mr Pitman'z sistem ov fonetik reiting, az apleid tu English. I shal not enter heer intu eni miniut diskŭshon ov fonetiks, or re-open the kontroversi which haz arizen between the advokaits ov diferent sistemz ov fonetik reiting. Ov koars, ther ar diferent degreez ov ekselens in diferent sistemz ov fonetik speling; bŭt even the wŭrst ov theez sistemz iz infinitli siuperior tu the tradishonal speling.

I giv Mr Pitman'z alfabet, which komprehendz the 'therti-siks braud tipikal soundz ov the English langwej, and aseinz tu eech a definit sein. With theez 'therti-siks seinz, English kan be riten rashonali and red eezili; and, whot iz moast important, it haz been proovd bei an eksperiens ov meni yeerz, bei niumerŭs pŭblikashonz, and bei praktikal eksperiments in teeching boa'th children and adŭlts, that sŭch a sistem az Mr Pitman'z iz perfektli praktikal.

THE PHONETIC ALPHABET.

The phonetic letters in the first column are pronounced like the italic letters in the words that follow. The last column contains the names of the letters.

CONSONANTS.

Exploidents.

P	p....rope....pee
B	b....robe...bee
T	t....fate.....tee
D	d....fade.....dee
Ɔ	ç....etch...chay
J	j....edge.....jay
K	k...leek....kay
G	g...league..gay

Continuants.

F	f....safe.....ef
V	v....save.....vee
H	h....breath...ith
Ƨ	dh...breathe..thee
S	s....hiss.....ess
Z	z....his.....zee
Σ	ʃ....vicious...ish
Ʒ	ʒ....vision..zhee

Nasals.

M	m...seem....em
N	n...seen.....en
Ŵ	ŋ...sing.....ing

Liquids.

L	l....fall.....el
R	r....rare.....ar

Coalescents.

W	w....wet.... way
Y	y....yet.....yay

Aspirate.

H	h...hay....aitch
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VOWELS.

Lingual.

A	a.....am, far..at
ʌ	ʌ.....alms... ah
E	e.....ell,fern..et
ɛ	ɛ.....ale,air..eh
I	i.....ill.....it
ɛ	ɛ.....eel,fear..ee

Labial.

O	o.....on, or...ot
Ō	Ō.....all.....aw
Ɔ	ɔ.....up, cur..ut
Ō	Ō.....ope,ore.. oh
U	u.....full....ööt
Ū	Ū...food, poor..ōō

DIPHTHONGS: ei, ou, iu, ai, oi.
as heard in by, now, new, ay (yes), boy.

[In the following pages the spelling will be strictly phonetic, with thirteen new letters, as in the preceding alphabet.]

Nou ei ask eni intelijent rijder hu dsz not fɪŋk ðat everifɪŋ niu and strɛnj iz, *ipso facto*, ridikiulss and absɜrd, wheder after a flu dsz' praktis, hɪ or ʃi wud not rɪd and reit Ingliʃ, akordiŋ tu Mr Pitman's sistem, wið perfekt jz? Ov kɔrs it tɛks mɔr ðan feiv minits tu master it, and mɔr ðan feiv minits tu form an opinion ov its merits. Bɜt admitiŋ jven ðat pipel ov a serten ɛj ʃud feind ðis niu alfabet trɛbelsəm, wɪ mʌst not forget ðat nɔ reform kan bi karid out wiðout a jenereʃon or tʃu ov marterz; and whot tru reformerz hav tu fɪŋk ov iz not ðemselvz, bɜt ðɔz hu kɔm after ðem—ðɔz, in fakt, hu ar nou grɔiŋ sp tu inherit hɪr-after, wheder ðɛ laik it or not, ɔl ðe gud and ɔl ðe jvil whiɟ wɪ ɟuz tu liv tu ðem.

It meit bi sed, houeever, ðat Mr Pitman's sistem, biŋj enteiri fɔnetik, iz tu radikal a reform, and ðat meni and ðe wɜrst irregiularitiz in Ingliʃ speliŋ kud bi remuɔvd wiðout ɟɔiŋ kweit sɔ far. ðe prinsipel ðat hɜf a lɔf iz beter ðan nɔ bred iz not wiðout sɜm truʃ, and in meni kɛsez wɪ nɔ ðat a polisi ov kompromeiz haz biŋ prodɜktiv ov veri gud rezɜlts. Bɜt, on ðe ɜðer hand, ðis hɜf-harted polisi haz often retarded a riɟal and komplɪt reform ov ekzistiŋ abiusez; and in ðe kes ov a reform ov speliŋ, ei ɔlmɔst dout wheder ðe difɪksɪltiz inhjrent in hɜf meɟurz ar not az gret az ðe difɪksɪltiz ov kariŋ a komplɪt reform. If ðe wɜrld iz not redi for reform, let ɜs wet. It sɪmz far beter, and at ɔl events far mɔr onest, tu wet til it iz redi ðan tu kari ðe relɜk-tant wɜrld wið yu a litel wɛ, and ðen tu feind ðat ɔl ðe impɜlsiv fɔrs iz spent, and ðe greter part ov ðe abiusez establiʃt on fermer ground ðan ever.

Mr Jones,¹ hū represents ðe konsiliatori reformerz ov speliŋ, wud bĳ satisfeid wið a moderet skĳm ov speliŋ reform, in whiĳ, bei obzerviŋ analoĳi and foloĳiŋ presedent in olteriŋ a komparativli smol nūmber ov wōrdz, it wud bĳ posibel tu simplifei ortografi tu a konsiderabel eks-tent wiðout apleiŋ eni niu prinsipel, or introdusiŋ niu leterz, and yet tu rediūs ðe teim and lēbor in tiĳiŋ rĳdiŋ and speliŋ bei at lĳst wōn hōf. It meit at ol events bĳ posibel tu setel ðe speliŋ ov ðōz tų or ðrĳ ðouzand wōrdz whiĳ at prezent ar speld diferentli bei diferent aŋtoritiz. ðis skĳm, advoketed bei Mr Jones, iz sertenli veri klever; and if it had a ĳans ov sōkses, ei meiself ĳud konsider it a gret step in advans. Mei sōnli dout iz wheder, in a kēs leik ðis, a smol mezur ov reform wud bĳ karid mōr ĳzili ðan a komplĳt reform. It iz diferent in Jerman, wher ðe disĳz haz not spred sō far. Hĳr ðe Komĳti apointed bei ĳsvernment tu konsider ðe kwes-tion ov a reform ov speliŋ haz deklērd in fēvor ov sōm sōĳ moderet prinsipelz az Mr Jones advokets for Ingliŋ. In Ingliŋ, houeвер, ðe difikōlti leiz in ĳenĳiŋ eniŋiŋ; and if ðe prinsipel ov eni ĳenĳ iz wōns admited, it wud rĳali bĳ ĳzier, ei belĳv, tu begin *de novo* ðan tu ĳenĳ sōmĳiŋ, and lĳv ðe rest sōnĳenĳd.

Let ōs nou sĳ hou Mr Pitman's or eni similar sistem ov fōnetik reitiŋ haz wōrkt wher it haz bĳn put tu ðe test.

Mr William White reits:—"Ei spĳk from ekspiĳriens. Ei hav tōt pųr ĳildren in Glasgō tu rĳd ðe Sermon on ðe Mount after a kōrs ov ekserseizez ekstendiŋ sōver nō mōr ðan siks ourz."

ðe foloĳiŋ iz an ekstrakt from a leter riten sōm teim

¹ Popiular Ediukeŋon—A Revĳon ov Ingliŋ Speliŋ a Nafonal Nesesiti. Bei E. Jones, B.A. London, 1876.

agør bei ðe læt Mr William Colbourne, manejer ov ðe Dorset Bank at Styrminster, tu a frend ov hiz, a skul-master. Hȳ sez :—

“ Mei litel Sidni, hȳ iz nou a fiu mōnts mōr ðan fōr yȳrz ōld, wil rȳd eni fōnetik buk widout ðe sleitest heziteſon ; ðe hardest nemz or ðe longest wōrdz in ðe Ōld or Niu Testament form nō obstakel tu him. And hou lon dȳ yȳ ðĩnk it tuk mȳ—for ei am hiz tȳger—tu impart tu him dis pouer ? Whei sȳmȳĩg les ðan et ourz ! Yȳ mē belȳv it or not az yȳ leik, bȳt ei am konfident ðat not mōr ðan ðāt amount ov teim woz spent on him, and ðāt woz in snagez ov feiv minits at a teim, wheil tȳ woz getĩg redi. Ei nō yȳ wil bȳ inkleind tu sē, ‘ Ōl ðāt iz veri wel, bȳt whot iz ðe yȳs ov rȳdĩg fōnetik buks ? hȳ iz stil az far of, and mē bȳ farder, from rȳdĩg rōmanik buks.’ Bȳt in ðis yȳ ar mistēken. Tēk anȳder ekzampel. Hiz nekst elder brȳder, a boi ov siks yȳrz, haz had a fōnetik ediukeſon sō far. Whot iz ðe konsekwens ? Whei, rȳdĩg in ðe ferst steȳ woz sō deleitful and ȳzi a ðĩg tu him, ðat hȳ tōt himself tu rȳd rōmanikali, and it wud bȳ a difikȳlt mater tu feind wōn boi in twenti, ov a korespondĩg ēȳ, ðat kud rȳd hȳf sō wel az hȳ kan in eni buk. Agen, mei ōldest boi haz riten mōr fōnetik forthand and loȳhand, perhaps, ðan eni boi ov hiz ēȳ (eleven yȳrz) in ðe kĩngdom ; and nōwōn ei derse haz had les tu dȳ wĩd ðāt absȳrditi ov absȳrditiz, ðe spelĩg-buk ! Hȳ iz nou at a ferst-ret skul in Wiltſȳr, and in ðe hȳf yȳr presȳdĩg Krĩsmas, hȳ karid of ðe preiz for ortografi in a kontest wĩd boiz sȳm ov ðem hiz sȳniorz bei yȳrz ! ”

Bei ðe adopſon ov ðe fōnetik alfabet, ðe difikȳltiz ðat lei in ðe wē ov forenerz lernĩg Inȳliſ, ōlsō wud bȳ dȳn awe wĩd. ðe Rev. Newman Hall reits, “ Ei met wĩd a

Denif jentelman ðe æðer ðe hu heili preizd ðe Ingliſ fœnotipik Niu Testament. It had bijn ov gret yus tu him, and *enebeld him tu rjd* [*buks in ðe komon speliſ*] *widout an instrskter*, remuvin ðe grestest obstakel in akweiriſ Ingliſ, ðe monſtræs anomaliz ov pronœnsiœſon." Ekzampelz leik ðiz gœ a loſ we.

Mr A. J. Ellis, ðan hum nœwœn haz lebord mœr devœtedli for a reform ov speliſ, az a ferst step in a reform ov naſonal ediukeſon, and hu haz himſelf elaborœted ſeveral mœst injiniœs sistemz ov fœnetik reitiſ, givz œs ðe folœiſ az ðe rezœlts ov hiz praktikal ekſpiœriens :—

"Wid ðe fœnetik sistem ov speliſ, ðe Primer iz masterd widin ðri mœnts, at mœst. ðe gildren den proſið tu praktis ðis fœnetik rjdiſ for œm teim, til ðe kan rjd wid fluiensi from ðe jeneral luk ov ðe wœrd, and not from konsideriſ ðe pouerz ov its leterz. ðri mœnts mœr, at mœst, ar rekweird for ðis stej.

"When ðis pouer ov fluient rjdiſ in fœnetik print iz akweird, buks in ðe ordineri print, siuted tu ðer kapasitiz, ar tu bi put intu ðe gildren'z handz, and ðe ar tœld tu rjd ðem. ðg wœrd whiç ðe fel tu ges iz tœld ðem immjdiœtli ; bœt it iz found ðat gildren ar mœstli œbel tu rjd ðe ordineri print widout eni fœrder instrskſon. ðe teim nesœseri for komplitiſ ðis step mœ bi teken, at ðe longest, az tũ mœnts, œ ðat ðe hœl teim ov lœrniſ tu rjd in ðe ordineri print, on ðe Rjdiſ Reform sistem, mœ bi rekond az feiv œurz a wjk for œt mœnts. ðe hœl task haz, in meni keœez, bijn akomplift in les teim, jœven in ðri mœnts. On ðe œðer hand, in wœn skul wher it iz yuzd, eleven mœnts ar okiœpeid, az ðe master feindz it advantœjœs in œðer respektœs tu kjp ðe piupil longer at fœnetik rjdiſ. Bœt œnli wœn œur a ðe iz rekweird." Mr Ellis œœmz œp az folœz :

“Kerful eksperiments in tjiņ gildren ov veriss ejez and rangs, and jven pøperz and kriminal adslts, hav establif—

“1. Ðat piupilz mē bj tot tu rjd buks in fønetik print, sløli bst fiurli, in from ten tu forti ourz, and wil aten konsiderabel fliuensi after a fiu wjks’ praktis.

“2. Ðat when ðe piupilz hav atend fliuensi in rjdiņ from fønetik print, a veri fiu ourz sşfeiz tu giv ðem ðe sem fliuensi in rjdiņ ordineri print.

“3. Ðat ðe høl teim neseseri for impartij a nolej ov bōt fønetik and ordineri rjdiņ ðsz not eksjd et mōnts for gildren ov averej intelijens, betwijn fōr and feiv yjrz ov ej, tot in klas, at skul, not mōr ðan hsf-an-our tu an our iċ ðe; and ðat in ðis teim an abiliti tu rjd iz akweird siupjrior tu dát yuzuali atend in tŷ or frj teimz ðe pjriod on ðe øld plan; wheil ðe pronysisefon ov ðe piupil iz mşċ imprqvd, hiz interest in hiz stōdi iz kept aleiv, and a lojikal trenij ov endiuriņ valiu iz given tu hiz meind bei ðe habitual analisis and sintesis ov spōken soundz.

“4. Ðat ðsz tot tu rjd in ðis maner akweir ðe art ov ordineri speliņ mōr redili ðan ðsz instrċkted on ðe øld metod.”

Tu øl hŷ nō Mr Alexander J. Ellis, ðis evidens wil bj sşfifent az tu ðe praktikal yusfulnes ov ðe Fønetik sistem ov speliņ. Tu ðsz hŷ wij for mōr evidens ei rekomend a pamflet bei Mr G. Withers, “Ðe Ingliš Langwej Speld az Pronōunst,” 1874: and wşn bei Dr J. W. Martin, “Ðe Gordian Nōt Kşst,” 1875, wher ðe wil feind ðe konkşrent testimoni ov praktikal tjiċerz in Ingland, Skotland, Eirland, and Amerika, øl agriņ ðat, bōt az a praktikal and a lojikal trenij, ðe Fønetik sistem haz prŷvd ðe grētest sykkes.

Ðer remenz, ðerfor, ðis wşn objekşon ønli, ðat whot-

ever de praktikal, and whotever de tjoretikal advantejez ov de fonetik sistem me bj, it wud sterli destroi de historikal or etimolojikalkarakter ov de Ingliſ langwey.

Sæpœz it did ; whot den ? De Reformeſon iz sæpœzd tu hav destroid de historikal karakter ov de Ingliſ *Æſſe*, and dat sentimental grijvans iz stil felt bei sœm ſtiudents ov ekljizastikal antikwitiz. Bœt did Ingland, did œl de rjali progresiv neſonz ov Yurœp, alou dis sentimental grijvans tu outwe de praktikal and tjoretikal advantejez ov Protestant Reform ? Langwey iz not med for skolarz and etimolojists : and if de hœl res ov Ingliſ etimolojists wer rjali tu bj swept awœ bei de introdœkſon ov a Speliſ Reform, ei hœp de wud bj de ferst tu rejois in sakrifeizſſ demselvz in sœ gud a kœz.

Bœt iz it rjali de kes dat de historikal kontiniœiti ov de Ingliſ langwey wud bj brœken bei de adopſon ov fœnetik speliſ, and dat de profeſon ov de etimolojist wud bj gon for ever ? Ei sœ, Nœ, mœst emfatikali, tu bœt propozisonz. If de seiens ov langwey haz prœvd eniſſſſ, it haz prœvd dat œl langwejez œenj akordiſſ tu lœ, and wið konsiderabel yœniformiti. If, dœrfor, de reitiſ folœd, *pari passu*, on de œenjez in pronœnsisœſon, whot iz kœld de etimolojikalkonfœssnes ov de spikœrz and de rijderz—ei spik, ov kœrs, ov ediukated pipel œnli—wud not sæfer in de liſt. If wj retœn de fjliſ ov an etimolojikalkonekſon betwœn *gentlemanly* and *gentlemanlike*, wj ſud fjurli retœn it wheder wj reit *gentlemanly* or *jentelmanli*. If wj fjl dat *think* and *thought*, *bring* and *brought*, *buy* and *bought*, *freight* and *fraught*, belœnj tœgedœr, ſud wj fjl it les if wj rœt *thœt*, *brœt*, *bœt*, *frœt* ? If, in spikiſ, dœz hœ nœ Latin retœn de fjliſ dat wœrdz endiſſ in *-ation* korespond tu Latin wœrdz in *-atio*, wud de lœz de fjliſ if de sœ de sem wœrdz speld wið *œſon* ? or jœven “œſœn ?” Du de not rekœg-

neiz Latin *-itia* in *-ice*; or *-ilis* in *-le*, az in *-able* (Latin *abilis*)? If ðe skolar nóz, at wəns, ðat sɛɟ wɜrdz az *barbarous*, *anxious*, *circus*, *genius*, ar ov Latin orijin, wud hj hezitet if ðe last silabel in ɔl ov ðem wer yuni-formli riten “sɛs?” Ne, iz not ðe prezent speliŋ ov *barbarous* and *anxious* enteirli misliðin, bei konfoundin wɜrdz endin in *-osus*, sɛɟ az *famous* (*famosus*) wið wɜrdz endin in *-us*, leik *barbarous*, *anxious*, ets.? Bekɔz ðe Italianz reit *filosofo*, ar ðe les awer ðan ðe Ingliʃ, hu reit *philosopher*, and ðe Freng, hu reit *philosophe*, ðat ðe hav befɔr ðem ðe Latin *philosophus*, ðe Griʃk φιλόσοφος? If wj reit *f* in *fancy*, whei not in *phantom*? if in *frenzy* and *frantic*, whei not in *phrenology*? A langwey whig tolerets *vial* for *phial*, njd not siver at *filosofer*. Everi ediuketed spjker nóz ðat sɛɟ wɜrdz az *honour*, *ardour*, *colour*, *odour*, *labour*, *vigour*, *error*, *emperor*, hav past from Latin tu Freng, and from Freng tu Ingliʃ. Wud hj nó it les if ɔl wer speld aleik, sɛɟ az *onor* (*onorabel*), *ardor*, *vigor* (*vigorous*), *labor* (*laborious*), or jven “onɜr, ardɜr, vigɜr?” ðe ɔld speliŋ ov *emperor*, *doctor*, *governor*, and *error*, woz *emperour*, *doctour*, *governour*, and *errour*. If ðiz kud bj ɟenjd, whei not ðe rest? Spenser haz *neibor* for *neighbour*, and it iz difikɜlt tu se whot woz gend bei ɟenjin *-bor* intu *-bour* in sɛɟ piurli Sakson wɜrdz az *neighbor*, *harbor*. Nɔ dout if wj sj *laugh* riten wið *gh* at ðe end, ðɔz hu nó Jerman ar at wəns remeinded ov its etimolojikalkonekʃon wið ðe Jerman *lachen*; bɜt wj ʃud sɜn nó ðe sɛm bei analoji, if wj found not ɔnli “lɜʃ,” bɜt “kɔʃ” for *cough* (Jer. *keuchen*), “ɛnɜʃ” for *enough* (Jer. *genug*), ets. In “draft,” fɔnetik speliŋ haz njrli sɛplanted ðe sɔ-kold historikalspeliŋ *draught*; in “dwarf” (*dwergh*, *thweorh*) and in “ruff” (*rough*), ɔltugeðer.

Whot pipel køl ðe etimolojikāl konfʒsnes ov ðe spiker iz striktli a mater ov oratorikal sentiment ōnli, and it wud remen nīrlī az stroḡ az it iz nou, whotever spelīḡ bī adopted. Bst īven if it fud sʒfer hīr and ðer, wī ōt tu bē in meīnd ðāt, eksept for oratorikal pʒrposez, ðāt konfʒsnes, konfeīnd az it iz tu a veri fīu edīukted pipel, iz ov veri smōl importans, ʒnles it haz ferst bīn korekted bei a strikt etimolojikāl disīplin. Wīðout ðāt, it often dejenerets īntu whot iz kōld “popiular etimolojī,” and aktiuali tendz, in sʒm kesez, tu vīfiet ðe korekt spelīḡ ov wʒrdz.

Ei hav frikwentli dwelt on ðis befʒr, in order tu sʒ hou, whot iz nou kōld ðe etimolojikāl or historikal spelīḡ ov wʒrdz iz, in menī kesez, ʒterli ʒnetimolojikāl and ʒnhistorikal. Wī spel *to delight*, and ðʒs īndīʒs menī pipel tu belīv ðāt ðis wʒrd iz sʒmhōu konekted wīð *light* (lux), or *light* (levis); wheraz ðe ōld spelīḡ woz *to delyt* or *to delite* (Tyndale), reprezentīḡ ðe ōld Freḡ *deleiter*. On ðe ʒðer hand wī feīnd for *quite* and *smite*, ðe ōld spelīḡ *quight*, *smight*, whīḡ mē bī ōld and historikal, bst iz deseīdedli ʒnetimolojikāl.

Sovereign and *foreign* ar speld az if ðe wer konekted wīð *reign*, *regnum*; ðe trū etimolojī ov ðe former bīīḡ *superanus*, Old Freḡ *sovrain*, Old Inḡlīf *soveraine*; wheīl *foreign* iz ðe lēt Latin *foraneus*; Old Freḡ *forain*; Old Inḡlīf *forein*. And wheī dū wī reit *to feign*? Arḡ-bīfop Trench (“Inḡlīf Past and Prezent,” p. 238) fīḡks ðe *g* in *feign* iz elokwent tu ðe eī; bst its elokwens iz mislīdīḡ. *Feign* iz not teken from Latin *figo*, az lītel az *honour* iz teken from Latin *honor*. *Feign* kʒmz from ðe Old Freḡ *faindre*; it woz in Old Inḡlīf *faynen* and *feynen*, and it woz ðerfor a mīretimolojikāl fent tu īsert ðe *g* ov ðe Latin *figo*, and ðe Freḡ *feignānt*. ðe Old

Ingliš *shammfast* (Orm.), formd leik *stedefasst* (stedfast) iz nou speld *shamefaced*, az if it had *sæmfiŋ* tu *du* wið a blæfiŋ fæs. *Aghast*, insted ov Old Ingliš *agast*, iz sƿoƿzd tu luk mœr freitful bekœz it remeindz æs ov *ghost*. ðe Freng *lanterne* woz riten *lant-horn*, az if it had bīn sœ kœld from ðe transparent siŋts ov horn ðat enklœzd ðe leit. ðe *s* in *island* œz its orijin tu a misteken belif ðat ðe wœrd iz konekted wið *isle* (*insula*), wheraz it iz ðe Anglœ-Sakson *eáland* (Jerman *eiland*), ðát iz, wœter-land. ðe speliŋ *iland* woz stil kœrent in Shakspere's teim. In *aisle*, tƳ, ðe *s* iz œnetimolojikál, ðœ it iz historikal, az haviŋ bīn tœken œver from ðe Old Freng *aisle*.

ðis tendensi tu olter ðe speliŋ in order tu impart tu a wœrd, at œl hazardz, an etimolojikál karakter, beginz iƵen in Latin, wher *postumus*, a siuperlativ ov *post*, woz sƳmteimz riten *posthumus*, az if, when apleid tu a læt-born sœn, it woz dereivd from *humus*. In Ingliš, ðis fols speliŋ iz retend in *posthumous*. *Cena* woz speld bei pipel hƳ wonted tu fœ ðer nolej ov Griŋk, *cœna*, az if konekted wið *κοινή*, whiŋ it iz not.

BƳt nou let æs luk mœr kœrfuli intu ðe far mœr important stetment, ðat ðe Ingliš langweŋ, if riten fœnetikali, wud riáli lƳz its historikal and etimolojikál karakter. ðe ferst kwestion iz, in whot sens kan ðe prezent speliŋ ov Ingliš bī kœld historikal? Wi hav œnli tu gœ bak a veri fœrt wœ in order tu si ðe modern œpstart karakter ov whot iz kœld historikal speliŋ. Wi nou reit *pleasure*, *measure*, and *feather*, bƳt not veri loŋ ago, in Spenser's teim, ðiz wœrdz wer speld *plesure*, *mesure*, *fether*. Tyndale rœt *frute*; ðe *i* in *fruit* iz a mīr restoreŋon ov ðe Freng speliŋ. For *debt*, on ðe kontrari, wi feind, bƳt tri or fœr hœndred Ƴīrz ago, *dett*. ðis iz mœr historikal ðerfor ðan *debt*, bekœz in Freng, from

whic̃ ðe wȳrd woz borȳd, ðe *b* had disapȳrd, and it woz a piurli etimolojikāl fānsi tu restȳr it. ðe *b* woz leikweiz rȳ-introdiȳst in *doubt*, bȳt ðe *p* woz not restȳrd in *to count* (Freng̃ *compter*, Latin *computare*), wher *p* had at lȳst ðe sȳm reit az *b* in *doute*. ðȳs *receipt* reziȳmz ðe Latin *p*, bȳt *deceit* dȳz widout it. *To deign* kȳps ðe *g*, *to disdain* dȳz widout it. ðer iz anȳder *b* whic̃ haz a serten historikal ȳr in sȳm Ingliſ̃ wȳrdz, bȳt whic̃ woz orijinali piurli fȳnetik, and iz nou simpli siupȳrfliuȳs. ðe ȳld wȳrd for *member* woz *lim*. In sȳȳ kompoundz az *lim-lama*, lim(b)-lame; *lim-leas*, lim(b)-less, it woz imposibel tu avoid ðe interkalȳſon ov a *b* in pronȳnsiȳſon. In ðis maner ðe *b* krept in, and wȳ hav nou tu tȳȳ ðat in *limb*, *crumb* (crume), *thumb* (thuma) ðe *b* mȳst bȳ riten, bȳt not pronȳunst. Agen, *tung* (Jer. *zunge*), *yung* (Jer. *jung*), az speld bei Spenser, hav a far mȳr historikal aspek̃ ðan *tongue* and *young*.

If wȳ wiſt tu reit historikali, wȳ ȳt tu reit *salm* insted ov *psalm*, for ðe inisāl *p*, bȳȳ lost in pronȳnsiȳſon, woz dropt in reitiȳ at a veri erli teim (Anglȳ-Sakson *sealm*) and woz rȳ-introdiȳst simpli tu plȳz sȳm eklȳziastikal etimolojists; ȳlsȳ *newew* (Freng̃ *neveu*) insted ov *nephew*, whic̃ iz bȳt ȳnetimolojikāl and ȳnfȳnetik.

In whot sȳns kan it bȳ kȳld historikal speliȳ if ðe ȳld pliuralz ov *mouse* and *louse*, whic̃ wȳr *mys* and *lys*, ar nou speld *mice* and *lice*? ðe pliural ov *goose* iz not speld *geece* bȳt *geese*, yet everibodi nȳz hou tu pronȳuns it. ðe sȳm mistȳken atempt at an okeȳzonal fȳnetik speliȳ haz separated *dice* from *die*, and *pence* from *pens*, ðat iz, *penyes*; wheil in *nurse*, wher ðe speliȳ *nurce* wud hav bȳȳ yȳsful, az remeindiȳ ȳs ov its trȳ etimon *nourrice*, ðe *c* haz bȳȳ riplȳst bei *s*.

ðer ar, in fakt, meni speliȳz whic̃ wud bȳ at ðe sȳm

teim mør historikal and mør fōnetik. Whei reit *little*, when nōwʒn pronounsez *little*, and when ðe øld spelij woz *lytel*? Whei *girdle*, when ðe øld spelij woz *girdel*? ðe sem røl aplēiz tu njrli øl wōrdz endij in *le*, sʒ az *sickle*, *ladle*, *apple*, ets., wher ðe etimoloji iz komplēti obskiūrd bei ðe prezent ortografi. Whei *scent*, bʒt *dissent*, when jven Milton stil røt *sent*? Whei *ache*, insted ov ðe Sækspirian *ake*? Whei *cat*, bʒt *kitten*; whei *cow*, bʒt *kine*? Whei *accede*, *precede*, *secede*, bʒt *exceed*, *proceed*, *succeed*? Whei indij, eksept tu west ðe prefʒs teim ov çildren?

And if it iz difikʒlt tu se whot konstitiuts historikal spelij, it iz jkwali perpleksij tu defein ðe rjāl mjning ov etimolojikāl spelij. For, wher ar wj tu stop? It wud bj konsiderd veri ʒnetimolojikāl wer wj tu reit *nee* insted ov *knee*, *now* insted ov *know*, *night* insted ov *knight*; yet nōwʒn komplēnz about ðe los ov ðe inifal *h*, ðe reprezentativ ov an orijinal *k*, in *loaf*, A. S. hlâf (cf. κλίβανος), in *ring* (A.S. *hring*); in *lade*, *ladder*, *neck*, ets.

If wj ar tu reit etimolojikali, ðen whei not retʒrn tu *loverd*, or *hlaforð*, insted ov *lord*? tu *nose-thrill*, or *noſethirle* insted ov *nostril*; tu *swister* insted ov *sister*; whiç wud not bj mør trʒbelsʒm ðan *sword*. *Wifmann* fiurli wud bj beter ðan *woman*; *meadwife* beter ðan *midwife*; *godspel* beter ðan *gospel*, *ortyard* beter ðan *orchard*, *puisne* beter ðan *puny*. Frikwentli ðe prezent rekogneizd spelij luks etimolojikāl, bʒt it iz ʒterli ʒnetimolojikāl. *Righteous* luks leik an ajektiv in *-eous*, sʒ az *plenteous*, bʒt it iz rjālī a Sakson wōrd, *rightwis*, ðāt iz *rightwise*, formd leik *otherwise*, ets.

Could iz riten wið an *l* in analoji tu *would*, bʒt wheil ðe *l* iz jʒstifeid in *would* from *will*, and *should* from

shall, wj feind ðe Old Ingliſ imperfekt ov *can* riten *cuthe*, ðen *couthe*, *coude*. ðe *l*, ðerfor, iz neider fōnetik nor etimolojikāl. Nŕđin, agen, kan bj mōr mislđin tu an etimolojist ðan ðe prezent spelin ov *whole* and *hale*. Bōđ kēm from ðe sēm sōrs, ðe Gođik *hail-s*, Sanskrit *kalya-s*, mđinđ oriđinali, *fit*, *redi*; ðen *sound*, *complete*, *whole*. In Anglō-Sakson wj hav *hæl*, hōl; and *hal*, heldi, wiđout eni tres ov a *w*, eider befōr or after. ðe Old Ingliſ *halsum*, hōlsēm, iz ðe Jerman *hailsam*. *Whole*, ðerfor, iz a mđr mis-spelin, ðe *w* haviđ probabli bjn aded in analođi tu *who*, *which*, ets. From a piurli etimolojikāl point ov viu, ðe *w* iz rođli left out befōr *h* in *hou*; for az Anglō-Sakson *hwy* bekēm *why*, Anglō-Sakson *hwa* ſud hav bekēm *how*.

If wj řjali attempted tu reit etimolojikali, wj ſud hav tu reit *bridegroom* wiđout ðe *r*, bekōz *groom* iz a mđr korřpſon ov *guma*, man, Anglō-Sakson *bryd-guma*. Wj ſud hav tu reit *burse* insted ov *purse*, az in *disburse*. In fakt, it iz difiksłt tu sē wher wj ſud stop. Whei du wj not reit *metal* insted ov *mettle*, *worthship* insted ov *worship*, *chirurgion* insted ov *surgeon*, *furhlong* (đát iz, fŕrō lođ) insted ov *furlong*, *feordhing* (đát iz, fōrđ part) insted ov *farthing*? If wj reit piuni *puisne*, wj meit az wel reit *post-natus*. Wj meit spel koi, *quietus*; pert, *apertus*; priřt, *presbyter*; master, *magister*; sekston, *sacristan*; smz, *eleemosyne*, ets. If enibodi wil tel mđ at whot ðet etimolojikāl spelin iz tu begin, wheder at 1,500 A.D., or at 1,000 A.D., or at 500 A.D., ei am wilin tu diskŕs ðe kwestion. Til ðen, ei beg lřv tu sē ðat etimolojikāl spelin wud plē greter havok in Ingliſ ðan fōnetik spelin, řven if wj wer tu drō a lein not mōr ðan feiv hŕndred yřz agō.

ðe tđ strongest arguments, ðerfor, agenst fōnetik

spelin, nemli, dat it wud destroi de historikal and etimolojikal karakter ov de Ingliſ langweĳ, ar, after  l, b t veri parfali tru . H r and  er, n  dout, de etimoloji and histori ov an Ingliſ w rd meit b  obski rd bei f netik spelin ; az if, for instans, w  r t “Yur p” insted ov *Europe*. B t  ven  en analoji wud help  s, and t ĳ   z hu  n  G rk, ov hu m  er ar not meni,  at “Yur” in s ĳ w rdz az *Europe*, *Eurydice*, reprez nted de G rk *  r  s*.  e r al anser, however, iz,  at n w n kud onestli k l de prezent sistem ov spelin  eider historikal or etimolojikal ; and ei bel v,  at teken az a h l, de los oke ond bei konsistent f netik spelin  wud not b  greter  an de gen.

Another objektsjon rjdd agenst fonetisk spelj, nemli, dat wid it it wud bi imposibel tu distingwis homonimz, mst bi met in de sem w. Nø dout it iz a serten advantage if in reiti wj kan distingwis *right*, *rite*, *write* and *wright*. Bst if, in de høri ov konversejon, der iz hardli ever a dout whiç wørd iz ment, siurli der wud bi mæç les danjer in de slø proses ov rjdi a kontinjuus sentens. If veriss speljz ov de sem wørd ar neseseri tu point out diferent mjuinz, wj sud rekweir et speljz for *box*, tu signifei a gest, a Krismas gift, a hønti sjt, a tri, a slap, tu sel round, sjts in a tjater, and de frønt sjt on a køg; and dis prinsipel wud hav tu bi apleid tu absv 400 wørdz. Hw wud øndertøk tu providei øl diç variejonz ov de prezent yunifurm spelj ov diç wørdz? And wj mst not forget dat, after øl, in rjdi a pej wj ar seldom in dout wheder *sole* mju a fis, or de *sole* ov a fut, or iz yuzd az an ajektiv. If der iz at eni teim eni rjal difikølti, langwej providei its øn remedi. It eider drops sçç wørdz az *rite* and *sole*, replesi diem bei *cere-mony* and *only*, or it yuzei a perifrastik ekspresjon, sçç az de søl ov de fut, or de søl and ønli ground, ets.

Dës far ei hav treid tu anser de rjali important argu-
 ments whic hav bin brøt forwerd agenst fōnetik spelij.
 Ei hav dæn sō wið spefal referens tu de pouverful remon-
 stransez ov Arçbifop Trench, and hiz mōst ebel
 plijdiŋ in fēvor ov de establifst sistem ov ortografi. Az
 a mjr skolar, ei fuli fēr hiz fliŋz, and ei sinsirli admeir
 hiz elokwent advokasi. Ei difer from him bekōz ei dū
 not ŋiŋk, az hī dæz, dat de los enteld bei fōnetik spelij
 wud bī sō grēt az wī imajin; or dat it wud bī ol on
 wæn seid. Beseidz, ænles hī kan fō hou a reform ov
 spelij iz not ønli for de prezent tu bī avoided, bæt øltu-
 geðer tu bī renderd ænneseseri, ei konsider dat de suŋer
 it iz teken in hand de beter. It sijnz tu mī dat de
 Arçbifop luks on de introdæksjon ov fōnetik spelij az
 a mjr kroget ov a fiu skolarz, or az an atempt on de
 part ov sām hsf-ediuƋeted personz, wiŋiŋ tu avoid de
 træbel ov lerniŋ hou tu spel korektli. If dāt wer sō, ei
 kweit agri wið him dat pøblik opinion wud never asiúm
 sæfifent fōrs for kariŋ ðer skjm. Bæt ðer iz a mōtiv
 pouver beheind ðiz fōnetik reformerz whic de Arçbifop haz
 hardli teken intu akount. Ei mīn de mizeri endiúrd bei
 milionz ov çildren at skul, hū meit lern in wæn yīr, and
 wið rjal advantage tu ðemselvz, whot de nou rekweir fōr
 or feiv yīrz tu lern, and seldom sæksjð in lerniŋ after ol.
 If de evidens ov sæç men az Mr Ellis iz tu bī depended
 on, and ei belīv hī iz wiliŋ tu sūbmit tu eni test, ðen
 fīurli de los ov sām historikal and etimolojikæl *syvnjrz*
 wud wæ litel agenst de hapines ov milionz ov çildren, and
 de stil heier hapines ov milionz ov Ingliŋmen and Ingliŋ-
 wimen, grōiŋ æp az de ærz [heirs] tu ol de welt and
 streŋt ov Ingliŋ literatiur, or ænabel tu rið jven ðer
 Beibel. Hīr it iz wher ei ventīur tu difer from de Arç-
 bifop, not az bīiŋ sangwin az tu eni immjdiæt sækses,

bʏt simpli az fʃliŋ it a diuti tu help in a kɔz whiç at prezent iz mɔst ʒnpopiular. ðe jvɪl ðe mɛ bɪ put of for a lɔŋ teim, partikiularli if ðe wɛt ov sɜç mɛn az Arç-biʃop Trench iz ðrɔn intu ðe ʒðer skel. Bʏt ʒnlɛs langweɪ sɪsez tu bɪ langweɪ, and reitiŋ sɪsez tu bɪ reitiŋ, ðe ðɛ wil fɪurli kɜm when pɪs wil hav tu bɪ mɛd betwɪn ðe tɹ. Germani haz apointed a Gɜvernment Komifon tu konsider whot iz tu bɪ dɜn wid German speliŋ. In Amerika, tɹ, sɜm lɪdiŋ stɛtsmɛn sɪm inkleind tu tɛk ʒp ðe reform ov speliŋ on naʃonal groundz. Iz ðer nɔ stɛtsman in Ingland ʒɜfɪʃɛntli prɹf agenst ridikiul tu kɔl ðe atenʃon ov Parliment tu whot iz a grɔiŋ naʃonal misfortiun?

Mɜç, however, az ei difer from ðe Arçbiʃop on ðiz groundz, ei kanot bʏt depreket ðe tɔn in whiç hiz pouerful opozifon haz bɪn met bei meni ov ðe ʒphɔlderz ov fɔnetik speliŋ. Nɛ, ei mɔst gɔ stil fɜrðer, and fraŋkli konfɛs ðat tu wɜn ov hiz argiუმents ei feind it difikɜlt, at prezent, tu giv a satisfaktori anser.

“It iz a mɹ asɜmpʃon,” ðe Arçbiʃop remárks, “ðat ɔl mɛn prɔnoũns ɔl wɜrdz aleik; or ðat whenever ðe kɜm tu spel a wɜrd ðe wil ekzaktli agri az tu whot ðe outlein ov its sound iz. Nou wɹ ar fɪur mɛn wil not dɹ ðis, from ðe fakt ðat, befɔr ðer woz eni fikst and seteld ɔrtɔgrafi in our langweɪ, when, ðɛrfɔr, everibodi woz mɔr or les a fonografer, sɹkiŋ tu reit doun ðe wɜrd az it sounded tu *him*,—for hɹ had nɔ ʒðer lɔ tu geid him,—ðe vɛriɛʃonz ov speliŋ ar infinit. Tek, for instans, ðe wɜrd *sudden*, whiç dɜz not sɪm tu promis eni gret skɔp for vareieti. Ei hav meiself met wid ðis wɜrd speld in nɔ les ðan fɔrtɹn wɛz amɔŋ our erli reiterz. Agen, in hou meni wɛz woz Raleigh’s nɛm speld, or Shakspere’s? ðe sɛm iz evident from ðe speliŋ ov ʒnediuketed personz

in our ɔn də. ðe hav nə ʔder rʌl bʌt ðe sound tu geɪd dem. Hou iz it ðat ðe dʌ not ɔl spel aleɪk ?"—*English Past and Present*, p. 203.

Leik mōst men hʌ plɪd wɪð ðer hart az wel az wɪð ðer hed, ðe Aɹgbɪʃop haz hɪr ɔverlʌkt wɜn ɔbvɪs anser tu hɪz kwɛstɪən. ðe dʌ not spel aleɪk bekɔz ðe hav bɪn brɔt ʃp wɪð a sɪstəm ɔv spɛlɪŋ ɪn wɪç ðe sɛm sound kan bɪ rɛprɛzɛntɛd ɪn tɛn dɪfɛrɛnt wɛz, and ɪn wɪç hardli ɛni wɜn lɛtɛr ɪz rɛstrɪktɛd tu wɜn fɒnɛtɪk pɔwɛr ɔnli. If çɪldrɛn wɛr brɔt ʃp wɪð an alfabet ɪn wɪç ɪç lɛtɛr had bʌt wɜn sound, and ɪn wɪç ðe sɛm sound wɔz ɔlwɛz rɛprɛzɛntɛd bɛi ðe sɛm sɛɪn—and ðɪs ɪz ðe vɛrɪ ɛsɛns ɔv fɒnɛtɪk rɛɪtɪŋ—ðɛn ɪt wʉd bɪ sɪmplɪ ɪmposɪbɛl ðat ðe ʃʉd dɪrɪm ɔv rɛɪtɪŋ *sudden* ɪn fɔrtɪŋ, or *Woburn* ɪn 140, dɪfɛrɛnt wɛz.

Bʌt fɔr ɔl ðæt ðer ɪz sɛm truθ ɪn ðe Aɹgbɪʃop's rɛmark; and ɪf wɪ kɔmpɛr ðe dɪfɛrɛnt wɛz ɪn wɪç ðe advɔkɛts ɔv fɒnɛtɪk spɛlɪŋ—mɛn lɛɪk Pɪtmən, Bɛll, ɛllɪs, Wɪðɛrs, Jɔnɛs—rɛɪt ðe sɛm wɜrɔdz, ɷvən wɛn yʉzɪŋ ðe sɛm fɒnɛtɪk alfabet, wɪ ʃal sɪ ðat ðe dɪfɪkʌltɪ pɔɪntɛd ɔʉt bɛi ðe Aɹgbɪʃop ɪz a rɪʌl wɜn. ɛvɛrɪwɜn nɔz hɔu dɪfɛrɛntli ðe sɛm wɜrɔdz ɔlwɛz hav bɪn and stɪl ɔr prɔnɔʉnst ɪn dɪfɛrɛnt pɑrts ɔv ɪŋɡlənd. And ɪt ɪz not ɔnli ɪn tɔʉnz and kɔʉntɪz ðat ðɪz pɛkɪʉlɪərɪtɪz prɛvɛl; ðɛr ɔr sɛrtɛn wɜrɔdz wɪç wɜn fəmɪli prɔnɔʉnzɛz dɪfɛrɛntli frɔm ʌnðɛr; and ðɛr ɔr bɛsɛɪdz ðe stɪdɪd and ʌnstɪdɪd pɛkɪʉlɪərɪtɪz ɔv ɪndɪvɪdʉəl spɪkɛrz. Tu kɔnvɪns pɪpɛl ðat wɜn prɔnɔnsɪɛʃən ɪz rɛɪt and ðe ʔðɛr rɔŋ, sɪmz ʃtɛrli hɔpɛs. ɛi hav hɛrd a hɛɪli kʌltɪvɛtɛd mən dɛfɛndɪŋ hɪz drɔpɪŋ ðe *h* ʌt ðe bɛɡɪnɪŋ ɔv sɛrtɛn wɜrɔdz, bɛi ðe ʌnʌnsɛrəbɛl ɔrɡɪʉmɛnt ðat ɪn ðe plɛs wɛr hɪ wɔz brɔt ʃp, nɔwɜn prɔnɔʉnst ðɪz ɪnɪʃəl *h*'z. Wɔt skɔɡmən wʉd ɔdmɪt ðat hɪz prɔnɔnsɪɛʃən wɔz fɔltɪ?

Whot Eirifman wud sȳbmit tu lȳz ov speliȳ past in Lȳndon? And whot renderz argiument on eni neisetiz ov pronȳnsieȳon stil mȳr difikȳlt iz, ȳat bȳt ȳe jr and ȳe tȳȳ ar mȳst tregersȳ witneses. Ei hav herd Amerikanz mȳnten in gud ernest ȳat der woz mȳȳ les ov nezal tȳwȳ in Amerika ȳan in Ingland. Pipel ar not awer hou ȳe pronȳuns, and hou diferentli ȳe pronȳuns wȳn and ȳe sem wȳrd. Az a forener ei hav had ampel oportiuunitiz for obzerveȳon on ȳis point. Sȳm frendz wud tel mj, for instans, ȳat *world* woz pronȳunst laik *whirl'd*, *father* laik *farther*, *nor* (befȳr konsonants) laik *gnaw*, *bud* laik *bird*, *burst* laik *bust*, *for* laik *fur*, *birth* laik *berth*; ȳat ȳe vouelz had ȳe sem sound in *where* and *were*, in *God* and *gaudy*; wheil ȳȳderz aȳiurd mj ȳat nȳwȳn bȳt a forener kud ȳiȳk sȳ. And ȳe wȳrst iz, ȳat jȳven ȳe sem person dȳz not ȳlwȳz pronȳuns ȳe sem wȳrd in ekzaktli ȳe sem maner. Konstantli, when ei askt a frend tu repȳt a wȳrd whiȳ hj had jȳst pronȳunst, hj wud pronȳuns it agen, bȳt wiȳ a sleit diferens. ȳe mȳr fakt ov hiz treiiȳ tu pronȳuns wel wud giv tu hiz pronȳnsieȳon a konȳȳs and emfatik karakter. ȳe prepozizȳon *of* iz pronȳunst bei mȳst pipel *ov*, bȳt if kros-ekzamind, meni wil sȳ ȳat ȳe pronȳuns *ov*, bȳt ȳe *o* not ekzaktli laik *off*.

ȳe konȳuȳon bekȳmȳz gretest when it iz atempted tu eidentifei ȳe pronȳnsieȳon, sȳ ov a vouel in Jerman wiȳ a vouel in Ingliȳ. Nȳ tȳ Ingliȳmen and nȳ tȳ Jermanz sȳmd tu bj ebel tu agri on whot ȳe herd wiȳ ȳer jrȳ, or whot ȳe sed wiȳ ȳer tȳȳȳ; and ȳe rezȳlt in ȳe end iz, ȳat nȳ vouel in Jerman woz rȳali ȳe sem az eni ȳȳer vouel in Ingliȳ. Tu tȳk wȳn or tȳ instansez from Mr Ellis's Kȳ tu Palioteip (Palȳotype), ei kan hjr nȳ diferens betȳwȳn ȳe *a* in Italian *mano*, Ingliȳ *father*, and Jerman

mahnen, ʒnles ei restrikt mei obzerveſonz tu ðe ʒterans ov serten individualz; wheraz ei dʒ hɪr a veri deseided, and jenerali adopted, diferens betwɪn ðe vouelz in German *böcke* and Freng *jeune*. Mr Ellis, tʒçɪŋ on ðe sɛm difikʌlti, remárks, “Mr Bell’s pronʌnsiʃon, in meni instansez, diferz from ðát whɪç ei am akʌstomd tu giv, espefali in foren wɜrdz. Bøð ov ʌs mɛ bɪ roŋ.” Mr Sweet remárks, peɪ 10, “Mr Ellis insists stroŋli on ðe monofʊŋgal karakter ov hiz ɛn ɛːz and øːz. Ei hɪr hiz ɛ (*may*), and ø (*no*) az distɪŋkt difʊŋz, not ɛnli in hiz Ingliʃ pronʌnsiʃon, bʌt olso in hiz pronʌnsiʃon ov Freng, Jerman, and Latin.” If fonetik reitiŋ ment ðis miniút fʊtografi ov spøken soundz, in whɪç Mes. Bell and Ellis eksél; if eni atempt had ever bɪn mɛd tu emploi ðis hɛr-splitiŋ maʃɪneri for a praktikal reform ov Ingliʃ speliŋ, ðe objekʃonz rɛzd bei Arçbɪʃop Trench wud bɪ kweit ʌnanserabel. ðɛr wud bɪ fɪfti diferent wɛz ov speliŋ Ingliʃ, and ðe konfuzon wud bɪ grɛtɛr ðan it iz nou. Not jvɛn Mr Bellˈz ðɛrti-siks kategoriz ov vouel sound wud bɪ sʃɪʃɛnt tu render everi pekiuliariti ov vouel kwoliti, piç, and kwontiti, wið perfekt akiurasi. (Sj H. Sweet, “Histori ov Ingliʃ Soundz,” pp. 58, 68.) Bʌt ðis woz never intended, and wheil konsɪdɪŋ mʌç tu ðe Arçbɪʃopˈs argiʊments, ei mʌst not konsɪd tʒ mʌç.

Whot ei leik in Mr Pitmanˈz sistem ov speliŋ iz ekzaktli whot ei nó haz bɪn found fɔlt wið bei ʌðɛr, nɛmli, ðát hɪ dʒz not atempt tu refeɪn tʒ mʌç, and tu ekspres in reitiŋ ðɛz endles sɛdz ov pronʌnsiʃon, whɪç mɛ bɪ ov ðe grɛtest interest tu ðe stiʊdɛnt ov akoustiks, or ov fonetiks, az apleid tu ðe stʌdi ov liviŋ deialekts, bʌt whɪç, for praktikal az wel az for seientifik filolojikəl pʌrposez, mʌst bɪ enteɪrli ignɔrd. Reitiŋ woz never intended tu fʊtograf spøken langwejez: it wɛz ment tu

indiket, not tu pent, soundz. If Voltaire sez, “L’écriture c’est la peinture de la voix,” hj iz reit; bxt when hj gøz on tu se, “plus elle est ressemblante, meilleur elle est,” ei am not serten dat, az in a piktiur ov a landskep, sø in a piktiur ov de vois, prij-Rsfæleit miniutnes me not destroi de veri objekt ov de piktiur. Langwej djlz in brød kælorz, and reitiŋ ot tu folø de ekzampel ov langwej, whiç ðø it alouz an endles vareieti ov pronøn-siəfən, restriktz itself for its øn pærpos, for de pærpos ov ekspresiŋ ðot in øl its modifiəkəfənz, tu a veri limited nʌmber ov tipikal vouelz and konsonants. Out ov de larj nʌmber ov soundz, for instans, whiç hav bijn katalogd from de veriəs Ingliš deialekts, ðøz ønli kan bj rekogneizd az konstituent elements ov de langwej whiç in, and bei, ðer diferens from iç æðer konvé a diferens ov miŋiŋ. Ov sɛç pregnant and ðot-konveiŋ vouelz, Ingliš pozésez nø mør ðan twelv. Whotever de meinor fədz ov vouel soundz in Ingliš deialekts mæ bj, de dʌ not en-riç de langwej, az sɛç, ðát iz, de dʌ not enəbel de spiķer tu konvé mør miniút fədz ov ðot ðan de twelv tipikal singel vouelz. Beseidz, ðer jenerali iz whot de Freŋç meit køl a fənetik solidariti in iç deialekt. If wɜn vouel çenjez, de æðerz ar apt tu folø, and de mæn objekt ov langwej remenz de sem truut, næmli, tu prevent wɜn wɜrd from ræniŋ intu anæðer, and yet tu absten from tú miniút fənetik distiŋkəfənz, whiç an ordineri iʃr meit feind it difiķəlt tu grasp. ðis prinsipel ov fənetik solidariti iz ov gret importans, not ønli in ekspleniŋ de gradiual çenjez ov vouelz, bxt ølsø sɛç jeneral çenjez ov konsonants az wi sj, for instans, in de Jerman *Lautverschiebung*. Az sʌn az wɜn ples iz left vekant, ðer iz prefur tu fil it, or sø mɛç ov it az iz left vekant, bxt nø mør.

ðer ar, in fakt, tú brancez, or at øl events, tú kweit

distinkt praktikal aplikasjonz ov de seiens ov Fonetiks, whig, for wont ov beter nemz, ei designet az *filolojik*al and *deialektikal*. Her iz whot me bi kold a filolojik al stædi ov Fonetiks, whig iz an esensal part ov de Seiens ov Langweij, and haz for its objekt tu giv a kljir eidja ov de alfabet, not az riten, bæt az spøken. It trjts ov de matjrialz out ov whig, de instruments wið whig, and de proses bei whig, vouelz and konsonants ar formd; and after eksplenij hou serten leterz agrij, and difer, in der matjrial; in de instruments wið whig, and de proses bei whig, de ar prodiúst; it enæbelz æs tu ænderstand de køzez and rezslts ov whot iz kold Fonetik Cæn. In meni respekts de mœst instræktiv trjtmænt ov de jeneral tjori ov Fonetiks iz tu bi found in de Prâtisâkhyas; partikiularli in de øldest (400 B.K.), dát ataçt tu de Rig Veda.¹ Hæ de næmber ov posibel soundz me sjm infinit, de næmber ov rjal soundz yuzd in Sanskrit or eni æder given langweij for de pærpos ov ekspresij diferent sædz ov mjnij, iz veri limited. It iz wið ðjz brød kategoriz ov sound aløn ðat de Prâtisâkhyas djl; and it iz for a proper ænderstandij ov ðjz de Seiens ov Langweij haz tu inklud wiðin its sfej a kærful stædi ov Fonetiks.

De deialektikal stædi ov Fonetiks haz larjer objekts. It wifæz tu ekzœst øl posibel soundz whig kan bi prodiúst bei de vøkal organz, litel konsernd az tu wheder ðjz soundz okær in eni rjal langweij or not. It iz partikiularli yqsful fœr de pærpos ov pentij, wið de æt-mœst akiurasi, de aktiual pronønsiæsjon ov individualz, and ov fiksij de fœntest sædz ov deialektik vareieti. Hæ

¹ "Rig-Veda-Prâtisâkhyas, Das älteste Lehrbuch der Vedischen Phonetik, Sanskrit Text mit Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, herausgegeben," von F. Max Müller, Leipzig, 1869.

mōst marvelous aġvment in dis branġ ov apleid fōnetiks me bj sijn in Mr. Bell's "Vizibel Spjg."

Ďjz tŭ brancez ov fōnetik seiens, houeever, jud bj kept kerfuli distiņkt. Az de foundeġon ov a praktikal alfabet, leikweiz az de ōnli sef foundeġon for de Seiens ov Langweġ, wj wont filolojikāl or đjoretik Fōnetiks. Wj wont an ōnderstandiņ ov đōz jeneral prinsipelz and đōz brōd kategoriz ov sound whiġ ar triġed in de Prātisākhyas; wj đų not wont eni ov de miniút deialektik distiņkġonz, whiġ hav nō gramatikal pŕpos, and ar đerfor outseid de pel ov gramatikal seiens. Tų miniút distiņkġon pro-diúsez konfuġon, and wher it kan bj avoided, wiđout a sakrifeiz ov akiurasi, it ōt tu bj avoided. Wher vegnes ekzists in rġaliti, and wher netiur alouz a brōd marġin on eider seid, it wud bj roġ tu ignōr đát latitiud. Akiurasi itself wud hjr bekŕm inakiurasi.

Bŕt when wj wont tu ekzōst ōl posibel šedz ov sound, when wj wont tu fōtograf de pekiuliaritiz ov serten deialekts, or mezur de đjvieġonz in de pronŕnsieġon ov individuiālz bei de mōst miniut degriġz, wj đen mōst avel ouseľvz ov đát ekskwizit artistik maġneri konstrōkted bei Mr. Bell, and handeld wiđ sō mŕġ skil bei Mr. A. J. Ellis, đō fiu ōnli wil bj ēbel tu yŕz it wiđ rġal sōkses.

Sŕm pipel sġm tu imajin đat de pouer ov distiņġwifġiņ miniút diferensez ov soundz iz a naturali ġift, and kanot bj akweird. It me bj sō in kweit eksepŕsonal kesez, bŕt ei nō az a fakt đat a ġeild đat had, az pipel se, nō jr for miuzik, and kud not sġj "God Sev de Kwġn," ġraduali akweird de pouer ov distiņġwifġiņ de ordineri nōts, and ov sġiņ a tiun. Spġkiņ from mei ōn eksġiriens, ei jud se đat a ġud jr kŕmz bei inheritans, for, az loġ az ei kan remember, a fols nōt, or, az wj yŕst tu kōl it, an impiur (*unrein*) nōt, woz tu mġ fizikali penful.

Bxt ðis apleiz tu miuzik ønli, and it iz bei nø mǫnz jenerali tru, ðat pipel hǫ hav a gud miuzikal ǫr, hav ølsø a gud ǫr for langwey. Ei hav nøñ pipel kweit ønmiuzikal, pozést ov a veri gud ǫr for langwey, and *vice versá*. ðe tú natiural gifts, ðerfor, if natiural gifts ðe ar, ov distingwifǫ miniút degriǫ ov piǫ and kwoliti ov sound dǫ not sǫm tu bǫ ðe sem. ðe rǫal difkølti, however, whiǫ mæks itself felt in diskøsiǫ miniút sedz ov sound, areizez from ðe insøfisiens ov our nømenkløtiur, from ðe ølmøst irrezistibel influiens ov imajinøson, and in ðe end, from ðe wont ov a fønometer. A gud miuzifan kan distingwiǫ betwǫn *C farp* and *D flat*, a gud fønøtifan betwǫn a “lø-bak-narø” and a “lø-mikst-narø” vouel. Bxt ðe kanot ølwez translet ðer sentiments intu definit langwey, and if ðe trei bei aktiual eksperiment tu imitet ðǫz tú soundz ov vouelz, ðe imperfeksonz ov ðe ǫr and tøǫ, bøf in ðe spǫker and ðe lisener, frikwentli render øl attempts at a miutiual ønderstandiǫ imposibel. Wiǫ sal never areiv at seientifik presiǫn til wiǫ hav a fønometer for kwoliti ov sound, nor dǫ ei sǫ whei søǫ an instrument sud bǫ imposibel. Ei wel remember Wheatstone teliǫ mǫ, ðat hǫ wud øndertek tu riǫrodiús bei mǫnz ov an instrument everi sed ov vouel in eni langwey ov ðe wørld, and ei sud tǫǫ ðat Willis’s and Helmholtz’s eksperiments wud øsplei ðe elements from whiǫ søǫ a fønometer meit bǫ konstitiuted. Az sǫñ az wiǫ kan mezur, ðefin, and riǫrodius, at plezur, whot at prezent wiǫ kan ønli ðeskreib in aproksimet termz, ðe seiens ov fønøtiks wil bekøm møst frøtful, and asiúm its lejitimet pløz az a *sine quá non* tu ðe stiudent ov langwey.

Ei hav øømteimz bǫñ blømd for haviǫ insisted on Fønøtiks bǫǫ rekogneizd az ðe foundøson ov ðe Seiens ov Langwey. Prof. Benfey and øder skolarz protested

agenst de gapter ei hav devoted tu Fonetiks in de Sekond Sjriz ov mei "Lektiurz," az an ʒnneseseri inovasjon, and dɔz protests hav bekʌm stil stronger ov let. Bʌt hɪr, tʌ, wɪ mʌst distɪŋgwɪʃ betwɪn tʌ tɪŋz. Filolojikəl or Jeneral Fonetiks, ar, ei hɔld az stronli az ever, an integral part ov de Seiens ov Langweɪ; Deialektik Fonetiks mɛ bɪ jʌsful hɪr and dɛr, bʌt de juð bɪ kept widɪn dɛr proper sfɪr; ʌðerweɪz, ei admit az redɪli az enɪwʌn els, de obskiʊr rɛðer ðan revɪl de brɔd and masɪv kɔlɔrz ov sound whɪç langweɪ jʊzez for its ordɪnerɪ wɜrk.

If wɪ reflekt a litel, wɪ ʃal sɪ ðat de filolojikəl konsepsjon ov a vowel iz sɪmfɪŋ tɔtali diferent from its piurli akoustik or deialektik konsepsjon. De former iz ɡɪfli konsernd wɪð de sfɪr ov posɪbel vɛrɪsjon, and de later wɪð de piurli fenomenal individualɪti ov ɪç vowel. Tu de filolojist, de ʃri vowelz in *septimus*, for instans, whot-ever dɛr ekzakt pronʌnsɪsɪjnz mɛ hav bɪn at diferent teɪmz, and in diferent provinsez ov de Rɔman Empeɪr, ar pɔtensjali wɜn and de sɛm. Wɪ luk on *septimus* and εβδομος az on Sanskrit *saptamas*, and ɔnli bei nɔɪŋ ðat e, i, and u in *septimus* ar ɔl reprezentatɪvz ov a ʃɔrt a, or ðat *optimus* standz for de mɔr ɛnsɛnt *optumus* and *optomos*, dʌ wɪ tek in at wɜn ɡlans de hɔl histori and posɪbel vɛrɪsjon ov ðɪz vowelz in diferent langweɪz and deialekts. Eʋen whɛr a vowel disapɪrɪz komplɪtli, az in *gigno* for *gigeno*, in πίπτω for πίπετω, de mental eɪ ov de filolojist disɛrnz and wɛz whot nɔ ɪr kan hɪr. And wheɪl in ðɪz kɛsez de etimolojist, disregardin de klɪrest vareɪeti ov pronʌnsɪsɪjnz, trɪts sɛç vowelz az a, e, i, o, u az wɜn and de sɛm, in ʌðɛrɪz whɛr tʌ vowelz sɪm tu hav ekzaktli de sɛm sound tu de deialektɪfən, de filolojist on hɪz part persɪvz diferensez ov de ɡrɛtest importans. De i in

fides and *cliens* mē hav ðe sēm sound az ðe *i* in *gigno* or *septimus*, ðe *u* ov *luo* mē not difer from ðe *u* in *optumus* or *lubens*, bȳt ðer intrinsik valiu, ðer kepabilitiz ov grōf and deké, ar tōtali diferent in iȝ. Wj šal never bj ēbel tu spj̄k wið eniȝiȝ leik rj̄al seientifik akiurasi ov ðe pron̄nsiesjon ov en̄sent langwejez, bȳt j̄ven if wj luk tu ðer riten apj̄rans onli, wj sj̄ agen and agen hou vouelz, riten aleik, ar historikali tōtali distiȝkt. Grimm introdiúst ðe distiȝkjon betwjn *ái* and *aí*, betwjn *áu* and *aú*, not bekōz it iz bei eni m̄jnz serten ðat ðe pron̄nsiesjon ov ðj̄z distiȝonz verid, bȳt bekōz hj̄ wiȝt tu indiket ðat ðe antesj̄dents ov *ái* and *áu* wer diferent from ðōz ov *aí* and *aú*. In Goȝik *faíhu*, (Sk. pasu, pecu,) *aí* iz *a* sortend tu *i*, and brōken befōr *h* tu *aí*; in Goȝik *váit* (Sk. veda, *oīda*), *ai* iz radikal *i* streȝtend tu *ái*. In Goȝik *daúhtar* (Sk. duhitar, *θυγάτηρ*), *aú* iz radikal *u* brōken tu *aú*; in *aúhna*, sven (Sk. asna, *ἰπνó=ἰκνo=ἄκνo*), ðe *au* iz *a* darkend tu *u*, and brōken tu *áu*; wheil in Goȝik *báug* (*πέφευγα*), *áu* iz orijinal *u* streȝtend tu *áu*. When wj hj̄r *é* and *ó* in Goȝik, wj sj̄ *ā*, j̄st az wj sj̄ Dorik *ā* beheind Eionik *η*. When wj hj̄r *c* in *canis*, wj sj̄ Sanskrit *s*; when wj hj̄r *c* in *cruor*, wj sj̄ Sanskrit *k*. When wj hj̄r *γ* in *γένος*, wj sj̄ Arian *g*; when wj hj̄r *γ* in *φλέγω*, wj sj̄ Arian *z*.

Ȝj̄z fiu ilsstresjonz wil eksplen, ei hōp, ðe esenjal diferens in ðe aplikesjon ov fōnetiks tu filoloji and deialektoloji, and wil sj̄ ðat in ðe former our br̄sȝ m̄st ov nesesiti bj̄ brōd, wheil in ðe later it m̄st bj̄ fein. It iz bei miksiȝ sȝp tȝj̄ separet leinz ov reserȝ, iȝ heili important in itself, ðat sȝ m̄sȝ konfuzjon haz ov let bj̄n okeȝond. ðe valiu ov piurli fōnetik obzervefjonz j̄ud on nō akount bj̄ s̄nderrated; bȳt it iz neseseri, for dát veri rj̄zon, ðat deialektikal az wel az filoloȝikal

fōnetiks jūd bȳ konfeind tu ðer proper sȳr. ðe filolojist haz mæç tu lern from ðe fōnetiſan, bæt hȳ jūd never forget ðat hȳr, az elſwher, whot iz brōd and tipikal iz az important and az ſeientifikali akiuret az whot iz miniút and ſpeſal.

Whot iz brōd and tipikal iz often mōr akiuret jȳen ðan whot iz miniút and ſpeſal. It meit bȳ poſibel, for inſtans, bei a fōtografik proſes, tu reprezent ðe ekzakťt poziſon ov ðe tæŋ and ðe inſeid wōlz ov ðe mouť wheil wȳ pronouns ðe Italian vouel *i*. Bæt it wud bȳ ðe greteſt miſtek tu ſȳpōz ðat ðis imej givz æs ðe ōnli wē in whiç ðát vouel iz, and kan bȳ, pronóunſt. ðe iç indiuidiual mē hav hiz ōn wē ov plēſiŋ ðe tæŋ in pronóunſiŋ *i*, wȳ hav ōnli tu trei ðe eksperiment in order tu konvíns ourſelvz ðat, wiť sām efort, wȳ mē veri ðát poziſon in meni wēz and yet prodiús ðe ſound ov *i*. When, ðerfor, in mei “Lektiurz on ðe Seiens ov Langwej,” ei gev piktiurz ov ðe poziſonz ov ðe vōkal organz rekweird for pronounſiŋ ðe tipikal leterz ov ðe alfabet, ei tuk gret ker tu mēk ðem tipikal, ðát iz, tu lȳv ðem ræf ſkegez ræder ðan miniút fōtografs. Ei kanot beter ekspres whot ei fȳl on ðis point ðan bei kwōtiŋ ðe wōrdz ov Hæckel:—

“For didaktik pōrpoſez, ſimpel ſkȳmatik figiurz ar far mōr yuſful ðan piktiurz prezerviŋ ðe greteſt fæťfulnes tu netiur and karid out wiť ðe greteſt akiurasi.” (“Ziele und Wege,” p. 37.)

Tu retōrn, after ðis digreſon, tu Mr Pitman’s alfabet, ei repȳt ðat it komendz iťſelf tu mei meind bei whot æderz kol iťs inakiurasi. It ſōz iťs rȳal and praktikal wiſdom bei not atemptiŋ tu fiks eni diſtȳŋkſonz whiç ar not abſoliutli neſeſeri. If, for inſtans, wȳ tēk ðe gȳtōral teniuis, wȳ feind ðat Ingliſ rekogneizez wōn *k* ōnli, oldō iťs pronōnsiēſon veriz konſiderabli. It iz

səmteimz pronounst sɔ az tu prodiús olmost a fəp krak ; səmteimz it haz a dip, holə sound ; and səmteimz a soft, lezi, *mouillé* karakter. It veriz konsiderabli akordin tu ðe vouel whiç foləz it, az enibodi mɛ hɪr, nɛ fɪl, if hɪ pronounsez, in sɛksɛsɔn, *kot, kyl, kar, kat, kit*. Bɛt az Ingliʃ dɔz not yuz ðiz diferent kɔ for ðe pɔrpos ov distingwiʃɪŋ wɔrdz or gramatikal formz, wɛn brɔð kategori ɔnli ov voisles gɔtʃrəl ʧɛks haz tu bɪ admited in reitiŋ Ingliʃ. In ðe Semitik langwejez ðe kɛs iz diferent ; not ɔnli ar *kaf* and *kof* diferent in sound, bɛt ðis diferens iz yuzd tu distingwiʃ diferent miɪniŋz.

Or if wɪ tɛk ðe vouel *a* in its orijinal, piur pronɔnsiɛsɔn, laik Italian *a*, wɪ kan ɟzili pɛrsɪv ðat it haz diferent kɔlorz in diferent kountiz ov Ingland. Yet in reitiŋ it mɛ bɪ trijted az wɛn, bekɔz it haz bɛt wɛn and ðe sɛm gramatikal intensɔn, and dɔz not konvɛ a niu miɪniŋ til it ɛksɟdz its weidest limits. Gud spɪkɛrz in Ingland pronouns ðe *a* in *last* laik ðe piur Italian *a* ; wið ɛðɛrz it bekɔmz brɔð, wið ɛðɛrz ðin. Bɛt ðɔ it mɛ ðɔs osilet konsiderabli, it mɔst not enkrɔç on ðe provins ov *e*, whiç wud ʧɛɲj its miɪniŋ tu *lest* ; nor on ðe provins ov *o*, whiç wud ʧɛɲj it tu *lost* ; nor on ðe provins ov *u*, whiç wud ʧɛɲj it tu *lust*.

Ðe difɪksɪti, ðɛrfɔr, whiç Arçbisɔp Trench haz pointed out iz rɟali restrikted tu ðɔz kɛsɛz whɛr ðe pronɔnsiɛsɔn ov vouelz—for it iz wið vouelz ʧɪfli ðat wɪ ar trɛsbeld—veriz sɔ mɔç az tu ɔvɛrstep ðe brɔðest limits ov wɛn ov ðe rekɔgneizd kategoriz ov sound, and tu enkrɔç on anðɛr. If wɪ tɛk ðe wɔrd *fast*, whiç iz pronounst veri diferentli ɟven bei ediuɟeted pipel, ðɛr wud bɪ nɔ nesɛsiti for indiketiŋ in reitiŋ ðe diferent sɛdz ov pronɔnsiɛsɔn whiç lei betwiɲ ðe sound ov ðe fɔrt Italian *a* and ðe loŋ *a* herd in *father*. Bɛt when ðe *a* in *fast* iz pronounst

leik *de a* in *fat*, ðen ðe nesesiti ov a niu grafik eksponent wud areiz, and Arçbifop Trench wud bj reit in twiting fōnetik reformerz wið saŋkŋoniŋ tŋ spelinj for ðe sem wɔrd.

Ei kud menŋon ðe nemz ov frj bifops, wɔn ov hum pronounst ðe vouel in *God* leik *God*, anðer leik *rod*, a ðerd leik *gad*. ðe last prononsieŋon wud probabli bj kondemd bei everibodi, bɔt ðe sðer tŋ wud remen, saŋkŋond bei ðe heiest aŋoritɪ, and ðerfor retend in fōnetik reitinj.

Sø far, ðen, ei admit ðat Arçbifop Trench haz pointed out a rjal difikɔlti inhjrent in fōnetik reitinj; bɔt whot iz ðát wɔn difikɔlti komperd wið ðe difikɔltiz ov ðe prezent sistem ov Ingliŋ spelinj? It wud not bj onest tu trei tu eved hiz ɟarj, bei seiŋ ðat ðer iz bɔt wɔn prononsieŋon rekogneizd bei ðe yuzej ov ediuketed pipel. ðát iz not sɔ, and ðeɔz hu nɔ best ðe beioloji ov langweij, nɔ ðat it kanot bj sɔ. ðe veri leif ov langweij konsists in a konstant frikŋon betwijn ðe sentripetal fɔrs ov kɔstom and ðe sentrifugal fɔrs ov individual frjdom. Agenst ðát difikɔlti ðerfor ðer iz nɔ remedi. Onli hjr agen ðe Arçbifop sijnz tu hav øverlukt ðe fakt ðat ðe difikɔlti belonjz tu ðe prezent sistem ov spelinj njrli az mɔç az tu ðe fōnetik sistem. ðer iz bɔt wɔn rekogneizd wɛ ov spelinj, bɔt everibodi pronounsez akordinj tu hiz øn idiosinkrasiz. It wud bj ðe sem wið fōnetik spelinj. Wɔn prononsieŋon, ðe best rekogneizd, wud hav tu bj adopted az a standard in fōnetik reitinj, liviŋ tu everi Ingliŋman hiz frjdom tu pronouns az sijnest gud tu him. Wj sud lɔz nɔstij ov whot wj nou pozés, and ol ðe advantejez ov fōnetik reitinj wud remen ønimperd. ðe rjal stet ov ðe kes iz, ðerfor, ðis—Nowɔn defendz ðe prezent sistem ov spelinj; everiwɔn admits ðe sɔrɪs

injuri whic it inflikts on nasonal ediukeſon. Everibodi admits de praktikal advantejez ov fōnetik ſpeliſ, bſt after dāt, ol eksklēm dāt a reform ov ſpeliſ, wheder parſal or komplīt, iz impoſibel. Wheder it iz impoſibel or not, ei gladli liv tu men ov de wōrld tu deſeid. Az a ſkolar, az a ſtiudent ov de histori ov langgwej, ei ſimpli menten dāt in everi riten langgwej a reform ov ſpeliſ iz, ſuner or lēter, inevitabel. Nō dout de jvil de mē bj put of. Ei hav litel dout dāt it wil bj put of for meni jenereſonz, and dāt a rjal reform wil probabli not bj karid ekſept konkōrentli wiđ a veiolent ſōjal konvōlſon. Ōnli let de kwēſtion bj argiud fērli. Let fakts hav ſym wet, and let it not bj ſpōzd bei men ov de wōrld dāt dōz hū defend de prinsipelz ov de *Fōnetik Niuz* ar ōnli tjtōtalerz and vejeterianz, hū hav never lernd hou tu ſpel.

If ei hav ſpōken ſtronli in ſpōrt ov Mr Pitman'z ſiſtem, it iz not bekōz on ol points ei konſider it ſiupjrior tu de ſiſtemz preperd bei ſder reformerz, hū ar deli inkriſiſ in nōmber; bſt gijfi bekōz it haz bjn tested ſō larjli, and haz ſtud de test wel. Mr. Pitman'z *Fōnetik Jernal* haz nou [1894] bjn pōbliſt fifti-ſtri jīrz, and if it iz nōn dāt it iz pōbliſt wīkli in 23,000 kopiz, iġ kopi reprezentīſ at liſt fōr or feiv rīderz, it mē not ſjm ſō veri fuliſ, after ol, if wī imajin dāt dēr iz ſym veital pouer in dāt inſignifikant jerm.

SPELLING REFORM IN FRENCH.

IT is generally supposed that the necessity of a reform in spelling is felt in England only, or that, at all events, there are more irregularities and abuses to reform in the spelling of English than of any other language. French, Spanish and Italian have often been held up as models of what spelling ought to be; and the spelling reform carried out in Germany by order of Bismarck has been appealed to as showing that where there is a will there is a way of removing at least the more glaring blemishes in the traditional systems of orthography.

We have lately been informed, however (see *Times*, Jan. 28, 1893), that in France also the shoe begins to pinch. A committee appointed by the French Academy, which in literary matters is not less dictatorial than Bismarck himself, has reported in favour of a small number of spelling reforms to be adopted in the next edition of its famous dictionary¹. Hyphens, we are told, are to be abolished in such compounds as *eau-de-vie*, likewise the apostrophe in such words as *entr'aider*. Foreign words, such as *break* and *spleen*,

¹ *Le Maître Phonétique*; organe de l'Association Phonétique des Professeurs des Langues vivantes.

are to be written *brec* and *spline*. Latin plurals like *errata* are to take an *s*, as *erratas*; *sœur* and *paon* are to become *seur* and *pan*. *Ph* is to become *f*, and in plurals *x* is to be changed to *s*.

Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte, but the Academy will find that this *premier pas*, however small, will cost them a great deal of trouble. Bismarck, indeed, was able to say, 'So far, and no farther'; but in a republic the large number of spelling reformers, now that they have tasted blood, will not be satisfied till they get a great deal more than such small concessions. Spelling reform is one of those questions where the argument is all on one side, but the heavy weight of unreasoning authority all on the other. What can be said against the arguments in favour of consistent spelling except what was said against Dr. Fell? The supporters of the *Fonetik Nuz* in England have been indefatigable, but they are not popular, and what results can they show except here and there a newspaper venturing to spell *program* instead of *programme*, because there is *epigram* and *telegram*; or committing itself to the etymological anachronism of writing *honor* instead of *honour*? In France the *Société de Reforme Orthographique* has been very active in agitating and trying to get public support for a limited measure of reform which they wish to see introduced into the elementary schools, and adopted by Government in all official documents. It seems as if they had really succeeded at last in gaining the ear of the public. There are two kinds of spelling reform. One class of reformers is satisfied with nothing short of a complete phonetic revolution. They follow the

example of the once famous *Fonetik Nuz*. Write, they say, as you speak; but they do not say how we are to speak; and in these days they would hardly venture to deny Home Rule in pronunciation to Ireland, Scotland, or Wales—perhaps even to England. Another class of reformers is satisfied with less. They only want to remove glaring inconsistencies in the traditional spelling, which in many cases are quite recent, and often due to the whims of compositors rather than to the wishes of more or less pedantic authors. The radical party of spelling reformers is represented in France by M. Paul Passy and his friends; the more moderate party has put forward its programme through the *Société de Reforme Orthographique*. What M. Paul Passy would make of French spelling may be seen from the following specimen taken from *Le Maître Phonétique*.

kô:ferâ:s a la sôrbôn

syr l âsɛnmâ de lâ:g vi:vât

Êsi k nu l avjô di, mæsɟ M. Bréal, dâ l êstity, a kômâ:se a la sôrbôn yn seri d kô:ferâ:s syr l âsɛnmâ de lâ:g vi:vât. la prêmjer a y ljø l vâdrædi 26 fevrie, dvât ên o:ditwa:r dâ 150 person, prôfæsœ:r, êstitytris e etýdjâ.

â kômâ:sâ sa kô:ferâ:s. mæsɟ B. a raple l êportâ:s dâ l âsɛnmâ de lâ:g vi:vât, zeneralnâ rkony, pũisk i j a â s mômâ a pa:ri, 157 ku:r pyblik d â:gle, 107 d almâ, 47 d espanøl e 6 d italjê. me si ôn € dakœ:r syr l êportâ:s dâ st âsɛnma, ô n l € ni syr lœ byt k i dwa

vi:ze ni syr le mwajê k i dwa âplwaje; s ki tje a l
apsâ:s dâ tut tradisjô, e o rkrytmâ dy personel âsenâ,
fe œ pø o hazar zyskê dâ se dernjerz ane. [a s prôpo
mæsijø B. rakô:t k œ pølone, vny â frâ:s a la suit dez
evenmâ dâ 1832, e nôme prôfescœ:r d almâ dâz œ lise
dy midi malgre se prôtesta:sjô d inôrâ:s, s et akite t
se fôksjô êprôvi:ze ân âsenâ pâdâ plyzjœ:rz ane l pølone
oljø d I almâ. lørsk œn êspektoœ:r ki par azar save l
almâ, yt â:iê dekuver la jo:z, i le:sa l prôfescœ:r, deza
a:ze, kô:tinqe sôn âsenmâ zysk a s k il y drwa a la
rtret.]

syr lø byt mê:m dâ l âsenmâ de lâ:g, i j a døz ôpinjô
prê:sipal.

lez œ di:s kœ l âsenmâ zgô:de:r dâvâ vi:ze a fôrme
dez om e nô de spesjalist, i n fo pa rjerse dâ l etyd, de
lâ:g œ byt imedjatmâ pratik, me plyto la kyly:r
general dâ l espri. k ôn apren oz ele:v a lir lez o:tœ:r,
a ekri:r pasablêmâ œ tem fasil; k ô lœr fas gute le
bote d Goethe e d Shakespear; me k ô n s atardœ pa
a fe:r dez egzersis dâ prônô:sja:sjô u d kô:versa:sjô;
dajœ:r lœ tâ mâkre pur ari:ve a parle yn lâ:g etrâ:zœ:r;
sø ki i tjen i parvjê:drô ply syr:mâ par œ sezu:r a l
etrâ:ze.

lez o:trœ repô:d kœ le lâ:g vi:vât nœ dwaf pa s âsene
kœm de lâ:g mœrt. pœ:se tu l tâ de klâ:s a etydje de
lâ:g k ôn a if pa a savwar, sa fini:re par lœ:se la
pasjâ:z dez ele:v — e de parâ, lœ tâ k ôn akœrdœ
mê:tnâ o lâ:g vi:vât œ larzœmâ syfi:zâ (a kôdisjô d œd
bj^ reparti). si l â:senmâ d yn lâ:g

France has passed through many revolutions, but it
seems hardly credible that Frenchmen would now
break so completely with the past as the writers of

this page of phonetic French. It is true, the spelling reformers have high authorities to appeal to. Descartes, in 1638, declared himself a complete believer in phonetic writing. 'I must openly express my opinion,' he wrote, 'that if we exactly followed pronunciation in writing it would be a greater advantage to strangers in helping them to learn our language, than an embarrassment to ourselves, owing to the ambiguity of certain equivocal terms. It is in speaking that one composes a language, rather than in writing; and if the pronunciation of certain equivocal terms should cause any ambiguity, usage would soon lead to a change in order to avert it.'

These are brave words, and they are perfectly true in the abstract. Still, we must remember that even Descartes shrank from carrying out his reforming ideas. The members of the *Société de Reforme Orthographique* declare themselves satisfied with much smaller concessions. But they have at least the courage of their opinions, and carry out in their publications what they consider right. The wedge of their reforms is so thin and so sharp that it has actually pierced through the armour of the Academy—nay, that it has even touched the heart of the Government, and elicited a certain qualified approval of a reform in spelling from Ministerial authorities. One of their most plausible reforms is the suppression of the *x* when it has taken the place of an original *s*. Why should we write *chevaux* instead of *chevaus*? It is well known that the *s* of the plural in French is the representative of the *s* of the accusative plural in Latin. *Chevaus*, the old way of spelling, stands for *cavallos*. The plural of the articles is *les*—i.e. *illos*.

Then why should the dative for *à les* be *aux*, instead of *aus*? And why should such Latin words as *caules*, *regales*, *locos*, be represented by *choux*, *royaux*, and *lieux*, instead of *chous*, *royaus*, and *lieus*? There is no excuse whatever for it, as little as there is for *curieux*, but *curieuse*. Why should Latin *pretium* be written *prix*, but *palatium*, *palais*? The *x* in *noix* has nothing to do with the *x* of *nux*, for *noix* stands for the accusative *nucem*. And if *noix* is written with an *x*, why should *rois* (i.e. *royau*) be written with an *s*? All these *x*'s owe their origin to a mere misapprehension. The final *s* after vowels was often abbreviated in writing, and it was this sign of abbreviation which was mistaken for an *x*, just as in English the abbreviated spelling of *the* was misread as *ye*.

This *x* therefore seems to be doomed, and, like most reforms, this also will only be a return to the original state of things, for before the fifteenth century everybody wrote *royaus*, *curieus*, *pris*, *nois*, &c.

A very troublesome abuse in French consists in the doubling of consonants. Voltaire wrote *aprocher*, *souffrir*, *couroux*, *alumer*. No printer would tolerate such forms now; he would correct them at once, and print *approcher*, *souffrir*, *courroux*, *allumer*. The same men, however, would correct *aggréger* into *agréger*. No reason is given for these double letters; they may have an etymological justification, but they are certainly not pronounced, except by some people who seem to imagine that by saying *cour-roux* they can express a higher degree of wrath than by *couroux*. Why should we have to write *honneur* for 'honour,' but *honorer*, 'to honour'; why *ennemi* for 'enemy,'

but *inimitié*, 'enmity'; why *siffler*, 'to whistle,' but *persifler*, 'to mock,' when neither etymology nor pronunciation requires it?

As the termination of the third person singular is *t*, and as this *t* absorbs the final consonant—as, for instance, *il dort* for *il dormt*; why should we not write *il pert*, *il prent*, *il répont*, instead of *il perd*, *il prend*, *il répond*? And, in the same way, as the termination of the first and second persons is *s*, why not write *tu prens*, as one writes *tu dors*? Racine still wrote *je prens*, *j'attens*, *je répons*; why should we have to write *je prends*, *j'attends*, *je réponds*?

The etymological argument has lost much of its former favour. Formerly it was most powerful, and for a scholar to propose to write in English *det* instead of *debt* was considered not very far from sacrilege. Yet, if Descartes is right in saying that language is spoken first, and afterwards written; also, if students of language are right that there is method in the mad phonetic changes which every spoken language undergoes, while there is none in the spelling adopted by various printing-offices, it is clear that what is possible in a language spoken must be possible in a language written, and that a knowledge of the system according to which a spoken language changes must be a safer guide to the etymologist than the present haphazard spelling of compositors and readers. If we once know that dissimilar consonants in Latin are assimilated in French, we know that *dette* may stand for *debita*, just as *recette* stands for *recepta*, a receipt. We have only to go back a few hundred years in order to discover the etymological spelling of many French words. But not even the Academy

could now restore *froid* to *froigd*, though it retains *doigt*, 'finger'; or *même* to *mesme*, *chrétien* to *chrestien*, *contrôle* to *contrerolle*, or *girofle* to *caryophyllum*.

We wish every success to the spelling reformers of France. The reforms which they propose at present are certainly very moderate and reasonable. - But no nation is more sensitive to what is pedantic and awkward than the French, and it is not likely that they will ever tolerate such words as *filosofie* and *téologie*.

GERMAN LITERATURE¹.

THERE is no country where so much interest is taken in the literature of Germany as in England, and there is no country where the literature of England is so much appreciated as in Germany. Some of the German classics, whether poets or philosophers, are read by Englishmen with the same attention as their own; and the historians, the novel-writers, and the poets of England have exercised, and continue to exercise, a most powerful and beneficial influence on the people of Germany. In recent times the literature of the two countries has almost grown into one. Lord Macaulay's History has not only been translated into German, but reprinted at Leipzig in the original; and it is said to have had a larger sale in Germany than the work of any German historian. Baron Humboldt and Baron Bunsen address their writings to the English as much as to the German public.

¹ This article formed the Preface to a collection of extracts published in 1858, under the title of 'German Classics.' The extracts are arranged chronologically, and extend from the fourth to the nineteenth century. They are given in the original Gothic, Old High-German, and Middle High-German with translations, while in the more modern portions the difficult words only are explained in notes. A list of the principal works from which the extracts are taken will be found at the end of the article, p. 350.

The novels of Dickens and Thackeray are expected with the same impatience at Leipzig and Berlin as in London. The two great German classics, Schiller and Goethe, have found their most successful biographers in Carlyle and Lewes; and several works of German scholarship have met with more attentive and thoughtful readers in the colleges of England, than in the universities of Germany. Goethe's idea of a world-literature has, to a certain extent, been realized; and the strong feeling of sympathy between the best classes in both countries holds out a hope that, for many years to come, the supremacy of the Teutonic race, not only in Europe, but over all the world, will be maintained in common by the two champions of political freedom and of the liberty of thought—Protestant England and Protestant Germany.

The interest, however, which Englishmen take in German literature, has hitherto been confined almost exclusively to the literature of the last fifty years, and very little is known of those fourteen centuries during which the German language had been growing up and gathering strength for the great triumphs which were achieved by Lessing, Schiller, and Goethe. Nor is this to be wondered at. The number of people in England who take any interest in the early history of their own literature is extremely small, and there is as yet no history of English literature worthy of that name. It cannot be expected therefore that in England many people will care to read in the original the ancient epic poems of the 'Nibelunge' or 'Gudrun,' or acquire a grammatical knowledge of the Gothic of Ulfilas and the Old High-German of Otfried. Gothic,

Old High-German, and Middle High-German are three distinct languages, each possessing its own grammar, each differing from the others and from Modern German more materially than the Greek of Homer differs from the Greek of Demosthenes. Even in Germany these languages are studied only by professional antiquarians and scholars, and they do not form part of the general system of instruction in public schools and universities. The study of Gothic grammar alone (where we still find a dual in addition to the singular and plural, and where some tenses of the passive are still formed, as in Greek and Latin, without auxiliary verbs) would require as much time as the study of Greek grammar, though it would not offer the key to a literature like that of Greece. Old High-German, again, is as difficult a language to a German as Anglo-Saxon is to an Englishman; and the Middle High-German of the 'Nibelunge,' of Wolfram, and Walther, nay even of Eckhart and Tauler, is more remote from the language of Goethe, than Chaucer is from Tennyson.

But, without acquiring a grammatical knowledge of these ancient languages, there are, I believe, not a few people who wish to know something of the history of German Literature. Nor is this, if properly taught, a subject of narrow or merely antiquarian interest. The history of literature reflects and helps us to interpret the political history of a country. It contains, as it were, the confession which every generation, before it passed away, has made to posterity. 'Without Literary History,' as Lord Bacon says, 'the History of the World seemeth to be as the Statue of Polyphemus with his eye out;

that part being wanting which doth most shew the spirit and life of the person.' From this point of view the historian of literature learns to value what to the critic would seem unmeaning and tedious, and he is loth to miss the works even of mediocre poets, where they throw light on the times in which they lived, and serve to connect the otherwise disjointed productions of men of the highest genius, separated, as these necessarily are, by long intervals in the annals of every country.

Although there exists no literature to reward the student of Gothic, yet every one who cares for the history of Germany and of German thought, should know something of Ulfilas, the great Bishop of the Goths, who anticipated the work of Luther by more than a thousand years, and who, at a time when Greek and Latin were the only two respectable and orthodox languages of Europe, dared for the first time to translate the Bible into the vulgar tongue of Barbarians, as if foreseeing with a prophetic eye the destiny of these Teutonic tribes, whose language, after Greek and Latin had died away, was to become the life-spring of the Gospel over the whole civilised world. He ought to know something of those early missionaries and martyrs, most of them sent from Ireland and England to preach the Gospel in the dark forests of Germany—men like St. Gall (died 638), St. Kilian (died 689), and St. Boniface (died 755), who were not content with felling the sacred oak-trees and baptizing unconverted multitudes, but founded missionary stations, and schools, and monasteries; working hard themselves in order to acquire a knowledge of the language

and the character of the people, and drawing up those curious lists of barbarous words, with their no less barbarous equivalents in Latin, which we still possess, though copied by a later hand. He ought to know the gradual progress of Christianity and civilisation in Germany, previous to the time of Charlemagne; for we see from the German translations of the Rules of the Benedictine monks, of ancient Latin Hymns, the Creeds, the Lord's Prayer, and portions of the New Testament, that the good sense of the national clergy had led them to do what Charlemagne had afterwards to enjoin by repeated Capitularia¹. It is in the history of German literature that we learn what Charlemagne really was. Though claimed as a Saint by the Church of Rome, and styled *Empereur Français* by modern French historians, Karl was really and truly a German king, proud, no doubt, of his Roman subjects, and of his title of Emperor, and anxious to give to his uncouth Germans the benefit of Italian and English teachers, but fondly attached in his heart to his own mother tongue, to the lays and laws of his fatherland: feelings displayed in his own attempt to compose a German grammar, and in his collection of old national songs, fragments of which may have been preserved to us in the ballads of Hildebrand and Hadubrand.

After the death of Charlemagne, and under the reign of the good but weak King Ludwig, the prospects of a national literature in Germany became

¹ 'Ut easdem homilias quisque (episcopus) aperte transferre studeat in *rusticam romanam* linguam aut *theodiscam*, quo facilius cuncti possint intelligere quae dicantur.'—Conc. Tur. can. 17. Wackernagel, 'Geschichte der Deutschen Literatur,' § 26.

darkened. In one instance, indeed, the king was the patron of a German poet; for he encouraged the author of the 'Heliand' to write that poem for the benefit of his newly converted countrymen. But he would hardly have approved of the thoroughly German and almost heathen spirit which pervades that Saxon epic of the New Testament, and he expressed his disgust at the old German poems which his great father had taught him in his youth. The seed, however, which Charlemagne had sown had fallen on healthy soil, and grew up even without the sunshine of royal favour. The monastery of Fulda, under Hrabanus Maurus, the pupil of Alcuin, became the seminary of a truly national clergy. Here it was that Otfried, the author of the rhymed Gospel-book, was brought up. In the meantime, the heterogeneous elements of the Carlovingian empire broke asunder. Germany, by losing its French and Italian provinces, became Germany once more. Ludwig the German was king of Germany, Hrabanus Maurus archbishop of Mayence; and the spirit of Charlemagne, Alcuin, and Eginhard was revived at Aachen, Fulda, and many other places, such as St. Gall, Weissenburg, and Corvey, where schools were founded on the model of that of Tours. The translation of the Harmony of the Gospels gives us a specimen of the quiet studies of those monasteries, whereas the lay on the victory of Lewis III over the Normans, in 881, reminds us of the dangers that threatened Germany from the West, at the same time that the Hungarians began their inroads from the East. The Saxon Emperors had hard battles to fight against these invaders. and there were few

places in Germany where the peaceful pursuits of the monasteries and schools could be carried on without interruption. St. Gall is the one bright star in the approaching gloom of the next centuries. Not only was the Bible read, and translated, and commented upon in German at St. Gall, as formerly at Fulda, but Greek and Roman classics were copied and studied for educational purposes. Notker Teutonicus is the great representative of that school, which continued to maintain its reputation for theological and classical learning, and for a careful cultivation of the national language, nearly to the close of the eleventh century. At the court of the Saxon Emperors, though their policy was thoroughly German, there was little taste for German poetry. The Queen of Otto I was a Lombard, the Queen of Otto II a Greek lady; and their influence was not favourable to the rude poetry of national bards. If some traces of their work have been preserved to us, we owe it again to the more national taste of the monks of St. Gall and Passau. They translate some of the German epics into Latin verse, such as the poem of the Nibelunge, of Walther of Aquitain, and of Ruodlieb. The first is lost; but the other two have been preserved and published¹. The stories of the Fox and the Bear, and the other animals,—a branch of poetry so peculiar to Germany, and epic rather than didactic in its origin,—attracted the attention of the monks; and it is owing again to their Latin translations that the existence of this curious style of poetry can be traced back so far as

¹ 'Lateinische Gedichte des X. und XI. Jahrhunderts,' von J. Grimm und A. Schmeller. Göttingen, 1838.

the tenth century¹. As these poems are written in Latin, they could not find a place in a German reading-book ; but they, as well as the unduly suspected Latin plays of the nun Hrosvitha, throw much light on the state of German civilisation during the tenth and eleventh centuries.

The eleventh century presents almost an entire blank in the history of literature. Under the Frankish or Salic dynasty, Germany had either to defend herself against the inroads of Hungarian and Slavonic armies, or it was the battle-field of violent feuds between the Emperors and their vassals. The second half of that century was filled with the struggles between Henry IV and Pope Gregory VII. The clergy, hitherto the chief support of German literature, became estranged from the German people ; and the insecurity of the times was unfavourable to literary pursuits. Williram's German had lost the classical correctness of Notker's language, and the 'Merigarto,' and similar works, are written in a hybrid style, which is neither prose nor poetry. The Old High-German had become a literary language chiefly through the efforts of the clergy, and the character of the whole Old High-German literature is pre-eminently clerical. The Crusades put an end to the preponderance of the clerical element in the literature of Germany. They were, no doubt, the work of the clergy. By using to the utmost the influence which they had gradually gained and carefully fomented, the priests were able to rouse a whole nation to

¹ 'Reinhard Fuchs,' von Jacob Grimm. Berlin, 1834. 'Sendschreiben an Karl Lachmann.' Leipzig, 1840.

a pitch of religious enthusiasm never known before or after. But the Crusades were the last triumph of the clergy; and with their failure the predominant influence of the clerical element in German society is checked and extinguished.

From the first beginning of the Crusades the interest of the people was with the knight—no longer with the priest. The chivalrous emperors of the Hohenstaufen dynasty formed a new rallying point for all national sympathies. Their courts, and the castles of their vassals, offered a new and more genial home to the poets of Germany than the monasteries of Fulda and St. Gall. Poetry changed hands. The poets took their inspirations from real life, though they borrowed their models from the romantic cycles of Brittany and Provence. Middle High-German, the language of the Swabian court, became the language of poetry. The earliest compositions in that language continue for a while to bear the stamp of the clerical poetry of a former age. The first Middle High-German poems are written by a nun, and the poetical translation of the Books of Moses, the poem on Anno, bishop of Cologne, and the Chronicle of the Roman Emperors, all continue to breathe the spirit of cloisters and cathedral-towns. And when a new taste for chivalrous romances was awakened in Germany; when the stories of Arthur and his knights, of Charlemagne and his champions, of Achilles, Aeneas, and Alexander, in their modern dress, were imported by French and Provençal knights, who, on their way to Jerusalem, came to stay at the castles of their German allies, the first poets who ventured to imitate these motley compositions were priests, not laymen. A few

short extracts from Konrad's 'Roland,' and Lamprecht's 'Alexander,' are sufficient to mark this period of transition. Like Charlemagne, who had been changed into a legendary hero by French poets before he became again the subject of German poetry, another German worthy returned at the same time to his native home, though but slightly changed by his foreign travels, 'Reinhard the Fox.' The influence of Provence and of Flanders is seen in every branch of German poetry at that time: and yet nothing can be more different than the same subject, as treated by French and German poets. The German Minnesänger in particular were far from being imitators of the Trouvères or Troubadours. There are a few solitary instances of lyric poems translated from Provençal into German¹; as there is, on the other hand, one poem translated from German into Italian², early in the thirteenth century. But the great mass of German lyrics are of purely German growth. Neither the Romans, nor the lineal descendants of the Romans, the Italians, the Provençals, the Spaniards, can claim that poetry as their own. It is Teutonic, purely Teutonic in its heart and soul, though its utterance, its rhyme and metre, its grace and imagery, have been touched by the more genial rays of the brilliant sun of a more southern sky. The same applies to the great romantic poems of that period. The first impulse came from abroad. The subjects were borrowed

¹ Poems of Grave Ruodolf von Fenis, Her Bernger von Horheim; see 'Des Minnesangs Frühling,' by Lachmann and Haupt. Leipzig, 1857.

² Poem of the 'Kürenberger'; see 'Des Minnesangs Frühling,' pp. 8 and 230.

from a foreign source, and the earlier poems, such as Heinrich von Veldecke's *Aeneid*, might occasionally paraphrase the sentiments of French poets. But in the works of Hartmann von Aue, Wolfram von Eschenbach, and Gottfried von Strassburg, we breathe again the pure German air: and we cannot but regret that these men should have taken the subjects of their poems, with their unpronounceable names, extravagant conceits, and licentious manners, from foreign sources, while they had at home their grand mythology, their heroic traditions, their kings and saints, which would have been more worthy subjects than Tristan and Isold, Schionatulander and Sigune. There were new thoughts stirring in the hearts and minds of those men of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. A hundred years before Dante, the German poets had gazed with their eyes wide open into that infinite reality which underlies our short existence on earth. To Wolfram, and to many a poet of his time, the human tragedy of this world presented the same unreal, transitory, and transparent aspect which we find again in Dante's '*Divine Comedy*.' Everything points to another world. Beauty, love, virtue, happiness,—everything, in fact, that moves the heart of the poet,—has a hidden reference to something higher than this life; and the highest object of the highest poetry seems to be to transfer the mind to those regions where men feel the presence of a Divine power and a Divine love, and are lost in blissful adoration. The beginning of the thirteenth century is as great an era in the history of German literature as the beginning of the nineteenth. The German mind was completely regenerated. Old words, old thoughts, old

metres, old fashions were swept away, and a new spring dawned over Germany. The various branches of the Teutonic race which, after their inroads into the seats of Roman civilisation, had for a time become separated, were beginning to assume a national independence,—when suddenly a new age of migration threatened to set in. The knights of France and Flanders, of England, Lombardy, and Sicily, left their brilliant castles. They marched to the East, carrying along with them the less polished, but equally enthusiastic, nobility of Germany. From the very first the spirit of the Roman towns in Italy and Gaul had exercised a more civilising influence on the Barbarians who had crossed the Alps and the Rhine, whereas the Germans of Germany proper had been left to their own resources, assisted only by the lessons of the Roman clergy. Now, at the beginning of the Crusades, the various divisions of the German race met again, but they met as strangers; no longer with the impetuosity of Franks and Goths, but with the polished reserve of a Godefroy of Bouillon and the chivalrous bearing of a Frederick Barbarossa. The German emperors and nobles opened their courts to receive their guests with brilliant hospitality. Their festivals, the splendour and beauty of their tournaments, attracted crowds from great distances, and foremost among them poets and singers. It was at such festivals as Heinrich von Veldeke describes at Mayence, in 1184, under Frederick I, that French and German poetry were brought face to face. It was here that high-born German poets learnt from French poets the subjects of their own romantic compositions. German ladies became the patrons of German poets;

and the etiquette of French chivalry was imitated at the castles of German knights. Poets made bold for the first time to express their own feelings, their joys and sufferings, and epic poetry had to share its honours with lyric songs. Not only France and Germany, but England and Northern Italy were drawn into this gay society. Henry II married Eleanor of Poitou, and her grace and beauty found eloquent admirers in the army of the Crusaders. Their daughter Mathilde was married to Henry the Lion, of Saxony, and one of the Provençal poets has celebrated her loveliness. Frenchmen became the tutors of the sons of the German nobility. French manners, dresses, dishes, and dances were the fashion everywhere. The poetry which flourished at the castles was soon adopted by the lower ranks. Traveling poets and jesters are frequently mentioned, and the poems of the 'Nibelunge' and 'Gudrun,' such as we now possess them, were composed at that time by poets who took their subjects, their best thoughts and expressions, from the people, but imitated the language, the metre, and the manners of the court-poets. The most famous courts to which the German poets resorted, and where they were entertained with generous hospitality, were the court of Leopold, Duke of Austria (1198-1230), and of his son Frederick II; of Hermann, Landgrave of Thuringia, who resided at the Wartburg, near Eisenach (1190-1215); of Berthold, Duke of Zähringen (1186-1218); and of the Swabian Emperors in general. At the present day, when not only the language, but even the thoughts of these poets have become to most of us unintelligible and strange, we cannot claim for their poetry more

than an historical interest. But if we wish to know the men who took a leading part in the Crusades, who fought with the Emperors against the Pope, or with the Pope against the Emperors, who lived in magnificent castles like that of the Wartburg, and founded cathedrals like that of Cologne (1248), we must read the poetry which they admired, which they composed or patronised. The subjects of their Romances cannot gain our sympathy. They are artificial, unreal, with little of humanity, and still less of nationality in them. But the mind of a poet like Wolfram von Eschenbach rises above all these difficulties. He has thoughts of his own, truly human, deeply religious, and thoroughly national; and there are expressions and comparisons in his poetry which had never been used before. His style, however, is lengthy, his descriptions tiresome, and his characters somewhat vague and unearthly. As critics, we should have to bestow on Wolfram von Eschenbach, on Gottfried von Strassburg, even on Hartmann von Aue and Walther von der Vogelweide, as much of blame as of praise. But as historians, we cannot value them too highly. If we measure them with the poets that preceded and those that followed them, they tower above all like giants. From the deep marks which they left behind we discover that they were men of creative genius, men who had looked at life with their own eyes, and were able to express what they had seen and thought and felt in a language which fascinated their contemporaries, and which even now holds its charm over all who can bring themselves to study their works in the same spirit in which they read the tragedies of Aeschylus, or the 'Divina Commedia' of Dante.

But the heyday of German chivalry and chivalrous poetry was of short duration. Towards the end of the thirteenth century we begin to feel that the age is no longer aspiring, and hoping, and growing. The world assumes a different aspect. Its youth and vigour seem spent ; and the children of a new generation begin to be wiser and sadder than their fathers. The Crusades languish. Their object, like the object of many a youthful hope, has proved unattainable. The Knights no longer take the Cross 'because God wills it' ; but because the Pope commands a Crusade, bargains for subsidies, and the Emperor cannot decline his demands. Walther von der Vogelweide already is most bitter in his attacks on Rome. Walther was the friend of Frederick II (1215-50), an emperor who reminds us, in several respects, of his namesake of Prussia. He was a sovereign of literary tastes,—himself a poet and a philosopher. Harassed by the Pope, he retaliated most fiercely, and was at last accused of a design to extirpate the Christian religion. The ban was published against him, and his own son rose in rebellion. Germany remained faithful to her Emperor, and the Emperor was successful against his son. But he soon died in disappointment and despair. With him the star of the Swabian dynasty had set, and the sweet sounds of the Swabian lyre died away with the last breath of Corradino, the last of the Hohenstaufen, on the scaffold at Naples, in 1268. Germany was breaking down under heavy burdens. It was visited by the Papal interdict, by famine, by pestilence. Sometimes there was no Emperor, sometimes there were two or three. Rebellion could not be kept under, nor could crime be punished. The

only law was the 'Law of the Fist.' The Church was deeply demoralised. Who was to listen to Romantic poetry? There was no lack of poets or of poetry. Rudolf von Ems, a poet called Der Stricker, and Konrad von Würzburg, all of them living in the middle of the thirteenth century, were more fertile than Hartmann von Aue and Gottfried von Strassburg. They complain, however, that no one took notice of them, and they are evidently conscious themselves of their inferiority. Lyric poetry continued to flourish for a time, but it degenerated into an unworthy idolatry of ladies, and affected sentimentality. There is but one branch of poetry in which we find a certain originality, the didactic and satiric. The first beginnings of this new kind of poetry carry us back to the age of Walther von der Vogelweide. Many of his verses are satirical, political, and didactic; and it is supposed, on very good authority, that Walther was the author of an anonymous didactic poem, Freidank's Bescheidenheit. By Thomasin von Zerclar, or Tommasino di Circlaria, we have a metrical composition on manners, the 'Italian Guest,' which likewise belongs to the beginning of the thirteenth century¹. Somewhat later we meet, in the works of the Stricker, with the broader satire of the middle classes; and towards the close of the century, Hugo von Trimberg, in his 'Renner,' addresses himself to the lower ranks of German society, and no longer to princes, knights, and ladies.

¹ See an account of the Italian Guest of Thomasin von Zerclaria by Eugene Oswald, in 'Queene Elizabeth's Achademy,' edited by F. J. Furnivall. London, 1869. This thoughtful essay contains some important information on Thomasin.

How is this to be accounted for? Poetry was evidently changing hands again. The Crusades had made the princes and knights the representatives and leaders of the whole nation; and during the contest between the imperial and the papal powers, the destinies of Germany were chiefly in the hands of the hereditary nobility. The literature, which before that time was entirely clerical, had then become worldly and chivalrous. But now, when the power of the emperors began to decline, when the clergy were driven into taking a decidedly anti-national position, when the unity of the empire was well nigh destroyed, and princes and prelates were asserting their independence by plunder and by warfare, a new element of society rose to the surface,—the middle classes—the burghers of the free towns of Germany. They were forced to hold together, in order to protect themselves against their former protectors. They fortified their cities, formed corporations, watched over law and morality, and founded those powerful leagues, the first of which, the Hansa, dates from 1241. Poetry also took refuge behind the walls of free towns; and at the fireside of the worthy citizen had to exchange her gay, chivalrous, and romantic strains, for themes more subdued, practical, and homely. This accounts for such works as Hugo von Trimberg's 'Renner,' as well as for the general character of the poetry of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Poetry became a trade like any other. Guilds were formed, consisting of master-singers and their apprentices. Heinrich Frauenlob is called the first Meistersänger; and during the fourteenth, the fifteenth, and even the sixteenth centuries, new guilds or schools sprang up in all the principal towns

of Germany. After order had been restored by the first Hapsburg dynasty, the intellectual and literary activity of Germany retained its centre of gravitation in the middle classes. Rudolf von Habsburg was not gifted with a poetical nature, and contemporaneous poets complain of his want of liberality. Attempts were made to revive the chivalrous poetry of the Crusades by Hugo von Montfort and Oswald von Wolkenstein in the beginning of the fifteenth century, and again at the end of the same century by the 'Last of the German Knights,' the Emperor Maximilian. But these attempts could not but fail. The age of chivalry was gone, and there was nothing great or inspiring in the wars which the Emperors had to wage during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries against their vassals, against the Pope, against the precursors of the Reformation, the Hussites, and against the Turks. In Fritsche Closener's 'Chronicle' there is a description of the citizens of Strassburg defending themselves against their Bishop in 1312; in Twinger's 'Chronicle' a picture of the processions of the Flagellants and the religious enthusiasm of that time (1349). The poems of Suchenwirt and Halbsuter represent the wars of Austria against Switzerland (1386), and Niclas von Weyl's translation gives us a glimpse into the Council of Constance (1414) and the Hussite wars, which were soon to follow. The poetry of those two centuries, which was written by and for the people, is interesting historically; but, with few exceptions, without any further worth. The poets wish to amuse or to instruct their humble patrons, and they do this, either by giving them the dry bones of the romantic poetry of former ages, or

by telling them fables and the quaint stories of the 'Seven Wise Masters.' What beauty there was in a *Meistergesang* may be fairly seen from the poem of Michael Beheim; and the Easter play by no means shows the lowest ebb of good taste in the popular literature of that time.

It might seem, indeed, as if all the high and noble aspirations of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had been lost and forgotten during the fourteenth and fifteenth. And yet it was not quite so. There was one class of men on whom the spirit of true nobility had descended, and whose works form a connecting chain between the great era of the Crusades and the still greater era of the Reformation. These are the so-called Mystics,—true Crusaders, true knights of the spirit, many of whom sacrificed their lives for the cause of truth, and who at last conquered from the hands of the infidels that Holy Sepulchre in which the true Christian faith had been lying buried for centuries. The name of Mystics, which has been given to these men, is apt to mislead. Their writings are not dark or unintelligible, and those who call them so must find Christianity itself unintelligible and dark. There is more broad daylight in Eckhart and Tauler than in the works of all the Thomists and Scotists. Eckhart was not a dreamer. He had been a pupil of Thomas Aquinas, and his own style is sometimes painfully scholastic. But there is a fresh breeze of thought in his works, and in the works of his disciples. They knew that whenever the problems of man's relation to God, the creation of the world, the origin of evil, and the hope of salvation come to be discussed, the sharpest edge of logical reasoning

will turn, and the best defined terms of metaphysics die away into mere music. They knew that the hard and narrow categories of the schoolmen do greater violence to the highest truths of religion than the soft, and vague, and vanishing tones with which they tried to shadow forth in the vulgar language of the people the distant objects which transcend the horizon of human understanding. They did not handle the truths of Christianity as if they should or could be proved by the syllogisms of our human reasoning. Nevertheless these Mystics were hard and honest thinkers, and never played with words and phrases. Their faith is to them as clear and as real as sunshine; and instead of throwing scholastic dust into the eyes of the people, they boldly told them to open their eyes and to look at the mysteries all around them, and to feel the presence of God within and without, which the priests had veiled by the very revelation which they had preached. For a true appreciation of the times in which they lived, the works of these Reformers of the faith are invaluable. Without them we should try in vain to explain how a nation which, to judge from its literature, seemed to have lost all vigour and virtue, could suddenly rise and dare the work of a Reformation of the Church. With them we learn how that same nation, after groaning for centuries under the yoke of superstition and hypocrisy, found in its very prostration the source of an irresistible strength. The higher clergy contributed hardly anything to the literature of these two centuries; and what they wrote would better have remained unwritten. At St. Gall, towards the end of the thirteenth century, the monks, the successors

of Notker, were unable to sign their names. The abbot was a nobleman who composed love-songs,—a branch of poetry at all events out of place in the monastery founded by St. Gall. It is only among the lower clergy that we find the traces of genuine Christian piety and intellectual activity, though frequently branded by obese prelates and obtuse magistrates with the names of mysticism and heresy. The orders of the Franciscans and Dominicans, founded in 1208 and 1215, and intended to act as clerical spies and confessors, began to fraternise in many parts of Germany with the people against the higher clergy. The people were hungry and thirsty after religious teaching. They had been systematically starved, or fed with stones. Part of the Bible had been translated for the people, but what Ulfilas was free to do in the fourth century, was condemned by the prelates assembled at the Synod of Trier in 1231. Nor were the sermons of the itinerant friars in towns and villages always to the taste of bishops and abbots. We possess collections of these discourses, preached by Franciscans and Dominicans under the trees of cemeteries, and from the church-towers of the villages. Brother Berthold, who died in 1272, was a Franciscan. He travelled about the country, and was revered by the poor like a saint and prophet. The doctrine he preached, though it was the old teaching of the Apostles, was as new to the peasants who came to hear him, as it had been to the citizens of Athens who came to hear St. Paul. The saying of St. Chrysostom that Christianity had turned many a peasant into a philosopher, came true again in the time of Eckhart and Tauler. Men who called themselves Christians had been

taught, and had brought themselves to believe, that to read the writings of the Apostles was a deadly sin. Yet in secret they were yearning after that forbidden Bible. They knew that there were translations, and though these translations had been condemned by popes and synods, the people could not resist the temptation of reading them. In 1373, we find the first complete version of the Bible into German, by Matthias of Beheim. Several are mentioned after this. The new religious fervour that had been kindled among the inferior clergy, and among the lower and middle classes of the laity, became stronger; and, though it sometimes degenerated into wild fanaticism, the sacred spark was kept in safe hands by such men as Eckhart (died 1329), Tauler (died 1361), and the author of the German Theology. Men like these are sure to conquer; they are persecuted justly or unjustly, they suffer and die, and all they thought and said and did seems for a time to have been in vain. But suddenly their work, long marked as dangerous in the smooth current of society, rises above the surface like the coral reefs in the Pacific, and it remains for centuries the firm foundation of a new world of thought and faith. Without the labours of these Reformers of the Faith, the Reformers of the Church would never have found a whole nation waiting to receive, and ready to support them.

There are two other events which prepared the way of the German Reformers of the sixteenth century, the foundation of universities and the invention of printing. Their importance is the same in the literary and in the political history of Germany. The intellectual and moral character of a nation is formed

in schools and universities; and those who educate a people have always been its real masters, though they may go by a more modest name. Under the Roman empire public schools had been supported by the government, both at Rome and in the chief towns of the Provinces. We know of their existence in Gaul and parts of Germany. With the decline of the central authority, the salaries of the grammarians and rhetors in the Provinces ceased to be paid, and the pagan gymnasia were succeeded by Christian schools, attached to episcopal sees and monasteries. Whilst the clergy retained their vigour and efficiency, their schools were powerful engines for spreading a half clerical and half classical culture in Germany. During the Crusades, when ecclesiastical activity and learning declined very rapidly, we hear of French tutors at the castles of the nobility, and classical learning gave way to the superficial polish of a chivalrous age. And when the nobility likewise relapsed into a state of savage barbarism, new schools were wanted, and they were founded by the towns, the only places where, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we see any evidence of a healthy political life. The first town schools are mentioned in the beginning of the fourteenth century, and they were soon followed by the high schools and universities. The University of Prague was founded in 1348; Vienna, 1366; Heidelberg, 1386; Erfurt, 1392; Leipzig, 1408; Basle, 1460; Tübingen, 1477; Mainz, 1482. These universities are a novel feature in the history of German and of European civilisation. They are not ecclesiastical seminaries, not restricted to any particular class of society: they are national institu-

tions, open to the rich and the poor, to the knight, the clerk, the citizen. They are real universities of learning: they profess to teach all branches of knowledge,—theology and law, medicine and philosophy. They contain the first practical acknowledgment of the right of every subject to the highest education, and through it to the highest offices in Church and State. Neither Greece nor Rome had known such institutions: neither the Church nor the nobility, during the days of their political supremacy, were sufficiently impressed with the duty which they owed to the nation at large to provide such places of liberal education. It was the nation itself, when forsaken by its clergy and harassed by its nobility, which called these schools into life, and it is in these schools and universities that the great men who inaugurate the next period of literature—the champions of political liberty and religious freedom—were fostered and formed.

The invention of printing was in itself a reformation, and its benefits were chiefly felt by the great masses of the people. The clergy possessed their libraries, where they might read and study if they chose: the castles contained collections of MSS., sacred and profane, illuminated with the most exquisite taste; while the citizen, the poor layman, though he might be able to read and to write, was debarred from the use of books, and had to satisfy his literary tastes with the sermons of travelling Franciscans, or the songs of blind beggars and pedlars. The art of printing admitted that large class to the same privileges which had hitherto been enjoyed almost exclusively by clergy and nobility; it placed in the hands of the

third estate arms more powerful than the swords of the knights and the thunderbolts of the priests: it was a revolution in the history of literature, more eventful than any in the history of mankind. Poets and philosophers addressed themselves no longer to emperors and noblemen, to knights and ladies, but to the people at large, and especially to the middle classes, in which henceforth the chief strength of the nation resides.

The years from 1450 to 1500 form a period of preparation for the great struggle that was to inaugurate the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was an age 'rich in scholars, copious in pedants, but poor in genius, and barren of strong thinkers.' One of the few interesting men, in whose life and writings the history of that preliminary age may be studied, is Sebastian Brant, the famous author of the famous 'Ship of Fools.'

With the sixteenth century, we enter upon the modern history and the modern literature of Germany. We shall here pass on more rapidly, dwelling only on the men in whose writings the political and social changes of Germany can best be studied.

With Luther, the literary language of Germany became New High-German. A change of language invariably betokens a change in the social constitution of a country. In Germany, at the time of the Reformation, the change of language marks the rise of a new aristocracy, which is henceforth to reside in the universities. Literature leaves its former homes. It speaks no longer the language of the towns. It addresses itself no longer to a few citizens, nor to imperial patrons, such as Maximilian I. It indulges

no longer in moral saws, didactic verses, and prose novels, nor is it content with mystic philosophy and the secret outpourings of religious fervour. For a time, though but for a short time, German literature becomes national. Poets and writers wish to be heard beyond the walls of their monasteries and cities. They speak to the whole nation: nay, they desire to be heard beyond the frontiers of their country. Luther and the Reformers belonged to no class,—they belonged to the people. The voice of the people, which, during the preceding periods of literature, could only be heard like the rolling of distant thunder, had now become articulate and distinct, and for a time one thought seemed to unite all classes,—emperors, kings, nobles, and citizens, clergy and laity, high and low, old and young. This is a novel sight in the history of Germany. We have seen in the first period the gradual growth of the clergy, from the time when the first missionaries were massacred in the marshes of Friesland to the time when the Emperor stood penitent before the gates of Canossa. We have seen the rise of the nobility, from the time when the barbarian chiefs preferred living outside the walls of cities to the time when they rivalled the French cavaliers in courtly bearing and chivalrous bravery. Nor were the representatives of these two orders, the Pope and the Emperor, less powerful at the beginning of the sixteenth century than they had been before. Charles V was the most powerful sovereign whom Europe had seen since the days of Charlemagne, and the Papal see had recovered by diplomatic intrigue much of the influence which it had lost by moral depravity. Let us think then

of these two ancient powers : the Emperor with his armies, recruited in Austria, Spain, Naples, Sicily, and Burgundy, and with his treasures brought from Mexico and Peru ; and the Pope with his armies of priests and monks, recruited from all parts of the Christian world, and armed with the weapons of the Inquisition and the thunderbolts of Excommunication ;—let us think of their former victories, their confidence in their own strength, their belief in their divine right ;—and let us then turn our eyes to the small University of Wittenberg, and look into the bleak study of a poor Augustine monk, and see that monk step out of his study with no weapon in his hand but the Bible,—with no armies and no treasures,—and yet defying with his clear and manly voice both Pope and Emperor, both clergy and nobility ;—there is no grander sight in history ; and the longer we allow our eyes to dwell on it, the more we feel that history is not without God, and that at every decisive battle the divine right of truth asserts its supremacy over the divine right of popes and emperors, and overthrows with one breath both empires and hierarchies. We call the Reformation the work of Luther ; but Luther stood not alone, and no really great man ever stood alone. The secret of their greatness lies in their understanding the spirit of the age in which they live, and in giving expression with the full power of faith and conviction to the secret thoughts of millions. Luther was but lending words to the silent soul of suffering Germany, and no one should call himself a Protestant who is not a Lutheran with Luther at the Diet of Worms, and able to say with him in the face of princes and

prelates, 'Here I stand, I can no otherwise, God help me, Amen.'

As the Emperor was the representative of the nobility, as the Pope was the representative of the clergy, Luther was the head and leader of the people, which through him and through his fellow-workers claimed now, for the first time, an equality with the two old estates of the realm. If this national struggle took at first an aspect chiefly religious, it was because the German nation had freedom of thought and of belief more at heart than political freedom. But political rights also were soon demanded, and demanded with such violence, that during his own lifetime Luther had to repress the excesses of enthusiastic theorists and of a violent peasantry. Luther's great influence on the literature of Germany, and the gradual adoption of his dialect as the literary language, were owing in a great measure to this, that whatever there was of literature during the sixteenth century, was chiefly in the hands of one class of men. After the Reformation, nearly all eminent men in Germany, poets, philosophers, and historians, belonged to the Protestant party, and resided chiefly in the Universities.

The Universities were what the Monasteries had been under Charlemagne, the Castles under Frederick Barbarossa,—the centres of gravitation for the intellectual and political life of the country. The true nobility of Germany was no longer to be found among the priests,—Alcuin, Hrabanus Maurus, Notker Teutonicus; nor among the knights,—Walther von der Vogelweide; Wolfram von Eschenbach, and their patrons, Frederick II, Hermann von Thüringen, and Leopold of Austria. The intellectual sceptre of Ger-

many was wielded by a new nobility, a nobility that had risen from the ranks, like the priests and the knights, but which, for a time at least, kept itself from becoming a caste, and from cutting away those roots through which it imbibed its vigour and sustained its strength. It had its castles in the Universities, its tournaments in the diets of Worms and Augsburg, and it counted among its members, dukes and peasants, divines and soldiers, lawyers and artists. This was not, indeed, an hereditary nobility, but on that very ground it is a nobility which can never become extinct. The danger, however, which threatens all aristocracies, whether martial, clerical, or municipal, was not averted from the intellectual aristocracy of Germany. The rising spirit of caste deprived the second generation of that power which men like Luther had gained at the beginning of the Reformation. The moral influence of the Universities in Germany was great, and it is great at the present day. But it would have been greater and more beneficial if the conceit of caste had not separated the leaders of the nation from the ranks whence they themselves had risen, and to which alone they owed their position and their influence. It was the same with the priests, who would rather form a hierarchy than be merged in the laity. It was the same with the knights, who would rather form a select society than live among the gentry. Both cut away the ground under their feet; and the Reformers of the sixteenth century fell into the same snare before they were aware of it. We wonder at the eccentricities of the priesthood, at the conceit of the hereditary nobility, at the affectation of majestic stateliness inherent in royalty. But the pedantic

display of learning, the disregard of the real wants of the people, the contempt of all knowledge which does not wear the academic garb, show the same foible, the same conceit, the same spirit of caste among those who, from the sixteenth century to the present day, have occupied the most prominent rank in the society of Germany. Professorial knight-errantry still waits for its Cervantes. Nowhere have the objects of learning been so completely sacrificed to the means of learning, nowhere has that Dulcinea—knowledge for its own sake,—with her dark veil and her barren heart, numbered so many admirers; nowhere have so many windmills been fought and so many real enemies been left unhurt, as in Germany, particularly during the last two centuries. New universities have been founded: Marburg, in 1527; Königsberg, in 1547; Jena, in 1558; Helmstädt, in 1575; Giessen, in 1607. And the more the number and the power of the Professors increased, the more they forgot that they and their learning, their Universities and their libraries, were for the benefit of the people; that a Professor might be very learned, and very accurate, and very laborious, yet worse than useless as a member of our toiling society. It was considered more learned and respectable to teach in Latin, and all lectures at the Universities were given in that language. Luther was sneered at because of his little German tracts which ‘any village clerk might have written.’ Some of the best poets in the sixteenth century were men such as Eoban Hessius (1540), who composed their poetry in Latin. National poems, for instance, Brant’s ‘Ship of Fools,’ were translated into Latin, in order to induce the German

professors to read them. The learned doctors were ashamed of their honest native names. Schwarzerd must needs call himself Melanchthon; Meissel Celtes, Schnitter Agricola; Hausschein, Ecolampadius! All this might look very learned, and professorial, and imposing; but it separated the professors from the people at large; it retarded the progress of national education, and blighted the prospects of a national policy in Germany. Everything promised well at the time of the Reformation; and a new Germany might have risen before a new France, if, like Luther, the leaders of the nation had remained true to their calling. But when to speak Latin was considered more learned than to speak German, when to amass vast information was considered more creditable than to digest and to use it, when popularity became the same bugbear to the professors which profanity had been to the clergy, and vulgarity to the knights, Luther's work was undone; and two more centuries had to be spent in pedantic controversies, theological disputes, sectarian squabbles, and political prostration, before a new national spirit could rise again in men like Lessing, and Schiller, and Fichte, and Stein. Ambitious princes and quarrelsome divines continued the rulers of Germany, and, towards the end of the sixteenth century, everything seemed drifting back into the middle ages. Then came the Thirty Years' War, a most disastrous war for Germany, which is felt in its results to the present day. If, as a civil and religious contest, it had been fought out between the two parties—the Protestants and Roman Catholics of Germany,—it would have left, as in England, one side victorious; it would have been brought to an

end before both were utterly exhausted. But the Protestants, weakened by their own dissensions, had to call in foreign aid. First Denmark, then Sweden, poured their armies into Germany, and even France — Roman-Catholic France — gave her support to Gustavus Adolphus and the Protestant cause. England, the true ally of Germany, was too weak at home to make her influence felt abroad. At the close of the war, the Protestants received indeed the same rights as the Roman Catholics: but the nation was so completely demoralised that it hardly cared for the liberties guaranteed by the treaty of Westphalia. The physical and moral vigour of the nation was broken. The population of Germany is said to have been reduced by one half. Thousands of villages and towns had been burnt to the ground. The schools, the churches, the universities were deserted. A whole generation had grown up during the war, particularly among the lower classes, with no education at all. The merchants of Germany, who formerly, as Aeneas Sylvius said, lived more handsomely than the Kings of Scotland, were reduced to small traders. The Hansa was broken up. Holland, England, and Sweden had taken the wind out of her sails. In the Eastern provinces, commerce was suspended by the inroads of the Turks; whilst the discovery of America, and of the new passage to the East Indies, had reduced the importance of the mercantile navy of Germany and Italy in the Mediterranean. Where there was any national feeling left, it was a feeling of shame and despair, and the emperor and the small princes of Germany might have governed even more selfishly than they did, without rousing opposition among the people.

What can we expect of the literature of such times? Popular poetry preserved some of its indestructible charms. The Meistersänger went on composing according to the rules of their guilds, but we look in vain for the raciness and honest simplicity of Hans Sachs. Some of the professors wrote plays in the style of Terence, or after English models, and fables became fashionable in the style of Phædrus. But there was no trace anywhere of originality, truth, taste, or feeling, except in that branch which, like the palm-tree, thrives best in the desert—sacred poetry. Paul Gerhard is still without an equal as a poet of sacred songs; and many of the best hymns which are heard in the Protestant churches of Germany date from the seventeenth century. Soon, however, this class of poetry also degenerated on one side into dry theological phraseology, on the other into sentimental, and almost erotic affectation.

There was no hope of a regeneration in German literature, unless either great political and social events should rouse the national mind from its languor, or the classical models of pure taste and true art should be studied again in a different spirit from that of professorial pedantry. Now, after the Thirty Years' War, there was no war in Germany in which the nation took any warm interest. The policy pursued in France during the long reign of Louis XIV (1643–1708) had its chief aim in weakening the house of Hapsburg. When the Protestants would no longer fight his battles, Louis roused the Turks. Vienna was nearly taken, and Austria owed its delivery to Johann Sobiesky. By the treaty of Ryswick (1697), all the country on the left side of the Rhine was

ceded to France, and German soldiers fought under the banners of the great Monarch. The only German prince who dared to uphold the honour of the empire, and to withstand the encroachments of Louis, was Frederick William, the great Elector of Prussia (1670-88). He checked the arrogance of the Swedish court, opened his towns to French Protestant refugees, and raised the house of Brandenburg to a European importance. In the same year in which his successor, Frederick III, assumed the royal title as Frederick I, the king of Spain, Charles I, died; and Louis XIV, whilst trying to add the Spanish crown to his monarchy, was at last checked in his grasping policy by an alliance between England and Germany. Prince Eugene and Marlborough restored the peace and the political equilibrium of Europe. In England, the different parties in Parliament, the frequenters of the clubs and coffee-houses, were then watching every move on the political chess-board of Europe, and criticising the victories of their generals and the treaties of their ambassadors. In Germany, the nation took but a passive part. It was excluded from all real share in the great questions of the day, and, if it showed any sympathies, they were confined to the simple admiration of a great general, such as Prince Eugene.

While the policy of Louis XIV was undermining the political independence of Germany, the literature of his court exercised an influence hardly less detrimental on the literature of Germany. No doubt, the literature of France stood far higher at that time than that of Germany. 'Poet' was amongst us a term of abuse, while in France the Great Monarch himself

did homage to his great poets. But the professorial poets who had failed to learn the lessons of good taste from the Greek and Roman classics, were not likely to profit by an imitation of the spurious classicality of French literature. They heard the great stars of the court of Louis XIV praised by their royal and princely patrons as they returned from their travels in France and Italy, full of admiration for everything that was not German. They were delighted to hear that in France, in Holland, and in Italy, it was respectable to write poetry in the modern vernacular, and set to work in good earnest. After the model of the literary academies in Italy, academies were founded at the small courts of Germany. Men like Opitz would hardly have thought it dignified to write verses in their native tongue had it not been for the moral support which they received from these academies and their princely patrons. His first poems were written in Latin, but he afterwards devoted himself completely to German poetry. He became a member of the 'Order of the Palm-tree,' and the founder of what is called the *First Silesian School*. Opitz is the true representative of the classical poetry of the seventeenth century. He was a scholar and a gentleman; most correct in his language and versification; never venturing on ground that had not been trodden before by some classical poet, whether of Greece, Rome, France, Holland, or Italy. In him we also see the first traces of that baneful alliance between princes and poets which has deprived the German nation of so many of her best sons. But the charge of mean motives has been unjustly brought against Opitz by many historians. Poets require an audience,

and at his time there was no class of people willing to listen to poetry, except the inmates of the small German courts. After the Thirty Years' War the power of these princes was greater than ever. They divided the spoil, and there was neither a nobility, nor a clergy, nor a national party to control or resist them. In England, the royal power had, at that time, been brought back to its proper limits, and it has thus been able to hold ever since, with but short interruptions, its dignified position, supported by the self-respect of a free and powerful nation. In France it assumed the most enormous proportions during the long reign of Louis XIV, but its appalling rise was followed, after a century, by a fall equally appalling, and it has not yet regained its proper position in the political system of that country. In Germany the royal power was less imposing, its prerogatives being divided between the Emperor and a number of small but almost independent vassals, remnants of that feudal system of the middle ages which in France and England had been absorbed by the rise of national monarchies. These small principalities explain the weakness of Germany in her relation with foreign powers, and the instability of her political constitution. Continental wars gave an excuse for keeping up large standing armies, and these standing armies stood between the nation and her sovereigns, and made any moral pressure of the one upon the other impossible. The third estate could never gain that share in the government which it had obtained, by its united action, in other countries; yet no form of government can be stable which is deprived of the support and the active co-operation of the middle

classes. Constitutions have been granted by enlightened sovereigns, such as Joseph II and Frederick William IV, and barricades have been raised by the people at Vienna and at Berlin; but both have failed to restore the political health of the country. There is no longer a German nobility in the usual sense of the word. Its vigour was exhausted when the powerful vassals of the empire became powerless sovereigns with the titles of king or duke, while what remained of the landed nobility, became more reduced with every generation, owing to the absence of the system of primogeniture. There is no longer a clergy as a powerful body in the state. This was broken up at the time of the Reformation, and it hardly had time to recover and to constitute itself on a new basis, when the Thirty Years' War deprived it of all social influence, and left it no alternative but to become a salaried class of servants of the crown. No third estate exists powerful enough to defend the interests of the commonwealth against the encroachments of the sovereign; and public opinion, though it may pronounce itself within certain limits, has no means of legal opposition, and must choose, at every critical moment, between submission to the royal will and rebellion.

Thus, during the whole modern history of Germany, the political and intellectual supremacy is divided. The former is monopolised by the sovereigns, the latter belongs to a small class of learned men. These two soon begin to attract each other. The kings seek the society, the advice, and support of literary men; whilst literary men court the patronage of kings, and acquire powerful influence by governing those who

govern the people. From the time of Opitz there have been few men of eminence in literature or science who have not been drawn towards one of the larger or smaller courts of Germany; and the whole of our modern literature bears the marks of this union between princes and poets. It has been said that the existence of these numerous centres of civilisation has proved beneficial to the growth of literature; and it has been pointed out that some of the smallest courts, such as Weimar, have raised the greatest men in poetry and science. Goethe himself gives expression to this opinion. 'What has made Germany great,' he says, 'but the culture which is spread through the whole country in such a marvellous manner, and pervades equally all parts of the realm? And this culture, does it not emanate from the numerous courts which grant it support and patronage? Suppose we had had in Germany for centuries but two capitals, Vienna and Berlin, or but one; I should like to know how it would have fared with German civilisation, or even with that general well-being which goes hand in hand with true civilisation.' In these words we hear Goethe, the minister of the petty court of Weimar, not the great poet of a great nation. Has France had more than one capital? Has England had more than one court? Great men have risen to eminence in great monarchies like France, and they have risen to eminence in a great commonwealth such as England, without the patronage of courts, by the support, the sympathy, the love of a great nation. Truly national poetry exists only where there is a truly national life; and the poet who, in creating his works, thinks of a whole

nation which will listen to him and be proud of him, is inspired by a nobler passion than he who looks to his royal master, or the applause even of the most refined audience of the *dames de la cour*. In a free country, the sovereign is the highest and most honoured representative of the national will, and he honours himself by honouring those who have well deserved of his country. There a poet-laureate may hold an independent and dignified position, conscious of his own worth, and of the support of the nation. But in despotic countries, the favour even of the most enlightened sovereign is dangerous. Germany never had a more enlightened king than Frederick the Great; and yet, when he speaks of the Queen receiving Leibniz at court, he says, 'She believed that it was not unworthy of a queen to show honour to a philosopher; and as those who have received from heaven a privileged soul rise to the level of sovereigns, she admitted Leibniz into her familiar society.'

The seventeenth century saw the rise and fall of the first and the second Silesian schools. The first is represented by men like Opitz and Weckherlin, and it exercised an influence in the North of Germany on Simon Dach, Paul Flemming, and a number of less-gifted poets, who are generally known by the name of the *Königsberg School*. Its character is pseudo-classical. All these poets endeavoured to write correctly, sedately, and eloquently. Some of them aimed at a certain simplicity and sincerity, which we admire particularly in Flemming. But it would be difficult to find in all their writings one single thought, one single expression that had not been used before. The

second Silesian school is more ambitious; but its poetic flights are more disappointing even than the honest prose of Opitz. The 'Shepherds of the Pegnitz' had tried to imitate the brilliant diction of the Italian poets; but the modern Meistersänger of the old town of Nürnberg had produced nothing but wordy jingle. Hoffmannswaldau and Lohenstein, the chief heroes of the second Silesian school, followed in their track, and did not succeed better. Their compositions are bombastic and full of metaphors. It is a poetry of adjectives, without substance, truth, or taste. Yet their poetry was admired, praised not less than Goethe and Schiller were praised by their contemporaries, and it lived beyond the seventeenth century. There were but few men during that time who kept aloof from the spirit of these two Silesian schools, and were not influenced by either Opitz or Hoffmannswaldau. Among these independent poets we have to mention Friedrich von Logau, Andreas Gryphius, and Moscherosch. Beside these, there were some prose writers whose works are not exactly works of art, but works of original thought, and of great importance to us in tracing the progress of science and literature during the dreariest period of German history. We can only mention the *Simplicissimus*, a novel full of clever miniature drawing, and giving a truthful picture of German life during the Thirty Years' War; the patriotic writings of Professor Schupp; the historical works of Professor Pufendorf (1631-94); the pietistic sermons of Spener, and of Professor Franke (1663-1727), the founder of the Orphan School at Halle; Professor Arnold's (1666-1714) *Ecclesiastical History*; the first political pamphlets by Professor Thomasius

(1655-1728); and among philosophers, Jacob Böhme at the beginning, and Leibniz at the end of the seventeenth century.

The second Silesian school was defeated by Gottsched, professor at Leipzig. He exercised, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the same dictatorship as a poet and a critic which Opitz had exercised at the beginning of the seventeenth. Gottsched was the advocate of French models in art and poetry, and he used his widespread influence in recommending the correct, and so-called classical style of the poets of the time. After having rendered good service in putting down the senseless extravagance of the school of Lohenstein, he became himself a pedantic and arrogant critic; and it was through the opposition which he roused by his Gallomania, that German poetry was delivered at last from the trammels of that foreign school. Then followed a long literary warfare: Gottsched and his followers at Leipzig defended the French, Bodmer and his friends in Switzerland the English, style of literature. The former insisted on classical form and traditional rules; the latter on natural sentiment and spontaneous expression. The question was, whether poets should imitate the works of the classics, or imitate the classics who had become classics by imitating nobody. A German professor wields an immense power by means of his Journals. He is the editor; he writes in them himself, and allows others to write; he praises his friends, who are to laud him in turn; he patronises his pupils, who are to call him master; he abuses his adversaries, and asks his allies to do the same. It was in this manner that Professor Gottsched triumphed

for a long time over Bodmer and his party, till at last public opinion became too strong, and the dictator died the laughing-stock of Germany. It was in the very thick of this literary struggle that the great heroes of German poetry grew up—Klopstock, Lessing, Wieland, Herder, Goethe, and Schiller. Goethe, who knew both Gottsched and Bodmer, has described that period of fermentation and transition in which his own mind was formed, and his extracts may be read as a commentary on the poetical productions of the first half of the eighteenth century. He does justice to Günther, and more than justice to Liscow. He shows the influence which men like Brockes, Hagedorn, and Haller exercised in making poetry respectable. He points out the new national life which, like an electric spark, flew through the whole country when Frederick the Great said, '*J'ai jeté le bonnet par-dessus les moulins*'; and defied, like a man, the political popery of Austria. The estimate which Goethe forms of the poets of the time, of Gleim and Uz, of Gessner and Rabener, and more especially of Klopstock, Lessing, and Wieland, should be read in the original, as likewise Herder's Rhapsody on Shakespeare. The latter contains the key to many of the secrets of that new period of literature, which was inaugurated by Goethe himself and by those who like him could dare to be classical, by being true to nature and to themselves.

My object in taking this rapid survey of German literature has been to show that the extracts which I have collected in my 'German Classics' have not been chosen at random, and that, if properly used, they can be read as a running commentary on the

political and social history of Germany. The history of literature is but an applied history of civilisation. As in the history of civilisation, we watch the play of the three constituent classes of society,—clergy, nobility, and commoners, we can see, in the history of literature, how that class which is supreme politically, shows for the time being its supremacy in the literary productions of the age, and impresses its mark on the works of poets and philosophers.

Speaking very generally, we might say that, during the first period of German history, the really moving, civilising, and ruling class was the clergy; and in the whole of German literature, nearly to the time of the Crusades, the clerical element predominates. The second period is marked by the Crusades, and the triumph of Teutonic and Romantic chivalry, and the literature of that period is of a strictly correspondent tone. After the Crusades, and during the political anarchy that followed, the sole principle of order and progress is found in the towns, and in the towns the poetry of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries finds its new home. At last, at the time of the Reformation, when the political life of the country assumed for a time a national character, German literature also is for a short time national. The hopes, however, which had been raised of a national policy and of a national literature, were soon blighted, and, from the Thirty Years' War to the present day, the inheritance of the nation has been divided between princes and professors. There have been moments when the princes had to appeal to the nation at large, and to forget for a while their royal pretensions; and these times of national

enthusiasm, as during the wars of Frederick the Great, and during the wars against Napoleon, have not failed to tell on the literature of Germany. They produced a national spirit, free from professorial narrowness, such as we find in the writings of Lessing and Fichte. But with the exception of these short lucid intervals, Germany has always been under the absolute despotism of a number of small sovereigns and great professors, and her literature has been throughout in the hands of court poets and academic critics. Klopstock, Lessing, and Schiller are most free from either influence, and most impressed with the duties which a poet owes, before all, to the nation to which he belongs. Klopstock's national enthusiasm borders sometimes on the fantastic, for, as his own times could not inspire him, he borrowed the themes of his national panegyrics from the distant past of Arminius and the German bards. Lessing looked more to his own age, but he looked in vain for national heroes. 'Pity the extraordinary man,' says Goethe, 'who had to live in such miserable times, which offered him no better subjects than those which he takes for his works. Pity him, that in his "Minna von Barnhelm" he had to take part in the quarrel between the Saxons and the Prussians, because he found nothing better. It was owing to the rottenness of his time that he always took, and was forced to take, a polemical position. In his "Emilia Galotti" he shows his *pique* against the princes; in "Nathan," against the priests.' But, although the subjects of these works of Lessing were small, his object in writing was always great and national. He never condescended to amuse a provincial court by masque-

tragedies and comedies, nor did he degrade his genius by pandering, like Wieland, to the taste of a profligate nobility. Schiller, again, was a poet, truly national and truly liberal; and although a man of aspirations rather than of actions, he has left a deeper impress on the kernel of the nation than either Wieland or Goethe. These considerations, however, must not interfere with our appreciation of the greatness of Goethe. On the contrary, when we see the small sphere in which he moved at Weimar, we admire the more the height to which he grew, and the freedom of his genius. And it is, perhaps, owing to this very absence of a strongly marked national feeling, that in Germany the first idea of a world-literature was conceived. 'National literature,' Goethe says, 'is of little importance: the age of a world-literature is at hand, and every one ought to work in order to accelerate this new era.' Perhaps Goethe felt that the true poet belonged to the whole of mankind, and that he must be intelligible beyond the frontiers of his own country. And, from this point of view, his idea of a world-literature has been realised, and his own works have gained their place side by side with the works of Homer, Virgil, Dante, and Shakspeare. But, so long as there are different languages and different nations, let each poet think, and work, and write for his own people, without caring for the applause of other countries. Science and philosophy are cosmopolitan; poetry and art are national: and those who would deprive the Muses of their home-sprung character, would deprive them of much of their native charms.

LIST OF EXTRACTS FOR ILLUSTRATING THE HISTORY OF GERMAN LITERATURE.

FOURTH CENTURY AFTER CHRIST.

Gothic :—

Ulfilas, Translation of the Bible ; the Lord's Prayer.

SEVENTH CENTURY.

Old High-German :—

Vocabulary of St. Gall.

EIGHTH CENTURY.

Old High-German :—

Interlinear Translation of the Benedictine Rules.

Translation of the Gospel of St. Matthew.

Exhortation addressed to the Christian Laity.

Literal Translations of the Hymns of the Old Church :—

1. Deus qui cordi lumen es.

2. Aurora lucis rutilat.

3. Te Deum laudamus.

The Song of Hildebrand and his son Hadubrand—in alliterative metre.

The Prayer from the Monastery of Wessobrun—in alliterative metre.

The Apostolic Creed.

NINTH CENTURY.

Old High-German :—

From Einhard's Life of Charlemagne—the German names of the Months and the Winds fixed by the Emperor.

Muspilli, or on the Last Judgment—alliterative Poem.

The Oaths of Lewis the German, and Charles the Bald, and their armies at Strassburg, 842, in Old Frankish and Old French ; from the History of Nithard, the Grandson of Charlemagne.

The Heliand, or the Saviour—old Saxon poem, in alliterative metre.

The Krist, or the Gospel-Book—poem in rhyme by Otfried, the pupil of Hrabanus Maurus, dedicated to Lewis the German.

Old High-German (continued) :—

Translation of a Harmony of the Gospels.

Lay on St. Peter.

Song on the Victory gained by King Lewis III at Saucourt, in 881, over the Normans.

TENTH CENTURY.

Old High-German :—

Notker Teutonicus of St. Gall—

1. Translation of the Psalms.
2. Treatise on Syllogisms.
3. Translation of Aristotle.
4. Translation of Boëthius de Consolatione.

ELEVENTH CENTURY.

Old High-German :—

Williram's Explanation of the Song of Solomon.

Merigarto, or the Earth—fragment of a geographical poem.

TWELFTH CENTURY.

Middle High-German :—

The Life of Jesus—poem by the Nun Ava.

Poetical Translation of the Books of Moses.

Historical Poem on Anno, Bishop of Cologne.

Poetical Chronicle of the Roman Emperors.

Nortperti Tractatus de Virtutibus, translated.

The poem of Roland, by Konrad the Priest.

The poem of Alexander, by Lamprecht the Priest.

Poem of Reinhart the Fox.

Dietmar von Aist—lyrics.

The Spervogel—lyrics.

The Kurenberger—lyrics.

The Eneid, by Heinrich von Veldecke.

THIRTEENTH CENTURY.

Middle High-German :—

Hartmann von Aue; extracts from his 'Iwein'—a heroic poem.

The Old Reinmar—lyrics.

Walther von der Vogelweide—lyrics.

Freidank's Bescheidenheit—didactic poem.

Middle High-German (continued) :—

Wolfram von Eschenbach—

1. Extracts from his 'Parcival'—a heroic poem.

2. Extracts from his 'Titarel'—a heroic poem.

Gottfried von Strassburg; extracts from his 'Tristan'—a heroic poem.

The poem of the Nibelunge—epic poem.

Thomasin von Zerclar; extracts from his poem on manners, called 'The Italian Guest.'

Neidhart von Reuenthal—lyrics.

Otto von Botenlaube—lyrics.

Gudrun—epic poem.

The Stricker—extract from his satirical poem, 'Amis the Priest.'

Rudolf von Ems—extract from his 'Wilhelm von Orleans.'

Christian von Hamle—lyrics.

Gottfried von Neifen—lyrics.

Ulrich von Lichtenstein—lyrics.

Sermon of Friar Berthold of Regensburg.

Reinmar von Zweter—lyrics.

Master Stolle—satire.

The Marner—lyrics.

Master Konrad of Würzburg—

1. Poem.

2. Extract from the Trojan War.

Anonymous poet—extract from the life of St. Elizabeth.

Herman der Damen.

Anonymous poet—extract from the 'Wartburg Krieg.'

Marcgrave Otto von Brandenburg—lyrics.

Heinrich, Duke of Breslau—lyrics.

Hugo von Trimberg—extract from the 'Renner.'

FOURTEENTH CENTURY.

Middle High-German :—

Heinrich Frauenlob—lyrics.

Master Johann Hadlaub—lyrics.

The Great Rosegarden—popular epic poem.

Master Eckhart—homily.

Hermann von Fritzlar—life of St. Elizabeth.

Dr. Johann Tauler—sermon.

Heinrich Suso.

Heinrich der Teichner—fable.

Peter Suchenwirt—on the death of Leopold, Duke of Austria,
1386.

Middle High-German (continued) :—

- Halbsuter's poem on the Battle of Sempach, 1386.
- Fritsche Closener's Strassburg Chronicle.
- Jacob Twinger's Chronicle—on the Flagellants.

FIFTEENTH CENTURY.

Middle High-German :—

- Hugo von Montfort—lyrics.
- Oswald von Wolkenstein—lyrics.
- Muscatblüt—lyrics.
- Hans von Büchel's Life of Diocletian, or the Seven Wise Masters.
- Popular Songs.
- Sacred Songs.
- The Soul's Comfort—didactic prose.
- Michael Beheim—Meistergesang.
- An Easter Mystery.
- Popular Rhymes.
- Caspar von der Roen's Heldenbuch—Hildebrand and his Son.
- Niclas von Weyl's Translations—Hieronymus at the Council of Constance.
- Veit Weber's poem on the Victory of Murten, 1476.
- Heinrich Steinhöwel's Fables.
- Sebastian Brant's Ship of Fools.
- Johann Geiler von Kaisersberg—sermon.
- Emperor Maximilian—extract from the 'Theuerdank.'

SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

Modern High-German :—

- Martin Luther—
 - 1. Sacred Song.
 - 2. Letter on the Diet of the Jackdaws and Crows.
 - 3. His last Sermon.
- Ulrich Zwingli—
 - 1. A Poem on his Illness.
 - 2. Criticism on Luther.
- Philipp Nicolai—sacred songs.
- Justus Jonas—sacred songs.
- Ulrich von Hutten—
 - 1. Letter to Franz von Sickingen.
 - 2. Political poem.

Modern High-German (continued):—

Sebastian Frank—

1. Preface to his *Germania*.
2. *Rudolf von Habsburg*.
3. *Maximilian der Erste*.
4. *Fables*.

Burkard Waldis—*fables*.

Hans Sachs—

1. *Sacred Song*.
2. *Poem on the Death of Martin Luther*.
3. *Poem on the War*.

Petermann Etterlin's *Chronicle*—*William Tell* and *Rudolf von Habsburg*.Aegidius Tschudi's *Chronicle*—*William Tell*.

Paulus Melissus Schede.

Johann Fischart—

1. *Exhortation addressed to the German people*.
2. *Das glückhafte Schiff*.

Georg Rollenhagen—*fable*.

Popular Books—

1. *Tyll Eulenspiegel*.
2. *Dr. Faust*.

Popular Songs.

SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

Modern High-German:—

Martin Opitz, and the First Silesian School.

Georg Rudolf Weckherlin.

Anonymous Poem—'O Ewigkeit.'

Michael Altenburg's *Camp-song* (*Gustavus Adolphus*).Johannes Heermann—*sacred song*.

Popular Songs.

Johann Arndt—

1. *Sacred Song*.
2. *On the Power and Necessity of Prayer*.

Jacob Böhme, *Mysterium Magnum*.

Johann Valentin Andreae.

Friedrich Spee.

Julius Wilhelm Zinggreff.

Friedrich von Logau.

Simon Dach and the Königsberg School.

Paul Flemming.

Paul Gerhard.

Modern High-German (continued) :—

Georg Philipp Harsdörffer and the Nürnberg School.
Johannes Rist.

Andreas Gryphius—

1. Sonnets.

2. From the Tragedy 'Cardenio and Celinde.'

Joachim Rachel—satire.

Johann Michael Moscherosch—satires.

Christoph von Grimmelshausen, *Simplicissimus*—novel.

Johann Balthasar Schupp—on the German Language.

Angelus Silesius.

Hoffmannswaldau and Lohenstein—Second Silesian School.

Abraham a Santa Clara—sermon.

Philipp Jacob Spener—on Luther.

Gottfried Arnold—sacred poem.

Christian Weise.

Hans Assmann von Abschatz.

Friedrich R. L. von Canitz.

Christian Wernicke.

Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz—on the German Language.

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

Modern High-German :—

Johann Christoph Gottsched—Cato.

Johann Jacob Bodmer—Character of German Poetry.

Barthold Heinrich Brockes.

Johann Christian Günther.

Nicolaus Ludwig Graf von Zinzendorf.

Christian Ludwig Liscow.

Friedrich von Hagedorn.

Albrecht von Haller.

Gottlieb Wilhelm Rabener.

Ewald Christian von Kleist.

Christian Fürchtegott Gellert.

Johann Ludwig Gleim.

Johann Peter Uz.

Justus Möser.

Klopstock. See below.

Salomon Gessner.

Johann Winkelmann.

Lessing. See below.

Johann Georg Hamann.

Immanuel Kant.

Modern High-German (continued):—

Johann August Musaeus.

Wieland. See below.

Gottlieb Konrad Pfeffel.

Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart.

Matthias Claudius.

Johann Caspar Lavater.

Herder. See below.

Heinrich Jung, Stilling.

Georg Christoph Lichtenberg.

Gottfried August Bürger.

Johann Heinrich Voss.

Friedrich Leopold und Christian Grafen zu Stollberg.

Das Siebengestirn der Dichter des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts—

1. Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock.

2. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing.

3. Christoph Martin Wieland.

4. Johann Gottfried von Herder.

5. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.

6. Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller.

7. Jean Paul Friedrich Richter.

OLD GERMAN LOVE-SONGS¹.

SEVEREN hundred years ago! What a long time it seems! Philip Augustus, King of France; Henry II, King of England; Frederic I, the famous Barbarossa, Emperor of Germany! When we read of their times, the times of the Crusades, we feel as the Greeks felt when reading of the War of Troy. We listen, we admire, but we do not compare the heroes of St. Jean d'Acre with the great generals of the nineteenth century. They seem a different race of men from those who are now living, and poetry and tradition have lent to their royal frames such colossal proportions that we hardly dare to criticise the legendary history of their chivalrous achievements. It was a time of heroes, of saints, of martyrs, of miracles! Thomas a'Becket was murdered at Canterbury, but for more than three hundred years his name lived on, and his bones were working miracles, and his soul seemed as it were embodied and petrified in the lofty pillars that surround the spot of his martyrdom. Abelard was persecuted and imprisoned, but his spirit revived in the Reformers of the sixteenth cen-

¹ 'Des Minnesangs Frühling.' Herausgegeben von Karl Lachmann und Moritz Haupt. Leipzig, 1857.

tury, and the shrine of Abelard and Heloise in the Père Lachaise is still decorated every year with garlands of *immortelles*. Barbarossa was drowned in the same river in which Alexander the Great had bathed his royal limbs, but his fame lived on in every cottage of Germany, and the peasant near the Kyffhäuser still believes that some day the mighty Emperor will awake from his long slumber and rouse the people of Germany from their fatal dreams. We dare not hold communion with such stately heroes as Frederick the Red-beard, and Richard the Lion-heart; they seem half to belong to the realm of fable. We feel from our very schooldays as if we could shake hands with a Themistocles and sit down in the company of a Julius Caesar, but we are awed by the presence of those tall and silent knights, with their hands folded and their legs crossed, as we see them reposing in full armour on the tombs of our cathedrals.

And yet, however different in all other respects, these men, if they once lift their steel beaver and unbuckle their rich armour, are wonderfully like ourselves. Let us read the poetry, which they either wrote themselves, or to which they liked to listen in their castles on the Rhine or under their tents in Palestine, and we find it is poetry which a Tennyson or a Moore, a Goethe or Heine might have written. Neither Julius Caesar nor Themistocles would know what was meant by such poetry. It is modern poetry—poetry unknown to the ancient world, and who invented it nobody can tell. It is sometimes called romantic, but this is a strange misnomer. Neither the Romans, nor the lineal descendants of the Romans,

the Italians, the Provençals, the Spaniards, can claim that poetry as their own. It is Teutonic poetry—purely Teutonic in its heart and soul, though its utterance, its rhyme and metre, its grace and imagery, show the marks of a warmer clime. It is called sentimental poetry, the poetry of the heart rather than of the head, the picture of the inward rather than of the outward world. It is subjective as distinguished from objective poetry, as the German critics, in their scholastic language, are fond of expressing it. It is Gothic, as contrasted with classical poetry. The one, it is said, sublimizes nature, the other bodies forth spirit—the one deifies the human, the other humanizes the divine—the one is ethnic, the other Christian. But all these are but names, and their true meaning must be discovered in the works of art themselves, and in the history of the times which produced the artists, the poets, and their ideals. We shall perceive the difference between these two hemispheres of the Beautiful better if we think of Homer's 'Helena' and Dante's 'Beatrice,' if we look at the 'Venus of Milo' and a 'Madonna' of Francia, than in reading the profoundest systems of aesthetics.

The work which has caused these reflections is a volume of German poetry, just published by Lachmann and Haupt. It is called 'Des Minnesangs Frühling—the Spring of the Songs of Love'; and it contains a collection of the poems of twenty German poets, all of whom lived during the period of the Crusades, under the Hohenstaufen Emperors, from about 1170 to 1230. This period may well be called the spring of German poetry, though the summer that followed was but of short duration, and the autumn

was cheated of the rich harvest which the spring had promised. Tieck, one of the first who gathered the flowers of that forgotten spring, describes it in glowing language. 'At that time,' he says, 'believers sang of faith, lovers of love, knights described knightly actions and battles; and loving, believing knights were their chief audience. The spring, beauty, gaiety, were objects that could never tire: great duels, and deeds of arms carried away every hearer, the more surely, the stronger they were painted; and as the pillars and dome of the church encircle the flock, so did religion, as the highest, encircle poetry and reality; and every heart, in equal love, humbled itself before her.' Carlyle, too, has listened with delight to those merry songs of spring. 'Then truly,' he says, 'was the time of singing come; for princes and prelates, emperors and squires, the wise and the simple, men, women and children, all sang and rhymed, or delighted in hearing it done. It was a universal noise of song, as if the spring of manhood had arrived, and warblings from every spray—not indeed, without infinite twitterings also, which, except their gladness, had no music—were bidding it welcome.' And yet it was not all gladness; and it is strange that Carlyle, who has so keen an ear for the silent melancholy of the human heart, should not have heard that tone of sorrow and fateful boding which breaks, like a suppressed sigh, through the free and light music of that Swabian era. The brightest sky of spring is not without its clouds in Germany, and the German heart is never happy without some sadness. Whether we listen to a short ditty, or to the epic ballads of the 'Nibelunge,' or to Wolfram's grand

poems of the 'Parcival' and the 'Holy Graal,' it is the same everywhere. There is always a mingling of light and shade,—in joy a fear of sorrow, in sorrow a ray of hope, and throughout the whole, a silent wondering at this strange world. Here is a specimen of an anonymous poem—and anonymous poetry is an invention peculiarly Teutonic. It was written before the twelfth century; its language is strangely simple, and sometimes uncouth. But there is truth in it, and it is truth after all, and not fiction, that is the secret of all poetry:—

It has pained me in the heart,
Full many a time,
That I yearned after that
Which I may not have,
Nor ever shall win.
It is very grievous.
I do not mean gold or silver:
It is more like a human heart.

I trained me a falcon,
More than a year.
When I had tamed him,
As I would have him,
And had well tied his feathers
With golden chains,
He soared up very high,
And flew into other lands.

I saw the falcon since,
Flying happily;
He carried on his foot
Silken straps,
And his plumage was
All red of gold. . . .
May God send them together,
Who would fain be loved.

The key-note of the whole poem of the 'Nibelunge,' such as it was written down at the end of the

twelfth, or the beginning of the thirteenth century, is 'Sorrow after Joy.' This is the fatal spell against which all the heroes are fighting, and fighting in vain. Fierce Hagen dashes the Chaplain into the waves, in order to belie the prophecy of the Mermaids, but the Chaplain rises, and Hagen rushes headlong into destruction. Chriemhilt, too, is bargaining and playing with the same inevitable fate, cautiously guarding her young heart against the happiness of love, that she may escape the sorrows of a broken heart. She, too, has been dreaming 'of a wild young falcon that she trained for many a day, till two fierce eagles tore it.' And she rushes to her mother Ute, that she may read the dream for her; and her mother tells her what it means. And then the coy maiden answers:—

. . . . no more, no more, dear mother, say,
 From many a woman's fortune this truth is clear as day,
 That falsely smiling Pleasure with Pain requites us ever.
 I from both will keep me, and thus will sorrow never.

But Siegfried comes, and Chriemhilt's heart does no longer cast up the bright and the dark days of life. To Siegfried she belongs; for him she lives, and for him, when 'two fierce eagles tore him,' she dies. A still wilder tragedy lies hidden in the songs of the 'Edda,' the most ancient fragments of truly Teutonic poetry. Wolfram's poetry is of the same sombre cast. He wrote his 'Parcival' about the time when the songs of the 'Nibelunge' were written down. The subject was taken by him from a French source. It belonged originally to the British cycle of Arthur and his Knights. But Wolfram took the story merely as a skeleton, to which he himself gave a new body and

soul. The glory and happiness which this world can give, is to him but a shadow—the crown for which his hero fights is that of the Holy Graal.

Faith, Love, and Honour are the chief subjects of the so-called *Minnesänger*. They are not what we should call erotic poets. *Minne* means love in the old German language, but it means, originally, not so much passion and desire, as thoughtfulness, reverence, and remembrance. In English *Minne* would be ‘Minding,’ and it is different therefore from the Greek *Eros*, the Roman *Amor*, and the French *Amour*. It is different also from the German *Liebe*, which means originally desire, not love. Most of the poems of the ‘*Minnesänger*’ are sad rather than joyful—joyful in sorrow, sorrowful in joy. The same feelings have since been so often repeated by poets in all the modern languages of Europe, that much of what we read in the ‘*Minnesänger*’ of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries sounds stale to our ears. Yet there is a simplicity about these old songs, a want of effort, an entire absence of any attempt to please or to surprise, and we listen to them as we listen to a friend who tells us his sufferings in broken and homely words, and whose truthful prose appeals to our heart more strongly than the most elaborate poetry of a Lamartine or a Heine. It is extremely difficult to translate these poems from the language in which they are written, the so-called Middle High-German, into modern German—much more so to render them into English. But translation is at the same time the best test of the true poetical value of any poem, and we believe that many of the poems of the *Minnesänger*s can bear that test. Here is another poem,

very much in the style of the one quoted above, but written by a poet whose name is known, Dietmar von Eist:—

A lady stood alone,
 And gazed across the heath,
 And gazed for her love.
 She saw a falcon flying.
 'O happy falcon that thou art,
 Thou fliest wherever thou likest;
 Thou choosest in the forest
 A tree that pleases thee.
 Thus I too had done.
 I chose myself a man:
 Him my eyes selected.
 Beautiful ladies envy me for it.
 Alas! why will they not leave me my love?
 I did not desire the beloved of any one of them.
 Now woe to thee, joy of summer!
 The song of birds is gone;
 So are the leaves of the lime-tree:
 Henceforth, my pretty eyes too
 Will be overcast.
 My love, thou shouldst take leave
 Of other ladies;
 Yes, my hero, thou shouldst avoid them.
 When thou sawest me first,
 I seemed to thee in truth
 Right lovely made:
 I remind thee of it, dear man!'

These poems, simple and homely as they seem to us, were loved and admired by the people for whom they were written. They were copied and preserved with the greatest care in the albums of Kings and Queens, and some of them were translated into foreign languages. The poem which we quoted first was translated as an Italian sonnet in the thirteenth century, and has been published in Franc Trucchi's 'Poesie Italiane Inedite':—

Tapina me, che amava uno spaviero;
 amaval tanto ch' io me ne moria:
 a lo richiamo ben m'era maniero
 ed unque troppo pascere no'l dovia.
 or è montato e salito al altero,
 assai più altero che far non solia;
 ed è assiso dentro a un verziere,
 e un' altra donna l'averà in balsa.
 isparvier mio, ch' io t'avea nodrito;
 sonaglio d'oro ti facea portare,
 perchè nell' uccellar fossi più ardito.
 or sei salito siccome lo mare,
 ed hai rotti li getti, e sei fuggito
 quando eri fermo nel tuo uccellare.

One of the most original and thoughtful of the 'Minnesänger' is the old Reinmar. His poems are given now for the first time in a correct and readable text by Lachmann and Haupt, and many a difficult passage has been elucidated by their notes. His poems, however, are not easy to read, and we should have been thankful for some more help than the editors have given us in their notes. The following is a specimen of Reinmar's poetry:—

High as the sun stands my heart:
 That is because of a lady who can be without change
 In her grace, wherever she be.
 She makes me free from all sorrow.

I have nothing to give her, but my own life,
 That belongs to her: the beautiful woman gives me always
 Joy, and a high mind,
 If I think of it, what she does for me.

Well is it for me that I found her so true!
 Wherever she dwell, she alone makes every land dear to me;
 If she went across the wild sea,
 There I should go; I long so much for her.

If I had the wisdom of a thousand men, it would be well
 That I keep her, whom I should serve:
 May she take care right well,
 That nothing sad may ever befall me through her.

I was never quite blessed, but through her:
Whatever I wish to her, may she allow it to me!
It was a blessed thing for me
That she, the Beautiful, received me into her grace.

Carlyle, no doubt, is right when he says, that among all this warbling of love there are infinite twitterings which, except their gladness, have little to charm us. Yet we like to read them as part of the bright history of those bygone days. One poet sings:—

If the whole world was mine,
From the Sea to the Rhine,
I would gladly give it all,
That the Queen of England
Lay in my arms, etc.

Who was the impertinent German that dared to fall in love with a Queen of England? We do not know. But there can be no doubt that the Queen of England whom he adored was the gay and beautiful Eleonore of Poitou, the Queen of Henry II, who filled the heart of many a Crusader with unholy thoughts. Her daughter, too, Mathilde, who was married to Henry the Lion of Saxony, inspired many a poet of those days. Her beauty was celebrated by the Provençal Troubadours; and at the Court of her husband, she encouraged several of her German vassals to follow the example of the French and Norman Knights, and sing the love of Tristan and Isolt, and the adventures of the Knights of Charlemagne. They must have been happy times, those times of the Crusades! Nor have they passed away without leaving their impress on the hearts and minds of the nations of Europe. The Holy Sepulchre, it is true, is still in the hands of the

Infidels, and the bones of the Crusaders lie buried in unhallowed soil, and their deeds of valour are well nigh forgotten, and their chivalrous Tournaments and their Courts of Love are smiled at by a wiser generation. But much that is noble and heroic in the feelings of the nineteenth century has its hidden roots in the thirteenth. Gothic architecture and Gothic poetry are the children of the same mother; and if the true but unadorned language of the heart, the aspirations of a real faith, the sorrow and joy of a true love are still listened to by the nations of Europe—and if what is called the Romantic school is strong enough to hold its ground against the classical taste and its Royal patrons, such as Louis XIV, Charles II, and Frederick the Great—we owe it to those chivalrous poets who dared for the first time to be what they were, and to say what they felt, and to whom faith, love, and honour were worthy subjects of poetry, though they lacked the sanction of the Periclean and Augustan ages.

The new edition of the Poems of the 'Minnesänger' is a masterpiece of German scholarship. It was commenced by Lachmann, the greatest critic after Wolf, that Germany has produced. Lachmann died before the work was finished, and Professor Haupt, his successor at Berlin, undertook to finish it. His share in the edition, particularly in the notes, is greater than that of Lachmann, and the accuracy with which the text has been restored from more than twenty MSS., is worthy of the great pupil of that great master.

YE SCHYPPE OF FOOLES¹.

THE critical periods in the history of the world are best studied in the lives of a few representative men. The history of the German Reformation assumes a living, intelligible, and human character in the biographies of the Reformers; and no historian would imagine that he understood the secret springs of that mighty revolution in Germany without having read the works of Hutten, the table-talk of Luther, the letters of Melancthon, and the sermons of Zwingli. But although it is easy to single out representative men in the great decisive struggles of history, they are more difficult to find during the preparatory periods. The years from 1450 to 1500 are as important as the years from 1500 to 1550—nay, to the thoughtful historian, that silent period of incubation is perhaps of deeper interest than the violent outburst of the sixteenth century. But where, during those years, are the men of sufficient eminence to represent the age in which they lived? It was an age of transition and preparation, of dissatisfaction and hesitation. Like the whole of the fifteenth

¹ Sebastian Brant's 'Narrenschiff.' Herausgegeben von Friedrich Zarncke. Leipzig, 1857.

century, 'it was rich in scholars, copious in pedants, but poor in genius, and barren of strong thinkers.' We must not look for heroes in so unheroic an age, but be satisfied with men if they be but a head taller than their contemporaries.

One of the most interesting men in whose life and writings the history of the preliminary age of the German Reformation may be studied, is Sebastian Brant, the famous author of the famous 'Ship of Fools.' He was born in the year 1457. The Council of Basle had failed to fulfil the hopes of the German laity as to a *reformatio ecclesiae in capite et membris*. In the very year of Brant's birth, Martin Meyer, the Chancellor of Mayence, had addressed his letter to his former friend, Æneas Sylvius—a national manifesto, in boldness and vigour only surpassed by the powerful pamphlet of Luther, 'To the Nobility of the German Nation.' Germany seemed to awaken at last to her position, and to see the dangers that threatened her political and religious freedom. The new movement which had taken place in Italy in classical learning, supported chiefly by Greek refugees, began to extend its quickening influence beyond the Alps. Æneas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius II, 1458, writes in one of his letters, that poets were held in no estimation in Germany, though he admits that their poetry is less to be blamed for this than their patrons, the princes, who care far more for any trifles than for poetry. The Germans, he says, do not care for science nor for a knowledge of classical literature, and they have hardly heard the name of Cicero or any other orator. In the eyes of the Italians, the Germans were barbarians; and when

Constantine Lascaris saw the first specimen of printing, he was told by the Italian priests, that this invention had lately been made *apud barbaros in urbe Germaniae*. They were dangerous neighbours these barbarians, who could make such discoveries as the art of printing; and Brant lived to see the time when Joh. Caesarius was able to write to a friend of his:—‘At this moment, Germany, if she does not surpass Italy, at least need not, and will not, yield to her; not so much on account of her empire, as for her wonderful fecundity in learned men, and the almost incredible growth of learning.’

This period of slow but steady progress, from the invention of printing to the Council of Worms, is bridged over by the life of Sebastian Brant, who lived from 1457 to 1521. Brant was very early the friend of Peter Schott, and through him had been brought in contact with a circle of learned men, who were busily engaged in founding one of the first schools of classical learning at Schlettstadt. Men like Jac. Wimpheling, Joh. Torrentinus, Florentius Hundius, and Johannes Hugo, belonged to that society. Brant afterwards went to Basle to study law. Basle was then a young University. It had only been founded in 1459, but it was already a successful rival of Heidelberg. The struggle between the Realists and Nominalists was then raging all over Europe, and it divided the University of Basle into two parties; each of them trying to gain influence and adherents among the young students. It has been usual to look upon the Realists as the Conservative, and upon the Nominalists as the Liberal, party of the fifteenth century. But although at times this was

the case, philosophical opinions, on which the differences between these two parties were founded, were not of sufficient strength to determine for any length of time the political and religious bias of either school. The Realists were chiefly supported by the Dominicans, the Nominalists by the Franciscans ; and there is always a more gentle expression beaming in the eyes of the followers of the seraphic Doctor, particularly if contrasted with the stern frown of the Dominican. Ockam himself was a Franciscan, and those who thought with him were called *doctores renovatores* and *sophistae*. Suddenly, however, the tables were turned. At Oxford, the Realists, in following out their principles in a more independent spirit, had arrived at results dangerous to the peace of the Church. As philosophers, they began to carry out the doctrines of Plato in good earnest—as reformers, they looked wistfully to the early centuries of the Christian Church. The same liberal and independent spirit reached from Oxford to Prague, and the expulsion of the German nation from that University may be traced to the same movement. The Realists were at that time no longer in the good odour of orthodoxy ; and, at the Council of Constanz, the Nominalists, such as Joh. Gerson and Petrus de Alliaco, gained triumphs which seemed for a time to make them the arbiters of public opinion in Germany, and to give them the means of securing the Church against the attacks of Huss on one side, and against the more dangerous encroachments of the Pope and the monks on the other. This triumph, however, was of short duration. All the rights which the Germans seemed to have conquered at the Councils of Constanz

and Basle were sacrificed by their own Emperor. No one dared to say again, what Gregory von Heimburg had said to the Italian clergy—‘*Quid fines alienos invaditis? quid falcem vestram in messem alienam extenditis?*’ Under Æneas Sylvius, the power of the Pope in Germany was as absolute as ever. The Nominalist party lost all the ground which it had gained before. It was looked upon with suspicion by Pope and Emperor. It was banished from Courts and Universities, and the disciples of the Realistic school began a complete crusade against the followers of Ockam.

Johannes Heynlin a Lapide, a former head of a house in Paris, migrated to Basle, in order to lend his influence and authority to the Realist party in that rising University. Trithemius says of him:—‘*Hic doctrinam eorum Parisiensium qui reales appellantur primus ad Basiliensium universitatem translulit, ibidemque plantavit, roboravit et auxit.*’ This Johannes Heynlin a Lapide, however, though a violent champion of the then victorious Realist party, was by no means a man without liberal sentiments. On many points the Realists were more tolerant, or at least more enlightened, than the Nominalists. They counted among themselves better scholars than the adherents of Ockam. They were the first and foremost to point out the uselessness of the dry scholastic system of teaching grammar and logic, and nothing else. And though they cherished their own ideas as to the supreme authority of the Pope, the divine right of the Emperor, or the immaculate conception of the Virgin (a dogma denied by the Dominicans, and defended by the Franciscans), they were always

ready to point out abuses and to suggest reforms. The age in which they lived was not an age of decisive thought or decisive action. There was a want of character in individuals as well as in parties; and the points on which they differed seemed of small importance, though they masked differences of greater weight. At Basle, the men who were gathered round Johannes a Lapide, were what we should call Liberal Conservatives, and it is among them that we find Sebastian Brant. Basle could then boast of some of the most eminent men of the time. Besides Agricola, and Wimpheling, and Geiler von Kaisersberg, and Trithemius, Reuchlin was there for a time, and Wessel, and the Greek Kontablacos. Sebastian Brant, though on friendly terms with most of these men, was their junior; and, among his contemporaries, a new generation grew up, more independent and more free-spoken than their masters, though as yet very far from any revolutionary views in matters of Church or State. Feuds broke out very soon between the old and the young schools. Locher, the friend of Brant—the poet who had turned his ‘Ship of Fools’ into Latin verse—published a poem, in which he attacked rather petulantly the scholastic philosophy and theology. Wimpheling, at the request of Geiler of Kaisersberg, had to punish him for this audacity, and he did it in a pamphlet full of the most vulgar abuse. Reuchlin also had given offence, and was attacked and persecuted; but his party retaliated by the ‘*Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum*.’ Thus the Conservative, or Realistic party became divided; and when, at the beginning of a new century and a new era in the history of the world, Luther raised his

voice in defence of national and religious freedom, he was joined not only by the more advanced descendants of the Nominalistic school, but by all the vigour, the talent, and the intellect of the old Conservatives.

Brant himself, though he lived at Strasburg up to 1521, did not join the standard of the Reformation. He had learned to grumble, to find fault, to abuse and to condemn; but his time was gone when the moment for action arrived. And yet he helped toward the success of the Reformation in Germany. He had been one of the first, after the discovery of printing, to use the German language for political purposes. His fly-sheets, his illustrated editions, had given useful hints how to address the large masses of the people. If he looked upon the world, as it then was, as a ship of fools, and represented every weakness, vice, and wickedness, under the milder colour of foolery, the people who read his poems singled out some of his fools, and called them knaves. The great work of Sebastian Brant was his 'Narrenschiff.' It was first published in 1497, at Basle, and the first edition, though on account of its woodcuts it could not have been a very cheap book, was sold off at once. Edition after edition followed, and translations were published in Latin, in Low German, in Dutch, in French, and English. Sermons were preached on the 'Narrenschiff'; Trithemius calls it *Divina Satira*, Locher compares Brant with Dante, Hutten calls him the new lawgiver of German poetry. The 'Narrenschiff' is a work which we may still read with pleasure, though it is difficult to account for its immense success at the time of its publication. Some historians

ascribe it to the woodcuts. They are certainly very clever, and there is reason to suppose that most of them were, if not actually drawn, at least suggested by Brant himself. Yet even a Turner has failed to render mediocre poetry popular by his illustrations, and there is nothing to show that the caricatures of Brant were preferred to his satires. Now his satires, it is true, are not very powerful, nor pungent, nor original. But his style is free and easy. Brant is not a ponderous poet. He writes in short chapters, and mixes his fools in such a manner that we always meet with a variety of new faces. It is true that all this would hardly be sufficient to secure a decided success for a work like his at the present day. But then we must remember the time in which he wrote. What had the poor people of Germany to read toward the end of the fifteenth century? Printing had been invented, and books were published and sold with great rapidity. People were not only fond, but proud, of reading books. Reading was fashionable, and the first fool who enters Brant's ship is the man who buys books. But what were the books that were offered for sale? We find among the early prints of the fifteenth century religious, theological, and classical works in great abundance, and we know that the respectable and wealthy burghers of Augsburg and Strasburg were proud to fill their shelves with these portly volumes. But then German aldermen had wives, and daughters, and sons; and what were they to read during the long winter evenings? The poetry of the thirteenth century was no longer intelligible, and the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had produced very little that would be to the taste of young

ladies and gentlemen. The poetry of the 'Meistersänger' was not very exhilarating. The romances of 'The Book of Heroes' had lost all their native charms under the rough treatment they had experienced at the hand of their latest editor, Caspar von der Roen. The so-called 'Misteries' (not mysteries) might be very well as Christmas pantomimes once a year, but they could not be read for their own sake, like the dramatic literature of later times. The light literature of the day consisted entirely in novels, and in spite of their miserable character, their popularity was immense. Besides the 'Gesta Romanorum' which were turned into German verse and prose, we meet with French novels, such as 'Lothar and Maler,' translated by a Countess of Nassau in 1437, and printed in 1514; 'Pontus and Sidonia,' translated from the French by Eleonore of Scotland, the wife of Sigismund of Austria, published 1498; 'Melusina,' equally from the French, published 1477. The old epic poems of Tristan, and Lancelot, and Wigalois, were too long and tedious. People did not care any longer for the deep thoughts of Wolfram von Eschenbach, and the beautiful poetry of Gottfried von Strassburg. They wanted only the plot, the story, the dry bones, and these were dished up in the prose novels of the fifteenth century, and afterwards collected in the so-called 'Book of Love.' There was room, therefore, at that time for a work like the 'Ship of Fools.' It was the first printed book that treated of contemporaneous events and living persons, instead of old German battles and French knights. People are always fond of reading the history of their own times. If the good qualities of their age are brought out, they

think of themselves or their friends; if the dark features of their contemporaries are exhibited, they think of their neighbours and enemies. Now, the 'Ship of Fools' is just such a satire which ordinary people would read, and read with pleasure. They might feel a slight twinge now and then, but they would put down the book at the end, and thank God that they were not like other men. There is a chapter on Misers—and who would not gladly give a penny to a beggar? There is a chapter on Gluttony—and who was ever more than a little exhilarated after dinner? There is a chapter on Church-goers—and who ever went to church for respectability's sake, or to show off a gaudy dress, or a fine dog, or a new hawk? There is a chapter on Dancing—and who ever danced except for the sake of exercise? There is a chapter on Adultery—and who ever did more than flirt with his neighbour's wife? We sometimes wish that Brant's satire had been a little more searching, and that, instead of his many allusions to classical fools (for his book is full of scholarship), he had given us a little more of the *chronique scandaleuse* of his own time. But he was too good a man to do this, and his contemporaries no doubt were grateful to him for his forbearance.

Brant's poem is not easy to read. Though he was a contemporary of Luther, his language differs much more from modern German than Luther's translation of the Bible. His 'Ship of Fools' wanted a commentary, and this want has been supplied by one of the most learned and industrious scholars of Germany, Professor Zarneke, in his lately published edition of the 'Narrenschiff.' This must have been a work of

many years of hard labour. Nothing that is worth knowing about Brant and his works has been omitted, and we hardly know of any commentary on Aristophanes or Juvenal in which every difficulty is so honestly met as in Professor Zarneke's notes on the German satirist. The editor is a most minute and painstaking critic. He tries to re-establish the correct reading of every word, and he enters upon his work with as much zeal as if the world could not be saved till every tittle of Brant's poem had been restored. He is, however, not only a critic, but a sensible and honest man. He knows what is worth knowing and what is not, and he does not allow himself to be carried away by a desire to display his own superior acquirements—a weakness which makes so many of his colleagues forgetful of the real ends of knowledge, and the real duties of the scholar and the historian.

We have to say a few words on the English translation of Brant's 'Ship of Fools.' It was not made from the original, but from Locher's Latin translation. It reproduces the matter, but not the manner of the original satire. Some portions are added by the translator, Alexander Barclay, and in some parts his translation is an improvement on the original. It was printed in 1508, published 1509, and went through several editions.

The following may serve as a specimen of Barclay's translation, and of his original contributions to Brant's 'Navis Stultifera':—

Here beginneth the 'Ship of Fooles,' and first of unprofitable books:—

I am the first foole of all the whole navie,
To keep the Pompe, the Helme, and eke the Sayle:
For this is my minde, this one pleasure have I,

Of bookes to have great plentie and apparayle.
 I take no wisdome by them, nor yet awayle,
 Nor them perceave not, and then I them despise:
 Thus am I a foole, and all that sue that guise.

That in this Ship the chiefe place I governe,
 By this wide Sea with fooles wandring,
 The cause is plaine and easy to discerne,
 Still am I busy, bookes assembling,
 For to have plentie it is a pleasant thing
 In my conceyt, and to have them ay in hande:
 But what they meane do I not understande.

But yet I have them in great reverence
 And honoure, saving them from filth and ordure,
 By often brusshing and much diligence,
 Full goodly bounde in pleasant coverture,
 Of Damas, Sattin, or els of Velvet pure:
 I keepe them sure, fearing least they should be lost,
 For in them is the cunning wherein I me boast.

But if it fortune that any learned men
 Within my house fall to disputation,
 I drawe the curtaynes to shewe my bokes then,
 That they of my cunning should make probation:
 I kepe not to fall in alterication,
 And while they comment, my bookes I turne and winde,
 For all is in them, and nothing in my minde.

In the fourth chapter, 'Of newe fassions and disguised garmentes,' there is at the end what is called 'The Lenvoy of Alexander Barclay,' and in it an allusion to Henry VIII:—

But ye proude galants that thus your selfe disguise,
 Be ye ashamed, beholde unto your prince:
 Consider his sadness, his honestie devise,
 His clothing expresseth his inwarde prudence,
 Ye see no example of such inconvenience
 In his highness, but godly wit and gravitie,
 Ensue him, and sorrowe for your enormitie.

ON THE LANGUAGE AND POETRY OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

AFTER all that has been written about the Schleswig-Holstein question, how little is known about those whom that question chiefly concerns—the Schleswig-Holsteiners. There may be a vague recollection that, during the general turmoil of 1848, the German inhabitants of the Duchies rose against the Danes; that they fought bravely, and at last succumbed, not to the valour, but to the diplomacy of Denmark. But, after the Treaty of London in 1852 had disposed of them, as the Treaty of Vienna had disposed of other brave people, they sank below the horizon of European interests, never to rise again, it was fondly hoped, till the present generation had passed away.

Yet these Schleswig-Holsteiners have an interest of their own, quite apart from the political clouds that have lately gathered round their country. Ever since we know anything of the history of Northern Europe, we find Saxon races established as the inhabitants of that northern peninsula which was then called the *Cimbric Chersonese*. The first writer who ever mentions the name of Saxons is Ptolemy¹, and he speaks of them as settled in what is now called

¹ Ptol. ii. 11, ἐπὶ τὸν αὐχένα τῆς Κιμβρικῆς Χερσονήσου Σάξονες.

Schleswig-Holstein¹. At the time of Charlemagne the Saxon race is described to us as consisting of three tribes; the *Ostfalai*, *Westfalai*, and *Angrarii*. The *Westphalians* were settled near the Rhine, the *Eastphalians* near the Elbe, and the intermediate country, washed by the Weser, was held by the *Angrarii*². The name of Westphalia is still in existence; that of Eastphalia has disappeared, but its memory survives in the English *sterling*. Eastphalian traders, the ancestors of the merchant princes of Hamburg, were known in England by the name of *Easterlings*, and, their money being of the purest quality, *easterling*, in Latin *esterlingus*, shortened to *sterling*, became the general name of pure or sterling money. The name of the third tribe, the *Angrarii*, continued through the Middle Ages as the name of a people, and to the present day the reigning Duke of Anhalt, calls himself Duke of '*Sachsen, Engern, und Westphalen*.' But the name of the *Angrarii* was meant to fulfil another and more glorious destiny. The name *Angrarii* or *Angarii*³ is a corruption of the older name, *Angrivarii*, the famous German race mentioned by Tacitus as the neighbours of the *Cherusci*. These *Angrivarii* are in later documents called *Anglevarii*. The termination *varii*⁴ represents the same word which exists in A. S. as *ware*; for instance, in *Cant-ware*, inhabitants of Kent, or *Cant-ware-burh*, Canterbury; *burh*-

¹ Grimm, 'Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache,' p. 609. Strabo, Pliny, and Tacitus do not mention the name of Saxons.

² Grimm, l. c. p. 629.

³ See 'Poeta Saxo,' anno 772, in Pertz, Monum. I. 228, line 36; Grimm, l. c. p. 629.

⁴ See Grimm, l. c. p. 781.

ware, inhabitants of a town, burghers. It is derived from *werian*, to defend, to hold, or may be connected with *wer*, a man. The same termination is found in *Ansivarii* or *Ampsivarii*; probably also in *Teutonoarii* instead of *Teutoni*, *Chattuarii* instead of *Chatti*.

The principal seats of these *Angrarii* were, as we saw, between the Rhine and Elbe, but Tacitus¹ knows of *Anglii*, i. e. *Angrii*, east of the Elbe, and an offshoot of the same Saxon tribe is found very early in possession of that famous peninsula between the Schlei and the Bay of Flensburg on the eastern coast of Schleswig², which by Latin writers was called *Anglia*, i. e. *Angria*. To derive the name of *Anglia* from the Latin *angulus*³, corner, is about as good an etymology as the kind-hearted remark of St. Gregory, who interpreted the name of *Angli* by *angeli*. From that *Anglia*, the *Angli*, together with the *Saxons* and *Juts*, migrated to the British Isles in the fifth century, and the name of the *Angli*, as that of the most numerous tribe, became in time the name of *England*⁴. In the Latin laws ascribed to King Edward the Confessor a curious supplement is found, which states 'that the *Juts* (*Guti*) came formerly from the noble blood of the *Angli*, namely, from the state of *Engra*, and that the English came from the same blood. The *Juts*, therefore, like the *Angli* of Ger-

¹ 'Germania,' c. 40. Grimm, 'Deutsche Sprache,' p. 604.

² Grimm, p. 641.

³ Beda, 'Hist. Eccl.' I. 15. 'Porro de Anglis, hoc est, de illa patria quae Angulus dicitur,' &c. Ethelwert, Chron. I, 'Porro Anglia vetus sita est inter Saxones et Giotos, habens oppidum capitale, quod sermone Saxonico *Sleswic* nuncupatur, secundum vero Danos, *Haithaby*.'

⁴ Grimm, l. c. p. 630.

many, should always be received in England as brothers, and as citizens of the realm, because the Angli of England and Germany had always intermarried, and had fought together against the Danes¹.

Like the Angli of Anglia, the principal tribes clustering round the base of the Cimbric peninsula, and known by the general name of *Northalbingi* or *Transalbiani*, also *Nordleudi*, were all offshoots of the Saxon stem. Adam of Bremen (2,15) divides them into *Tedmarsgoi*, *Holcetae*, and *Sturmarii*. In these it is easy to recognize the modern names of *Dithmarschen*, *Holtseten* or *Holsten*, and *Stormarn*. It would require more space than we can afford, were we to enter into the arguments by which Grimm has endeavoured to identify the *Dithmarschen* with the *Teutoni*, the *Stormarn* with the *Cimbri*, and the *Holsten* with the *Harudes*. His arguments, if not convincing, are at least highly ingenious, and may be examined by those interested in these matters, in his 'History of the German Language,' pp. 633-640.

For many centuries the Saxon inhabitants of those

¹ 'Guti vero similiter cum veniunt (in regnum Britanniae) suscipi debent, et protegi in regno isto sicut conjurati fratres, sicut propinqui et proprii cives regni hujus. Exierunt enim quondam de nobili sanguine Anglorum, scilicet de Engra civitate, et Anglici de sanguine illorum, et semper efficiuntur populus unus et gens una. Ita constituit optimus Ina Rex Anglorum. . . . Multi vero Angli ceperunt uxores suas de sanguine et genere Anglorum Germaniae, et quidam Angli ceperunt uxores suas de sanguine et genere Scotorum; proceres vero Scotorum, et Scoti fere omnes ceperunt uxores suas de optimo genere et sanguine Anglorum Germaniae, et ita fuerunt tunc temporis per universum regnum Britanniae duo in carne una. . . . Universi praedicti semper postea pro communi utilitate coronae regni in simul et in unum viriliter contra Danos et Norwegienses semper steterunt; et atrocissime unanimi voluntate contra inimicos pugnaverunt, et bella atrocissima in regno gesserunt.' ('Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen,' ed. Schmid, p. 296.)

regions have had to bear the brunt of the battle between the Scandinavian and the German races. From the days when the German Emperor Otho I (died 973) hurled his swift spear from the northernmost promontory of Jutland into the German Ocean to mark the true frontier of his empire, to the day when Christian IX put his unwilling pen to that Danish constitution which was to incorporate all the country north of the Eider with Denmark, they have had to share in all the triumphs and all the humiliations of the German race to which they are linked by the strong ties of a common blood and a common language.

Such constant trials and vicissitudes have told on the character of these German borderers, and have made them what they are, a hardy and determined, yet careful and cautious race. Their constant watchings and struggles against the slow encroachments or sudden inroads of an enemy more inveterate even than the Danes, viz. the sea, had imparted to them from the earliest times somewhat of that wariness and perseverance which we perceive in the national character of the Dutch and the Venetians. But the fresh breezes of the German Ocean and the Baltic kept their nerves well braced and their hearts buoyant, and for muscular development the arms of these sturdy ploughers of the sea and the land can vie with those of any of their neighbours on the isles or on the continent. *Holsten-treue*, i.e. Holstein-truth, is proverbial throughout Germany, and it has stood the test of long and fearful trials.

There is but one way of gaining an insight into the real character of a people, unless we can actually

live among them for years; and that is to examine their language and literature. Now it is true that the language spoken in Schleswig-Holstein is not German—at least not in the ordinary sense of the word—and one may well understand how travellers and correspondents of newspapers, who have picked up their German phrases from Ollendorf, and who, on the strength of this, try to enter into a conversation with Holstein peasants, should arrive at the conclusion that these peasants speak Danish, or at all events, that they do not speak German.

The Germans of Schleswig-Holstein are Saxons, and all true Saxons speak Low German, and Low German is more different from High German than English is from Scotch. Low German, however, is not to be mistaken for vulgar German. It is the German which from time immemorial was spoken in the low countries and along the northern sea-coast of Germany, as opposed to the German of the high country, of Swabia, Thuringia, Bavaria, and Austria. These two dialects differ from each other like Doric and Ionic; neither can be considered as a corruption of the other; and, however far back we trace these two branches of living speech, we never arrive at a point when they diverge from one common source. The Gothic of the fourth century, preserved in the translation of the Bible by Ulphilas, is not, as has been so often said, the mother both of High and Low German. It is to all intents and purposes Low German, only Low German in its most primitive form, and more primitive therefore in its grammatical framework than the earliest specimens of High German, which date from the seventh or eighth century. This

Gothic, which was spoken in the east of Germany, has become extinct. The Saxon, spoken in the north of Germany, continues its manifold existence to the present day in the Low German dialects, in Frisian, in Dutch, and in English. The rest of Germany was and is occupied by High German. In the West the ancient High German dialect of the Franks has been absorbed in French, while the German spoken from the earliest times in the centre and south of Germany has supplied the basis of what is now called the literary and classical language of Germany.

Although the literature of Germany is chiefly High German, there are a few literary compositions, both ancient and modern, in the different spoken dialects of the country, sufficient to enable scholars to distinguish at least nine distinct grammatical settlements:— in the Low German branch, *Gothic*, *Saxon*, *Anglo-Saxon*, *Frisian*, and *Dutch*; in the High German branch, *Thuringian*, *Frankish*, *Bavarian*, and *Alemannish*. Professor Weinhold is engaged at present in publishing separate grammars of six of these dialects, viz. of *Alemannish*, *Bavarian*, *Frankish*, *Thuringian*, *Saxon*, and *Frisian*: and, in his great German grammar Jacob Grimm has been able to treat these, together with the Scandinavian tongues, as so many varieties of one common, primitive type of Teutonic speech.

But although, in the early days of German life, the Low and High German dialects were on terms of perfect equality, Low German has fallen back in the race, while High German has pressed forward with double speed. High German has become the language of literature and good society. It is taught

in schools, preached in church, pleaded at the bar; and, even in places where ordinary conversation is still carried on in Low German, High German is clearly intended to be the language of the future. At the time of Charlemagne this was not so, and one of the earliest literary monuments of the German language, the *Heliand*, i. e. the Saviour, is written in Saxon or Low German. The Saxon emperors, however, did little for German literature, while the Swabian emperors were proud of being the patrons of art and poetry. The language spoken at their court being High German, the ascendancy of that dialect may be said to date from their days, though it was not secured till the time of the Reformation, when the translation of the Bible by Luther put a firm and lasting stamp on what has since become the literary speech of Germany.

But language, even though deprived of literary cultivation, does not easily die. Though at present people write the same language all over Germany, the towns and villages teem everywhere with dialects, both High and Low. In Hanover, Brunswick, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, the Free Towns, and in Schleswig-Holstein, the lower orders speak their own German, generally called *Platt Deutsch*, and in many parts of Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Ostfriesland, and Holstein, the higher ranks too cling in their everyday conversation to this more homely dialect¹. Chil-

¹ Klaus Groth writes: 'The island of Friesian speech on the continent of Schleswig between Husum and Tondern is a very riddle and miracle in the history of language, which has not been sufficiently noticed and considered. Why should the two extreme ends only of the whole Friesian coast between Belgium and Jutland have retained their mother-speech? For the Ost-Friesians in Oldenburg speak

dren frequently speak two languages : High German at school, Low German at their games. The clergyman speaks High German when he stands in the pulpit, but when he visits the poor he must address them in their own peculiar *Platt*. The lawyer pleads in the language of Schiller and Goethe ; but, when he examines his witnesses, he has frequently to condescend to the vulgar tongue. That vulgar tongue is constantly receding from the towns ; it is frightened away by railways, it is ashamed to show itself in parliament. But it is loved all the more by the people ; it appeals to their hearts, and it comes back naturally to all who have ever talked it together in their youth. It is the same with the local patois

simply Platt-Deutsch like the Westphalians and ourselves. Cirk Hinrich Stürenburg's so-called Ost-Friesian Dictionary has no more right to call itself Friesian than the Bremen Dictionary. Unless the whole coast has sunk into the sea, who can explain that close behind Husum, in a flat country as monotonous as a Hungarian Pussta, without any natural frontier or division, the traveller on entering the next inn, may indeed be understood if he speaks High or Low German, nay, may receive to either an answer in pure German, but hears the host and his servants speak in words that sound quite strange to him ? Equally strange is the frontier north of the Wiede-au, where Danish takes the place of Friesian. Who can explain by what process the language has maintained itself so far and no farther, a language with which one cannot travel beyond eight or ten square miles ? Why should these few thousand people not have surrendered long ago this 'useless remnant of an unschooled dialect,' considering they learn at the same time Low and High German, or Low German and Danish ! In the far-stretching, straggling villages a Low German house stands sometimes alone among Friesian houses, and *vice versa*, and that has been going on for generations. In the Saxon families they do not find it necessary to learn Friesian, for all the neighbours can speak Low German ; but in the Friesian families one does not hear German spoken except when there are German visitors. Since the seventeenth century German has hardly conquered a single house, certainly not a village.'—('Illustrirte Deutsche Monatshefte,' 1869, p. 330.)

of High German. Even where at school the correct High German is taught and spoken, as in Bavaria and Austria, each town still keeps its own patois, and the people fall back on it as soon as they are among themselves. When Maria Theresa went to the Burgtheater to announce to the people of Vienna the birth of a son and heir, she did not address them in high-flown literary German. She bent forward from her box, and called out: *Hörts, der Leopold hot án Buebá*, 'Hear, Leopold has a boy.' In German comedies, characters from Berlin, Leipzig, and Vienna, are constantly introduced speaking their own local dialects. In Bavaria, Styria, and the Tyrol, much of the poetry of the people is written in their patois, and in some parts of Germany sermons even, and other religious tracts, continue to be published in the local vernaculars.

There are here and there a few enthusiastic champions of dialects, particularly of Low German, who still cherish a hope that High German may be thrown back, and Low German restored to its rights and former dominion. Yet, whatever may be thought of the relative excellences of High and Low German—and in several points, no doubt, Low German has the advantage of High German, yet, practically, the battle between the two is decided, and cannot now be renewed. The national language of Germany, whether in the South or the North, will always be the German of Luther, Lessing, Schiller, and Goethe. This, however, is no reason why the dialects, whether of Low or High German, should be despised or banished. Dialects are everywhere the natural feeders of literary languages, and an attempt

to destroy them, if it could succeed, would be like shutting up the tributaries of great rivers.

After these remarks it will be clear that, if people say that the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein do not speak German, there is some truth in such a statement, at least just enough of truth to conceal the truth. It might be said, with equal correctness, that the people of Lancashire do not speak English. But, if from this a conclusion is to be drawn that the Schleswig-Holsteiners, speaking this dialect, which is neither German nor Danish, might as well be taught in Danish as in German, this is not quite correct, and would deceive few if it were adduced as an argument for introducing French instead of English in the national schools of Lancashire.

The Schleswig-Holsteiners have their own dialect, and cling to it as they cling to many things which, in other parts of Germany, have been discarded as old-fashioned and useless. *Oll Knust hölt Hus*, 'stale bread lasts longest,' is one of their proverbs. But they read their Bible in High German; they write their newspapers in High German, and it is in High German that their children are taught, and their sermons preached in every town and in every village. It is but lately that Low German has been taken up again by Schleswig-Holstein poets, and some of their poems, though intended originally for their own people only, have been read with delight, even by those who had to spell them out with the help of a dictionary and a grammar. This kind of home-spun poetry is a sign of healthy national life. Like the songs of Burns, in Scotland, the poems of Klaus Groth and others reveal to us, more than

anything else, the real thoughts and feelings, the everyday cares and occupations of the people whom they represent, and to whose approval alone they appeal. But as Scotland, proud though she well may be of her Burns, has produced some of the best writers of English, Schleswig-Holstein, too, small as it is in comparison with Scotland, counts among its sons some illustrious names in German literature. Niebuhr, the great traveller, and Niebuhr, the great historian, were both Schleswig-Holsteiners, though during their lifetime that name had not yet assumed the political meaning in which it is now used. Karsten Niebuhr, the traveller, was a Hanoverian by birth; but, having early entered the Danish service, he was attached to a scientific mission sent by King Frederick V to Egypt, Arabia, and Palestine, in 1760. All the other members of that mission having died, it was left to Niebuhr, after his return in 1767, to publish the results of his own observations and of those of his companions. His 'Description of Arabia,' and his 'Travels in Arabia and the adjoining Countries,' though published nearly a hundred years ago, are still quoted with respect, and their accuracy has hardly ever been challenged. Niebuhr spent the rest of his life as a kind of collector and magistrate at Meldorf, a small town of between two and three thousand inhabitants, in Dithmarschen. He is described as a square and powerful man, who lived to a good old age, and who, even when he had lost his eyesight, used to delight his family and a large circle of friends, by telling them of the adventures in his oriental travels, of the starry nights of the desert, and of the bright moonlight of Egypt, where

riding on his camel, he could, from his saddle, recognise every plant that was growing on the ground. Nor were the listeners that gathered round him unworthy of the old traveller. Like many a small German town, Meldorf, the home of Niebuhr, had a society consisting of a few government officials, clergymen, and masters at the public school; most of them men of cultivated mind, and quite capable of appreciating a man of Niebuhr's powers. Even the peasants there were not the mere clods of other parts of Germany. They were a well-to-do race, and by no means illiterate. Their sons received at the Gymnasium of Meldorf a classical education, and they were able to mix with ease and freedom in the society of their betters. The most hospitable house at Meldorf was that of Boie, the High Sheriff of Dithmarschen. He had formerly, at Göttingen, been the life and soul of a circle of friends who have become famous in the history of German literature, under the name of 'Hainbund.' That 'Hainbund' or Grove-Club, included Bürger, the author of 'Lenore'; Voss, the translator of Homer; the Counts Stolberg, Hölty, and others. With Goethe, too, Boie had been on terms of intimacy, and when, in after life, he settled down at Meldorf, many of his old friends, his brother-in-law Voss, Count Stolberg, Claudius, and others, came to see him and his illustrious townsman, Niebuhr. Many a seed was sown there, many small germs began to ripen in that remote town of Meldorf, which are yielding fruit at the present day, not in Germany only, but even here in England. The sons of Boie, fired by the descriptions of the old, blind traveller, followed his example, and became dis-

tinguished as explorers and discoverers in natural history. Niebuhr's son, young Barthold, soon attracted the attention of all who came to see his father, particularly of Voss; and he was enabled, by their help and advice, to lay, in early youth, that foundation of solid learning which fitted him, in the intervals of his chequered life, to become the founder of a new era in the study of Ancient History. And how curious the threads which bind together the destinies of men! how marvellous the rays of light which, emanating from the most distant centres, cross each other in their onward course, and give their own peculiar colouring to characters apparently original and independent! We have read, of late, in the Confessions of a modern St. Augustine, how the last stroke that severed his connection with the Church of England, was the establishment of the Jerusalem Bishopric. But for that event, Dr. Newman might now be a bishop, and his friends a strong party in the Church of England. Well, that Jerusalem Bishopric owes something to Meldorf. The young schoolboy of Meldorf was afterwards the private tutor and personal friend of the Crown-Prince of Prussia, and he thus exercised an influence both on the political and the religious views of King Frederick William IV. He was likewise Prussian Ambassador at Rome, when Bunsen was there as a young scholar, full of schemes, and planning his own journey to the East. Niebuhr became the friend and patron of Bunsen, and Bunsen became his successor in the Prussian Embassy at Rome. 'It is well known that the Jerusalem Bishopric was a long-cherished plan of the King of Prussia, Niebuhr's

pupil, and that the Bill for the establishment of a Protestant Bishopric at Jerusalem was carried chiefly through the personal influence of Bunsen, the friend of Niebuhr. Thus we see how all things are working together for good or for evil, though we little know of the grains of dust that are carried along from all quarters of the globe, to tell like infinitesimal weights in the scales that decide hereafter the judgment of individuals and the fate of nations.

If Holstein, and more particularly Dithmarschen, of which Meldorf had in former days been the capital, may claim some share in Niebuhr the historian—if he himself, as the readers of his history are well aware, is fond of explaining the social and political institutions of Rome by references to what he had seen or heard of the little republic of Dithmarschen—it is certainly a curious coincidence that the only worthy successor of Niebuhr, in the field of Roman history, Theodore Mommsen, is likewise a native of Schleswig. His history of Rome, though it did not produce so complete a revolution as the work of Niebuhr, stands higher as a work of art. It contains the results of Niebuhr's critical researches, sifted and carried on by a most careful and thoughtful disciple. It is, in many respects, a most remarkable work, particularly in Germany. The fact that it is readable, and has become a popular book, has excited the wrath of many critics, who evidently consider it beneath the dignity of a learned professor that he should digest his knowledge, and give to the world, not all and everything he has accumulated in his note-books, but only what he considers really important and worth knowing. One

German critic declared, Mommsen's style is excellent, and yet he is a true scholar. The fact, again, that he does not load his pages with references and learned notes, has been treated like a *crimen læsæ majestatis*; and yet, with all the clamour and clatter that has been raised, few authors have had so little to alter or rectify in their later editions as Mommsen. To have produced two such scholars, historians, and statesmen, as Niebuhr and Mommsen, would be an honour to any kingdom in Germany: how much more to the small duchy of Schleswig-Holstein, in which we have been told so often that nothing is spoken but Danish and some vulgar dialects of Low German.

Well, even those vulgar dialects of Low German, and the poems and novels that have been written in them by true Schleswig-Holsteiners, are well worth a moment's consideration. In looking at their language, an Englishman at once discovers a number of old acquaintances: words which he would look for in vain in Schiller or Goethe. We shall mention a few.

Black means black; in High German it would be *schwarz*. *De black* is the black horse; *black up wit* is black on white; *gif mek kil un blak*, give me quill and ink. *Blid* is *blithe*, instead of the High German *mild*. *Bottervogel*, or *botterhahn*, or *botterhex*, is *butterfly*, instead of *Schmetterling*. It is a common superstition in the North of Germany, that one ought to mark the first butterfly one sees in spring. A white one betokens mourning, a yellow one a christening, a variegated one a wedding. *Bregen* or *brehm* is used instead of the High German *Gehirn*; it is the English *brain*. People say of a very foolish person, that his brain is frozen, *de brehm is em verforrn*. The peculiar

English *but*, which has given so much trouble to grammarians and etymologists, exists in the Holstein *buten*, literally outside, the Dutch *buiten*, the Old Saxon *bi-ûtan*. *Buten* in German is a regular contraction, just as *binnen*, which means inside, within, during. 'Heben is the English heaven, while the common German name is *Himmel*. *Hückup* is a sigh, and no doubt the English *hiccough*. *Düsig* is dizzy; *talkig* is talkative.

There are some curious words which, though they have a Low German look, are not to be found in English or Anglo-Saxon. Thus *plitsch*, which is used in Holstein in the sense of clever, turns out to be a corruption of *politisch*, i. e. political. *Krüdtsch* means particular or over nice; it is a corruption of *kritisch*, critical. *Katolsch* means angry, mad, and is a corruption of *catholic*, i. e. Roman Catholic. *Kränsch* means plucky, and stands for *courageux*. *Fränksch*, i. e. frankish, means strange; *flämsch*, i. e. flemish, means sulky, and is even used to form superlatives; *polsch*, i. e. polish, means wild. *Forsch* means strong and strength, and comes from the French *force*. *Klür* is a corruption of *couleur*, and *Kunkelfusen* stands for confusion or fibs.

Some idiomatic and proverbial expressions, too, deserve to be noted. Instead of saying the sun has set, the Holsteiners, fond as they are of their beer, particularly in the evening after a hard day's work, say *de Sünne geiht to Beer*, 'the sun goes to beer.' If you ask in the country how far it is to some town or village, a peasant will answer, 'n *Hunnblaff*, a dog's bark, if it is quite close; or 'n *Pip Toback*, a pipe of tobacco, meaning about half an hour. Of a conceited

fellow they say, *Hé hört de Flégn hosten*, 'he hears the flies coughing.' If a man is full of great schemes, he is told, *In Gedanken fört de Bur ók in't Kutsch*, 'in thought the peasant, too, drives in a coach.' A man who boasts is asked, *Pracher! häst ók Lüs oder schuppst di man so?* 'Braggart! have you really lice, or do you only scratch yourself as if you had?'

Holstein singt nicht, 'Holstein does not sing,' is a curious proverb, and, if it is meant to express the absence of popular poetry in that country, it would be easy to convict it of falsehood by a list of poets whose works, though unknown to fame beyond the limits of their own country, are cherished, and deservedly cherished, by their own countrymen. The best known among the Holstein poets is Klaus Groth, whose poems, published under the title of *Quickborn*, i.e. quick bourn, or living spring, show that there is a well of true poetical feeling in that country, and that its strains are all the more delicious and refreshing if they bubble up with the native accent of the country. Klaus Groth was born in 1819. He was the son of a miller, and, though he was sent to school, he had frequently to work in the field in summer, and make himself generally useful. Like many Schleswig-Holsteiners, he showed a decided talent for mathematics; but, before he was sixteen, he had to earn his bread, and work as a clerk in the office of a local magistrate. His leisure hours were devoted to various studies; German, Danish, music, psychology, successively engaged his attention. In his nineteenth year he went to the seminary at Tondern to prepare himself for work as a schoolmaster. There he studied Latin, French, Swedish; and, after three years, was ap-

pointed teacher at a girls' school. Though he had to give forty-three lessons a week, he found time to continue his own reading, and he acquired a knowledge of English, Dutch, Icelandic, and Italian. At last, however, his health gave way, and in 1847 he was obliged to resign his place. During his illness his poetical talent, which he himself had never trusted, became a source of comfort to himself and to his friends, and the warm reception which greeted the first edition of his 'Quickborn' made him what he was meant to be, the poet of Schleswig-Holstein.

His political poems are few; and, though a true Schleswig-Holsteiner at heart, he has always declined to fight with his pen when he could not fight with his sword. In the beginning of this year, however, he published 'Five Songs for Singing and Praying,' which, though they fail to give an adequate idea of his power as a poet, may be of interest as showing the deep feelings of the people in their struggle for independence. The text will be easily intelligible with the help of a literal English translation.

DÜTSCH EHR AND DÜTSCH EER.

I.

Frühling, 1848.

Dar keemn Soldaten æwer de Elf,
Hurah, hurah, na't Norn!
Se keemn so dicht as Wagg an Wagg,
Un as en Koppel vull Korn.

Gundag, Soldaten! wo kamt jü her:
Vun alle Barga de Krüz un Quer,
Ut dütschen Landen na't dütsche Meer—
So wannert un treckt dat Heer.

Wat liggt so eben as weert de See?
 Wat schint so gel as Gold?
 Dat is de Marschen er Saat un Staat,
 Dat is de Holsten er Stoet.

Gundag jü Holsten op dütsche Eer!
 Gundag jü Friesen ant dütsche Meer!
 To leben un starben vær dütsche Ehr
 So wannert un treckt dat Heer.

GERMAN HONOUR AND GERMAN EARTH.

Spring, 1848.

There came soldiers across the Elbe,
 Hurrah, hurrah, to the North!
 They came as thick as wave on wave,
 And like a field full of corn.

Good day, soldiers! whence do you come?
 From all the hills on the right and left,
 From German lands to the German sea—
 Thus wanders and marches the host.

What lies so still as it were the sea?
 What shines so yellow as gold?
 The splendid fields of the Marshes they are,
 The pride of the Holsten race.

Good day, ye Holsten, on German soil!
 Good day, ye Friesians, on the German sea
 To live and to die for German honour—
 Thus wanders and marches the host.

II.

Sommer, 1851.

Dat treckt so trurig æwer de Elf,
 In Tritt un Schritt so swar—
 De Swalw de wannert, de Hatbar treckt—
 Se kamt wedder to tokum Jahr.

Ade, ade, du dütsches Heer!
 'Ade, ade, du Holsten meer!
 Ade op Hoffen un Wiederkehr!
 Wi truert alleen ant Meer.

De Storch kumt wedder, de Swalw de singt
 So fröhlich as all tovær—
 Wann kumt de dütsche Adler un bringt
 Di wedder, du dütsche Ehr?

Wak op du Floth, wak op du Meer!
 Wak op du Dunner, un weck de Eer!
 Wi sitt op Hæpen un Wedderkehr—
 Wi truert alleen ant Meer.

Summer, 1851.

They march so sad across the Elbe,
 So heavy, step by step—
 The swallow wanders, the stork departs—
 They come back in the year to come.

Adieu, adieu, thou German host!
 'Adieu, adieu, thou Holsten sea!
 Adieu, in hope, and to meet again!'
 We mourn alone by the sea.

The stork comes back, the swallow sings
 As blithe as ever before—
 When will the German eagle return,
 And bring thee back, thou German honour!

Wake up thou flood, wake up thou sea!
 Wake up thou thunder, and rouse the land!
 We are sitting in hope to meet again—
 We mourn alone by the sea.

III.

Winter, 1863.

Dar kumt en Brusen as Værjahswind,
 Dat dræhnt as wær dat de Floth.—
 Will't Fröhjahr kamen to Wihnachtstid?
 Hölpt Gott uns sülb'n inne Noth?

Vun alle Bargaen de Krüz un Quer
 Dar is dat wedder dat dütsche Heer
 Dat gelt op Nu oder Nimmermehr!
 So rett se, de dütsche Ehr!

Wi hört den Adler, he kumt, he kumt!
 Noch eenmal hæpt wi un harrt!
 Is't Friheit endlich, de he uns bringt?
 Is't Wahrheit, wat der ut ward?

Sunst hölp uns Himmel, nu geit't ni mehr!
 Hölp du, un bring uns den Herzog her!
 Denn wüllt wi starben vær dütsche Ehr!
 Denn begravt uns in dütsche Eer!

Dec. 30, 1863.

Winter, 1863.

There comes a blast like winter storm;
 It roars as it were the flood.—
 Is the spring coming at Christmas-tide?
 Does God himself help us in our need?

From all the hills on the right and left,
 There again comes the German host!
 It is to be now or never!
 Oh, save the German honour!

We hear the eagle, he comes, he comes!
 Once more we hope and wait!
 Is it freedom at last he brings to us?
 Is it truth what comes from thence?

Else Heaven help us, now it goes no more!
 Help thou, and bring us our Duke!
 Then will we die for German honour!
 Then bury us in German earth!

Dec. 30, 1863.

It is not, however, in war songs or political invective that the poetical genius of Klaus Groth shows to advantage. His proper sphere is the quiet idyll, a truthful and thoughtful description of nature, a reproduction of the simplest and deepest feelings of the human heart, and all this in the homely, honest, and heartfelt language of his own 'Platt Deutsch.' That the example of Burns has told on Groth, that the poetry of the Scotch poet has inspired and inspirited the poet of Schleswig-Holstein, is not to be denied. But to imitate Burns and to imitate him successfully,

is no mean achievement, and Groth would be the last man to disown his master. The poem 'Min Jehann' might have been written by Burns. I shall give a free metrical translation of it, but should advise the reader to try to spell out the original, for much of its charm lies in its native form, and to turn Groth even into High German destroys his beauty as much as when Burns is translated into English.

MIN JEHAHN.

Ik wull, wi weern noch kleen, Jehann,
 Do weer de Welt so grot!
 We seten op den Steen, Jehann,
 Weest noch? by Nawers Sot.
 An Heben seil de stille Maan,
 Wi segen, wa he leep,
 Un snacken, wa de Himmel hoch,
 Un wa de Sot wul deep.

Weest noch, wa still dat weer, Jehann?
 Dar röhr keen Blatt an Bom.
 So is dat nu ni mehr, Jehann,
 As höchstens noch in Drom.
 Och ne, wenn do de Scheper sung—
 Alleen in't wide Feld:
 Ni wahr, Jehann! dat weer en Ton—
 • De eenzige op de Welt.

Mitünner inne Schummerntid
 Denn ward mi so to Mod,
 Denn löppt mi't langs den Rügg so hitt,
 As domals bi den Sot.
 Den dreih ik mi so hasti um,
 As weer ik nich alleen:
 Doch Allens, wat ik finn, Jehann,
 Dat is—ik stah un ween.

MY JOHN.

I wish we still were little, John,
 The world was then so wide!
 When on the stone by neighbour's bourn
 We rested side by side.

We saw the moon in silver veiled
 Sail silent through the sky,
 Our thoughts were deeper than the bourn,
 And as the heavens high.

You know how still it was then, John;
 All nature seemed at rest;
 So is it now no longer, John,
 Or in our dreams at best!
 Think when the shepherd boy then sang
 Alone o'er all the plain,
 Aye, John, you know, that was a sound
 We ne'er shall hear again.

Sometimes now, John, the eventides
 The self-same feelings bring,
 My pulses beat as loud and strong
 As then beside the spring.
 And then I turn affrighted round,
 Some stranger to descry—
 But nothing can I see, my John—
 I am alone and cry.

The next poem is a little popular ballad, relating to a tradition, very common on the northern coast of Germany, both east and west of the peninsula, of islands swallowed by the sea, their spires, pinnacles, and roofs being on certain days still visible, and their bells audible, below the waves. One of these islands was called *Büsen*, or *Old Büsum*, and is supposed to have been situated opposite the village now called Büsen, on the west coast of Dithmarschen. Strange to say, the inhabitants of that island, in spite of their tragic fate, are represented rather in a comical light, as the Bœotians of Holstein.

WAT SIK DAT VOLK VERTELT.

Ol Büsum.

Ol Büsen liggt int wille Haff,
 De Floth de keem un wöhl en Graff.

De Floth de keem un spöl un spöl,
 Bet se de Insel ünner wöhl.
 Dar blev keen Steen, dar blev keen Pahl,
 Dat Water schæel dat all hendal.
 Dar weer keen Beest, dar weer keen Hund,
 De ligt nu all in depen Grund.
 Un Allens, wat der lev un lach,
 Dat deck de See mit depe Nach.
 Mitünner in de holle Ebb
 So süht man vunne Hüs' de Köpp.
 Denn dukt de Thorn herut ut Sand,
 As weert en Finger vun en Hand.
 Denn hört man sach de Klocken klingn,
 Denn hört man sach de Kanter singn;
 Denn geit dat lisen dær de Luft:
 'Begrabt den Leib in seine Gruft.'

WHAT THE PEOPLE TELL.

Old Büsum.

Old Büsen sank into the waves;
 The sea has made full many graves;
 The flood came near and washed around,
 Until the rock to dust was ground.
 No stone remained, no belfry steep;
 All sank into the waters deep.
 There was no beast, there was no hound;
 They all were carried to the ground.
 And all that lived and laughed around
 The sea now holds in gloom profound.
 At times, when low the water falls,
 The sailor sees the broken walls;
 The church tow'r peeps from out the sand,
 Like to the finger of a hand.
 Then hears one low the church bells ringing,
 Then hears one low the sexton singing;
 A chant is carried by the gust:—
 'Give earth to earth, and dust to dust.'

In the Baltic, too, similar traditions are current of sunken islands and towns buried in the sea, which are believed to be visible at certain times. The most famous tradition is that of the ancient town of Vineta

—once, it is said, the greatest emporium in the north of Europe—several times destroyed and built up again, till, in 1183, it was upheaved by an earthquake and swallowed by the sea. The ruins of Vineta are believed to be visible between the coast of Pomerania and the island of Rügen. This tradition has suggested one of Wilhelm Müller's—my father's—lyrical songs, published in his 'Stones and Shells from the Island of Rügen,' 1825, of which I am able to give a translation by Mr. J. A. Froude.

VINETA.

I.

Aus des Meeres tiefem, tiefem Grunde
Klingen Abendglocken dumpf und matt,
Uns zu geben wunderbare Kunde
Von der schönen alten Wunderstadt.

II.

In der Fluthen Schooss hinabgesunken
Blieben unten ihre Trümmer stehn,
Ihre Zinnen lassen goldne Funken
Wiederscheinend auf dem Spiegel sehn.

III.

Und der Schiffer, der den Zauberschimmer
Einmal sah im hellen Abendroth,
Nach derselben Stelle schiff't er immer,
Ob auch rings umher die Klippe droht.

IV.

Aus des Herzens tiefem, tiefem Grunde
Klingt es mir, wie Glocken, dumpf und matt:
Ach, sie geben wunderbare Kunde
Von der Liebe, die geliebt es hat.

V.

Eine schöne Welt ist da versunken,
Ihre Trümmer blieben unten stehn,
Lassen sich als goldne Himmelsfunken
Oft im Spiegel meiner Träume sehn.

VI.

Und dann möcht' ich tauchen in die Tiefen,
 Mich versenken in den Wiederschein,
 Und mir ist als ob mich Engel riefen
 In die alte Wunderstadt herein.

VINETA.

I.

From the sea's deep hollow faintly pealing,
 Far off evening-bells come sad and slow;
 Faintly rise, the wondrous tale revealing
 Of the old enchanted town below.

II.

On the bosom of the flood reclining,
 Ruined arch and wall and broken spire,
 Down beneath the watery mirror shining,
 Gleam and flash in flakes of golden fire.

III.

And the Boatman who at twilight hour
 Once that magic vision shall have seen,
 Heedless how the crags may round him lour,
 Evermore will haunt the charmed scene.

IV.

From the heart's deep hollow faintly pealing,
 Far I hear them, bell-notes sad and slow,
 Ah, a wild and wondrous tale revealing
 Of the drowned wreck of love below.

V.

There a world in loveliness decaying
 Lingers yet in beauty ere it die;
 Phantom forms across my senses playing,
 Flash like golden fire-flakes from the sky.

VI.

Lights are gleaming, fairy bells are ringing,
 And I long to plunge and wander free.
 Where I hear the angel-voices singing
 In those ancient towers below the sea.

I give a few more specimens of Klaus Groth's poetry

which I have ventured to turn into English verse, in the hope that my translations, though very imperfect, may, perhaps on account of their very imperfection, excite among some of my readers a desire to become acquainted with the originals.

HE SÄ MI SO VEL.

I.

He sä mi so vel, un ik sä em keen Wort,
Un all wat ik sä, weer: Jehann, ik mutt fort!

II.

He sä mi vun Lev un vun Himmel un Eer,
He sä mi vun allens—ik weet ni mal mehr!

III.

He sä mi so vel, un ik sä em keen Wort,
Un all wat ik sä, weer: Jehann, ik mutt fort!

IV.

He heeld mi de Hann, un he be mi so dull,
Ik schull em doch gut wen, un ob ik ni wull?

V.

Ik weer je ni bös, awer sä doch keen Wort,
Un all wat ik sä, weer: Jehann, ik mutt fort!

VI.

Nu sitt ik un denk, un denk jümmer daran,
Mi düch, ik muss seggt hebbn: Wa geern, min Jehann!

VII.

Un doch, kumt dat wedder, so segg ik keen Wort,
Un holst he mi, segg ik: Jehann, ik mutt fort!

HE TOLD ME SO MUCH.

I.

Though he told me so much, I had nothing to say,
And all that I said was, John, I must away!

II.

He spoke of his true love, and spoke of all that,
Of honour and heaven—I hardly know what.

III.

Though he told me so much, I had nothing to say,
And all that I said was, John, I must away!

IV.

He held me, and asked me, as hard as he could,
That I too should love him, and whether I would?

V.

I never was wroth, but had nothing to say,
And all that I said was, John, I must away!

VI.

I sit now alone, and I think on and on,
Why did I not say then, How gladly, my John!

VII.

Yet even the next time, oh what shall I say,
If he holds me and asks me?—John, I must away!

TÖF MAL!

Se is doch de stillste vun alle to Kark!
Se is doch de schönste vun alle to Mark!
So weekli, so bleekli, un de Ogen so grot,
So blau as en Heben un deep as en Sot.
Wer kikt wul int Water, un denkt ni sin Deel?
Wer kikt wul nan Himmel, un wünscht sik ne vel?
Wer stüht er in Ogen, so blau un so fram,
Un denkt ni an Engeln, un allerhand Kram?

WAIT A LITTLE.

I.

In Church she is surely the stillest of all,
She steps through the market so fair and so tall,

II.

So softly, so lightly, with wondering eyes,
As deep as the sea, and as blue as the skies.

III.

Who thinks not a deal when he looks on the main?
Who looks to the skies, and sighs not again?

IV.

Who looks in her eyes, so blue and so true,
And thinks not of angels and other things too?

KEEN GRAFF IS SO BRUT.

I.

Keen Graff is so brut un keen Mür so hoch,
Wenn Twe sik man gut sünd, so drapt se sik doch.

II.

Keen Wedder so gruli, so düster keen Nacht,
Wenn Twe sik man sehn wüllt, so seht se sik sacht.

III.

Dat gif wul en Maansch, dar schint wul en Steern,
Dat gift noch en Licht oder Lucht un Lantern.

IV.

Dar fiunt sik en Ledder, en Stegelsch un Steg:
Wenn Twe sik man leef hebbt—keen Sorg vaer den Weg.

NO DITCH IS SO DEEP.

I.

No ditch is so deep, and no wall is so high,
If two love each other, they'll meet by and bye.

II.

No storm is so wild, and no night is so black,
If two wish to meet, they will soon find a track.

III.

There is surely the moon, or the stars shining bright,
Or a torch, or a lantern, or some sort of light;

IV.

There is surely a ladder, a step or a stile,
If two love each other, they'll meet ere long while.

JEHANN, NU SPANN DE SCHIMMELS AN!

I.

Jehann, nu spann de Schimmels an!
Nu fahr wi na de Brut!
Un hebbt wi nix as brune Per,
Jehann, so is't ok gut!

II.

Un hebbt wi nix as swarte Per,
 Jehann, so is't ok recht!
 Un bün ik nich uns Weerth sin Sœn,
 So bün'k sin jüngste Knecht!

III.

Un hebbt wi gar keen Per un Wag',
 So hebbt wi junge Been!
 Un de so glückli is as ik,
 Jehann, dat wüll wi sehn!

MAKE HASTE, MY JOHN, PUT TO THE GREYS.

I.

Make haste, my John, put to the greys,
 We'll go and fetch the bride,
 And if we have but two brown hacks,
 They'll do as well to ride.

II.

And if we've but a pair of blacks,
 We still can bear our doom,
 And if I'm not my master's son,
 I'm still his youngest groom.

III.

And have we neither horse nor cart,
 Still strong young legs have we,—
 And any happier man than I,
 John, I should like to see.

DE JUNGE WETFRU.

Wenn Abends roth de Wolken treckt,
 So denk ik och! an di!
 So trock verbi dat ganze Heer,
 Un du weerst mit derbi.

Wenn ut de Böm de Blaeder fallt,
 So denk ik glik an di:
 So full so menni brawe Jung,
 Un du weerst mit derbi.

Denn sett ik mi so truri hin,
Un denk so vel an di,
Ik et alleen min Abendbrot—
Un du büst nich derbi.

THE SOLDIER'S WIDOW.

When ruddy clouds are driving past,
'Tis more than I can bear;
Thus did the soldiers all march by,
And thou, too, thou wert there.

When leaves are falling on the ground,
'Tis more than I can bear;
Thus fell full many a valiant lad,
And thou, too, thou wert there.

And now I sit, so still and sad,
'Tis more than I can bear;
My evening meal I eat alone,
For thou, thou art not there.

I wish I could add one of Klaus Groth's tales (*Vertellen*, as he calls them), which give the most truthful description of all the minute details of life in Dithmarschen, and bring the peculiar character of the country and of its inhabitants vividly before the eyes of the reader. But, short as they are, even the shortest of them would fill more pages than could here be spared for Schleswig-Holstein. I shall, therefore, conclude this sketch with a tale which has no author—a simple tale from one of the local Holstein newspapers. It came to me in a heap of other papers, fly-sheets, pamphlets, and books, but it shone like a diamond in a heap of rubbish; and, as the tale of 'The Old Woman of Schleswig-Holstein,' it may help to give to many who have been unjust to the inhabitants of the Duchies some truer idea of the stuff there is in that strong and staunch and sterling race to which

England owes its language, its best blood, nay its honoured name.

‘When the war against Denmark began again in the winter of 1863, offices were opened in the principal towns of Germany for collecting charitable contributions. At Hamburg, Messrs. L. and K. had set apart a large room for receiving lint, linen, and warm clothing, or small sums of money. One day, about Christmas, a poorly-clad woman from the country stepped in and inquired, in the pure Holstein dialect, whether contributions were received here for Schleswig-Holstein. The clerk showed her to a table covered with linen rags and such like articles. But she turned away and pulled out an old leather purse, and, taking out pieces of money, began to count aloud on the counter; “One mark, two marks, three marks,” till she had finished her ten marks. “That makes ten marks,” she said, and shoved the little pile away. The clerk, who had watched the poor old woman while she was arranging her small copper and silver coins, asked her: “From whom does the money come?”

““From me,” she said, and began counting again, “One mark, two marks, three marks.” Thus she went on emptying her purse, till she had counted out ten small heaps of coin, of ten marks each. Then, counting each heap once over again, she said: “These are my hundred marks for Schleswig-Holstein; be so good as to send them to the soldiers.”

‘While the old peasant woman was doing her sums, several persons had gathered round her; and, as she was leaving the shop, she was asked again in a tone of surprise from whom the money came.

"From me," she said; and, observing that she was closely scanned, she turned back, and, looking the man full in the face, she added, smiling: "It is all honest money; it won't hurt the good cause."

The clerk assured her that no one had doubted her honesty, but that she herself had, no doubt, often known want, and that it was hardly right to let her contribute so large a sum, probably the whole of her savings.

The old woman remained silent for a time, but, after she had quietly scanned the faces of all present, she said: "Surely it concerns no one how I got the money. Many a thought passed through my heart while I was counting that money. You would not ask me to tell you all? But you are kind gentlemen, and you take much trouble for us poor people. So I'll tell you whence the money came. Yes, I have known want; food has been scarce with me many a day, and it will be so again, as I grow older. But our gracious Lord watches over us. He has helped me to bear the troubles which He sent. He will never forsake me. My husband has been dead this many and many a year. I had one only son; and my John was a fine stout fellow, and he worked hard, and he would not leave his old mother. He made my home snug and comfortable. Then came the war with the Danes. All his friends joined the army; but the only son of a widow, you know, is free. So he remained at home, and no one said to him "Come along with us," for they knew that he was a brave boy, and that it broke his very heart to stay behind. I knew it all. I watched him when the people talked of the war, or when the schoolmaster brought the news-

paper. Ah, how he turned pale and red, and how he looked away, and thought his old mother did not see it. But he said nothing to me, and I said nothing to him. Gracious God, who could have thought that it was so hard to drive our oppressors out of the land? Then came the news from Fredericia! That was a dreadful night. We sat in silence opposite each other. We knew what was in our hearts, and we hardly dared to look at each other. Suddenly he rose and took my hand, and said, "Mother!"—God be praised, I had strength in that moment—"John," I said, "our time has come; go in God's name. I know how thou lovest me, and what thou hast suffered. God knows what will become of me if I am left quite alone, but our Lord Jesus Christ will forsake neither thee nor me." John enlisted as a volunteer. The day of parting came. Ah, I am making a long story of it all! John stood before me in his new uniform. "Mother," he said, "one request before we part—if it is to be"—"John," I said to him, "I know what thou meanest—Oh, I shall weep, I shall weep very much when I am alone; but my time will come, and we shall meet again in the day of our Lord, John! and the land shall be free, John! the land shall be free!"

' Heavy tears stood in the poor old woman's eyes as she repeated her sad tale; but she soon collected herself, and continued; "I did not think then it would be so hard. The heart always hopes even against hope. But for all that"—and here the old woman drew herself up, and looked at us like a queen—"I have never regretted that I bade him go. Then came dreadful days; but the most dreadful of all was when

we read that the Germans had betrayed the land, and that they had given up our land with all our dead to the Danes! Then I called on the Lord and said, "O Lord, my God, how is that possible? Why lettest thou the wicked triumph and allowest the just to perish?" And I was told that the Germans were sorry for what they had done, but that they could not help it. But that, gentlemen, I could never understand. We should never do wrong, nor allow wrong to be done. And, therefore, I thought, it cannot always remain so; our good Lord knows His own good time, and in His own good time He will come and deliver us. And I prayed every evening that our gracious Lord would permit me to see that day when the land should be free, and our dear dead should sleep no more in Danish soil. And, as I had no other son against that day, I saved every year what I could save, and on every Christmas Eve I placed it before me on a table, where, in former years, I had always placed a small present for my John, and I said in my heart, "The war will come again, and the land will be free, and thou shalt sleep in a free grave, my only son, my John!" And now, gentlemen, the poor old woman has been told that the day has come, and that her prayer has been heard, and that the war will begin again; and that is why she has brought her money, the money she saved for her son. Good morning, gentlemen," she said, and was going quickly away.

'But, before she had left the room, an old gentleman said, loud enough for her to hear, "Poor body! I hope she may not be deceived."

"Ah," said the old woman, turning back, "I know

what you mean; I have been told all is not right yet. But have faith, men! the wicked cannot prevail against the just; man cannot prevail against the Lord. Hold to that, gentlemen; hold fast together, gentlemen! This very day I—begin to save up again.”

‘Bless her, good old soul! And, if Odin were still looking out of his window in the sky as of yore, when he granted victory to the women of the Lombards, might he not say even now—

“When women are heroes,
What must the men be like!
Theirs is the victory;
No need of me.”’

1864.

JOINVILLE¹.

OUR attention was attracted a few months ago by a review published in the 'Journal des Débats,' in which a new translation of Joinville's 'Histoire de Saint Louis,' by M. Natalis de Wailly, a distinguished member of the French Institute, was warmly recommended to the French public. After pointing out the merits of M. de Wailly's new rendering of Joinville's text, and the usefulness of such a book for enabling boys at school to gain an insight into the hearts and minds of the Crusaders, and to form to themselves a living conception of the manners and customs of the people of the thirteenth century, the reviewer, whose name is well known in this country as well as in France by his valuable contributions to the history of

¹ 'Histoire de St. Louis, par Joinville.' Texte rapproché du Français Moderne par M. Natalis de Wailly, Membre de l'Institut. Paris, 1865.

'Œuvres de Jean Sire de Joinville, avec un texte rapproché du Français Moderne, par M. Natalis de Wailly.' Paris, 1867. M. Natalis de Wailly has since published a new edition of Joinville, 'Histoire de Saint Louis, par Jean Sire de Joinville, suivie du Credo et de la lettre à Louis X ; texte ramené à l'orthographe des Chartes du Sire de Joinville.' Paris, 1868. He has more fully explained the principles according to which the text of Joinville has been restored by him in his 'Mémoire sur la Langue de Joinville.' Paris, 1868,

medicine, dwelt chiefly on the fact that through the whole of Joinville's '*Mémoires*' there is no mention whatever of surgeons or physicians. Nearly the whole French army is annihilated, the King and his companions lie prostrate from wounds and disease, Joinville himself is several times on the point of death, yet nowhere, according to the French reviewer, does the chronicler refer to a medical staff attached to the army or to the person of the King. Being somewhat startled at this remark, we resolved to peruse once more the charming pages of Joinville's history, nor had we to read far before we found that one passage at least had been overlooked, a passage which establishes beyond the possibility of doubt, the presence of surgeons and physicians in the camp of the French crusaders. On page 78 of M. de Wailly's spirited translation, in the account of the death of Gautier d'Autrèche, we read that when that brave knight was carried back to his tent nearly dying, 'several of the surgeons and physicians of the camp came to see him, and not perceiving that he was dangerously injured, they bled him on both his arms.' The result was what might be expected: Gautier d'Autrèche soon breathed his last.

Having once opened the '*Mémoires of Joinville*,' we could not but go on to the end, for there are few books that carry on the reader more pleasantly, whether we read them in the quaint French of the fourteenth century, or in the more modern French in which they have just been clothed by M. Natalis de Wailly. So vividly does the easy gossip of the old soldier bring before our eyes the days of St. Louis and Henry III, that we forget that we are reading an old

chronicle, and holding converse with the heroes of the thirteenth century. The fates both of Joinville's 'Mémoires' and of Joinville himself suggest in fact many reflections apart from mere mediæval history, and a few of them may here be given in the hope of reviving the impressions left on the minds of many by their first acquaintance with the old crusader, or of inviting others to the perusal of a work which no one who takes an interest in man, whether past or present, can read without real pleasure and real benefit.

It is interesting to watch the history of books, and to gain some kind of insight into the various circumstances which contribute to form the reputation of poets, philosophers, or historians. Joinville, whose name is now familiar to the student of French history, as well as to the lover of French literature, might fairly have expected that his memory would live by his acts of prowess, and by his loyal devotion and sufferings when following the King of France, St. Louis, on his unfortunate crusade. When, previous to his departure for the Holy Land, the young Sénéchal de Champagne, then about twenty-four years of age, had made his confession to the Abbot of Cheminon, when, barefoot and in a white sheet, he was performing his pilgrimages to Blehecourt (Blechicourt), St. Urbain, and other sacred shrines in his neighbourhood, and when on passing his own domain 'he would not once turn his eyes back on the castle of Joinville, *pour ce que li cuers ne me attendrisist dou biau chastel que je lessioie et de mes dous enfans* ('that the heart might not make me pine after the beautiful castle which I left behind, and after my two children'), he must

have felt that, happen what might to himself, the name of his family would live, and his descendants would reside from century to century in those strong towers where he left his young wife, Alix de Grandpré, and his son and heir Jean, then but a few months old. After five years he returned from his crusade, full of honours and full of wounds. He held one of the highest positions that a French nobleman could hold. He was Sénéchal de Champagne, as his ancestors had been before him. Several members of his family had distinguished themselves in former crusades, and the services of his uncle Geoffroi had been so highly appreciated by Richard Cœur de Lion that he was allowed by that King to quarter the arms of England with his own. Both at the court of the Comtes de Champagne, who were Kings of Navarre, and at the court of Louis IX, King of France, Joinville was a welcome guest. He witnessed the reigns of six kings—of Louis VIII, 1223–26; Louis IX, or St. Louis, 1226–70; Philip III, le Hardi, 1270–85; Philip IV, le Bel, 1285–1314; Louis X, le Hutin, 1314–16; and Philip V, le Long, 1316–22. Though later in life Joinville declined to follow his beloved King on his last and fatal crusade in 1270, he tells us himself how, on the day on which he took leave of him, he carried his royal friend, then really on the brink of death, in his arms from the residence of the Comte d'Auxerre to the house of the Cordeliers. In 1282 he was one of the principal witnesses when, previous to the canonization of the King, an inquest was held to establish the purity of his life, the sincerity of his religious professions, and the genuineness of his self-sacrificing devotion in the cause of Christendom. When the daughter of his own liege

lord, the Comte de Champagne, Jeanne de Navarre, married Philip le Bel, and became Queen of France, she made Joinville Governor of Champagne, which she had brought as her dowry to the grandson of St. Louis. Surely, then, when the old Crusader, the friend and counsellor of many kings, closed his earthly career, at the good age of ninety-five, he might have looked forward to an honoured grave in the church of St. Laurent, and to an eminent place in the annals of his country, which were then being written in more or less elegant Latin by the monks of St. Denis.

But what has happened? The monkish chroniclers, no doubt, have assigned him his proper place in their tedious volumes, and there his memory would have lived with that kind of life which belongs to the memory of Geoffroi, his illustrious uncle, the friend of Philip Augustus, the companion of Richard Cœur de Lion, whose arms were to be seen in the church of St. Laurent, at Joinville, quartered with the royal arms of England. Such parchment or hatchment glory might have been his, and many a knight, as good as he, has received no better, no more lasting reward for his loyalty and bravery. His family became extinct in his grandson. Henri de Joinville, his grandson, had no sons, and his daughter, being a wealthy heiress, was married to one of the Dukes of Lorraine. The Dukes of Lorraine were buried for centuries in the same church of St. Laurent where Joinville reposed, and where he had founded a chapel dedicated to his companion in arms, Louis IX, the Royal Saint of France; and when, at the time of the French Revolution, the tombs of St. Denis were broken open by an infuriated people, and their ashes scattered

abroad, the vaults of the church at Joinville, too, shared the same fate, and the remains of the brave Crusader suffered the same indignity as the remains of his sainted King. It is true that there were some sparks of loyalty and self-respect left in the hearts of the citizens of Joinville. They had the bones of the old warrior and of the Dukes of Lorraine re-interred in the public cemetery, and there they now rest, mingled with the dust of their faithful lieges and subjects. But the church of St. Laurent, with its tombs and tombstones, is gone. The property of the Joinvilles descended from the Dukes of Lorraine to the Dukes of Guise, and, lastly, to the family of Orleans. The famous Duke of Orleans, Égalité, sold Joinville in 1790, and stipulated that the old castle should be demolished. Poplars and fir-trees now cover the ground of the ancient castle, and the name of Joinville is borne by a royal prince, the son of a dethroned king, the grandson of Louis Égalité, who died on the guillotine.

Neither his noble birth, nor his noble deeds, nor the friendship of kings and princes would have saved Joinville from that inevitable oblivion which has blotted from the memory of living men the names of his more eminent companions, Robert, Count of Artois, Alphonse, Count of Poitiers, Charles, Count of Anjou, Hugue, Duke of Burgundy, William, Count of Flanders, and many more. A little book which the old warrior wrote or dictated—for it is very doubtful whether he could have written it himself—a book which for many years attracted nobody's attention, and which even now we do not possess in the original language of the thirteenth or the beginning of the

fourteenth centuries—has secured to the name of Jean de Joinville a living immortality, and a fame that will last long after the bronze statue which was erected in his native place in 1853 shall have shared the fate of his castle, of his church, and of his tomb. Nothing could have been further from the mind of the old nobleman when, at the age of eighty-five, he began the history of his Royal comrade, St. Louis, than the hope of literary fame. He would have scouted it. That kind of fame might have been good enough for monks and abbots, but it would never at that time have roused the ambition of a man of Joinville's stamp. How the book came to be written he tells us himself in his dedication, dated in the year 1309, and addressed to Louis le Hutin, then only King of Navarre and Count of Champagne, but afterwards King of France. His mother, Jeanne of Navarre, the daughter of Joinville's former liege lord, the last of the Counts of Champagne, who was married to Philip le Bel, the grandson of St. Louis, had asked him 'to have a book made for her, containing the sacred words and good actions of our King, St. Loos.' She died before the book was finished, and Joinville, therefore, sent it to her son. How it was received by him we do not know; nor is there any reason to suppose that there were more than a few copies made of a work which was intended chiefly for members of the Royal family of France and of his own family. It is never quoted by historical writers of that time, and the first historian who refers to it is said to be Pierre le Baud, who, towards the end of the fifteenth century, wrote his '*Histoire de Bretagne*.' It has been proved that for a long time no mention of the dedication copy

occurs in the inventories of the private libraries of the Kings of France. At the death of Louis le Hutin his library consisted of twenty-nine volumes, and among them the history of St. Louis does not occur. There is, indeed, one entry, 'Quatre caiers de Saint Loys,' but this could not be meant for the work of Joinville, which was in one volume. These four *cahiers* or quires of paper were more likely manuscript notes of St. Louis himself. His confessor, Geoffroy de Beaulieu, relates that the King, before his last illness, wrote down with his own hand some salutary counsels in French, of which he, the confessor, procured a copy before the King's death, and which he translated from French into Latin.

Again, the widow of Louis X left at her death a collection of forty-one volumes, and the widow of Charles le Bel a collection of twenty volumes, but in neither of them is there any mention of Joinville's history.

It is not till we come to the reign of Charles V (1364-80) that Joinville's book occurs in the inventory of the Royal library, drawn up in 1373 by the King's valet de chambre, Gilles Mallet. It is entered as 'La vie de Saint Loys, et les fais de son voyage d'outre mer;' and in the margin of the catalogue there is a note, 'le Roy l'a par devers soy,'—'the King has it by him.' At the time of his death the volume had not yet been returned to its proper place in the first hall of the Louvre; but in the inventory drawn up in 1411 it appears again, with the following description¹:—

'Une grant partie de la vie et des fais de Monseigneur Saint Loys que fist faire le Seigneur de

¹ See Paulin Paris, p. 175.

Joinville; très-bien escript et historié. Couvert de cuir rouge à empreintes, à deux fermoirs d'argent. Escript de lettres de forme en françois à deux coulombes; commençant au deuxième folio "et porceque," et au derrenier "en tele maniere."

This means, 'A great portion of the life and actions of St. Louis which the Seigneur de Joinville had made, very well written and illuminated. Bound in red leather, tooled, with two silver clasps. Written in formal letters in French, in two columns, beginning on the second folio with the words "*et porceque*," and on the last with "*en tele maniere*."

During the Middle Ages and before the discovery of printing, the task of having a literary work published, or rather of having it copied, rested chiefly with the author, and as Joinville himself, at his time of life, and in the position which he occupied, had no interest in what we should call 'pushing' his book, this alone is quite sufficient to explain its almost total neglect. But other causes too have been assigned by M. Paulin Paris and others for what seems at first sight so very strange—the entire neglect of Joinville's work. From the beginning of the twelfth century the monks of St. Denis were the recognised historians of France. They at first collected the most important historical works of former centuries, such as Gregory of Tours, Eginhard, the so-called Archbishop Turpin, Nithard, and William of Jumièges. But beginning with the first year of Philip I, 1060-1108, the monks became themselves the chroniclers of passing events. The famous Abbot Suger, the contemporary of Abelard and St. Bernard, wrote the life of Louis le Gros;

Rigord and Guillaume de Nangis followed with the history of his successors. Thus the official history of St. Louis had been written by Guillaume de Nangis long before Joinville thought of dictating his personal recollections of the King. Besides the work of Guillaume de Nangis, there was the 'History of the Crusades,' including that of St. Louis, written by Guillaume, Archbishop of Tyre, and translated into French, so that even the ground which Joinville had more especially selected as his own was pre-occupied by a popular and authoritative writer. Lastly, when Joinville's history appeared, the chivalrous King, whose sayings and doings his old brother in arms undertook to describe in his homely and truthful style, had ceased to be an ordinary mortal. He had become a Saint, and what people were anxious to know of him were legends rather than history. With all the sincere admiration which Joinville entertained for his King, he could not compete with such writers as Geoffroy de Beaulieu (Gaufridus de Belloloco), the confessor of St. Louis, Guillaume de Chartres (Guillelmus Carnotensis), his chaplain, or the Confessor of his daughter Blanche, each of whom had written a life of the Royal Saint. Their works were copied over and over again, and numerous MSS. have been preserved of them in public and private libraries. Of Joinville one early MS. only was saved, and even that not altogether a faithful copy of the original.

The first edition of Joinville was printed at Poitiers in 1547, and dedicated to François I. The editor, Pierre Antoine de Rieux, tells us that when, in 1542, he examined some old documents at Beau-

fort en Valée, in Anjou, he found among the MSS. the chronicle of King Louis, written by a Seigneur de Joinville, Sénéchal de Champagne, who lived at that time, and had accompanied the said St. Louis in all his wars. But because it was badly arranged or written in a very rude language, he had it polished and put in better order, a proceeding of which he is evidently very proud, as we may gather from a remark of his friend Guillaume de Perrière, that 'it is no smaller praise to polish a diamond than to find it quite raw (*toute brute*).'

The text, which could hardly be called Joinville's, remained for a time the received text. It was reproduced in 1595, in 1596, and in 1609.

In 1617 a new edition was published by Claude Menard. He states that he found at Laval a heap of old papers, which had escaped the ravages committed by the Protestants in some of the monasteries at Anjou. When he compared the MS. of Joinville with the edition of Pierre Antoine de Rieux, he found that the ancient style of Joinville had been greatly changed. He therefore undertook a new edition, more faithful to the original. Unfortunately, however, his original MS. was but a modern copy, and his edition, though an improvement on that of 1547, was still very far from the style and language of the beginning of the fourteenth century.

The learned Du Cange searched in vain for more trustworthy materials for restoring the text of Joinville. Invaluable as are the dissertations which he wrote on Joinville, his own text of the history, published in 1668, could only be based on the two editions that had preceded his own.

It was not till 1761 that real progress was made in restoring the text of Joinville. An ancient MS. had been brought from Brussels by the Maréchal Maurice de Saxe. It was carefully edited by M. Capperonnier, and it has served, with few exceptions, as the foundation of all later editions. It is now in the Imperial Library. The editors of the 'Recueil des Historiens de France' express their belief that the MS. might actually be the original. At the end of it are the words 'Ce fu escript en l'an de grâce mil CCC et IX, on moys d'octovre.' This, however, is no real proof of the date of the MS. Transcribers of MSS., it is well known, were in the habit of mechanically copying all they saw in the original, and hence we find very commonly the date of an old MS. repeated over and over again in modern copies.

The arguments by which in 1839 M. Paulin Paris proved that this, the oldest MS. of Joinville, belongs not to the beginning, but to the end of the fourteenth century, seem unanswerable, though they failed to convince M. Daunou who, in the twentieth volume of the 'Historiens de France,' published in 1840, still looks upon this MS. as written in 1309, or at least during Joinville's lifetime. M. Paulin Paris establishes, first of all, that this MS. cannot be the same as that which was so carefully described in the catalogue of Charles V. What became of that MS., once belonging to the private library of the Kings of France, no one knows, but there is no reason, even now, why it should not still be recovered. The MS. of Joinville, which now belongs to the Imperial Library, is written by the same scribe who wrote another MS. of 'La Vie et les Miracles de Saint Louis.' Now, this MS. of 'La

Vie et les Miracles is a copy of an older MS., which likewise exists at Paris. This more ancient MS., probably the original, and written, therefore, in the beginning of the fourteenth century, had been carefully revised before it served as the model for the later copy, executed by the same scribe who, as we saw, wrote the old MS. of Joinville. A number of letters were scratched out, words erased, and sometimes whole sentences altered or suppressed, a red line being drawn across the words which had to be omitted. It looks, in fact, like a manuscript prepared for the printer. Now, if the same copyist who copied this MS. copied likewise the MS. of Joinville, it follows that he was separated from the original of Joinville by the same interval which separates the corrected MSS. of *'La Vie et les Miracles'* from their original, or from the beginning of the fourteenth century. This line of argument seems to establish satisfactorily the approximate date of the oldest MS. of Joinville as belonging to the end of the fourteenth century.

Another MS. was discovered at Lucca. As it had belonged to the Dukes of Guise, great expectations were at one time entertained of its value. It was bought by the Royal Library at Paris in 1741 for 360 livres, but it was soon proved not to be older than about 1500, representing the language of the time of François I rather than of St. Louis, but nevertheless preserving occasionally a more ancient spelling than the other MS. which was copied two hundred years before. This MS. bears the arms of the Princess Antoinette de Bourbon and of her husband Claude de Lorraine, who was *'Duc de Guise, Comte d'Aumale,*

Marquis de Mayence et d'Elbeuf, and Baron de Joinville.' Their marriage took place in 1513; he died in 1550, she in 1583.

There is a third MS. which has lately been discovered. It belonged to M. Brissart-Binet of Rheims, became known to M. Paulin Paris, and was lent to M. de Wailly for his new edition of Joinville. It seems to be a copy of the so-called MS. of Lucca, the MS. belonging to the Princess Antoinette de Bourbon, and it is most likely the very copy which that princess ordered to be made for Louis Lasséré, canon of St. Martin of Tours, who published an abridgement of it in 1541. By a most fortunate accident it supplies the passages from page 88 to 112, and from page 126 to 139, which are wanting in the MS. of Lucca.

It must be admitted, therefore, that for an accurate study of the historical growth of the French language, the work of Joinville is of less importance than it would have been if it had been preserved in its original orthography, and with all the grammatical peculiarities which mark the French of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century. There may be no more than a distance of not quite a hundred years between the original of Joinville and the earliest MS. which we possess. But in those hundred years the French language did not remain stationary. Even as late as the time of Montaigne, when French had assumed a far greater literary steadiness, that writer complains of its constant change. 'I wrote my book,' he says in a memorable passage ('Essais,' liv. 3, c. 9), 'for few people and for a few years. If it had been a subject that ought to last, it should have been committed to a more stable language (Latin). After the

continual variation which has followed our speech to the present day, who can hope that its present form will be used fifty years hence? It glides from our hands every day, and since I have lived it has been half changed. We say that at present it is perfect, but every century says the same of its own. I do not wish to hold it back, if it will fly away and go on deteriorating as it does. It belongs to good and useful writers to nail the language to themselves (*de la clouer à eux*).'

On the other hand, we must guard against forming an exaggerated notion of the changes that could have taken place in the French language within the space of less than a century. They refer chiefly to the spelling of words, to the use of some antiquated words and expressions, and to the less careful observation of the rules by which in ancient French the nominative is distinguished from the oblique cases, both in the singular and the plural. That the changes do not amount to more than this can be proved by a comparison of other documents which clearly preserve the actual language of Joinville. There is a letter of his which is preserved at the Imperial Library at Paris, addressed to Louis X in 1315. It was first published by Du Cange, afterwards by M. Daunou, in the twentieth volume of the 'Historiens de France,' and again by M. de Wailly. There are, likewise, some charters of Joinville, written in his *chancellerie*, and in some cases with additions from his own hand. Lastly, there is Joinville's 'Credo,' containing his notes on the Apostolic Creed, preserved in a manuscript of the thirteenth century. This was published in the 'Collection des Bibliophiles Français,'

unfortunately printed in twenty-five copies only. The MS. of the 'Credo,' which formerly belonged to the public library of Paris, disappeared from it about twenty years ago, and it now forms No. 75 of a collection of MSS. bought in 1849 by Lord Ashburnham from M. Barrois. By comparing the language of these thirteenth-century documents with that of the earliest MS. of Joinville's history, it is easy to see that although we have lost something, we have not lost very much, and that, at all events, we need not suspect in the earliest MS. any changes that could in any way affect the historical authenticity of Joinville's work¹.

¹ In his last edition of the text of Joinville, which was published in 1868, M. de Wailly has restored the spelling of Joinville on all these points according to the rules which are observed in Joinville's charters, and in the best MSS. of the beginning of the fourteenth century. The facsimiles of nine of these charters are published at the end of M. de Wailly's '*Mémoire sur la Langue de Joinville*,' of others an accurate transcript is given. The authentic texts thus collected, in which we can study the French language as it was written at the time of Joinville, amount to nearly one-fifth of the text of Joinville's History. To correct, according to these charters, the text of Joinville so systematically as has been done by M. de Wailly in his last edition may seem a bold undertaking, but few who have read attentively his '*Mémoire*' would deny that the new editor has fully justified his critical principles. Thus with regard to the terminations of the nominative and the oblique cases, where other MSS. of Joinville's History follow no principle whatever, M. de Wailly remarks: '*Pour plus de simplicité j'appellerai règle du sujet singulier et règle du sujet pluriel l'usage qui consistait à distinguer, dans beaucoup de mots, le sujet du régime par une modification analogue à celle de la déclinaison latine. Or, j'ai constaté que, dans les chartes de Joinville, la règle du sujet singulier est observée huit cent trente-cinq fois, et violée sept fois seulement; encore dois-je dire que cinq de ces violations se rencontrent dans une même charte, celle du mois de mai 1278, qui n'est connue que par une copie faite au siècle dernier. Si l'on fait abstraction de ce texte, il reste deux violations contre huit cent trente-cinq observations de la règle. La règle du sujet pluriel est observée cinq cent quatre-vingt-huit fois, et violée six fois: ce qui donne au total quatorze cent vingt-trois contre treize, en*

To the historian of the French language, the language of Joinville, even though it gives us only a picture of the French spoken at the time of Charles V, or contemporaneously with Froissart, is still full of interest. That language is separated from the French of the present day by nearly five centuries, and we may be allowed to give a few instances to show the curious changes both of form and meaning which many words have undergone during that interval.

Instead of *sœur*, sister, Joinville still uses *sereur*, which was the right form of the oblique case, but was afterwards replaced by the nominative *suer* or *sœur*. Thus, p. 424 E, we read, *quant nous menames la serour le roy*, i. e. *quand nous menâmes la sœur du roi*; but p. 466 A, *l'abbaye que sa suer fonda*, i. e. *l'abbaye que sa sœur fonda*. Instead of *ange*, angel, he has both *angle* and *angre*, where the *r* stands for the final *l* of *angele*, the more ancient French form of *angelus*. The same transition of final *l* into *r* may be observed in *apôtre* for *apostolus*, *chapitre* for *capitulum*, *chartre* for *cartula*, *esclandre* for *scandalum*. Instead of *vieux*, old, Joinville uses *veil* or *veel* (p. 132 C, *le veil le fil au veil*, i. e. *le vieux fils du vieux*); but in the nom. sing., *viex*, which is the Latin *vetulus* (p. 302 A, *li Viex de la Montaigne*, i. e. *le Vieux de la Montagne*; but p. 304 A, *li*

tenant compte même de six fautes commises dans le texte copié au siècle dernier. De ce résultat numérique, il faut évidemment conclure, d'abord, que l'une et l'autre règle étaient parfaitement connues et pratiquées à la chancellerie de Joinville, ensuite qu'on est autorisé à modifier le texte de l'Histoire, partout où ces règles y sont violées. (D'après un calcul approximatif, on peut croire que le copiste du quatorzième siècle a violé ces règles plus de quatre mille fois et qu'il les respectait peut-être une fois sur dix.)'

messaige le Vieil, i. e. *les messagers du Vieux*). Instead of *coude*, m., elbow, we find *coute*, which is nearer to the Latin *cubitus*, cubit. The Latin *t* in words like *cubitus* was generally softened in old French, and was afterwards dropped altogether. As in *coude*, the *d* is preserved in *aider* for *adjutare*, in *fade* for *fatuus*. In other words, such as *chaîne* for *catena*, *roue* for *rota*, *épée* for *spatha*, *aimée* for *amata*, it has disappeared altogether. True is *voir*, the regular modification of *verum*, like *soir* of *serum*, instead of the modern French *vrai*; e. g. p. 524 B, *et sachiez que voirs estait*, i. e. *et sachez que c'était vrai*. We still find *ester*, to stand (*et ne pooit ester sur ses pieds*, 'he could not stand on his legs'). At present the French have no single word for 'standing,' which has often been pointed out as a real defect of the language. 'To stand' is *ester*, in Joinville; 'to be' is *estre*.

In the grammatical system of the language of Joinville we find the connecting link between the case terminations of the classical Latin and the prepositions and articles of modern French. It is generally supposed that the terminations of the Latin declension were lost in French, and that the relations of the cases were expressed by prepositions, while the *s* as the sign of the plural was explained by the *s* in the nom. plur. of nouns of the third declension. But languages do not thus advance *per saltum*. They change slowly and gradually, and we can generally discover in what is, some traces of what has been.

Now the fact is that in ancient French, and likewise in Provençal, there is still a system of declension more or less independent of prepositions. There are,

so to say, three declensions in Old French, of which the second is the most important and the most interesting. If we take a Latin word like *annus*, we find in Old French two forms in the singular, and two in the plural. We find sing. *an-s*, *an*, plur. *an*, *ans*. If *an* occurs in the nom. sing. or as the subject, it is always *ans*; if it occur as a gen., dat., or acc., it is always *an*. In the plural, on the contrary, we find in the nom. *an*, and in all the oblique cases *ans*. The origin of this system is clear enough, and it is extraordinary that attempts should have been made to derive it from German or even from Celtic, when the explanation could be found so much nearer home. The nom. sing. has the *s*, because it was there in Latin; the nom. plur. has no *s*, because there was no *s* there in Latin. The oblique cases in the singular have no *s*, because the accusative in Latin, and likewise the gen., dat., and abl., ended either in vowels, which became mute, or in *m*, which was dropped. The oblique cases in the plural had the *s*, because it was there in the acc. plur., which became the general oblique case, and likewise in the dat. and abl. By means of these fragments of the Latin declension, it was possible to express many things without prepositions which in modern French can no longer be thus expressed. *Le fils Roi* was clearly the son of the King; *il fil Roi*, the sons of the King. Again we find *li roys*, the King, but *au roy*, to the King. Pierre Sarrasin begins his letter on the crusade of St. Louis by *A seigneur Nicolas Arode, Jehan-s Sarrasin, chambrelen-s le roy de France, salut et bonne amour*.

But if we apply the same principle to nouns of the first declension, we shall see at once that they could

not have lent themselves to the same contrivance. Words like *corona* have no *s* in the nom. sing., nor in any of the oblique cases ; it would therefore be in French *corone* throughout. In the plural indeed there might have been a distinction between the nom. and the acc. The nom. ought to have been without an *s*, and the acc. with an *s*. But with the exception of some doubtful passages, where a nom. plur. is supposed to occur in old French documents without an *s*, we find throughout, both in the nom. and the other cases, the *s* of the accusative as the sign of the plural.

Nearly the same applies to certain words of the third declension. Here we find indeed a distinction between the nom. and the oblique cases of the singular, such as *flor-s*, the flower, with *flor*, of the flower ; but the plural is *flor-s* throughout. This form is chiefly confined to feminine nouns of the third declension.

There is another very curious contrivance by which the ancient French distinguished the nom. from the acc. sing., and which shows us again how the consciousness of the Latin grammar was by no means entirely lost in the formation of modern French. There are many words in Latin which change their accent in the oblique cases from what it was in the nominative. For instance, *cantátor*, a singer, becomes *cantatórem*, in the accusative. Now in ancient French the nom., corresponding to *cantator*, is *chán-tere*, but the gen. *chanteór*, and thus again a distinction is established of great importance for grammatical purposes. Most of these words followed the analogy of the second declension, and added an *s* in

the nom. sing., dropped it in the nom. plur., and added it again in the oblique cases of the plural. Thus we get—

SINGULAR.		PLURAL.	
Nom.	Oblique Cases.	Nom.	Oblique Cases.
<i>chântere</i>	<i>chanteór</i>	<i>chanteór</i>	<i>chanteórs</i>
From <i>baro, baronis</i>	<i>baron</i>	<i>baron</i>	<i>barons</i>
(O. Fr. <i>ber</i>)			
<i>latro, latronis</i>	<i>larron</i>	<i>larron</i>	<i>larrons</i>
(O. Fr. <i>lierre</i>)			
<i>senior, senioris</i>	<i>seignor</i>	<i>seignor</i>	<i>seignors</i>
(O. Fr. <i>sendre</i>) (sire)			

Thus we read in the beginning of Joinville's history:—

A son bon signour Looyz, Jehans sires de Joinville salut et amour;
and immediately afterwards, *Chiers sire*, not *Chiers seigneur*.

If we compare this Old French declension with the grammar of Modern French, we find that the accusative or the oblique form has become the only recognised form, both in the singular and plural. Hence—

[Corone]	[Ans]	[Flors]	[Chântere] le chantre.
Corone	An	Flor	Chanteór le chanteur.
[Corones]	[An]	[Flors]	[Chanteór].
Corones	Ans	Flors	Chanteórs.

A few traces only of the old system remain in such words as *filz, bras, Charles, Jacques, &c.*

Not less curious than the changes of form are the changes of meaning which have taken place in the French language since the days of Joinville. Thus, *la viande*, which now only means meat, is used by Joinville in its original and more general sense of *victuals*, the Latin *vivenda*. For instance (p. 248 D), *et nous requiesmes que en nous donnast la viande*, 'and we asked that one might give us something to eat.' And soon after, *les viandes que il nous don-*

nèrent, ce furent begniet de fourmaiges qui estoient roti au soleil, pour ce que li ver n'i venissent, et oef dur cuit de quatre jours ou de cinc—‘and the viands which they gave us were cheese-cakes roasted in the sun, that the worms might not get at them, and hard eggs boiled four or five days ago.’

Payer, to pay, is still used in its original sense of pacifying or satisfying, the Latin *pacare*. Thus a priest who has received from his bishop an explanation of some difficulty and other ghostly comfort *se tint bin pour paié* (p. 34 C),—he ‘considered himself well satisfied.’ When the King objected to certain words in the oath which he had to take, Joinville says that he does not know how the oath was finally arranged, but he adds, *li amiral se tindrent bien apaié*—‘the admirals considered themselves satisfied’ (p. 242 C). The same word, however, is likewise used in the usual sense of paying.

Noise, a word which has almost disappeared from modern French, occurs several times in Joinville; and we can watch in different passages the growth of its various meanings. In one passage Joinville relates (p. 198) that one of his knights had been killed and was lying on a bier in his chapel. While the priest was performing his office six other knights were talking very loud, and *faisoient noise au prestre*—‘they annoyed or disturbed the priest; they caused him annoyance.’ Here *noise* has still the same sense as the Latin *nausea*, from which it is derived. In another passage, however, Joinville uses *noise* as synonymous with *bruit* (p. 152 A), *vint li roys à toute sa bataille, a grant noyse et à grant bruit de trompes et nacaires*, i.e. *vint le roi avec tout son corps de ba-*

taille, à grand cris et à grand bruit de trompettes et de timbales. Here *noise* may still mean an annoying noise, but we can see the easy transition from that to noise in general.

Another English word, 'to purchase,' finds its explanation in Joinville. Originally *pourchasser* meant to hunt after a thing, to pursue it. Joinville frequently uses the expression *par son pourchas* (p. 458 E) in the sense of 'by his endeavours.' When the King had reconciled two adversaries, peace is said to have been made *par son pourchas*. *Pourchasser* afterwards took the sense of 'procuring,' 'catering,' and lastly, in English, of 'buying.'

To return to Joinville's history, the scarcity of MSS. is very instructive from an historical point of view. As far as we know at present, his great work existed for centuries in two copies only, one preserved in his own castle, the other in the library of the Kings of France. We can hardly say that it was published, even in the restricted sense which that word had during the fourteenth century, and there certainly is no evidence that it was read by any one except by members of the Royal family of France, and possibly by descendants of Joinville. It exercised no influence, and if two or three copies had not luckily escaped (one of them, it must be confessed, clearly showing the traces of mice's teeth), we should have known very little indeed either of the military or of the literary achievements of one who is now ranked among the chief historians of France, or even of Europe. After Joinville's history had once emerged from its obscurity it soon became the fashion to praise it, and to praise it somewhat indiscriminately. Joinville

became a general favourite both in and out of France, and after all had been said in his praise that might be truly and properly said, each successive admirer tried to add a little more, till at last, as a matter of course, he was compared to Thucydides, and lauded for the graces of his style, the vigour of his language, the subtlety of his mind, and his worship of the harmonious and the beautiful, in such a manner that the old bluff soldier would have been highly perplexed and disgusted, could he have listened to the praises of his admirers. Well might M. Paulin Paris say—‘I shall not stop to praise what everybody has praised before me; to recall the graceful *naïveté* of the good Sénéchal, would it not be, as the English poet said, “to gild the gold and paint the lily white”?’

It is surprising to find in the large crowd of indiscriminate admirers a man so accurate in his thoughts and in his words as the late Sir James Stephen. Considering how little Joinville’s history was noticed by his contemporaries, how little it was read by the people before it was printed during the reign of François I, it must seem more than doubtful whether Joinville really deserved a place in a series of lectures, ‘On the power of the pen in France.’ But, waiving that point, is it quite exact to say, as Sir James Stephen does, ‘that three writers only retain, and probably they alone deserve, at this day the admiration which greeted them in their own—I refer to Joinville, Froissart, and to Philippe de Comines’? And is the following a sober and correct description of Joinville’s style?—

‘Over the whole picture the genial spirit of France glows with all the natural warmth which we seek in

vain among the dry bones of earlier chroniclers. Without the use of any didactic forms of speech, Joinville teaches the highest of all wisdom—the wisdom of love. Without the pedantry of the schools, he occasionally exhibits an eager thirst of knowledge, and a graceful facility of imparting it, which attest that he is of the lineage of the great father of history, and of those modern historians who have taken Herodotus for their model.’ (Vol. ii. pp. 209, 219.)

Now, all this sounds to our ears just an octave too high. There is some truth in it, but the truth is spoilt by being exaggerated. Joinville’s book is very pleasant to read, because he gives himself no airs, and tells us as well as he can what he recollects of his excellent King, and of the fearful time which they spent together during the Crusade. He writes very much as an old soldier would speak. He seems to know that people will listen to him with respect, and that they will believe what he tells them. He does not weary them with arguments. He rather likes now and then to evoke a smile, and he maintains the glow of attention by thinking more of his hearers than of himself. He had evidently told his stories many times before he finally dictated them in the form in which we read them, and this is what gives to some of them a certain finish and the appearance of art. Yet, if we speak of style at all—not of the style of thought, but of the style of language—the blemishes in Joinville’s history are so apparent that one feels reluctant to point them out. ‘He repeats his words, he repeats his remarks, he drops the thread of his story, begins a new subject, leaves it because,

as he says himself, it would carry him too far, and then, after a time, returns to it again. His descriptions of the scenery where the camp was pitched and the battles fought are neither sufficiently broad nor sufficiently distinct to give the reader that view of the whole which he receives from such writers as Caesar, Thiers, Carlyle, or Russell. Nor is there any attempt at describing or analysing the character of the principal actors in the Crusade of St. Louis, beyond relating some of their remarks or occasional conversations. It is an ungrateful task to draw up these indictments against a man whom one probably admires much more sincerely than those who bespatter him with undeserved praise. Joinville's book is readable, and it is readable even in spite of the antiquated and sometimes difficult language in which it is written. There are few books of which we could say the same. What makes his book readable is partly the interest attaching to the subject of which it treats, but far more the simple, natural, straightforward way in which Joinville tells what he has to tell. From one point of view it may be truly said that no higher praise could be bestowed on any style than to say that it is simple, natural, straightforward, and charming. But if his indiscriminate admirers had appreciated this artless art, they would not have applied to the pleasant gossip of an old General epithets that are appropriate only to the masterpieces of classical literature.

It is important to bear in mind what suggested to Joinville the first idea of writing his book. He was asked to do so by the Queen of Philip le Bel. After the death of the Queen, however, Joinville did not

dedicate his work to the King, but to his son, who was then the heir-apparent. This may be explained by the fact that he himself was Sénéchal de Champagne, and Louis, the son of Philip le Bel, Comte de Champagne. But it admits of another and more probable explanation. Joinville was dissatisfied with the proceedings of Philip le Bel, and from the very beginning of his reign he opposed his encroachments on the privileges of the nobility and the liberties of the people. He was punished for his opposition, and excluded from the assemblies in Champagne in 1287, and though his name appeared again on the roll in 1291, Joinville then occupied only the sixth instead of the first place. In 1314 matters came to a crisis in Champagne, and Joinville called together the nobility in order to declare openly against the King. The opportune death of Philip alone prevented the breaking out of a rebellion. It is true that there are no direct allusions to these matters in the body of Joinville's book, yet an impression is left on the reader that he wrote some portion of the life of St. Louis as a lesson to the young prince to whom it is dedicated. Once or twice, indeed, he uses language which sounds ominous, and which would hardly be tolerated in France, even after the lapse of five centuries. When speaking of the great honour which St. Louis conferred on his family, he says 'that it was, indeed, a great honour to those of his descendants who would follow his example by good works; but a great dishonour to those who would do evil. For people would point at them with their fingers, and would say that the sainted King from whom they descended would have despised such

wickedness.' There is another passage even stronger than this. After relating how St. Louis escaped from many dangers by the grace of God, he suddenly exclaims, 'Let the King who now reigns (Philip le Bel) take care, for he has escaped from as great dangers—nay, from greater ones—than we ; let him see whether he cannot amend his evil ways, so that God may not strike him and his affairs cruelly.'

This surely is strong language, considering that it was used in a book dedicated to the son of the then reigning King. To the father of Philip le Bel Joinville seems to have spoken with the same frankness as to his son, and he tells us himself how he reproved the King, Philip le Hardi, for his extravagant dress, and admonished him to follow the example of his father. Similar remarks occur again and again, and though the life of St. Louis was certainly not written merely for didactic purposes, yet one cannot help seeing that it was written with a practical object. In the introduction Joinville says, 'I send the book to you, that you and your brother and others who hear it may take an example, and that they may carry it out in their life, for which God will bless them.' And again (p. 268), 'These things shall I cause to be written, that those who hear them may have faith in God in their persecutions and tribulations, and God will help them, as He did me.' Again (p. 380), 'These things I have told you, that you may guard against taking an oath without reason, for, as the wise say, "He who swears readily forswears himself readily."'

It seems, therefore, that when Joinville took to dictating his recollections of St. Louis he did so partly

to redeem a promise given to the Queen, who, he says, loved him much, and whom he could not refuse, partly to place in the hands of the young Princes a book full of historical lessons which they might read, mark, and inwardly digest.

And well might he do so, and well might his book be read by all young Princes, and by all who are able to learn a lesson from the pages of history; for few Kings, if any, did ever wear their crowns so worthily as Louis IX of France; and few saints, if any, did deserve their halo better than St. Louis. Here lies the deep and lasting interest of Joinville's work. It allows us an insight into a life which we could hardly realise, nay, which we should hardly believe in, unless we had the testimony of that trusty witness, Joinville, the King's friend and comrade. The legendary lives of St. Louis would have destroyed in the eyes of posterity the real greatness and the real sanctity of the King's character. We should never have known the man, but only his saintly caricature. After reading Joinville we must make up our mind that such a life as he there describes was really lived, and was lived in those very palaces which we are accustomed to consider as the sinks of wickedness and vice. From other descriptions we might have imagined Louis IX as a bigoted, priest-ridden, credulous King. From Joinville we learn that, though unwavering in his faith, and most strict in the observance of his religious duties, the King was by no means narrow in his sympathies, or partial to the encroachments of priestcraft. We find Joinville speaking to the King on subjects of religion with the greatest freedom, and as no courtier would

have dared to speak during the later years of Louis XIV's reign. When the King asked him whether in the holy week he ever washed the feet of the poor, Joinville replied that he would never wash the feet of such villains. For this remark he was, no doubt, reproved by the King, who, as we are told by Beau-lieu, with the most unpleasant details, washed the feet of the poor every Saturday. But the reply though somewhat irreverent, is, nevertheless, highly creditable to the courtier's frankness. Another time he shocked his Royal friend still more by telling him, in the presence of several priests, that he would rather have committed thirty mortal sins than be a leper. The King said nothing at the time, but he sent for him the next day, and reproved him in the most gentle manner for his thoughtless speech.

Joinville, too, with all the respect which he entertained for his King, would never hesitate to speak his mind when he thought that the King was in the wrong. On one occasion the Abbot of Cluny presented the King with two horses, worth five hundred *livres*. The next day the abbot came again to the King to discuss some matters of business. Joinville observed that the King listened to him with marked attention. After the abbot was gone, he went to the King, and said, "Sire, may I ask you whether you listened to the abbot more cheerfully because he presented you yesterday with two horses?" The King meditated for a time, and then said to me, "Truly, yes." "Sire," said I, "do you know why I asked you this question?" "Why?" said he. "Because, Sire," I said, "I advise you, when you return to France, to prohibit all sworn counsellors from accepting any-

thing from those who have to bring their affairs before them. For you may be certain, if they accept anything, they will listen more cheerfully and attentively to those who give, as you did yourself with the Abbot of Cluny.”

Surely a King who could listen to such language is not likely to have had his Court filled with hypocrites, whether lay or clerical. The bishops, though they might count on the King for any help he could give them in the great work of teaching, raising, and comforting the people, tried in vain to make him commit an injustice in defence of what they considered religion. One day a numerous deputation of prelates asked for an interview. It was readily granted. When they appeared before the King their spokesman said, “Sire, these lords who are here, archbishops and bishops, have asked me to tell you that Christianity is perishing at your hands.” The King signed himself with the cross, and said, “Tell me how can that be?” “Sire,” he said, “it is because people care so little nowadays for excommunication that they would rather die excommunicated than have themselves absolved and give satisfaction to the Church. Now, we pray you, Sire, for the sake of God, and because it is your duty, that you command your provosts and bailiffs that by seizing the goods of those who allow themselves to be excommunicated for the space of one year, they may force them to come and be absolved.” Then the King replied that he would do this willingly with all those of whom it could be *proved* that they were in the wrong (which would, in fact, have given the King jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters). The bishops said that they

could not do this at any price; they would never bring their causes before his Court. Then the King said he could not do it otherwise, for it would be against God and against reason. He reminded them of the case of the Comte de Bretagne, who had been excommunicated by the prelates of Brittany for the space of seven years, and who, when he appealed to the Pope, gained his cause, while the prelates were condemned. "Now, then," the King said, "if I had forced the Comte de Bretagne to get absolution from the prelates after the first year, should I not have sinned against God and against him?"

This is not the language of a bigoted man; and if we find in the life of St. Louis traces of what in our age we might feel inclined to call bigotry or credulity, we must consider that the religious and intellectual atmosphere of the reign of St. Louis was very different from our own. There are, no doubt, some of the sayings and doings recorded by Joinville of his beloved King which at present would be unanimously condemned even by the most orthodox and narrow-minded. Think of an assembly of theologians in the monastery of Cluny who had invited a distinguished rabbi to discuss certain points of Christian doctrine with them. A knight, who happened to be staying with the abbot, asked for leave to open the discussion, and he addressed the Jew in the following words: 'Do you believe that the Virgin Mary was a virgin and Mother of God?' When the Jew replied, 'No!' the knight took his crutch and felled the poor Jew to the ground. The King, who relates this to Joinville, draws one very wise lesson from it—namely, that no one who is not a very good theologian should enter

upon a controversy with Jews on such subjects. But when he goes on to say that a layman who hears the Christian religion evil spoken of should take to the sword as the right weapon of defence and run it into the miscreant's body as far as it would go, we perceive at once that we are in the thirteenth and not in the nineteenth century. The punishments which the King inflicted for swearing were most cruel. At Cesarea, Joinville tells us that he saw a goldsmith fastened to a ladder, with the entrails of a pig twisted round his neck right up to his nose, because he had used irreverent language. Nay, after his return from the Holy Land, he heard that the King ordered a man's nose and lower lip to be burnt for the same offence. The Pope himself had to interfere to prevent St. Louis from inflicting on blasphemers mutilation and death. 'I would myself be branded with a hot iron,' the King said, 'if thus I could drive away all swearing from my kingdom.' He himself, as Joinville assures us, never used an oath, nor did he pronounce the name of the Devil except when reading the lives of the saints. His soul, we cannot doubt, was grieved when he heard the names which to him were the most sacred employed for profane purposes, and this feeling of indignation was shared by his honest chronicler. 'In my castle,' says Joinville, 'whosoever uses bad language receives a good pommelling, and this has nearly put down that bad habit.' Here again we see the upright character of Joinville. He does not, like most courtiers, try to outbid his Sovereign in pious indignation; on the contrary, while sharing his feelings, he gently reproves the King for his excessive zeal and cruelty, and this after

the King had been raised to the exalted position of a saint.

To doubt of any points of the Christian doctrine was considered at Joinville's time, as it is even now, as a temptation of the Devil. But here again we see at the Court of St. Louis a wonderful mixture of tolerance and intolerance. Joinville, who evidently spoke his mind freely on all things, received frequent reproofs and lessons from the King, and we hardly know which to wonder at most, the weakness of the arguments, or the gentle and truly Christian spirit in which the King used them. The King once asked Joinville how he knew that his father's name was Symon. Joinville replied he knew it because his mother had told him so. 'Then,' the King said, 'you ought likewise firmly to believe all the articles of faith which the Apostles attest, as you hear them sung every Sunday in the Creed.' The use of such an argument by such a man leaves an impression on the mind that the King himself was not free from religious doubts and difficulties, and that his faith was built upon ground which was apt to shake. And this impression is confirmed by a conversation which immediately follows after this argument. It is long, but it is far too important to be here omitted. The Bishop of Paris had told the King, probably in order to comfort him after receiving from him the confession of some of his own religious difficulties, that one day he received a visit from a great master in Divinity. The master threw himself at the bishop's feet and cried bitterly. The bishop said to him—

“Master, do not despair; no one can sin so much that God could not forgive him.”

‘The master said, “I cannot help crying, for I believe I am a miscreant, for I cannot bring my heart to believe the sacrament of the altar, as the holy Church teaches it, and I know full well that it is the temptation of the enemy.”

‘“Master,” replied the bishop, “tell me, when the enemy sends you this temptation, does it please you?”

‘And the master said, “Sir, it pains me as much as anything can pain.”

‘“Then I ask you,” the bishop continued, “would you take gold or silver in order to avow with your mouth anything that is against the sacrament of the altar, or against the other sacred sacraments of the Church?”

‘And the master said, “Know, Sir, that there is nothing in the world that I should take; I would rather that all my limbs were torn from my body than openly avow this.”

‘“Then,” said the bishop, “I shall tell you something else. You know that the King of France made war against the King of England, and you know that the castle which is nearest to the frontier is La Rochelle, in Poitou. Now, I shall ask you, if the King had trusted you to defend La Rochelle, and he had trusted me to defend the Castle of Laon, which is in the heart of France, where the country is at peace, to whom ought the King to be more beholden at the end of the war—to you who had defended La Rochelle without losing it, or to me who kept the Castle of Laon?”

‘“In the name of God,” said the master, “to me who had kept La Rochelle without losing it.”

“Master,” said the bishop, “I tell you that my heart is like the Castle of Laon (Montleheri), for I feel no temptation and no doubt as to the sacrament of the altar; therefore, I tell you, if God gives me one reward because I believe firmly and in peace, He will give you four, because you keep your heart for Him in this fight of tribulation, and have such goodwill towards Him that for no earthly good, nor for any pain inflicted on your body, you would forsake Him. Therefore, I say to you, be at ease; your state is more pleasing to our Lord than my own.”

When the master had heard this he fell on his knees before the bishop, and felt again at peace.

Surely, if the cruel punishment inflicted by St. Louis on blasphemers is behind our age, is not the love, the humility, the truthfulness of this bishop, is not the spirit in which he acted towards the priest, and the spirit in which he related this conversation to the King, somewhat in advance of the century in which we live?

If we only dwell on certain passages of Joinville's memoirs it is easy to say that he and his King and the whole age in which they moved were credulous, engrossed by the mere formalities of religion, and fanatical in their enterprise to recover Jerusalem and the Holy Land. But let us candidly enter into their view of life, and many things which at first seem strange and startling will become intelligible. Joinville does not relate many miracles, and such is his good faith that we may implicitly believe the facts, such as he states them, however we may differ as to the interpretation by which, to Joinville's mind, these facts assumed a miraculous character. On their

way to the Holy Land it seems that their ship was windbound for several days, and that they were in danger of being taken prisoners by the pirates of Barbary. Joinville recollected the saying of a priest who had told him that, whatever had happened in his parish, whether too much rain or too little rain, or anything else, if he made three processions for three successive Saturdays, his prayer was always heard. Joinville, therefore, recommended the same remedy. Sea-sick as he was, he was carried on deck, and the procession was formed round the two masts of the ship. As soon as this was done the wind rose, and the ship arrived at Cyprus the third Saturday. The same remedy was resorted to a second time, and with equal effect. The King was waiting at Damiette for his brother, the Comte de Poitiers and his army, and was very uneasy about the delay in his arrival. Joinville told the legate of the miracle that had happened on their voyage to Cyprus. The legate consented to have three processions on three successive Saturdays, and on the third Saturday the Comte de Poitiers and his fleet arrived before Damiette. One more instance may suffice. On their return to France a sailor fell overboard, and was left in the water. Joinville, whose ship was close by, saw something in the water, but, as he observed no struggle, he imagined it was a cask. The man, however, was picked up, and when asked why he did not exert himself, he replied that he saw no necessity for it. As soon as he fell into the water he commended himself to *Nostre Dame*, and she supported him by his shoulders till he was picked up by the King's galley. Joinville had a window

painted in his chapel to commemorate this miracle, and there, no doubt, the Virgin would be represented as supporting the sailor exactly as he described it.

Now, it must be admitted that before the tribunal of the ordinary philosophy of the nineteenth century these miracles would be put down either as inventions or as exaggerations. But let us examine the thoughts and the language of that age, and we shall take a more charitable and, we believe, a more correct view. Men like Joinville did not distinguish between a general and a special Providence, and few who have carefully examined the true import of words would blame him for that. Whatever happened to him and his friends, the smallest as well as the greatest events were taken alike as so many communications from God to man. Nothing could happen to any one of them unless God willed it. 'God wills it,' they exclaimed, and put the cross on their breasts, and left house and home, and wife and children, to fight the infidels in the Holy Land. The King was ill and on the point of death when he made a vow that if he recovered he would undertake a crusade. In spite of the dangers which threatened him and his country, where every vassal was a rival, in spite of the despair of his excellent mother, the King fulfilled his vow, and risked not only his crown, but his life, without a complaint and without a regret. It may be that the prospect of Eastern booty, or even of an Eastern throne, had some part in exciting the pious zeal of the French chivalry. Yet, if we read of Joinville, who was then a young and gay nobleman of twenty-four; with a young wife and a beautiful castle in Champagne, giving up everything, confessing his

sins, making reparation, performing pilgrimages, and then starting for the East, there to endure for five years the most horrible hardships; when we read of his sailors singing a *Veni, Creator Spiritus*, before they hoisted their sails; when we see how every day, in the midst of pestilence and battle, the King and his Sénéchal and his knights say their prayers and perform their other religious duties; how in every danger they commend themselves to God or to their saints; how for every blessing, for every escape from danger, they return thanks to Heaven, we easily learn to understand how natural it was that such men should see miracles in every blessing vouchsafed to them, whether great or small, just as the Jews of old, in that sense the true people of God, saw miracles, saw the finger of God, in every plague that visited their camp, and in every spring of water that saved them from destruction. When the Egyptians were throwing the Greek fire into the camp of the Crusaders, St. Louis raised himself in his bed at the report of every discharge of those murderous missiles, and, stretching forth his hands towards heaven, he said, crying, 'Good Lord God, protect my people.' Joinville, after relating this, remarks, 'And I believe truly that his prayers served us well in our need.' And was he not right in this belief, as right as the Israelites were when they saw Moses lifting up his heavy arms, and they prevailed against Amalek? Surely this belief was put to a hard test when a fearful plague broke out in the camp, when nearly the whole French army was massacred, when the King was taken prisoner, when the Queen, in child-bed, had to make her old Chamberlain swear that he would

kill her at the first approach of the enemy, when the small remnant of that mighty French army had to purchase its return to France by a heavy ransom. Yet nothing could shake Joinville's faith in the ever-ready help of our Lord, of the Virgin, and of the saints. 'Be certain,' he writes, 'that the Virgin helped us, and she would have helped us more if we had not offended her, her and her Son, as I said before.' Surely, with such faith, credulity ceases to be credulity. Where there is credulity without that living faith which sees the hand of God in everything, man's indignation is rightly roused. That credulity leads to self-conceit, hypocrisy, and unbelief. But such was not the credulity of Joinville or of his King, or of the bishop who comforted the great master in theology. A modern historian would not call the rescue of the drowning sailor, nor the favourable wind which brought the Crusaders to Cyprus, nor the opportune arrival of the Comte de Poitiers miracles, because the word 'miracle' has a different sense with us from what it had during the Middle Ages, from what it had at the time of the Apostles, and from what it had at the time of Moses. Yet to the drowning sailor his rescue was miraculous, to the despairing King the arrival of his brother was a godsend, and to Joinville and his crew, who were in imminent danger of being carried off as slaves by Moorish pirates, the wind that brought them safe to Cyprus was more than a fortunate accident. Our language differs from the language of Joinville, yet in our heart of hearts we mean the same thing.

And nothing shows better the reality and healthiness of the religion of those brave knights than their

cheerful and open countenance, their thorough enjoyment of all the good things of this life, their freedom in thought and speech. You never catch Joinville canting, or with an expression of blank solemnity. When his ship was surrounded by the galleys of the Sultan, and when they held a council as to whether they should surrender themselves to the Sultan's fleet or to his army on shore, one of his servants objected to all surrender. 'Let us all be killed,' he said to Joinville, 'and then we shall all go straight to Paradise.' His advice, however, was not followed, because, as Joinville says, 'we did not believe it.'

If we bear in mind that Joinville's history was written after Louis had been raised to the rank of a saint, his way of speaking of the King, though always respectful, strikes us, nevertheless, as it must have struck his contemporaries, as sometimes very plain and familiar. It is well known that an attempt was actually made by the notorious Jesuit, le Père Hardouin, to prove Joinville's work as spurious, or, at all events, as full of interpolations, inserted by the enemies of the Church. It was an attempt which thoroughly failed, and which was too dangerous to be repeated; but, on reading Joinville after reading the life and miracles of St. Louis, one can easily understand that the soldier's account of the brave King was not quite palatable or welcome to the authors of the legends of the royal saint. At the time when the King's bones had begun to work wretched miracles, the following story could hardly have sounded respectful:—'When the King was at Acre,' Joinville writes, 'some pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem wished to see him. Joinville went

to the King, and said, "Sire, there is a crowd of people who have asked me to show them the Royal Saint, though *I* have no wish as yet to kiss your bones." The King laughed loud, and asked me to bring the people.'

In the thick of the battle, in which Joinville received five wounds and his horse fifteen, and when death seemed almost certain, Joinville tells us that the good Count of Soissons rode up to him and chaffed him, saying, 'Let those dogs loose, for, *par la quoisie Dieu*,'—as he always used to swear,—'we shall still talk of this day in the rooms of our ladies.'

The Crusades and the Crusaders, though they are only five or six centuries removed from us, have assumed a kind of romantic character, which makes it very difficult even for the historian to feel towards them the same human interest which we feel for Caesar or Pericles. Works like that of Joinville are most useful in dispelling that mist which the chroniclers of old and the romances of Walter Scott and others have raised round the heroes of these holy wars. St. Louis and his companions, as described by Joinville, not only in their glistening armour, but in their every-day attire, are brought nearer to us, become intelligible to us, and teach us lessons of humanity which we can learn from men only, and not from saints and heroes. Here lies the real value of real history. It makes us familiar with the thoughts of men who differ from us in manners and language, in thought and religion, and yet with whom we are able to sympathise, and from whom we are able to learn. It widens our minds and our hearts, and gives us that true knowledge of the world and of human

nature in all its phases which but few can gain in the short span of their own life, and in the narrow sphere of their friends and enemies. We can hardly imagine a better book for boys to read or for men to ponder over; and we hope that M. de Wailly's laudable efforts may be crowned with complete success, and that, whether in France or in England, no student of history will in future imagine that he knows the true spirit of the Crusades and the Crusaders who has not read once, and more than once, the original Memoirs of Joinville, as edited, translated, and explained by the eminent Keeper of the Imperial Library at Paris, M. Natalis de Wailly.

THE JOURNAL DES SAVANTS AND THE JOURNAL DE TRÉVOUX¹.

FOR a hundred persons who, in this country, read the 'Revue des Deux Mondes,' how many are there who read the 'Journal des Savants'? In France the authority of that journal is indeed supreme; but its very title frightens the general public, and its blue cover is but seldom seen on the tables of the *salles de lecture*. And yet there is no French periodical so well suited to the tastes of the better class of readers in England. Its contributors are all members of the *Institut de France*, and, if we may measure the value of a periodical by the honour which it reflects on those who form its staff, no journal in France can vie with the 'Journal des Savants.' At the present moment we find on its roll such names as Cousin, Flourens, Villemain, Mignet, Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Naudet, Prosper Mérimé, Littré—names which, if now and then seen on the covers of the 'Revue des Deux Mondes,' the 'Revue Contemporaine,' or the 'Revue Moderne,' confer an excep-

¹ 'Table Méthodique des Mémoires de Trévoux (1701-1775), précédée d'une Notice Historique.' Par le Père P. C. Sommervogel, de la Compagnie de Jésus. 3 vols. Paris, 1864-5.

tional lustre on these fortnightly or monthly issues. The articles which are admitted into this select periodical may be deficient now and then in those outward charms of diction by which French readers like to be dazzled; but what in France is called *trop savant*, *trop lourd*, is frequently far more palatable than the highly spiced articles which are no doubt delightful to read, but which, like an excellent French dinner, make you almost doubt whether you have dined or not. If English journalists are bent on taking for their models the fortnightly or monthly contemporaries of France, the 'Journal des Savants' might offer a much better chance of success than the more popular *revues*. We should be sorry indeed to see any periodical published under the superintendence of the 'Ministre de l'Instruction Publique,' or of any other member of the Cabinet; but, apart from that, a literary tribunal like that formed by the members of the 'Bureau du Journal des Savants' would certainly be a great benefit to literary criticism. The general tone that runs through their articles is impartial and dignified. Each writer seems to feel the responsibility which attaches to the bench from which he addresses the public, and we can of late years recall hardly any case where the dictum of 'noblesse oblige' has been disregarded in this the most ancient among the purely literary journals of Europe.

The first number of the 'Journal des Savants' was published more than two hundred years ago, on the 5th of January, 1655. It was the first small beginning in a branch of literature which has since assumed immense proportions. Voltaire speaks of it as 'le père de tous les ouvrages de ce genre, dont l'Europe est

aujourd'hui remplie.' It was published at first once a week, every Monday; and the responsible editor was M. de Sallo, who, in order to avoid the retaliations of sensitive authors, adopted the name of Le Sieur de Hedouville, the name, it is said, of his *valet de chambre*. The articles were short, and in many cases they only gave a description of the books, without any critical remarks. The journal likewise gave an account of important discoveries in science and art, and of other events that might seem of interest to men of letters. Its success must have been considerable, if we may judge by the number of rival publications which soon sprang up in France and in other countries of Europe. In England, a philosophical journal on the same plan was started before the year was over. In Germany, the 'Journal des Savants' was translated into Latin by F. Nitzschius in 1668, and before the end of the seventeenth century the 'Giornale de' Letterati' (1668), the 'Bibliotheca Volante' (1677), the 'Acta Eruditorum' (1682), the 'Nouvelles de la République des Lettres' (1684), the 'Bibliothèque Universelle et Historique' (1686), the 'Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants' (1687), and the 'Monatliche Unterredungen' (1689), had been launched in the principal countries of Europe. In the next century it was remarked of the journals published in Germany 'plura dixeris pullulasse brevi tempore quam fungi nascuntur unâ nocte.'

Most of these journals were published by laymen, and represented the purely intellectual interests of society. It was but natural, therefore, that the clergy also should soon have endeavoured to possess a journal of their own. The Jesuits, who at that time were the

most active and influential order, were not slow to appreciate this new opportunity for directing public opinion, and they founded in 1701 their famous journal, the 'Mémoires de Trévoux.' Famous, indeed, it might once be called, and yet at present how little is known of that collection, how seldom are its volumes called for in our public libraries! Yet it was for a long time the rival of the 'Journal des Savants.' Under the editorship of Le Père Berthier it fought bravely against Diderot, Voltaire, and other heralds of the French Revolution. It weathered even the fatal year of 1762, but, after changing its name, and moderating its pretensions, it ceased to appear in 1782. The long rows of its volumes are now piled up in our libraries like rows of tombstones, which we pass by without even stopping to examine the names and titles of those who are buried in these vast catacombs of thought.

It was a happy idea that led the Père P. C. Sommervogel, himself a member of the order of the Jesuits, to examine the dusty volumes of the 'Journal de Trévoux,' and to do for it the only thing that could be done to make it useful once more, at least to a certain degree—namely, to prepare a general index of the numerous subjects treated in its volumes, on the model of the great index, published in 1753, of the 'Journal des Savants.' His work, published at Paris in 1865, consists of three volumes. The first gives an index of the original dissertations; the second and third of the works criticised in the 'Journal de Trévoux.' It is a work of much smaller pretensions than the index to the 'Journal des Savants'; yet, such as it is, it is useful, and will amply suffice for the pur-

poses of those few readers who have from time to time to consult the literary annals of the Jesuits in France.

The title of the 'Mémoires de Trévoux' was taken from the town of Trévoux, the capital of the principality of Dombes, which Louis XIV had conferred on the Duc de Maine, with all the privileges of a sovereign. Like Louis XIV, the young prince gloried in the title of a patron of art and science, but, as the pupil of Madame de Maintenon, he devoted himself even more zealously to the defence of religion. A printing-office was founded at Trévoux, and the Jesuits were invited to publish a new journal 'où l'on eût principalement en vûë la défense de la religion.' This was the 'Journal de Trévoux,' published for the first time in February, 1701, under the title of 'Mémoires pour l'Histoire des Sciences et des Beaux Arts, recueillis par l'ordre de Son Altesse Sérénissime, Monseigneur Prince Souverain de Dombes.' It was entirely and professedly in the hands of the Jesuits, and we find among its earliest contributors such names as Catrou, Tournemine, and Hardouin. The opportunities for collecting literary and other intelligence enjoyed by the members of that order were extraordinary. We doubt whether any paper, even in our days, has so many intelligent correspondents in every part of the world. If any astronomical observation was to be made in China or America, a Jesuit missionary was generally on the spot to make it. If geographical information was wanted, eye-witnesses could write from India or Africa to state what was the exact height of mountains or the real direction of rivers. The architectural monuments

of the great nations of antiquity could easily be explored and described, and the literary treasures of India or China or Persia could be ransacked by men ready for any work that required devotion and perseverance, and that promised to throw additional splendour on the order of Loyola. No missionary society has ever understood how to utilise its resources in the interest of science like the Jesuits, and if our own missionaries may on many points take warning from the history of the Jesuits, on that one point at least they might do well to imitate their example.

Scientific interests, however, were by no means the chief motive of the Jesuits in founding their journal, and the controversial character began soon to preponderate in their articles. Protestant writers received but little mercy in the pages of the 'Journal de Trévoux,' and the battle was soon raging in every country of Europe between the flying batteries of the Jesuits and the strongholds of Jansenism, of Protestantism, or of liberal thought in general. Le Clerc was attacked for his 'Harmonia Evangelica'; Boileau even was censured for his 'Épître sur l'Amour de Dieu.' But the old lion was too much for his reverend satirists. The following is a specimen of his reply:—

' Mes Révérends Pères en Dieu,
 Et mes Confrères en Satire,
 Dans vos Escrits dans plus d'un lieu
 Je voy qu'à mes dépens vous affectés de rire ;
 Mais ne craignés-vous point, que pour rire de Vous,
 Relisant Juvénal, refeuilletant Horace,
 Je ne ranime encor ma satirique audace ?
 Grands Aristarques de Trévoux,

N'allés point de nouveau faire courir aux armes,
 Un athlète tout prest à prendre son congé,
 Qui par vos traits maling au combat rengagé
 Peut encore aux Rieurs faire verser des larmes.
 Apprenés un mot de Régnier,
 Notre célèbre Devancier,
Corsaires attaquant Corsaires
Ne font pas, dit-il, leurs affaires.'

Even stronger language than this became soon the fashion in journalistic warfare. In reply to an attack on the Marquis Orsi, the 'Giornale de' Letterati d' Italia' accused the 'Journal de Trévoux' of *menzogna* and *impostura*, and in Germany the 'Acta Eruditorum Lipsiensium' poured out even more violent invectives against the Jesuitical critics. It is wonderful how well Latin seems to lend itself to the expression of angry abuse. Few modern writers have excelled the following tirade, either in Latin or in German:—

'Quae mentis stupiditas! At si qua est, Jesuitarum est. . . . Res est intoleranda, Trevoltianos Jesuitas, toties contusos, iniquissimum in suis diariis tribunal erexisse, in eoque non ratione duce, sed animi impotentia, non aequitatis legibus, sed praejudiciis, non veritatis lance, sed affectus aut odii pondere, optimis exquisitissimisque operibus detrahare, pessima ad coelum usque laudibus efferre: ignaris auctoribus, modo secum sentiant, aut sibi faveant, ubique blandiri, doctissimos sibi non plane pleneque deditos plus quam canino dente mordere.'

What has been said of other journals was said of the 'Journal de Trévoux':—

'Les auteurs de ce journal, qui a son mérite, sont constants à louer tous les ouvrages de ceux qu'ils

affectionnent, et pour éviter une froide monotonie, ils exercent quelquefois la critique sur les écrivains à qui rien ne les oblige de faire grâce.'

It took some time before authors became at all reconciled to these new tribunals of literary justice. Even a writer like Voltaire, who braved public opinion more than anybody, looked upon journals, and the influence which they soon gained in France and abroad, as a great evil. 'Rien n'a plus nui à la littérature,' he writes, 'plus répandu le mauvais goût, et plus confondu le vrai avec le faux.' Before the establishment of literary journals, a learned writer had indeed little to fear. For a few years, at all events, he was allowed to enjoy the reputation of having published a book; and this by itself was considered a great distinction by the world at large. Perhaps his book was never noticed at all, or, if it was, it was only criticised in one of those elaborate letters which the learned men of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries used to write to each other, which might be forwarded indeed to one or two other professors, but which never influenced public opinion. Only in extreme cases a book would be answered by another book, but this would necessarily require a long time; nor would it at all follow that those who had read and admired the original work would have an opportunity of consulting the volume that contained its refutation. This happy state of things came to an end after the year 1655. Since the invention of printing, no more important event had happened in the republic of letters than the introduction of a periodical literature. It was a complete revolution, differing from other revolutions only

by the quickness with which the new power was recognised even by its fiercest opponents.

The power of journalism, however, soon found its proper level, and the history of its rise and progress, which has still to be written, teaches the same lesson as the history of political powers. Journals which defended private interests, or the interests of parties, whether religious, political, or literary, never gained that influence which was freely conceded to those who were willing to serve the public at large in pointing out real merit wherever it could be found, and in unmasking pretenders, to whatever rank they might belong. The once all-powerful organ of the Jesuits, the 'Journal de Trévoux,' has long ceased to exist, and even to be remembered; the 'Journal des Savants' still holds, after more than two hundred years, that eminent position which was claimed for it by its founder, as the independent advocate of justice and truth.

CHASOT¹.

HISTORY is generally written *en face*. It reminds us occasionally of certain royal family pictures, where the centre is occupied by the king and queen, while their children are ranged on each side like organ-pipes, and the courtiers and ministers are grouped behind, according to their respective ranks. All the figures seem to stare at some imaginary spectator, who would require at least a hundred eyes to take in the whole of the assemblage. This place of the imaginary spectator falls generally to the lot of the historian, and of those who read great historical works; and perhaps this is inevitable. But it is refreshing for once to change this unsatisfactory position, and, instead of always looking straight in the faces of kings, and queens, and generals, and ministers, to catch, by a side-glance, a view of the times, as they appeared to men occupying a less central and less exalted position than that of the general historian. If we look at the Palace of Versailles from the terrace in front of the edifice, we are impressed with its broad magnificence, but we are soon tired, and all that is

¹ 'Chasot:' a Contribution to the History of Frederic the Great and his Time. By Kurd von Schlözer (died 1894). Berlin, 1856.

left in our memory is a vast expanse of windows, columns, statues, and wall. But let us retire to some of the *bosquets* on each side of the main avenue, and take a diagonal view of the great mansion of Louis XIV, and though we lose part of the palace, the whole picture gains in colour and life, and it brings before our mind the figure of the great monarch himself, so fond of concealing part of his majestic stateliness under the shadow of those very groves where we are sitting.

It was a happy thought of M. Kurd von Schlözer to try a similar experiment with Frederic the Great, and to show him to us, not as the great king, looking history in the face, but as seen near and behind another person, for whom the author has felt so much sympathy as to make him the central figure of a very pretty historical picture. This person is Chasot. Frederic used to say of him, *C'est le matador de ma jeunesse*—a saying which is not found in Frederic's works, but which is nevertheless authentic. One of the chief magistrates of the old Hanseatic town of Lübeck, Syndicus Curtius—the father, we believe, of the two distinguished scholars, Ernst and Georg Curtius—was at school with the two sons of Chasot, and he remembers these royal words, when they were repeated in all the drawing-rooms of the city where Chasot spent many years of his life. Frederic's friendship for Chasot is well known, for there are two poems of the king addressed to this young favourite. They do not give a very high idea either of the poetical power of the monarch, or of the moral character of his friend; but they contain some manly and straightforward remarks, which make up

for a great deal of shallow declamation. This young Chasot was a French nobleman, a fresh, chivalrous, buoyant nature—adventurous, careless, extravagant, brave, full of romance, happy with the happy, and galloping through life like a true cavalry officer. He met Frederic in 1734. Louis XV had taken up the cause of Stanislas Leszczynski, king of Poland, his father-in-law, and Chasot served in the French army which, under the Duke of Berwick, attacked Germany on the Rhine, in order to relieve Poland from the simultaneous pressure of Austria and Russia. He had the misfortune to kill a French officer in a duel, and was obliged to take refuge in the camp of the old Prince Eugène. Here the young Prince of Prussia soon discovered the brilliant parts of the French nobleman, and when his father, Frederic William I, no longer allowed him to serve under Eugène, he asked Chasot to follow him to Prussia. The years from 1735 to 1740 were happy years for the prince, though he, no doubt, would have preferred taking an active part in the campaign. He writes to his sister:—

‘J’aurais répondu plus tôt, si je n’avais été très-affligé de ce que le roi ne veut pas me permettre d’aller en campagne. Je le lui ai demandé quatre fois, et lui ai rappelé la promesse qu’il m’en avait faite; mais point de nouvelle; il m’a dit qu’il avait des raisons très-cachées qui l’en empêchaient. Je le crois, car je suis persuadé qu’il ne les sait pas lui-même.’

But, as he wished to be on good terms with his father, he stayed at home, and travelled about to inspect his future kingdom. ‘C’est un peu plus honnête qu’en

Sibérie,' he writes, 'mais pas de beaucoup.' Frederic, after his marriage, took up his abode in the Castle of Rheinsberg, near Neu-Ruppin, and it was here that he spent the happiest part of his life. M. de Schlözer has described this period in the life of the king with great art; and he has pointed out how Frederic, while he seemed to live for nothing but pleasure, shooting, dancing, music, and poetry, was given at the same time to much more serious occupations, reading and composing works on history, strategy, and philosophy, and maturing plans which, when the time of their execution came, seemed to spring from his head full grown and fully armed. He writes to his sister, the Markgravine of Baireuth, in 1737 :—

'Nous nous divertissons de rien, et n'avons aucun soin des choses de la vie, qui la rendent désagréable et qui jettent du dégoût sur les plaisirs. Nous faisons la tragédie et la comédie, nous avons bal, mascarade, et musique à toute sauce. Voilà un abrégé de nos amusements.'

And again, he writes to his friend Suhm, at St. Petersburg :—

'Nous allons représenter l'*Œdipe* de Voltaire, dans lequel je ferai le héros de théâtre; j'ai choisi le rôle de Philoctète.'

A similar account of the royal household at Rheinsberg is given by Bielfeld :—

'C'est ainsi que les jours s'écoulaient ici dans une tranquillité assaisonnée de tous les plaisirs qui peuvent flatter une âme raisonnable. Chère de roi, vin des dieux, musique des anges, promenades délicieuses dans les jardins et dans les bois, parties sur l'eau, culture des lettres et des beaux-arts, conversation

spirituelle, tout concourt à répandre dans ce palais enchanté des charmes sur la vie.'

Frederic, however, was not a man to waste his time in mere pleasure. He shared in the revelries of his friends, but he was perhaps the only person at Rheinsberg who spent his evenings in reading Wolff's 'Metaphysics.' And here let us remark, that this German prince, in order to read that work, was obliged to have the German translated into French by his friend Suhm, the Saxon minister at St. Petersburg. Chasot, who had no very definite duties to perform at Rheinsberg, was commissioned to copy Suhm's manuscript—nay, he was nearly driven to despair when he had to copy it a second time, because Frederic's monkey, Mimi, had set fire to the first copy. We have Frederic's opinion on Wolff's 'Metaphysics,' in his 'Works,' vol. i. p. 263 :—

'Les universités prospéraient en même temps. Halle et Francfort étaient fournies de savants professeurs : Thomasius, Gundling, Ludewig, Wolff, et Stryke tenaient le premier rang pour la célébrité et faisaient nombre de disciples. Wolff commenta l'ingénieux système de Leibnitz sur les monades, et noya dans un déluge de paroles, d'arguments, de corollaires, et de citations, quelques problèmes que Leibnitz avait jetés peut-être comme une amorce aux métaphysiciens. Le professeur de Halle écrivait laborieusement nombre de volumes, qui, au lieu de pouvoir instruire des hommes faits, servirent tout au plus de catéchisme de didactique pour des enfants. Les monades ont mis aux prises les métaphysiciens et les géomètres d'Allemagne, et ils disputent encore sur la divisibilité de la matière.'

In another place, however, he speaks of Wolff with greater respect, and acknowledges his influence in the German universities. Speaking of the reign of his father, he writes :—

‘ Mais la faveur et les brigues remplissaient les chaires de professeurs dans les universités ; les dévots, qui se mêlent de tout, acquirent une part à la direction des universités ; ils y persécutaient le bon sens, et surtout la classe des philosophes : Wolff fut exilé pour avoir déduit avec un ordre admirable les preuves sur l’existence de Dieu. La jeune noblesse qui se vouait aux armes, crût déroger en étudiant, et comme l’esprit humain donne toujours dans les excès, ils regardèrent l’ignorance comme un titre de mérite, et le savoir comme une pédanterie absurde.’

During the same time, Frederic composed his ‘ Refutation of Macchiavelli,’ which was published in 1740, and read all over Europe ; and besides the gay parties of the court, he organised the somewhat mysterious society of the *Ordre de Bayard*, of which his brothers the Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, the Duke Wilhelm of Brunswick-Bevern, Keyserling, Fouqué, and Chasot, were members. Their meetings had reference to serious political matters, though Frederic himself was never initiated by his father into the secrets of Prussian policy till almost on his death-bed. The King died in 1740, and Frederic was suddenly called away from his studies and pleasures at Rheinsberg, to govern a rising kingdom which was watched with jealousy by all its neighbours. He describes his state of mind, shortly before the death of his father, in the following words :—

‘ Vous pouvez bien juger que je suis assez tracassé

dans la situation où je me trouve. On me laisse peu de repos, mais l'intérieur est tranquille, et je puis vous assurer que je n'ai jamais été plus philosophe qu'en cette occasion-ci. Je regarde avec des yeux d'indifférence tout ce qui m'attend, sans désirer la fortune ni la craindre, plein de compassion pour ceux qui souffrent, d'estime pour les honnêtes gens, et de tendresse pour mes amis.'

As soon, however, as he had mastered his new position, the young king was again the patron of art, of science, of literature, and of social improvements of every kind. Voltaire had been invited to Berlin, to organise a French theatre, when suddenly the news of the death of Charles VI, the Emperor of Germany, arrived at Berlin. How well Frederic understood what was to follow, we learn from a letter to Voltaire :—

'Mon cher Voltaire—L'événement le moins prévu du monde m'empêche, pour cette fois, d'ouvrir mon âme à la vôtre comme d'ordinaire, et de bavarder comme je le voudrais. L'empereur est mort. Cette mort dérange toutes mes idées pacifiques, et je crois qu'il s'agira, au mois de juin, plutôt de poudre à canon, de soldats, de tranchées, que d'actrices, de ballets et de théâtre.'

He was suffering from fever, and he adds :—

'Je vais faire passer ma fièvre, car j'ai besoin de ma machine, et il en faut tirer à présent tout le parti possible.'

Again he writes to Algarotti :—

'Une bagatelle comme est la mort de l'empereur ne demande pas de grands mouvements. Tout était prévu, tout était arrangé. Ainsi il ne s'agit que

d'exécuter des desseins que j'ai roulés depuis long temps dans ma tête.'

We need not enter into the history of the first Silesian War; but we see clearly from these expressions, that the occupation of Silesia, which the house of Brandenburg claimed by right, had formed part of the policy of Prussia long before the death of the emperor; and that the peace of Breslau, in 1742, realised a plan which had probably been the subject of many debates at Rheinsberg. During this first war, Chasot obtained the most brilliant success. At Mollwitz, he saved the life of the king; and the following account of this exploit was given to M. de Schlözer by members of Chasot's family:—An Austrian cavalry officer, with some of his men, rode up close to the king. Chasot was near. 'Where is the king?' the officer shouted; and Chasot, perceiving the imminent danger, sprang forward, declared himself to be the king, and sustained for some time single-handed the most violent combat with the Austrian soldiers. At last he was rescued by his men, but not without having received a severe wound across his forehead. The king thanked him, and Voltaire afterwards celebrated his bravery in the following lines:—

'Il me souvient encore de ce jour mémorable
Où l'illustre Chasot, ce guerrier formidable,
Sauva par sa valeur le plus grand de nos rois.
O Prusse! élève un temple à ses fameux exploits.'

Chasot soon rose to the rank of major, and received large pecuniary rewards from the king. The brightest event, however, of his life was still to come; and this was the battle of Hohenfriedberg, in 1745. 'In spite of Frederic's successes, his position before that

engagement was extremely critical. Austria had concluded a treaty with England, Holland, and Saxony against Prussia. France declined to assist Frederic, Russia threatened to take part against him. On April 19, the king wrote to his minister:—

‘La situation présente est aussi violente que désagréable. Mon parti est tout pris. S’il s’agit de se battre, nous le ferons en désespérés. Enfin, jamais crise n’a été plus grande que la mienne. Il faut laisser au temps de débrouiller cette fusée, et au destin, s’il y en a un, à décider de l’événement.’

And again:—

‘J’ai jeté le bonnet par-dessus les moulins; je me prépare à tous les événements qui peuvent m’arriver. Que la fortune me soit contraire ou favorable, cela ne m’abaissera ni m’enorgueillira; et s’il faut périr, ce sera avec gloire et l’épée à la main.’

The decisive day arrived—‘le jour le plus décisif de ma fortune.’ The night before the battle, the king said to the French ambassador—‘Les ennemis sont où je les voulais, et je les attaque demain;’ and on the following day the battle of Hohenfriedberg was won. How Chasot distinguished himself, we may learn from Frederic’s own description:—

‘Muse, dis-moi, comment en ces moments
Chasot brilla, faisant voler des têtes,
De maints uhlands faisant de vrais squelettes,
Et des hussards, devant lui s’échappant,
Fendant les uns, les autres transperçant,
Et, maniant sa flamberge tranchante,
Mettait en fuite, et donnait l’épouvante
Aux ennemis effarés et tremblants.
Tel Jupiter est peint armé du foudre,
Et tel Chasot réduit l’uhlan en poudre.’

In his account of the battle, the king wrote:—

Action inouïe dans l'histoire, et dont le succès est dû aux Généraux Gessler et Schmettau, au Colonel Schwerin *et au brave Major Chasot, dont la valeur et la conduite se sont fait connaître dans trois batailles également.*'

And in his 'Histoire de mon Temps,' he wrote:—

'Un fait aussi rare, aussi glorieux, mérite d'être écrit en lettres d'or dans les fastes prussiens. Le Général Schwerin, *le Major Chasot* et beaucoup d'officiers s'y firent un nom immortel.'

How, then, is it that, in the later edition of Frederic's 'Histoire de mon Temps,' the name of Chasot is erased? How is it that, during the whole of the Seven Years' War, Chasot is never mentioned? M. de Schlözer gives us a complete answer to this question, and we must say that Frederic did not behave well to the *matador de sa jeunesse*. Chasot had a duel with a Major Bronickowsky, in which his opponent was killed. So far as we can judge from the documents which M. de Schlözer has obtained from Chasot's family, Chasot had been forced to fight; but the king believed that he had sought a quarrel with the Polish officer, and, though a court-martial found him not guilty, Frederic sent him to the fortress of Spandau. This was the first estrangement between Chasot and the king; and though after a time he was received again at court, the friendship between the king and the young nobleman who had saved his life had received a rude shock.

Chasot spent the next few years in garrison at Treptow; and, though he was regularly invited by Frederic to be present at the great festivities at Berlin, he seems to have been a more constant visitor

at the small court of the Duchess of Strelitz, not far from his garrison, than at Potsdam. The king employed him on a diplomatic mission, and in this also Chasot was successful. But notwithstanding the continuance of this friendly intercourse, both parties felt chilled, and the least misunderstanding was sure to lead to a rupture. The king, jealous perhaps of Chasot's frequent visits at Strelitz, and not satisfied with the drill of his regiment, expressed himself in strong terms about Chasot at a review in 1751. The latter asked for leave of absence, in order to return to his country and recruit his health. He had received fourteen wounds in the Prussian service, and his application could not be refused. There was another cause of complaint, on which Chasot seems to have expressed himself freely. He imagined that Frederic had not rewarded his services with sufficient liberality. He expressed himself in the following words:—

‘Je ne sais quel malheureux guignon poursuit le roi : mais ce guignon se reproduit dans tout ce que sa majesté entreprend ou ordonne. Toujours ses vues sont bonnes, ses plans sont sages, réfléchis et justes ; et toujours le succès est nul ou très-imparfait, et pourquoi ? Toujours pour la même cause ! parce qu’il manque un louis à l’exécution ; un louis de plus, et tout irait à merveille. Son guignon veut que partout il retienne ce maudit louis ; et tout se fait mal.’

How far this is just, we are unable to say. Chasot was reckless about money, and whatever the king might have allowed him, he would always have wanted one louis more. But, on the other hand, Chasot was not the only person who complained of

Frederic's parsimony; and the French proverb, 'On ne peut pas travailler pour le roi de Prusse,' probably owes its origin to the complaints of Frenchmen who flocked to Berlin at that time in great numbers, and returned home disappointed. Chasot went to France, where he was well received, and he soon sent an intimation to the king that he did not mean to return to Berlin. In 1752 his name was struck off the Prussian army-list. Frederic was offended, and the simultaneous loss of many friends, who either died or left his court, made him *de mauvaise humeur*. It is about this time that he writes to his sister:—

'J'étudie beaucoup, et cela me soulage réellement; mais lorsque mon esprit fait des retours sur les temps passés, alors les plaies du cœur se rouvrent et je regrette inutilement les pertes que j'ai faites.'

Chasot, however, soon returned to Germany, and, probably in order to be near the court of Strelitz, took up his abode in the old free town of Lübeck. He became a citizen of Lübeck in 1754, and in 1759 was made commander of its Militia. Here his life seems to have been very agreeable, and he was treated with great consideration and liberality. Chasot was still young, as he was born in 1716, and he now thought of marriage. This he accomplished in the following manner. There was at that time an artist of some celebrity at Lübeck—Stefano Torelli. He had a daughter whom he had left at Dresden to be educated, and whose portrait he carried about on his snuffbox. Chasot met him at dinner, saw the snuffbox, fell in love with the picture, and proposed to the father to marry his daughter Camilla. Camilla was sent for. She left Dresden, travelled through

the country, which was then occupied by Prussian troops, met the king in his camp, received his protection, arrived safely at Lübeck, and in the same year was married to Chasot. Frederic was then in the thick of the Seven Years' War, but Chasot, though he was again on friendly terms with the king, did not offer him his sword. He was too happy at Lübeck with his Camilla, and he made himself useful to the king by sending him recruits. One of the recruits he offered was his son, and in a letter, April 8, 1760, we see the king accepting this young recruit in the most gracious terms:—

‘J’accepte volontiers, cher de Chasot, la recrue qui vous doit son être, et je serai parrain de l’enfant qui vous naîtra, au cas que ce soit un fils. Nous tuons les hommes, tandis que vous en faites.’

It was a son, and Chasot writes—

‘Si ce garçon me ressemble, Sire, il n’aura pas une goutte de sang dans ses veines qui ne soit à vous.’

M. de Schlözer, who is himself a native of Lübeck, has described the later years of Chasot’s life in that city with great warmth and truthfulness. The diplomatic relations of the town with Russia and Denmark were not without interest at that time, because Peter III, formerly Duke of Holstein, had declared war against Denmark in order to substantiate his claims to the Danish crown. Chasot had actually the pleasure of fortifying Lübeck, and carrying on preparations for war on a small scale, till Peter was dethroned by his wife, Katherine. All this is told in a very comprehensive and luminous style; and it is not without regret that we find ourselves in the last chapter, where M. de Schlözer describes the last meet-

ings of Chasot and Frederic in 1779, 1784, and 1785. Frederic had lost nearly all his friends, and he was delighted to see the *matador de sa jeunesse* once more. He writes:—

‘Une chose qui n’est presque arrivée qu’à moi est que j’ai perdu tous mes amis de cœur et mes anciennes connaissances; ce sont des plaies dont le cœur saigne longtemps, que la philosophie apaise, mais que sa main ne saurait guérir.’

How pleasant for the king to find at least one man with whom he could talk of the old days of Rheinsberg—of Fräulein von Schack and Fräulein von Walmoden, of Caesarion and Jordan, of Mimi and le Tourbillon! Chasot’s two sons entered the Prussian service, though, in the manner in which they are received, we find Frederic again acting more as king than as friend. Chasot in 1784 was still as lively as ever, whereas the king was in bad health. The latter writes to his old friend:—‘Si nous ne nous revoyons bientôt, nous ne nous reverrons jamais;’ and when Chasot had arrived, Frederic writes to Prince Heinrich—‘Chasot est venu ici de Lübeck; il ne parle que de mangeaille, de vins de Champagne, du Rhin, de Madère, de Hongrie, et du faste de messieurs les marchands de la bourse de Lübeck.’

Such was the last meeting of these two knights of the *Ordre de Bayard*. The king died in 1786, without seeing the approach of the revolutionary storm which was soon to upset the throne of the Bourbons. Chasot died in 1797. He began to write his memoirs in 1789, and it is to some of their fragments, which had been preserved by his family, and were handed over to M. Kurd de Schlözer, that we owe this

delightful little book. Frederic the Great used to complain that Germans could not write history :—

‘Ce siècle ne produisit aucun bon historien. On chargea Teissier d’écrire l’histoire de Brandebourg : il en fit le panégyrique. Pufendorf écrivit la vie de Frédéric-Guillaume, et, pour ne rien omettre, il n’oublia ni ses clercs de chancellerie, ni ses valets de chambre dont il put recueillir les noms. Nos auteurs ont, ce me semble, toujours péché, faute de discerner les choses essentielles des accessoires, d’éclaircir les faits, de resserrer leur prose traînante et excessivement sujette aux inversions, aux nombreuses épithètes, et d’écrire en pédants plutôt qu’en hommes de génie.’

We believe that Frederic would not have said this of a work like that of M. de Schlözer ; and as to Chasot, it is not too much to say that, after the days of Mollwitz and Hohenfriedberg, the day on which M. de Schlözer undertook to write his biography was perhaps the most fortunate for his fame.

A GERMAN TRAVELLER IN ENGLAND¹.

A.D. 1598.

LESSING, when he was librarian at Wolfenbüttel, proposed to start a review which should only notice forgotten books—books written before reviewing was invented, published in the small towns of Germany; never read, perhaps, except by the author and his friends, then buried on the shelves of a library, properly labelled and catalogued, and never opened again, except by an inquisitive inmate of these literary mausoleums. The number of those forgotten books is great, and as in former times few authors wrote more than one or two works during the whole of their lives, the information which they contain is generally of a much more substantial and solid kind than our literary palates are now accustomed to. If a man now travels to the unexplored regions

¹ 'Pauli Hentzneri J.C. Itinerarium Germaniae, Galliae, Angliae-Italiae: cum Indice Locorum, Rerum, atque Verborum commemorabilium. Huic libro accessere novâ hâc editione—1. Monita Peregrinatoria duorum doctissimorum virorum; itemque Incerti auctoris Epitome Praecognitorum Historicorum, antehac non edita. Noribergae, Typis Abrahami Wagenmanni, sumptibus sui ipsius et Johan. Guntzelii, anno MDCXXIX.

of Central Africa, his book is written and out in a year. It remains on the drawing-room table for a season; it is pleasant to read, easy to digest, and still easier to review and to forget. Two or three hundred years ago this was very different. Travelling was a far more serious business, and a man who had spent some years in seeing foreign countries, could do nothing better than employ the rest of his life in writing a book of travels, either in his own language, or, still better, in Latin. After his death his book continued to be quoted for a time in works on history and geography, till a new traveller went over the same ground, published an equally learned book, and thus consigned his predecessor to oblivion. Here is a case in point: Paul Hentzner, a German, who, of course, calls himself Paulus Hentznerus, travelled in Germany, France, England, and Italy; and after his return to his native place in Silesia, he duly published his travels in a portly volume, written in Latin. There is a long title-page with dedications, introductions, a preface for the *Lector benevolus*, Latin verses, and a table showing what people ought to observe in travelling. Travelling, according to our friend, is the source of all wisdom, and he quotes Moses and the Prophets in support of his theory. We ought all to travel, he says—‘*vita nostra peregrinatio est* ;’ and those who stay at home like snails (*cochlearum instar*) will remain ‘*inhumani, insolentes, superbi*,’ &c.

It would take a long time to follow Paulus Hentznerus through all his peregrinations; but let us see what he saw in England. He arrived here in the year 1598. He took ship with his friends at *Depa*,

vulgo *Dieppe*, and after a boisterous voyage, they landed at *Rye*. On their arrival they were conducted to a *Notarius*, who asked their names, and inquired for what object they came to England. After they had satisfied his official inquiries, they were conducted to a *Diversorium*, and treated to a good dinner, *pro regionis more*, according to the custom of the country. From *Rye* they rode to *London*, passing *Flimwolt*, *Tumbridge*, and *Chepsted* on their way. Then follows a long description of *London*, its origin and history, its bridges, churches, monuments, and palaces; with extracts from earlier writers, such as Paulus Jovius, Polydorus Vergilius, &c. All inscriptions are copied faithfully, not only from tombs and pictures, but also from books which the travellers saw in the public libraries. Whitehall seems to have contained a royal library at that time, and in it Hentzner saw, besides Greek and Latin MSS., a book written in French by Queen Elizabeth, with the following dedication to Henry VIII:—

‘A Tres haut et Tres puissant et Redoubte Prince Henry VIII de ce nom, Roy d’Angleterre, de France, et d’Irlande, defenseur de la foy, Elizabeth, sa Tres humble fille, rend salut et obedience.’

After the travellers had seen St. Paul’s, Westminster, the House of Parliament, Whitehall, Guildhall, the Tower, and the Royal Exchange, commonly called *Bursa*—all of which are minutely described—they went to the theatres and to places *Ursorum et Taurorum venationibus destinata*, where bears and bulls, tied fast behind, were baited by bulldogs. In these places, and everywhere, in fact, as our traveller says, when you meet with Englishmen, they use

herba nicotiana, which they call by an American name, *Tobaca* or *Paetum*. The description deserves to be quoted in the original:—

‘Fistulae in hunc finem ex argillâ factae orificio posteriori dictam herbam probe exiccatam, ita ut in pulverem facile redigi possit, immittunt, et igne admoto accendunt, unde fumus ab anteriori parte ore attrahitur, qui per nares rursum, tamquam per infurnibulum exit, et phlegma ac capitis defluxiones magnâ copiâ secum educit.’

After they had seen everything in London—not omitting the ship in which Francis Drake, *nobilissimus pyrata*, was said to have circumnavigated the world—they went to Greenwich. Here they were introduced into the Presence-chamber, and saw the Queen. The walls of the room were covered with precious tapestry, the floor strewn with hay. The Queen had to pass through on going to chapel. It was a Sunday, when all the nobility came to pay their respects. The Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London were present. When divine service began, the Queen appeared, preceded and followed by the Court. Before her walked two Barons, carrying the sceptre and the sword, and between them the Great Chancellor of England with the Seal. The Queen is thus minutely described:—

‘She was said (*rumor erat*) to be fifty-five years old. Her face was rather long, white, and a little wrinkled. Her eyes small, black, and gracious; her nose somewhat bent; her lips compressed, her teeth black (from eating too much sugar). She had earrings of pearls; red hair, but artificial, and wore a small crown. Her breast was uncovered (as is the case with

all unmarried ladies in England), and round her neck was a chain with precious gems. Her hands were graceful, her fingers long. She was of middle stature, but stepped on majestically. She was gracious and kind in her address. The dress she wore was of white silk, with pearls as large as beans. Her cloak was of black silk with silver lace, and a long train was carried by a Marchioness. As she walked along she spoke most kindly with many people, some of them ambassadors. She spoke English, French, and Italian; but she knows also Greek and Latin, and understands Spanish, Scotch, and Dutch. Those whom she addressed bent their knees, and some she lifted up with her hand. To a Bohemian nobleman of the name of Slawata, who had brought some letters to the Queen, she gave her right hand after taking off her glove, and he kissed it. Wherever she turned her eyes, people fell on their knees.'

There was probably nobody present who ventured to scrutinise the poor Queen so impertinently as Paulus Hentznerus. He goes on to describe the ladies who followed the Queen, and how they were escorted by fifty knights. When she came to the door of the chapel, books were handed to her, and the people called out, 'God save the Queen Elizabeth'; whereupon the Queen answered, 'I thanke you, myn good people.' Prayers did not last more than half-an-hour, and the music was excellent. During the time that the Queen was in chapel, dinner was laid, and this again is described in full detail.

But we cannot afford to tarry with our German observer, nor can we follow him to Grantbridge (Cambridge), or Oxenford, where he describes the

colleges and halls (each of them having a library), and the life of the students. From Oxford he went to Woodstock, then back to Oxford; and from thence to Henley and Madenhood to Windsor. Eton also was visited, and here, he says, sixty boys were educated gratuitously, and afterwards sent to Cambridge. After visiting Hampton Court, and the royal palace of None-such, our travellers returned to London.

We shall finish our extracts with some remarks of Hentzner on the manners and customs of the English—

‘The English are grave, like the Germans, magnificent at home and abroad. They carry with them a large train of followers and servants. These have silver shields on their left arm and a pig-tail. The English excel in dancing and music. They are swift and lively, though stouter than the French. They shave the middle portion of the face, but leave the hair untouched on each side. They are good sailors, and famous pirates; clever, perfidious, and thievish. About three hundred are hanged in London every year. At table they are more civil than the French. They eat less bread, but more meat, and they dress it well. They throw much sugar into their wine. They suffer frequently from leprosy, commonly called the white leprosy, which is said to have come to England in the time of the Normans. They are brave in battle, and always conquer their enemies. At home they brook no manner of servitude. They are very fond of noises that fill the ears, such as explosions of guns, trumpets and bells. In London, persons who have got drunk are wont to mount a church tower, for the sake of exercise, and to ring the bells for several hours. If they see a foreigner

who is handsome and strong, they are sorry that he is not an Anglicus—*vulgo* Englishman.'

On his return to France, Hentzner paid a visit to Canterbury, and, after seeing some ghosts on his journey, arrived safely at Dover. Before he was allowed to go on board, he had again to undergo an examination, to give his name, to explain what he had done in England, and where he was going ; and, lastly, his luggage was searched most carefully, in order to see whether he carried with him any English money, for nobody was allowed to carry away more than ten pounds of English money ; all the rest was taken away and handed to the Royal Treasury. And thus farewell, Carissime Hentzneri ! and slumber on your shelf until the eye of some other benevolent reader, glancing at the rows of forgotten books, is caught by the quaint lettering on your back, '*Hentzneri Itin.*'

SHAKESPEARE¹.

‘THE city of Frankfort, the birthplace of Goethe, sends her greeting to the city of Stratford-on-Avon, the birthplace of Shakespeare. The old free town of Frankfort, which, since the days of Frederick Barbarossa, has seen the Emperors of Germany crowned within her walls, might well at all times speak in the name of Germany. But to-day she sends her greeting, not as the proud mother of German Emperors, but as the prouder mother of the greatest among the poets of Germany, and it is from the very house in which Goethe lived, and which has since become the seat of “the Free German Institute for Science and Art,” that this message of the German admirers and lovers of Shakespeare has been sent, which I am asked to present to you, the Mayor and Council of Stratford-on-Avon.

‘When honour was to be done to the memory of Shakespeare Germany could not be absent, for next to Goethe and Schiller there is no poet so truly loved by us, so thoroughly our own, as your Shakespeare. He is no stranger with us, no mere classic, like Homer,

¹ Speech delivered at Stratford-on-Avon on the 23rd of April, 1864, the Tercentenary of Shakespeare's birth.

or Virgil, or Dante, or Corneille, whom we admire as we admire a marble statue. He has become one of ourselves, holding his own place in the history of our literature, applauded in our theatres, read in our cottages, studied, known, loved, "as far as sounds the German tongue." There is many a student in Germany who has learned English solely in order to read Shakespeare in the original, and yet we possess a translation of Shakespeare with which few translations of any work can vie in any language. What we in Germany owe to Shakespeare must be read in the history of our literature. Goethe was proud to call himself a pupil of Shakespeare. I shall at this moment allude to one debt of gratitude only which Germany owes to the poet of Stratford-on-Avon. I do not speak of the poet only, and of his art, so perfect because so artless; I think of the man with his large, warm heart, with his sympathy for all that is genuine, unselfish, beautiful, and good; with his contempt for all that is petty, mean, vulgar, and false. It is from his plays that our young men in Germany form their first ideas of England and the English nation, and in admiring and loving him we have learnt to admire and to love you who may proudly call him your own. And it is right that this should be so. As the height of the Alps is measured by Mont Blanc, let the greatness of England be measured by the greatness of Shakespeare. Great nations make great poets, great poets make great nations. Happy the nation that possesses a poet like Shakespeare. Happy the youth of England whose first ideas of this world in which they are to live are taken from his pages. The silent influence of Shakespeare's poetry on millions of young hearts in England,

in Germany, in all the world, shows the almost super-human power of human genius. If we look at that small house, in a small street of a small town of a small island, and then think of the world-embracing, world-quickenings, world-ennobling spirit that burst forth from that small garret, we have learnt a lesson and carried off a blessing for which no pilgrimage would have been too long. Though the great festivals which in former days brought together people from all parts of Europe to worship at the shrine of Canterbury exist no more, let us hope, for the sake of England, more even than for the sake of Shakespeare, that this will not be the last Shakespeare festival in the annals of Stratford-on-Avon. In this cold and critical age of ours the power of worshipping, the art of admiring, the passion of loving what is great and good are fast dying out. May England never be ashamed to show to the world that she can love, that she can admire, that she can worship the greatest of her poets. May Shakespeare live on in the love of each generation that grows up in England? May the youth of England long continue to be nursed, to be fed, to be reprov'd and judg'd by his spirit! With that nation—that truly English, because truly Shakespearean, nation—the German nation will always be united by the strongest sympathies; for, superadded to their common blood, their common religion, their common battles and victories, they will always have in Shakespeare a common teacher, a common benefactor, and a common friend.'

BACON IN GERMANY¹.

‘**I**F our German Philosophy is considered in England and in France as German dreaming, we ought not to render evil for evil, but rather to prove the groundlessness of such accusations by endeavouring ourselves to appreciate, without any prejudice, the philosophers of France and England, such as they are, and doing them that justice which they deserve; especially as, in scientific subjects, injustice means ignorance.’ With these words M. Kuno Fischer introduces his work on Bacon to the German public; and what he says is evidently intended, not as an attack upon the conceit of French, and the insularity of English philosophers, but rather as an apology which the author feels that he owes to his own countrymen. It would seem, indeed, as if a German was bound to apologise for treating Bacon as an equal of Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. Bacon’s name is never mentioned by German writers without some proviso that it is only by a great stretch of the meaning of the word, or by courtesy, that he can be called a philosopher. His philosophy,

¹ ‘Franz Baco von Verulam. Die Realphilosophie und ihr Zeitalter, Von Kuno Fischer. Leipzig. Brockhaus. 1856.

it is maintained, ends where all true philosophy begins; and his style or method has frequently been described as unworthy of a systematic thinker. Spinoza, who has exercised so great an influence on the history of thought in Germany, was among the first who spoke slightly of the inductive philosopher. When treating of the causes of error, he writes, 'What he (Bacon) adduces besides, in order to explain error, can easily be traced back to the Cartesian theory; it is this, that the human will is free and more comprehensive than the understanding, or, as Bacon expresses himself in a more confused manner, in the forty-ninth aphorism, 'The human understanding is not a pure light, but obscured by the will.' In works on the general history of philosophy, German authors find it difficult to assign any place to Bacon. Sometimes he is classed with the Italian School of natural philosophy, sometimes he is contrasted with Jacob Boehme. He is named as one of the many who helped to deliver mankind from the thralldom of scholasticism. But any account of what he really was, what he did to immortalise his name, and to gain that prominent position among his own countrymen which he has occupied to the present day, we should look for in vain even in the most complete and systematic treatises on the history of philosophy published in Germany. Nor does this arise from any wish to depreciate the results of English speculation in general. On the contrary, we find that Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are treated with great respect. They occupy well-marked positions in the progress of philosophic thought. Their names are

written in large letters on the chief stations through which the train of human reasoning passed before it arrived at Kant and Hegel. Locke's philosophy took for a time complete possession of the German mind, and called forth some of the most important and decisive writings of Leibniz; and Kant himself owed his commanding position to the battle which he fought and won against Hume. Bacon alone has never been either attacked or praised, nor have his works, as it seems, even been studied very closely by Germans. As far as we can gather, their view of Bacon and of English philosophy is something as follows. Philosophy, they say, should account for experience; but Bacon took experience for granted. He constructed a cyclopaedia of knowledge, but he never explained what knowledge itself was. Hence philosophy, far from being brought to a close by his 'Novum Organon,' had to learn again to make her first steps immediately after his time. Bacon had built a magnificent palace, but it was soon found that there was no staircase in it. The very first question of all philosophy, How do we know? or, How can we know? had never been asked by him. Locke, who came after him, was the first to ask it, and he endeavoured to answer it in his 'Essay concerning Human Understanding.' The result of his speculations was, that the mind is a *tabula rasa*, that this *tabula rasa* becomes gradually filled with sensuous perceptions, and that these sensuous perceptions arrange themselves into classes, and thus give rise to more general ideas or conceptions. This was a step in advance; but there was again one thing taken for granted by Locke—the

perceptions. This led to the next step in English philosophy, which was made by Berkeley. He asked the question, What are perceptions? and he answered it boldly — ‘Perceptions are the things themselves, and the only cause of these perceptions is God.’ But this bold step was in reality but a bold retreat. Hume accepted the results both of Locke and Berkeley. He admitted with Locke, that the impressions of the senses are the source of all knowledge; he admitted with Berkeley, that we know nothing beyond the impressions of our senses. But when Berkeley speaks of the cause of these impressions, Hume points out that we have no right to speak of anything like cause and effect, and that the idea of causality, of necessary sequence, on which the whole fabric of our reasoning rests, is an assumption; inevitable, it may be, yet an assumption. Thus English philosophy, which seemed to be so settled and positive in Bacon, ended in the most unsettled and negative scepticism in Hume; and it was only through Kant that, according to the Germans, the great problem was solved at last, and men again knew *how* they knew.

From this point of view, which we believe to be that generally taken by German writers of the historical progress of modern philosophy, we may well understand why the star of Bacon should disappear almost below their horizon. And if those only are to be called philosophers who inquire into the causes of our knowledge, or into the possibility of knowing and being, a new name must be invented for men like him, who are concerned alone with the realities of knowledge. The two are antipodes—they inhabit two distinct hemispheres of thought. But German Ideal-

ism, as M. Kuno Fischer says, would have done well if it had become more thoroughly acquainted with its opponent:—

‘And if it be objected,’ he says, ‘that the points of contact between German and English philosophy, between Idealism and Realism, are less to be found in Bacon than in other philosophers of his kind, that it was not Bacon, but Hume, who influenced Kant; that it was not Bacon, but Locke, who influenced Leibniz; that Spinoza, if he received any impulse at all from those quarters, received it from Hobbes, and not from Bacon, of whom he speaks in several places very contemptuously, I answer, that it was Bacon whom Des Cartes, the acknowledged founder of dogmatic Idealism, chose for his antagonist. And as to those realistic philosophers who have influenced the opposite side of philosophy in Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant, I shall be able to prove that Hobbes, Locke, Hume, are all descendants of Bacon, that they have their roots in Bacon, that without Bacon they cannot be truly explained and understood, but only be taken up in a fragmentary form, and, as it were, plucked off. Bacon is the creator of realistic philosophy. Their age is but a development of the Baconian germs; every one of their systems is a metamorphosis of Baconian philosophy. To the present day, realistic philosophy has never had a greater genius than Bacon, its founder; none who has manifested the truly realistic spirit that feels itself at home in the midst of life, in so comprehensive, so original and characteristic, so sober, and yet at the same time so ideal and aspiring a manner; none, again, in whom the limits of this spirit stand out in such distinct and

natural relief. Bacon's philosophy is the most healthy, and quite inartificial expression of Realism. After the systems of Spinoza and Leibniz had moved me for a long time, had filled, and, as it were, absorbed me, the study of Bacon was to me like a new life, the fruits of which are gathered in this book.'

After a careful perusal of M. Fischer's work, we believe that it will not only serve in Germany as a useful introduction to the study of Bacon, but that it will be read with interest and advantage by many persons in England who are already acquainted with the chief works of the philosopher. The analysis which he gives of Bacon's philosophy is accurate and complete; and, without indulging in any lengthy criticisms, he has thrown much light on several important points. He first discusses the aim of his philosophy, and characterises it as Discovery in general, as the conquest of nature by man (*Regnum hominis, interpretatio naturae*). He then enters into the means which it supplies for accomplishing this conquest, and which consist chiefly in experience:—

'The chief object of Bacon's philosophy is the establishment and extension of the dominion of man. The means of accomplishing this we may call culture, or the application of physical powers toward human purposes. But there is no such culture without discovery, which produces the means of culture; no discovery without science, which understands the laws of nature; no science without natural science; no natural science without an interpretation of nature; and this can only be accomplished according to the measure of our experience.'

M. Fischer then proceeds to discuss what he calls

the negative or destructive part of Bacon's philosophy (*pars destruens*)—that is to say, the means by which the human mind should be purified and freed from all preconceived notions before it approaches the interpretation of nature. He carries us through the long war which Bacon commenced against the idols of traditional or scholastic science. We see how the *idola tribus*, the *idola specus*, the *idola fori*, and the *idola theatri*, are destroyed by his iconoclastic philosophy. After all these are destroyed, there remains nothing but uncertainty and doubt; and it is in this state of nudity, approaching very nearly to the *tabula rasa* of Locke, that the human mind should approach the new temple of nature. Here lies the radical difference between Bacon and Des Cartes, between Realism and Idealism. Des Cartes also, like Bacon, destroys all former knowledge. He proves that we know nothing for certain. But after he has deprived the human mind of all its imaginary riches, he does not lead it on, like Bacon, to a study of nature, but to a study of itself as the only subject which can be known for certain, *Cogito, ergo sum*. His philosophy leads to a study of the fundamental laws of knowing and being, that of Bacon enters at once into the gates of nature, with the innocence of a child (to use his own expression) who enters the kingdom of God. Bacon speaks, indeed, of a *Philosophia prima* as a kind of introduction to Divine, Natural, and Human Philosophy; but he does not discuss in this preliminary chapter the problem of the possibility of knowledge, nor was it with him the right place to do so. It was destined by him as a 'Receptacle for all such profitable observations and axioms as fall not

within the compass of the special parts of philosophy or sciences, but are more common, and of a higher stage. He mentions himself some of these axioms, such as—‘*Si inaequalibus aequalia addas, omnia erunt inaequalia ;*’ ‘*Quae in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se conveniunt ;*’ ‘*Omnia mutantur, nil interit.*’ The problem of the possibility of knowledge would generally be classed under metaphysics ; but what Bacon calls *Metaphysique* is, with him, a branch of philosophy treating only on Formal and Final Causes, in opposition to *Physique*, which treats on Material and Efficient Causes. If we adopt Bacon’s division of philosophy, we might still expect to find the fundamental problem discussed in his chapter on Human Philosophy ; but here, again, he treats man only as a part of the continent of Nature, and when he comes to consider the substance and nature of the soul or mind, he declines to enter into this subject, because ‘the true knowledge of the nature and state of soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance.’ There remains, therefore, but one place in Bacon’s cyclopaedia where we might hope to find some information on this subject—namely, where he treats on the faculties and functions of the mind, and in particular, of understanding and reason. And here he dwells indeed on the doubtful evidence of the senses as one of the causes of error so frequently pointed out by other philosophers. But he remarks that, though they charged the deceit upon the senses, their chief errors arose from a different cause, from the weakness of their intellectual powers, and from the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. And he then points to what

is to be the work of his life,—an improved System of invention, consisting of the *Experientia Literata*, and the *Interpretatio Naturae*.

It must be admitted, therefore, that one of the problems which has occupied most philosophers—nay, which, in a certain sense, may be called the first impulse to all philosophy—the question whether we can know anything, is entirely passed over by Bacon ; and we may well understand why the name and title of philosopher has been withheld from one who looked upon human knowledge as an art, but never inquired into its causes or credentials. This is a point which M. Fischer has not overlooked ; but he has not always kept it in view, and in wishing to secure to Bacon his place in the history of philosophy, he has deprived him of that more exalted place which Bacon himself wished to occupy in the history of the world. Among men like Locke, Hume, Kant, and Hegel, Bacon is, and always will be, a stranger. Bacon himself would have drawn a very strong line between their province and his own. He knows where their province lies, and if he sometimes speaks contemptuously of formal philosophy, it is only when formal philosophy has encroached on his own ground, or when it breaks into the enclosure of revealed religion, which he wished to be kept sacred. There, he holds, the human mind should not enter, except in the attitude of the Semnones, with chained hands.

Bacon's philosophy could never supplant the works of Plato and Aristotle, and though his method might prove useful in every branch of knowledge—even in the most abstruse points of logic and metaphysics—yet there has never been a Baconian school of

philosophy, in the sense in which we speak of the school of Locke or Kant. Bacon was above or below philosophy. Philosophy, in the usual sense of the word, formed but a part of his great scheme of knowledge. It had its place therein, side by side with history, poetry, and religion. After he had surveyed the whole universe of knowledge, he was struck by the small results that had been obtained by so much labour, and he discovered the cause of this failure in the want of a proper method of investigation and combination. The substitution of a new method of invention was the great object of his philosophical activity; and though it has been frequently said that the Baconian method had been known long before Bacon, and had been practised by his predecessors with much greater success than by himself or his immediate followers, it was his chief merit to have proclaimed it, and to have established its legitimacy against all gainsayers. M. Fischer has some very good remarks on Bacon's method of induction, particularly on the *instantiæ prærogativæ* which, as he points out, though they show the weakness of his system, exhibit at the same time the strength of his mind, which rises above all the smaller considerations of systematic consistency, where higher objects are at stake.

M. Fischer devotes one chapter to Bacon's relation to the ancient philosophers, and another to his views on poetry. In the latter, he naturally compares Bacon with his contemporary, Shakespeare. We recommend this chapter, as well as a similar one in a work on Shakespeare by Gervinus, to the author of the ingenious discovery that Bacon was the real

author of Shakespeare's plays. Besides an analysis of the constructive part of Bacon's philosophy, or the *Instauratio Magna*, M. Fischer gives us several interesting chapters, in which he treats of Bacon as an historical character, of his views on religion and theology, and of his reviewers. His defence of Bacon's political character is the weakest part of his work. He draws an elaborate parallel between the spirit of Bacon's philosophy and the spirit of his public acts. Discovery, he says, was the object of the philosopher—success that of the politician. But what can be gained by such parallels? We admire Bacon's ardent exertions for the successful advancement of learning, but, if his acts for his own advancement were blameable, no moralist, whatever notions he may hold on the relation between the understanding and the will, would be swayed in his judgment of Lord Bacon's character by such considerations. We make no allowance for the imitative talents of a tragedian, if he stands convicted of forgery, nor for the courage of a soldier, if he is accused of murder. Bacon's character can only be judged by the historian, and by a careful study of the standard of public morality in Bacon's times. And the same may be said of the position which he took with regard to religion and theology. We may explain his inclination to keep religion distinct from philosophy by taking into account the practical tendencies of all his labours. But there is such a want of straightforwardness, and we might almost say, of real faith, in his theological statements, that no one can be surprised to find that, while he is taken as the representative of orthodoxy by some, he has been attacked by others as the most dangerous

and insidious enemy of Christianity. Writers of the school of De Maistre see in him a decided atheist and hypocrite.

In a work on Bacon, it seems to have become a necessity to discuss Bacon's last reviewer, and M. Fischer therefore breaks a lance with Mr. Macaulay. We give some extracts from this chapter (page 358 *seq.*), which will serve, at the same time, as a specimen of our author's style:—

‘Mr. Macaulay pleads unconditionally in favour of practical philosophy, which he designates by the name of Bacon, against all theoretical philosophy. We have two questions to ask—1. What does Mr. Macaulay mean by the contrast of practical and theoretical philosophy, on which he dwells so constantly? and 2. What has his own practical philosophy in common with that of Bacon?’

‘Mr. Macaulay decides on the fate of philosophy with a ready formula, which, like many of the same kind, dazzles by means of words which have nothing behind them—words which become more obscure and empty, the nearer we approach them. He says—Philosophy was made for Man, not Man for Philosophy. In the former case it is practical; in the latter, theoretical. Mr. Macaulay embraces the first, and rejects the second. He cannot speak with sufficient praise of the one, nor with sufficient contempt of the other. According to him, the Baconian philosophy is practical—the pre-Baconian, and particularly the ancient philosophy, theoretical. He carries the contrast between the two to the last extreme, and he places it before our eyes, not in its naked form, but veiled in metaphors, and in well-chosen figures of

speech, where the imposing and charming image always represents the practical, the repulsive, the theoretical form of philosophy. By this play he carries away the great mass of people, who, like children, always run after images. Practical philosophy is not so much a conviction with him, but it serves him to make a point; whereas theoretical philosophy serves as an easy butt. Thus the contrast between the two acquires a certain dramatic charm. The reader feels moved and excited by the subject before him, and forgets the scientific question. His fancy is caught by a kind of metaphorical imagery, and his understanding surrenders what is due to it. . . . What does Mr. Macaulay mean in rejecting theoretical philosophy, because philosophy is here the object, and man the means; whereas he adopts practical philosophy, because man is here the object, and philosophy the means? What do we gain by such comparisons, as when he says that practical and theoretical philosophy are like works and words, fruits and thorns, a high-road and a treadmill? Such phrases always remind us of the remark of Socrates—They are said indeed, but are they well and truly said? According to the strict meaning of Mr. Macaulay's words, there never was a practical philosophy; for there never was a philosophy which owed its origin to practical considerations only. And there never was a theoretical philosophy, for there never was a philosophy which did not receive its impulse from a human want, that is to say, from a practical motive. This shows where playing with words must always lead. He defines theoretical and practical philosophy in such a manner that his definition is

inapplicable to any kind of philosophy. His antithesis is entirely empty. But if we drop the antithesis, and only keep to what it means in sober and intelligible language, it would come to this—that the value of a theory depends on its usefulness, on its practical influence on human life, on the advantage which we derive from it. Utility alone is to decide on the value of a theory. Be it so. But who is to decide on utility? If all things are useful which serve to satisfy human wants, who is to decide on our wants? We take Mr. Macaulay's own point of view. Philosophy should be practical; it should serve man, satisfy his wants, or help to satisfy them; and if it fails in this, let it be called useless and hollow. But if there are wants in human nature which demand to be satisfied, which make life a burden unless they are satisfied, is that not to be called practical which answers to these wants? And if some of them are of that peculiar nature that they can only be satisfied by knowledge, or by theoretical contemplation, is this knowledge, is this theoretical contemplation not useful—useful even in the eyes of the most decided Utilitarian? Might it not happen that what he calls theoretical philosophy seems useless and barren to the Utilitarian, because his ideas of men are too narrow? It is dangerous, and not quite becoming, to lay down the law, and say from the very first, "You must not have more than certain wants, and therefore you do not want more than a certain philosophy!" If we may judge from Mr. Macaulay's illustrations, his ideas of human nature are not very liberal. "If we were forced," he says, "to make our choice between the first shoemaker and Seneca, the

author of the books on Anger, we should pronounce for the shoemaker. It may be worse to be angry than to be wet. But shoes have kept millions from being wet; and we doubt whether Seneca ever kept anybody from being angry." I should not select Seneca as the representative of theoretical philosophy, still less take those for my allies whom Mr. Macaulay prefers to Seneca, in order to defeat theoretical philosophers. Brennus threw his sword into the scale in order to make it more weighty. Mr. Macaulay prefers the awl. But whatever he may think about Seneca, there is another philosopher more profound than Seneca, but in Mr. Macaulay's eyes likewise an unpractical thinker. And yet in him the power of theory was greater than the powers of nature and the most common wants of man. His meditations alone gave Socrates his serenity when he drank the fatal poison. Is there, among all evils, one greater than the dread of death? And the remedy against this, the worst of all physical evils, is it not practical in the best sense of the word? True, some people might here say, that it would have been more practical if Socrates had fled from his prison, as Criton suggested, and had died an old and decrepit man in Bœotia. But to Socrates it seemed more practical to remain in prison, and to die as the first witness and martyr of the liberty of conscience, and to rise from the sublime height of his theory to the seats of the Immortals. Thus it is the want of the individual which decides on the practical value of an act or of a thought, and this want depends on the nature of the human soul. There is a difference between individuals in different ages, and there is a difference in their wants. . . . As

long as the desire after knowledge lives in our hearts, we must, with the purely practical view of satisfying this want, strive after knowledge in all things, even in those which do not contribute towards external comfort, and have no use except that they purify and invigorate the mind. . . . What is theory in the eyes of Bacon? "A temple in the human mind, according to the model of the world." What is it in the eyes of Mr. Macaulay? A snug dwelling, according to the wants of practical life. The latter is satisfied if knowledge is carried far enough to enable us to keep ourselves dry. The magnificence of the structure, and its completeness according to the model of the world, is to him useless by-work, superfluous and even dangerous luxury. This is the view of a respectable ratepayer, not of a Bacon. Mr. Macaulay reduces Bacon to his own dimensions, while he endeavours at the same time to exalt him above all other people. . . . Bacon's own philosophy was, like all philosophy, a theory; it was the theory of an inventive mind. Bacon has not made any great discoveries himself. He was less inventive than Leibniz, the German metaphysician. If to make discoveries be practical philosophy, Bacon was a mere theorist, and his philosophy nothing but the theory of practical philosophy. . . . How far the spirit of theory reached in Bacon may be seen in his own works. He did not want to fetter theory, but to renew and to extend it to the very ends of the universe. His practical standard was not the comfort of the individual, but human happiness, which involves theoretical knowledge. . . . That Bacon is not the Bacon of Mr. Macaulay. What Bacon wanted was new, and it will

be eternal. What Mr. Macaulay and many people at the present day want, in the name of Bacon, is not new, but novel. New is what opposes the old, and serves as a model for the future. Novel is what flatters our times, gains sympathies, and dies away. . . . And history has pronounced her final verdict. 'It is the last negative instance which we oppose to Mr. Macaulay's assertion. Bacon's philosophy has not been the end of all theories, but the beginning of new theories—theories which flowed necessarily from Bacon's philosophy, and not one of which was practical in Mr. Macaulay's sense. Hobbes was the pupil of Bacon. His ideal of a State is opposed to that of Plato on all points. But one point it shares in common—it is as unpractical a theory as that of Plato. Mr. Macaulay, however, calls Hobbes the most acute and vigorous spirit. If, then, Hobbes was a practical philosopher, what becomes of Mr. Macaulay's politics? And if Hobbes was not a practical philosopher, what becomes of Mr. Macaulay's philosophy, which does homage to the theories of Hobbes?'

We have somewhat abridged M. Fischer's argument, for, though he writes well and intelligibly, he wants condensation; and we do not think that his argument has been weakened by being shortened. What he has extended into a volume of nearly five hundred pages, might have been reduced to a pithy essay of one or two hundred, without sacrificing one essential fact, or injuring the strength of any one of his arguments. The art of writing in our times is the art of condensing; and those who cannot condense write only for readers who have more time at their disposal than they know what to do with.

Let us ask one question in conclusion. Why do all German writers change the thoroughly Teutonic name of Bacon into Baco? It is bad enough that we should speak of Plato; but this cannot be helped. But unless we protest against Baco, *gen.* Baconis, we shall soon be treated to Newto, Newtonis, or even to Kans, Kantis.

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